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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 The Scope of the Project 
 In three places in the Corinthian correspondence the apostle Paul uses metaphorical 
temple language to define the identity of his readers. In 1 Cor 3:16 and 6:19 they are described as 
a temple in which God’s Spirit dwells and in 2 Cor 6:16 Paul includes himself with his readers as 
“the temple of the living God”.1 While Paul uses cultic language metaphorically in a number of 
his letters,2 only when writing to the Corinthians does Paul use metaphorical temple language 
repeatedly to shape the identity of his audience.3 For Paul, a former Pharisee (Phil 3:5; cf. Acts 
23:6; 26:5), the image of the temple had primary reference to the temple in Jerusalem: the place 
where God had promised to dwell, where worshippers longed to meet with God and where his 
glory had dwelt (1 Kgs 9:3; 2 Chr 5:14; 7:1; Ps 26:8; 43:3) and one day might dwell again (Ezek 
43–48).   
 However, his audience came from very different backgrounds. There are clear indicators 
that the majority of the readers were Gentiles (1 Cor 6:9–11; 8:7; 12:2). As residents of a very 
cosmopolitan and pluralistic city, Corinth, they would have been exposed to a variety of 
religious, cultural and philosophical influences, such as Roman temples to various gods and the 
feasts held there on various social and religious occasions, the presence of the Imperial cult, the 
bi-annual Isthmian games, the customs of Roman law, and the behavior of sophists and their 
                                                
 1 Though some manuscripts are closer in content to 1 Cor 3:16–17, substituting the personal pronoun 
“ὑμεῖς” for “ἡμεῖς”. This issue will be addressed in Chapter Four when the passage is explored in detail. 
 2 E.g. “living sacrifices” in Rom 12:1; the “priestly service of the gospel . . . the offering of the Gentiles” in 
Rom 15:16; “to be poured out as a drink offering upon the sacrificial offering of your faith” in Phil 2:17 and “a 
fragrant offering, a sacrifice acceptable and pleasing to God” in Phil 4:18. See Nijay K. Gupta, Worship That Makes 
Sense to Paul: A New Approach to the Theology and Ethics of Paul’s Cultic Metaphors (BZNW 175; Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2010), for a survey of all the possible cultic metaphors in the Pauline corpus. Gupta assigns each 
potential cultic metaphor one of three categories: “certain”, “almost certain” or “probable”.  
 3 Among the disputed Paulines, though, the image also appears in Eph 2:19–22. 
 2 
followers, among others.4 While Paul clearly had no hesitation in using OT traditions and 
expecting his audience to understand his allusions (e.g. 1 Cor 5:7–8 and 10:1–13), how would 
such temple language have spoken to them in the context of Corinth itself?  
 Of all Paul’s letters, only 1 Corinthians contains a lengthy discussion of the temptations 
posed by idol food, especially the prospect of eating in or around local temples (8:1–11:1, 
especially 8:10; 10:14). This fact, at the very least, suggests that Paul’s metaphorical temple 
language would have pointedly contrasted with the reality of Corinth with its many temples.5 
How would this language have compared with the Corinthians’ understanding of temples prior to 
their conversion? What would have been the chief influences on the thinking of the Corinthians 
when they read Paul’s metaphorical temple language?6 The evidence of 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 draws 
our attention to the religious influences in Corinth and the many opportunities to consume idol 
food in temple settings. This is clearly an important background for understanding the social and 
cultural context of the audience and relates to 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19 and 2 Cor 6:16. However, 1 Cor 
8:1–11:1 does not use metaphorical temple language and because this background to Paul’s 
                                                
 4 See e.g. Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000), 1–12; Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 7–25; and more generally, various essays in Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and 
James C. Walters, Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society (NovTSup 134; Leiden: Brill, 
2010).  
 5 See the many essays that deal with this subject in Idem, Corinth; Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. 
Friesen, Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches (HTS 53; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Divinity School, 2005), and Winter, Corinth, 269–86, and more recently in e.g. John R Lanci, A New Temple for 
Corinth: Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to Pauline Imagery (Studies in Biblical Literature 1; New 
York: Peter Lang, 1997), 89–113; Gregory Stevenson, Power and Place: Temple and Identity in the Book of 
Revelation (BZNW 107; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), 37–114; and Yulin Liu, Temple Purity in 1-2 Corinthians 
(WUNT 2/ 343; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2013), 70–105. 
 6 Cf. Stevenson, who addresses the question of how temple imagery in Revelation would have 
communicated to a mixed cultural audience in Asia Minor (Power, 3) and considers Paul’s use of temple language 
in 1–2 Corinthians to provide an analogy to his study of Revelation (Power, 19).   
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discussion has been covered so extensively in numerous articles and published monographs, 
particularly in the last twenty years, it will not be the focus of my discussion.7  
 It has long been recognized that in order to interpret Paul’s letters to the Corinthians, 
scholars need to understand the behaviors and ideas to which Paul is reacting. These have been 
conveyed to Paul before the writing of First Corinthians by the Corinthians themselves (e.g. 1 
Cor 7:1) and in reports which Paul has received from others (e.g. 1 Cor 1:11; 5:1). As Gordon 
Fee writes, “As former pagans they brought to the Christian faith a Hellenistic worldview and 
attitude toward ethical behavior.”8 However, this worldview was not communicated exclusively 
or perhaps even primarily through religious practices. Temples were public buildings that were 
set aside for individuals to offer sacrifices, not places for congregations to worship corporately, 
as in modern churches. Cult practices, though clearly communicating a certain worldview 
implicitly, did not express doctrine in a formal way.9 Rather, philosophy provided the kind of 
theological guidance for faith and practice that Paul sought to impart to the Corinthians. Everett 
Ferguson writes, “The various schools provided the worldview and practical guidance for life 
that religion does for many today. A person did not normally go to the priest of the local cult for 
                                                
 7 Published monographs include Wendell L. Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 
Corinthians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985); Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food: 1 
Corinthians 8–10 in Its Context (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993); Paul Douglas Gardner, 
The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8–11:1 (Lanham. Md.: 
University Press of America, 1994); Khiok-Khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal 
Analysis with Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic (BibInt 9; Leiden: Brill, 1995); 
Derek Newton, Diety and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth (JSNTSup 169; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998); A. T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy (JSNTSup 
176; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); Joop F. Smit, “About the Idol Offerings”. Rhetoric, Social Context 
and Theology of Paul’s Discourse in First Corinthians 8:1–11:1 (CBET 27; Leuven: Peeters, 2000); John 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-
11:1 (WUNT 2/ 151; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2003); Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority. A Study 
of 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1 in the Light of the Jewish Diaspora (JSNTSup 299; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), and 
Michael Li-Tak Shen, Canaan to Corinth (Studies in Biblical Literature 83; New York: Peter Lang, 2010). 
 8 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 23.   
 9 See James B. Rives, Religion in the Roman Empire (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007).  
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an interpretation of the nature of reality or for moral advice. One turned more often than not to a 
philosopher for an answer to these questions . . . Some even saw philosophy as bringing a kind of 
conversion and cleansing of the soul.”10  
 Some, however, have questioned the relevance of Hellenistic philosophy as an 
appropriate background to the Corinthian church, such as Dale B. Martin who writes, “ancient 
philosophers — who represent a tiny fraction of the population — cannot be used to reconstruct 
views of the broader population.”11 As one leading scholar of Hellenistic philosophy puts it in his 
introduction to the field, “In the period covered by this book philosophy became thoroughly 
institutionalized and practically synonymous with higher education.”12 Although few members 
of the Corinthian church might have had higher education, those who did were more influential 
members socially and may have exerted disproportionate influence on the church (for instance as 
owners of the homes in which churches met and/or as patrons of the church). However, the issue 
is not necessarily whether the Corinthians were especially well-educated, or were philosophers, 
whether they were capable of reading philosophical works or whether there is evidence of them 
doing so. Rather, the influence of Hellenistic philosophy was pervasive in the first century; its 
ideas trickled down to influence the thought-world of those who may never have read the 
original works.13 In this respect, Joseph Fitzmyer, a leading scholar in the study of 1 Corinthians, 
writes,  
                                                
 10 Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 320–21 and see 
also Robert L. Wilken, “Toward a Social Interpretation of Early Christian Apologetics,” CH 39.4 (1970): 437–58 at 
444.  
 11 Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 6; cited with approval 
by Alistair Scott May, The Body for the Lord: Sex and Identity in 1 Corinthians 5-7 (JSNTSup 278; London: T&T 
Clark, 2004), 159.  
 12 Idem, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 13.  
 13  As A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (London: Duckworth, 1974), 12, 
notes “Epicureans and Stoics were prepared to popularize their teaching. In his Letter to Herodotus . . . Epicurus 
opens by remarking that he has prepared an epitome of his philosophy for those unable to study his technical 
writings.”  
 5 
Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians seems at times to be coping with secular thinking 
among the members of the Christian community there, thinking that is at times akin to 
Epicurean teaching, Stoic tenets, and the rhetoric of the Sophists. That elements of such 
popular Greek philosophy and secular education were affecting the Christians of Corinth, 
along with the Roman culture that predominated, is to be expected, because of the 
heritage of Greek culture and philosophy that would have been there.14  
  
Some older studies have, perhaps, tainted this field of research by placing great emphasis on the 
influences of, say, Stoicism in shaping Paul’s own theology.15 However, distancing ourselves 
from this approach (as I do), should not lead us to neglect the ways in which Paul may have 
deliberately addressed an audience influenced by these world views. N. T. Wright makes a 
telling point here, “if Paul did not derive the central themes and categories of his proclamation 
from the themes and categories of pagan thought, that doesn’t mean he refused to make any use 
of such things. Indeed, he revels in the fact that he can pick up all kinds of things from his 
surrounding culture and make them serve his purposes – much as philosophers of his day could 
quote rival schools in order to upstage or refute them.”16 Some NT scholars have explored the 
relationship between Hellenistic philosophy and Paul’s writings in general.17 Others have 
examined the relationship between Hellenistic philosophy (Stoicism in particular) and First 
                                                
 14 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 32; 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 30–31.   
 15 The study of Wenschkewitz, explored below, being a prime example.  
 16 N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 201.  
 17 Notably Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989); 
Abraham L. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” ANRW 26.1: 267–333; Troels Engberg-
Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2000); and more generally in J. Paul 
Sampley, ed., Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2003). 
See now the history of research presented in Nathan J. Barnes, Reading 1 Corinthians with Philosophically 
Educated Women (Eugene, Oreg.: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 4–28.  
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Corinthians in relation to various topics.18 Others have set the scene for such a comparison in 
relation to my topic. Everett Ferguson performed an invaluable service with his 1980 article on 
“Spiritual Sacrifice in Early Christianity and Its Environment”, but since it is so wide ranging, it 
is necessarily brief and deals only with metaphorical sacrifice language, not with the language of 
temples.19 In any case, Ferguson surveys the use of this language in closed categories (such as 
“Greek and Roman Poets and Philosophers”, “Judaism”, “New Testament” etc.); it is not within 
his purview to attempt a comparison between the NT and other backgrounds. With these 
questions in mind, I shall provide an overview of key works from the past century that have 
addressed Paul’s use of temple language. In particular, I shall explore what light these works 
have shed on the relationship between Paul’s language and Hellenistic Philosophy. 
 
1.2 History of Research 
 My review of works on Paul’s metaphorical temple language is necessarily limited by 
constraints of space. With this in mind, my discussion will focus on a sample of what I consider 
the most significant contributions, which will be supplemented by brief references to other 
related studies, where appropriate. I shall provide a summary and critique of each work, but my 
review of each author will be skewed towards their coverage of the possible backgrounds to the 
metaphorical temple language, since that is the particular interest of my own study.20 I have 
                                                
 18 Such as Will Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7 
(2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004; Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ (SNTSMS 137; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Albert V. Garcilazo, The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics 
(Studies in Biblical Literature 106; New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 
 19 Everett Ferguson, “Spiritual Sacrifice in Early Christianity and Its Environment,” ANRW 23:2: 1151–81; 
see especially 1152–56. 
 20 Most of the works I will consider have already been reviewed from a variety of angles in e.g. Lanci, 
Temple, 7–14; Albert L.A. Hogeterp, Paul and God’s Temple: A Historical Interpretation of Cultic Imagery in the 
Corinthian Correspondence (Biblical Tools and Studies 2; Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 2–22; Martin Vahrenhorst, 
Kultische Sprache in den Paulusbriefen (WUNT 230; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2008), 10–16; Timothy Wardle, 
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divided these key studies into three categories that will help us to see more clearly each author’s 
understanding of the relationship between Paul, his audience, and the backgrounds to the 
imagery. Firstly, I shall explore the works that focus on the author and emphasize his 
dependence on a particular milieu. I shall note that this was a trend in earlier studies, many of 
whose conclusions have since been rejected by contemporary scholarship. Secondly, I shall 
discuss a number of works that argue that Paul was not dependent on a specific milieu, but rather 
drew on common tenets of Judaism. Because this is a relatively uncontroversial position, it is 
unsurprising that both older and more recent works have taken this stance. Finally, I shall note a 
newer trend. In my third category, I observe that the majority of more recent interpreters have 
turned their attention not so much to the influences on Paul himself, but to the way he uses 
temple imagery to address the religious and cultural milieu of his audience.  
  
1.2.1 Author-focused approaches:  The dependence of Paul on his milieu 
1.2.1.1 Hans Wenschkewitz (1932) 
 The earliest significant modern studies on Paul’s temple language concentrated solely on 
Paul’s own background and influences. The first of these was the seminal work of Hans 
Wenschkewitz21 which, although now over eighty years old, still forms the starting point for 
modern discussions of this topic, since it proved so influential in the decades that followed.22 To 
                                                
The Jerusalem Temple and Early Christian Identity (WUNT 2/ 291; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2010), 5–8; Gupta, 
Worship, 9–26; Liu, Purity, 3–9. 
 21 Hans Wenschkewitz, Die Spiritualisierung der Kultusbegriffe: Tempel, Priester und Opfer im Neuen 
Testament (Angelos Beihefte 4; Liepzig: Eduard Pfeiffer, 1932). 
 22 Discussed by, among others, R. J. McKelvey, The New Temple: The Church in the New Testament 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 42–43; E. Schüssler Fiorenza, “Cultic Language in Qumran and in the 
New Testament,” CBQ 38 (1976): 159-77 at 159–61; Michael Newton, The Concept of Purity at Qumran and in the 
Letters of Paul (SNTSMS 53; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 8; Lanci, Temple, 9–11; Hogeterp, 
Temple, 2–8; Wardle, Temple, 5; Gupta, Worship, 9–11; Liu, Purity, 3.  
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his credit, Wenschkewitz devoted more space to the relationship between Paul and Hellenistic 
philosophy than perhaps any other discussion up to the present day,23 but he sought it in the 
wrong place. Wenschkewitz’s thesis is devoted to his concept of Spiritualisierung 
(spiritualization). He contends that the objects of the cult were increasingly spiritualized in an 
evolutionary process whose origins lie in the OT itself but culminate in the writings of Paul. 
According to Wenschkewitz, from the Maccabean period onwards, the law began to supplant the 
temple as the most prominent focus of Judaism, even before the destruction of the temple in 70 
C.E.24 Wenschkewitz distinguished between a naive spiritualization represented by the OT and 
subsequent Jewish writings of the Diaspora, and a reflective spiritualization exemplified in the 
doctrine of the individual as the temple of God, which can be found in Stoic teaching and the 
writings of Philo. It was the genius of Paul to fuse these two distinct notions and combine them 
in his doctrine of the community as temple.25 However, the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls in 
1947, subsequent to Wenschkewitz’s study, demonstrated that other communities originating in 
Palestinian Judaism could use metaphorical temple language, particularly in relation to their 
communities. This finding obviated the need for an explanation outside of Judaism (such as Stoic 
thought), a fact that R. J. McKelvey was one of the first to note.26 To be fair to Wenschkewitz, he 
                                                
 23 Wenschkewitz, Spiritualisierung, 49–67 deals with Stoic philosophy and 67–87 with Philo of 
Alexandria, and discusses some key references to the notion of the divine dwelling in the soul/mind of the 
individual, see e.g. Idem, Spiritualisierung, 58.  
 24 Idem, Spiritualisierung, 22f. 
 25 Idem, Spiritualisierung, 116: “So ergibt sich also, daß die Spiritualisierung des Tempelbegriffes bei 
Paulus in stoischen Gedankenkreisen ihren Ursprung hat.” (So is it is clear, therefore, that the spiritualization of the 
temple concept in Paul has its source in the circles of Stoic thought.) 
 26 McKelvey, Temple, 42–43, 56, 104, 122; also Newton, Purity, 120;  Wardle, Temple, 5. M. Fraeyman, 
“La spiritualisation de l’Idée du Temple dans les Épîtres Pauliniennes,” ETL XXIII (1947):  378–412 at 410–11 had 
already observed the problems with Wenschkewitz’s thesis and postulated that Paul derived his conception of the 
spiritual temple from Judaism, not Hellenism, though Fraeyman was writing before the publication of the scrolls 
(also acknowledged by McKelvey, Temple, 56 note 1). Fraeyman, “Spiritualisation,” 398 also notes the contrasts 
between Paul and Platonic theories of the soul and body, but Fraeyman only relates a Pauline critique of Stoicism to 
the record of Paul’s speech in Acts 17:23–24 (Idem, “Spiritualisation,” 411).  
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does note that Paul’s doctrine of the temple of God as the community, not just the individual, and 
as the body, not only the soul, is radically different from Hellenistic philosophy and could not 
have been derived from it.27 Nevertheless, Wenschkewitz only thinks in terms of Paul 
appropriating a Greek concept. He does not explore the possibility that Paul may have intended 
to challenge or subvert the idea.28  
 
1.2.1.2 Bertil Gärtner (1965) 
 Bertil Gärtner, writing some thirty years after Wenschkewitz and following the 
publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls, appreciated the fresh light which the scrolls had cast on the 
background to aspects of NT doctrine which had previously been attributed to its Hellenistic 
heritage.29 Gärtner’s studies led him to take an approach that was essentially identical to 
Wenschkewitz, though his conclusions were precisely the opposite. Like Wenschkewitz, Gärtner 
claimed that Paul was dependent on his milieu and strongly emphasized the parallels between 
Paul and his sources, on which he was dependent.30 However, for Gärtner, Paul’s source was 
Qumran theology, and Gärtner alludes to Hellenistic Judaism only in order to dismiss it, but 
makes no reference to the relationship between Paul, his audience and the temple language in 
                                                
 27 Wenschkewitz, Spiritualisierung, 111–13; e.g. in his comment at 112: “Weder in der Stoa, noch bei Philo 
treffen wir diesen Gedanken, denn hier war alles auf den Einzelnen, auf das Individuum eingestellt” (“Neither in the 
Stoics nor in Philo do we meet this idea, because here everything was tailored to the individual, for the individual.”), 
and at 165. This point is also recognized in the critiques by Fraeyman, “Spiritualisation,” 411 and Gupta, Worship, 
10.   
 28 Cf. the critique of Idem, Worship, 25, that Wenschkewitz does not consider Paul’s unique contribution. 
Similarly to Wenschkewitz, Hans-Josef Klauck, “Kultische Symbolsprache Bei Paulus,” in Freude am Gottesdienst. 
Aspekte ursprünglicher Liturgie (ed. J. Schreiner; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1983), 109 sees the 
Hellenistic understanding of the dwelling of God in the soul (citing Philo and a Pythagorean maxim) as the 
“vorbild” (model) for 1 Cor 3:16. 
 29 Bertil E. Gärtner, The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the New Testament: A Comparative 
Study in the Temple Symbolism of the Qumran Texts and the New Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965), x. 
 30 Idem, Temple, x–xi, 47–49, 49–60, 142. 
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Hellenistic philosophy.31 Instead, Gärtner’s study emphasizes parallels between the language of 
temple and priesthood in Qumran and the NT (occasionally playing down the role of a literal 
future temple in the Scrolls, which does not correspond with NT teaching),32 hypothesizing that 
former members of Qumran/the Essenes brought these traditions into the church.33 Like 
Wenschkewitz, Gärtner does not consider Paul’s own unique contribution, preferring to stress 
similarities between Qumran and traditions across the NT corpus. Gärtner does not consider the 
possibility that Paul’s communities and the Qumran community may occupy similar positions 
vis-à-vis Judaism without one necessarily being dependent upon the other for Temple imagery.34 
 
1.2.1.3 Georg Klinzing (1971) 
 Georg Klinzing’s study is much more focused on the Qumran community than the NT,35 
and presents a very thorough study of cultic language in a variety of texts from Qumran. 
Klinzing is critical of Wenschkewitz’s concept of Spiritualisierung and prefers the term 
Umdeutung (“Reinterpretation”) to describe how both Qumran and Paul appropriated cultic 
language in speaking of their respective communities.36 While Klinzing recognizes that both the 
Qumran and Christian communities share a belief that they are an eschatological community 
living in the last days, like Gärtner, Klinzing is certain that the source for Paul’s temple language 
                                                
 31 Idem, Temple, 47. 
 32 E.g. Idem, Temple, 21. 
 33 Idem, Temple, 139.  
 34 See also the reviews of McKelvey, Temple, 96–97 and Gupta, Worship, 14–15.  
 35 The brevity of the NT section is noted by Idem, Worship, 14.  
 36 Georg Klinzing, Die Umdeutung des Kultus in der Qumrangemeinde und im Neuen Testament (SUNT 7; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 143–47. See also the critiques of Wenschkewitz’s spiritualization 
thesis in J. C. Coppens, “The Spiritual Temple in the Pauline Letters and Its Background,” in Studia evangelica. Vol 
VI: Papers presented to the Fourth International Congress on New Testament Studies held at Oxford, 1969 (ed. 
Elizabeth A. Livingstone; TUGAL 112; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1973), 59, and Wolfram Strack, Kultische 
Terminologie in ekklesiologischen Kontexten in den Briefen des Paulus (BBB 92; Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 
1994), 8–9, 375–80, 391, 396. 
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is Qumran, “Wenn die christliche Gemeinde von sich selbst als dem Tempel spricht, kann kein 
Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß diese Vorstellung aus der Qumrangemeinde stammt.”37 Klinzing’s 
methodical analysis has certainly identified points of similarity between the writings of Qumran 
and Paul. However, his notion of Pauline dependence is only one way of interpreting the reason 
for the similarities (such as wider trends within Jewish literature and the similarities between the 
self-understandings of the two communities in relation to Judaism) and Klinzing plays down 
some key differences between the two sets of writings which make the “dependency” hypothesis 
harder to accept.38 Klinzing follows Gärtner in briefly referring to the Stoic and Philonic 
background espoused by Wenschkewitz, but only in order to dismiss it.39 Despite these 
assertions, in Klinzing’s brief discussion of 1 Cor 6:19, he considers it likely that Paul knew the 
Hellenistic conception of the soul as temple and chose to appropriate it in order to subvert it with 
his own Judeo-Christian understanding.40 Similarly, Joseph Coppens, though critical of both 
Gärtner and Klinzing, expresses a thought comparable to that of Klinzing, “is it impossible that 
the ideas about a spiritual worship which were so widely diffused in the world of Hellenism and 
of hellenistic Judaism also contributed to foster Paul’s thought?”41 This promising line of 
thought is not developed by either scholar and, in the case of Klinzing, stands in stark contrast 
with his conclusions. 
 
                                                
 37 Klinzing, Umdeutung, 210 (“If the Christian church speaks of itself as the temple, there can be no doubt 
about the fact that this idea comes from the Qumran community.”) For a more recent work which concurs with this 
judgment, see David Flusser, “The Dead Sea Sect and Pre-Pauline Christianity,” in Judaism and the Origins of 
Christianity (ed. David Flusser; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1988), 23–74, especially at 71–73. 
 38 See in particular the insightful questions and critique of Schüssler Fiorenza, “Language,” 164–65, and the 
analysis of Coppens, “Temple,” 62–65 in relation to both McKelvey and Gärtner. More recently, the differences 
between Qumran and Pauline thought are discussed by Strack, Terminologie, 272.  
 39 Klinzing, Umdeutung, 183–84. 
 40 Idem, Umdeutung, 184. 
 41 Coppens, “Temple,” 65. 
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1.2.1.4 Robert J. Daly (1978) 
 The work of Robert Daly should also be mentioned briefly in regard to the three scholars 
discussed above. Daly published two works on the origins of the Christian notion of sacrifice in 
the same year. On the one hand, Daly takes over the evolutionary model of Wenschkewitz to 
postulate a gradual spiritualizing of the notion of sacrifice, beginning in the OT and finding its 
fulfillment in Christian writings.42 On the other hand, Daly cites with approval Gärtner’s 
conclusions that the resemblance between the Qumran writings and the NT suggests a common 
background, “but also to indicate that some elements in the Qumran tradition were taken over by 
the early Church”43 Yet, returning to the topic of spiritualizing language which he notes in Philo 
and Intertestamental literature, he concludes, “Thus, where the same type of spiritualization 
appears in Qumran and the NT or Early Christian tradition, this is not necessarily an indication 
of dependence or direct connection”44 which appears very much at odds with his earlier 
comments. The four authors with whom I have engaged each focus on what is influencing Paul, 
whether Hellenistic thought or Qumran. Where the possibility is raised that Paul may be 
engaging critically with Hellenistic thought in order to address a Gentile audience, this thought is 
left undeveloped.    
 
1.2.2 Author-focused approaches: Paul’s appropriation of Jewish thought 
1.2.2.1 R. J. McKelvey (1969) 
 R. J. McKelvey’s work, as its titles indicates, engages with the topic of the new temple 
across the NT corpus, but gives significant coverage to both Jewish and Greco-Roman 
                                                
 42 Robert J. Daly, The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 136–38.  
 43 Idem, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background Before Origen (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1978), 158, and see also at 257, 260–61.  
 44 Idem, Sacrifice, 161. 
 13 
background to the theme. McKelvey pays careful attention to the exegesis of all the texts he 
examines, ranging from the OT, to Intertestamental texts, relevant Greek and Latin sources, and 
NT texts by a variety of authors. McKelvey finds the new temple theme in a variety of diverse 
backgrounds, yet while conceding Greek influence on Paul, he also attributes to Paul himself a 
“Hebraicizing and Christianizing” of the idea.45 McKelvey’s work is relatively uncontroversial 
because its analysis and conclusions are careful and balanced. For my purposes, I note that 
McKelvey gives more consideration to Paul’s engagement with Hellenistic philosophy than most 
other writers I will discuss. He recognizes the influence of the Hellenistic milieu on certain 
Jewish writings,46 and while acknowledging similarities with Qumran, notes differences and 
does not posit the dependence of Paul on the scrolls.47 He surveys a number of key philosophical 
texts by authors such as Epictetus and Seneca,48 as well as providing a summary of his main 
findings from Philo,49 noting, like Wenschkewitz, the difference between these writings and 
Paul, with his emphasis on community and body.50 McKelvey is to be commended for his 
engagement with a neglected area and his well reasoned conclusions, which stress the positive 
basis for Paul’s spiritualization (McKelvey’s term), which differ from the rationale of the Stoics 
and Philo on the one hand, and Qumran on the other. However, much more could be said, since 
his main discussion of Hellenistic philosophical writings is only four pages long. In passing, 
McKelvey refers to Qumran, the Stoics and Philo as Paul’s “mentors”,51 but does not address the 
possibility that Paul may be, not so much their student, but rather in dialogue with some of these 
works, perhaps in order to accentuate the differences between his conception and theirs.   
                                                
 45 McKelvey, Temple, 104. See also Idem, Temple, 42–43, 53, 55–57, 106–07, 179.  
 46 Idem, Temple, 44. 
 47 Idem, Temple, 47–53, 96–97. 
 48 Idem, Temple, 53–54. 
 49 Idem, Temple, 38–40, 54–55.  
 50 Idem, Temple, 55. 
 51 Idem, Temple, 122. 
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1.2.2.2 Michael Newton (1985) 
 Like the earlier works of Gärtner, Klinzing and Schüssler Fiorenza (discussed below), 
Michael Newton’s study concentrates on the relationship between Paul and Qumran, while 
focusing on the concept of purity.52 Newton’s main point is that previous studies by scholars 
such as Wenschkewitz, Fraeyman and McKelvey were so preoccupied by the question of Paul’s 
“spiritualization” of Jewish thought under the influence of Philo and the Stoics, that they missed 
the more obvious concern for temple purity that was common to all strands of Judaism and is 
rooted in the OT itself.53 For Paul, the temple image is not simply a useful metaphor but a 
concept that borrows from the temple practice of the OT and applies it to the Christian 
community.54 A careful study of purity language at Qumran and its application to the community 
reveals significant differences between Paul and the scrolls, so that, unlike at Qumran, specific 
rites are not applied to Paul’s churches and their “temple” does not reside in one geographical 
location.55 Paul’s temple language is not a “spiritualization” fusing Greek and Jewish thought, 
but rather an outworking of his concern for temple purity, which is applied differently from the 
OT in the light of the coming of Christ, his death and resurrection.56 Paul and Qumran shared 
much in common, but their application of purity language differs too, since one is not dependent 
on the other; instead both draw on common Jewish thinking which is applied differently in light 
of a different theological understanding.57 Because Newton notes that Paul’s starting point is 
different from that of Philo and the Stoics, particularly in his focus on community,58 he dismisses 
                                                
 52 Newton, Purity. 
 53 Idem, Purity, 1, 8. 
 54 Idem, Purity, 8, 58–59. 
 55 Idem, Purity, 53; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Language,” 163–64 also makes similar points.  
 56 Newton, Purity, 77–78, 97, 113–14.  
 57 Idem, Purity, 115–16. 
 58 Idem, Purity, 57. Idem, Purity, 57–58 is also influenced by R. Kempthorne, “Incest and the body of 
Christ, a study of 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,” NTS 14:4 (1968): 568-74 in arguing that the primary referent of 1 Cor 
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the evidence of these writings and simply does not consider how Paul’s language might have 
sounded to an audience who was aware of temple language used in Hellenistic philosophy.59  
 
1.2.2.3 Nijay Gupta (2010) 
 Nijay Gupta’s recently published dissertation focuses on the use of non-atonement 
metaphors in the undisputed Pauline epistles.60 One chapter is devoted to metaphor theory, in 
which Gupta elucidates a number of criteria which help him to assess the likelihood of having 
discovered a cultic metaphor along a continuum from “Certain” to “Probable”.61 Perhaps because 
Gupta is interested in Paul’s rhetorical strategy of using metaphor to reshape the way his 
audience thinks,62 he is particularly focused on Paul as author and less on the backgrounds of 
Paul’s audience. Gupta asks about Paul’s reason for innovating by his use of metaphor, the cultic 
context from which the metaphors originate and how his own role as apostle shapes the way he 
uses cultic metaphors.63 However, perhaps because of the necessary limits of his study he does 
not consider how the backgrounds of Paul’s Gentile audience might have influenced the way that 
Paul may have chosen to interact with those backgrounds. There are points in his monograph 
where Gupta hints at this issue. Gupta, noting the prevalence of cultic metaphors in 1 Corinthians 
compared to 1 Thessalonians, suggests that, “there were contextual or rhetorical reasons for the 
                                                
6:19 is corporate, rather than to the individual bodies of the Corinthians. Kempthorne’s argument will be reviewed 
in Chapter Four.  
 59 Lanci, Temple, 11–12 also questions Newton’s assumption that Paul would draw exclusively from Jewish 
cultic purity practices when writing to a Gentile audience.  
 60 Gupta, Worship,  
 61 Idem, Worship, 46–51. Although this is not noted by Gupta, the criteria are reminiscent of Richard Hays’ 
methodology to identify “echoes of scripture” in Paul; see Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of 
Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).  
 62 Gupta, Worship, 2–4.  
 63 Idem, Worship, 35.  
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extensive employment of cultic metaphors in the Corinthian epistle.”64 In his conclusions, Gupta 
argues that Paul’s focus was on what these cultic metaphors do in seeking to form the identity of 
his converts.65 Agreeing with the work of Francis Watson, Gupta stresses the need to consider 
Paul as a “social agent” and to take into account Paul’s deployment of metaphor in relation to 
groups, whether they be his converts, their opponents and/or his opponents.66 I would affirm all 
these points, but simply note that Gupta does not explore these contextual reasons in relation to 
Hellenistic philosophy. Not all of the primary sources cited by Gupta are listed in his index of 
sources, but a perusal of his index suggests that Gupta interacts with very few Greco-Roman 
sources, though he does interact extensively with Philo. Gupta’s conclusions certainly focus on 
the impact of Paul’s metaphors on his target audience, but seldom bring specific Hellenistic 
literature into the discussion.67 
 
1.2.3 Audience-focused approaches:   
Paul’s engagement with the religious and cultural milieu of Corinth 
 Finally, I turn my attention to works which exhibit perhaps a newer and growing trend: to 
consider the impact of Paul’s temple language on his audience, and therefore to pay much closer 
attention to the backgrounds of Paul’s audience than the mainly older studies I have so far 
discussed. This approach was hinted at in some older studies that I will mention in passing, but 
of the major works I will examine, only one predates the 1990s. 
                                                
 64 Idem, Worship, 84. 
 65 Idem, Worship, 205–209. 
 66 Idem, Worship, 218. 
 67 Space will not allow me to discuss the comprehensive overview of the “Biblical Theology” of temple 
found in Gregory K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of 
God (NSBT 17; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2004). Suffice it to say that Beale focuses squarely on the Jewish 
background to this canonical theme and is only concerned with the author’s perspective. Philo is referenced in 
various places but other Hellenistic authors are not discussed.  
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1.2.3.1 Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (1976) 
 Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s short article compared cultic language in Qumran and in 
the NT, while offering a searching analysis of the writings of Wenschkewitz and Klinzing.68 
Schüssler Fiorenza wants to move past the language of ‘spiritualization’, which she sees as too 
broad to be helpful. Instead, she argues that the term “transference” is more suitable, since it 
indicates the way that both Jewish as well as Hellenistic cultic concepts were taken up by the 
respective communities and applied to non-cultic realities.69 While some scholars have been 
dazzled by the similarities between the use of cultic language at Qumran and in Paul, Schüssler 
Fiorenza asks how to account for the differences, such that the community of the War Scroll does 
not describe itself as a temple, and the community as temple at Corinth do not adopt a 
hierarchical priesthood?70 Instead, Schüssler Fiorenza enquires after “the concrete situation and 
theological motives that in each community led to the transference of cultic language.”71 Her 
careful study of some obvious differences between the two indicate that whereas Qumran 
stressed “sectarian separation”, Paul was guided by, “the missionary situation of the early 
Church.”72 Schüssler Fiorenza makes the tantalizing comment that, “the NT writers evidence 
affinity not only to the language of Qumran but also to the concepts of religious propaganda in 
the Greco-Roman world”.73 While she notes that later Christian apologists developed this 
                                                
 68 Schüssler Fiorenza, “Language,” 159-77. 
 69 Idem, “Language,” 161.  
 70 Idem, “Language,” 163–64. Timothy Wardle, “Who is Sacrificing? Assessing the Early Christian 
Reticence to Transfer the Idea of the Priesthood to the Community,” in Ritual and Metaphor: Sacrifice in the Bible 
(ed. Christian A. Eberhart; SBLRBS 68; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 99–114 contends that early 
Christian documents were reticent to appropriate the language of priesthood for the church or its leaders, even 
metaphorically. Wardle’s argument depends heavily on a late dating for 1 Peter, on which there is no consensus. 
 71 Schüssler Fiorenza, “Language,” 161. 
 72 Idem, “Language,” 171, 177.  
 73 Idem, “Language,” 177. 
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understanding within their own context to reach those attracted by the philosophical schools of 
their time,74 she gives no indication of what she means by this sentence for Paul’s social and 
historical context.75 Her work raises the question of whether Paul’s missionary interest may have 
included a desire to speak in relevant philosophical language. However, since her focus is on the 
Qumran and Pauline communities and their relationships with their contexts, her point is left 
undeveloped and unexplored.76  
 
1.2.3.2 John R Lanci (1997) 
 John R. Lanci’s published dissertation, in stark contrast to the earlier author-focused 
works I examined, makes a number of bold claims at the outset, such as, “The goal is to 
construct a plausible reading of the text, rather than to discover the original intention of its 
author” and “I will nowhere discuss the original intention behind the argument”77 This assertion 
seems at odds with Lanci’s decision to employ rhetorical analysis, mentioned in the next 
paragraph,78 which, though a text-centered method concerned with the “intended effect upon the 
audience”,79 tacitly assumes intent on the part of an author.80 In any case, Lanci later defines the 
role of an interpreter of 1 Cor 3:16–17 as, “to examine the passage closely in terms of its wider 
                                                
 74 Idem, “Language,” 171, 177. 
 75 Cf. Bruce W. Winter, “Carnal Conduct and Sanctification in 1 Corinthians: Simul Sanctus Et Peccator?,” 
in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New Testament (ed. Kent E. Brower and Andy Johnson; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2007), 191 who is suggestive in the way he relates the Corinthians’ worldview to philosophical schools 
such as Epicureanism. I shall explore this topic in Chapters 2, 4 and 5.  
 76 Cf. C. F. D. Moule, “Sanctuary and Sacrifice in the Church of the New Testament,” JTS 1:1 (1950): 29–
41 at 29, 39 who avers that Paul's apologetic interest may have led him to address the objections of both “Jews and 
pagans” who objected to the absence of temple, priesthood and sacrifice in Christianity. Strack, Terminologie, 380, 
392 also suggests that Paul may have used cultic categories in order to communicate the gospel to Gentiles.   
 77 Lanci, Temple, 3, italics in the original.  
 78 Idem, Temple, 3.  
 79 David E. Aune, The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and 
Rhetoric (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 416. 
 80 Cf. a similar critique made by Gupta, Worship, 19. 
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purpose in Paul’s rhetorical arguments in 1 Corinthians”.81 It is difficult to discern a clear 
difference between “intention” (which Lanci claims not to discuss) and “purpose” (which he 
does) and this tension is left unresolved.   
 Nevertheless, Lanci confronts the question of what Paul’s reference to a temple may have 
evoked when writing to a largely Gentile audience.82 Lanci is critical of most previous studies 
which assumed that Paul’s referent was the Jerusalem temple; this does not explain for Lanci 
why Paul would use this concept for a predominantly Gentile audience.83 Lanci is certainly right 
to say that the Jerusalem temple might not be the sole referent for Paul’s audience,84 and so 
devotes a chapter to Roman Corinth, which includes some examination of the various temples 
that would have been found there.85 However, Lanci’s main interest is in Paul’s “construction 
language”, noting the frequent use of words with the root οἰκοδομ- in the letter (e.g. 1 Cor 3:9; 
8:1, 10; 10:23; 14:3, 4, 5, 12, 17, 26) and Paul's self characterization as an ἀρχιτέκτων (master 
builder) in 1 Cor 3:10,86 as well as Lanci’s assumption that the Erastus of Rom 16:23 (probably 
written from Corinth) is the same aedile as the one referred to in the ‘Erastus inscription’.87 
Lanci’s distinctive contribution is to contend that building construction and renovation was a 
                                                
 81 Lanci, Temple, 18. Elsewhere Lanci refers to the passage’s “purpose” (123) and Paul’s “goal” (134).  
 82 Idem, Temple, 3. A topic also pursued more briefly by Christfried Böttrich, ““Ihr Seid Der Tempel 
Gottes”: Tempelmetaphorik Und Gemeinde Bei Paulus,” in Gemeinde ohne Tempel: Zur Substituierung und 
Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und seines Kults im Alten Testament, antiken Judentum und frühen 
Christentum (ed. Beate Ego, Armin Lange, and Peter Pilhofer; WUNT 118; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1999), 411–
25.  
 83 Lanci, Temple, 9–10. Although I note that Paul is not shy of using OT allusions and citations when 
writing to the Corinthians in places such as 1 Cor 1:19; 2:9, 16; 3:19–20; 5:7; 6:16; 9:9, 13; 10:1–10, 26; 14:21; 
15:26, 32, 45, 54–55; 2 Cor 3:1–18; 4:13; 6:2; 6:16–18; 8:15; 9:9; 10:17; 11:3 etc., see the observation of David 
Horrell, review of John R Lanci, A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to Pauline 
Imagery, JTS 50 (1999): 708–11 at 711, as also noted by Gupta, Worship, 19.   
 84 Lanci, Temple, 9–10. 
 85 Idem, Temple, 25–43.  
 86 Idem, Temple, 58–60, 77–78.  
 87 Idem, Temple, 34. This has been subsequently challenged by Steven J. Friesen, “The Wrong Erastus,” in 
Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society (ed. Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and 
James C. Walters; NovTSup 134; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 231–56 as also noted by Liu, Purity, 7.   
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major part of life in first century Corinth,88 and that this explains Paul’s use of construction 
imagery. Lanci ties this in to Margaret Mitchell’s argument (which he adopts) that 1 Corinthians 
is a deliberative letter with 1 Cor 1:10 as its thesis statement and that Paul’s overriding intention 
is to bring about unity by urging his audience to pursue the common good.89 
 Lanci is doubtless correct to detect an emphasis on unity and building up for the common 
good in 1 Corinthians, and to observe the connection between building imagery in 1 Cor 3:9–10 
and the temple imagery in 1 Cor 3:16–17. However, at times Lanci’s thesis threatens to subsume 
Paul’s stated purpose for using temple imagery under a more general intent related to building 
imagery. According to Lanci, Paul identifies the Corinthians with a building in 1 Cor 3:9–10  
“because of the community-defining role of some temples in Greco-Roman society”.90 Yet 
Paul’s comment on this imagery concerns the indwelling presence of God’s spirit and the 
sanctity of this temple and is substantiated with the reason “For God’s temple is holy, and you 
are that temple” (1 Cor 3:17). Again, Lanci avers that “The temple is a secondary image and is 
not the primary one with which Paul characterizes the community” nor is Paul’s purpose “to 
define the community as a new temple” but rather to combat dissension through construction 
imagery.91 Undoubtedly, many different images are used to describe the community in the 
Corinthian correspondence (such as the body in 1 Cor 12–14), but to view the temple imagery as 
non-defining seems strange in view of Paul’s repeated use of it when addressing the Corinthians 
                                                
 88 Lanci, Temple, 33–34, although some of the evidence is rather circumstantial and hypothetical such as 
Lanci’s contention that “there must have been many people living there who were associated with construction 
activity directly or indirectly” (33), despite the fact that we “cannot easily confirm the presence of these people by 
means of archaeological records (33–34), and yet Lanci suggests that “one may safely assume that laborers . . . . 
lived there” (34), which is reiterated on Idem, Temple, 76; my italics.  
 89 Idem, Temple, 45–56, following  Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An 
Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1991). 
 90 Lanci, Temple, 89. 
 91 Idem, Temple, 125.  
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(including 2 Cor 6:14–7:1), and when Lanci concedes that cultic imagery is prevalent throughout 
First Corinthians.92 Overall, Lanci interacts with an impressive range of primary and secondary 
sources and identifies one possible background for a major theme in 1 Corinthians, but in doing 
so he tends to overplay the allusions to building imagery and community formation and 
downplays Paul’s concern for purity and holiness. Paul’s own interest in the Jerusalem temple as 
his background is also neglected.93 
 From the perspective of my topic, Lanci’s correct assumption that, “Paul was capable of 
interacting with the wider culture around him”94 should include the question of metaphorical 
temple imagery used in Hellenistic philosophy, and Lanci notes the use of this language in the 
philosophers,95 but because there are no clear parallels to the use of this image in community 
contexts, Lanci moves on to discuss the Dead Sea Scrolls. Lanci quite correctly contends that, 
“when attempting to explain how Paul uses the temple image, we must investigate how people in 
Corinth understood temples, be they Jewish, Greek, or Roman”96 but this investigation could be 







                                                
 92 Idem, Temple, 128.  
 93 See Horrell, review of Lanci, and Gupta, Worship, 16–19 for similar critiques.  
 94 Lanci, Temple, 6.  
 95 Idem, Temple, 13.  
 96 Idem, Temple, 90. 
 22 
1.2.3.3 J. Ayodeji Adewuya (2003, 2007) 
 J. Ayodeji Adewuya’s published dissertation97 and subsequent article98 draw attention to 
the neglected theme of communal holiness in the Corinthian epistles, and helpfully situates 2 Cor 
6:14–7:1 within this wider concern of Paul’s for his readers. Much of Adewuya’s analysis and 
conclusions are relatively uncontroversial, so my review will centre on what is most relevant for 
my topic. Adewuya’s monograph raises important questions at the outset like, “What are the 
differences in Paul’s thought world and that of his audience? For example, what is the 
significance of the temple imagery both to the Jews and Gentiles in Corinth?”99 He rightly 
contends, “the question of influences and backgrounds should not always be restricted to the 
writer. It must include the readers as well”100 with particular attention paid to “features of the 
Greco-Roman moral and religious climate in Corinth”.101 A section on religious pluralism 
observes that Corinth, “maintained many ties with Greek religion, philosophy and the arts. 
Consequently, the faith of the Corinthians was considerably influenced by a Hellenistic world-
view and attitude toward moral behavior.”102 I note that Adewuya specifically cites the influence 
of philosophy but the section in which these words are found addresses matters of social culture 
(individualism), socio-economic factors and the role of temples in Corinth (where he summarizes 
Lanci) but says nothing about the philosophical climate.103 Adewuya’s subsequent article on the 
general theme of holiness in 2 Corinthians reuses his words cited above, almost word for word, 
                                                
 97 J. Ayodeji Adewuya, Holiness and Community in 2 Cor 6:14-7:1: Paul’s View of Communal Holiness in 
the Corinthian Correspondence (Studies in Biblical Literature; New York: Peter Lang, 2003).  
 98 Idem, “The People of God in a Pluralistic Society: Holiness in 2 Corinthians,” in Holiness and 
Ecclesiology in the New Testament (ed. Kent E. Brower and Andy Johnson; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 201–
18. 
 99 Idem, Holiness, 6.  
 100 Idem, Holiness, 77.  
 101 Idem, Holiness, 78. 
 102 Idem, Holiness, 85.  
 103 See Idem, Holiness, 77–87, and see further 110–15 on temples in Corinth.  
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but, similarly, the following section makes no reference to philosophy but addressees religious 
pluralism, and in addition refers to the influence of the imperial cult in relation to temples.104 
Adewuya is asking the right questions but though his frequent references to Paul’s “Hellenistic 
milieu”105 allude to Hellenistic philosophy, this topic is nowhere discussed. 
 
1.2.3.4 Albert L. A. Hogeterp (2006) 
 Albert L. A. Hogeterp’s substantial monograph is a greatly extended version of his Ph.D. 
dissertation. He focuses on Paul’s use of cultic imagery in 1–2 Corinthians in their historical 
context,106 and so devotes a number of chapters to setting Paul’s imagery in various historical 
and cultural contexts before dealing with each letter in turn. In light of this concern with 
historical context, it is interesting to note that Hogeterp cites, with approval, Schüssler Fiorenza’s 
contention that Paul “creates” a rhetorical situation which cannot be equated with the historical 
situation, and, “With this distinction in mind, Paul’s cultic imagery cannot be aligned with a 
presupposed idea of the historical context”.107 Hogeterp has in view the presupposed historical 
context presented by Wenschkewitz especially, although arguably Wenschkewitz was simply 
articulating a hypothesis based on his understanding of the literary and historical evidence, just 
as Hogeterp is trying to do. Hogeterp’s “historical interpretation” addresses the question, “What 
does Paul’s cultic imagery signify in view of Paul’s gospel mission to the Diaspora?”108 which 
would seem to focus on Paul’s engagement with the Hellenistic world; whether he is speaking to 
                                                
 104 Idem, “People,” 202–03. 
 105 E.g. Idem, Holiness, 6, 78, 86–87. 
 106 Hogeterp, Temple, 1. 
 107 Idem, Temple, 16, citing Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical 
Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 138–140. 
 108 Hogeterp, Temple, 22. 
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Jews or Gentiles. Hogeterp repeatedly speaks of the importance of relating Paul’s cultic imagery 
to the original readers’ own context, bearing in mind that his converts included both Jews and 
Greeks (citing 1 Cor 1:22–24).109 These contexts are often described using the terms “cultic” and 
“religious”.110 Hogeterp does hint at a philosophical context when noting objections that may 
have been raised to Paul’s gospel message, “that these objections may be of a philosophical, 
reasoned nature appears to be confirmed by the prominence of the theme of wisdom, σοφία, that 
is worldly wisdom as opposed to God’s wisdom in 1 Cor 1:17–2:13.”111 However, aside from a 
brief reference to Greek philosophies described by Josephus,112 Hogeterp does not explore this 
question any further. In his exegesis of 1 Cor 6:18–20, Hogeterp notes parallels from pagan 
contexts such as Valerius Maximus 4.7 ext. 1 and passages from Philo. However, because of the 
obvious emphasis on the communal and bodily aspect of the metaphor in Paul, Hogeterp 
dismisses these parallels as relevant background,113 rather like Gärtner and Newton before him. 
After perhaps the most extensive discussion available of Paul’s cultic imagery, Hogeterp’s work 
lacks a strong thesis114 but concludes that the Temple imagery is used to teach the Corinthians a 
holy way of life by drawing strict boundaries.115 Hogeterp’s work on Jewish historical 
background in general and Qumran in particular is thorough, but despite allusions to the 




                                                
 109 E.g. Idem, Temple, 297, 300, 301. 
 110 E.g. Idem, Temple, 272, 297.  
 111 Idem, Temple, 310.  
 112 Idem, Temple, 311, citing Josephus, Ag. Ap. 2.168.  
 113 Idem, Temple, 342–44. 
 114 cf. Gupta, Worship, 21 for a similar conclusion.   
 115 Hogeterp, Temple, 383–85.  
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1.2.3.5 Martin Vahrenhorst (2008) 
 Martin Varenhort’s published Habilitation thesis takes a broader approach than the works 
previously discussed, since Varenhorst’s interest extends beyond cultic imagery to cultic 
language more generally. He is concerned with the use of cultic issues with predominantly 
Gentile addressees and so examines Paul’s use of certain purity words in relation to 
Hellenism.116 Varenhorst is unconvinced by studies that detect a critique of the temple in Paul’s 
use of cultic language. Rather, Varenhorst contends that Paul uses cultic terminology positively 
to address his audience’s context,117 though, like Lanci, Varenhorst does not think that Paul has 
the Jerusalem temple exclusively in mind, since the audience were more familiar with the reality 
of idol temples in the city in which they lived.118 Although Varenhorst calls attention to the 
Greek conception of clean and unclean in both philosophical as well as religious contexts,119 in 
practice his study focuses its attention on the use of cultic language on inscriptions on temples 
and in their vicinity in order to see how the use of the same language would have struck Paul’s 
readers.120 He does not engage much with the philosophical context, although both Philo and 
Seneca are briefly discussed in relation to 1 Cor 3:16–17.121 Ultimately, because Varenhorst 
limits his detailed study to cultic language in relation to literal practice, the philosophical 
background is not his focus. 
 
 
                                                
 116 Vahrenhorst, Sprache, 1.  
 117 Idem, Sprache, 13, agreeing with Strack, Terminologie, 8–9. 
 118 Vahrenhorst, Sprache, 13, 15. 
 119 Idem, Sprache, 14.  
 120 Idem, Sprache, 16, though Gupta, Worship, 24, questions whether conclusions can be drawn from 
temple inscriptions that use certain words which were already common in Hellenistic Jewish literature, while, on the 
other hand, Paul does not use certain cultic terms that were common in non-Jewish literature.  
 121 Vahrenhorst, Sprache, 151–52.  
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1.2.3.6 Timothy Wardle (2010) 
 Timothy Wardle’s published dissertation differs from those discussed in this section, in 
that, while Wardle is focused on the milieu of Paul’s audience, his concern is with the Jewish 
background. Wardle’s thesis is a bold one, and envisages a provocative and polemical agenda on 
the part of Paul, “the decision to proclaim the Christian community as a temple was a bold and 
calculated move that held particular cultural currency in the first century C.E. It was a culturally 
recognizable way to register dissent. Moreover, the decision to construct an alternative temple in 
Jerusalem, in the shadow of the sanctuary that dominated the skyline of Jerusalem, held 
potentially explosive socio-religious consequences.122 In order to establish his thesis, Wardle 
looks at “patterns of dissent” in Jewish literature, in particular in the construction of temples as 
alternatives to the one in Jerusalem, especially by discussing the Samaritan and Leontoplis 
temples and the Qumran community’s understanding of itself as a rival temple.123 Wardle’s 
monograph is very well written and researched and certainly establishes his thesis vis-à-vis the 
temples discussed and may have some relevance to the evidence of certain texts in the gospels.124   
 However, when applied to Paul’s writings, Wardle’s thesis becomes problematic. He 
asserts, “if I am correct that the formation of alternative temples was the result of specific 
instances of conflict with the Jerusalem establishment, then it stands to reason that the early 
Christian temple ideology was borne of similar convictions.”125 However, it does not “stand to 
reason” on the basis of the evidence from Paul’s letters, nor is there evidence of Paul or his 
community’s, “reaction to the chief priests’ involvement in the crucifixion of Jesus and their 
                                                
 122 Wardle, Temple, 3.  
 123 Idem, Temple, 4, and see 30–165. 
 124 For which, see Idem, Temple, 166–91.  
 125 Idem, Temple, 10.  
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continued hostility toward the early Christian leadership in Jerusalem.”126 Of course though 
neither Paul nor the early Christian communities built rival temples, Wardle can point to the 
example of Qumran, whose understanding of the community as a temple could rival that of the 
Jerusalem temple.127 However, since Wardle accepts the evidence of Acts that the early 
Christians continue to participate in Jerusalem temple worship (e.g. Acts 2:46; 3:1), this would 
seem to be damaging to his thesis.128 Comparisons with Qumran might seem to provide the 
strongest warrant for Wardle's thesis in relation to the Pauline communities. In fact, though, in 
Wardle's discussion of 1 Cor 3:16–17 and 2 Cor 6:16–18, he explicitly acknowledges that Paul’s 
transference of temple language did not appear to be rooted in a denigration of the Jerusalem 
cult, nor to involve a concept of the community providing for atonement of sins, unlike at 
Qumran.129 When the prevalence of references to temple imagery is noted across multiple strands 
of the NT as well in a variety of contexts for Paul’s churches (Wardle deals with Gal 2:9;130 1 
Cor 3:16–17; 6:19; 2 Cor 6:16–18; Eph 2:19–22; 1 Pet 2:4–10 and Rev 3:12), it becomes 
difficult to argue that all of them are united in a polemical witness against the Jerusalem 
priesthood. This is especially problematic when the authors are addressing Christian 
                                                
 126 Idem, Temple, 10.  
 127 Idem, Temple, 139–62, especially p. 159. The question of whether this notion was uniformly held across 
the relevant scrolls will be discussed below.   
 128 Idem, Temple, 11. While I shall note below disagreement over the evidence for the Essenes’ offering of 
sacrifices in or around the temple, nobody is arguing that they participated in temple worship to the same degree as 
everyone else. 
 129 Idem, Temple, 210–11. Dr Fredrick J. Long, in personal correspondence, has pointed out the possibility 
of connecting Paul’s critique of the rulers who crucified Jesus in 1 Cor 2:6 (which could include the Jewish Temple 
establishment) with temple replacement imagery in 1 Cor 3:16. However, Wardle does not make that connection and 
in fact the first passage that he deals with in the letter is 1 Cor 3:9–15.    
 130 Idem, Temple, 207–10 argues that “στῦλοι” in Gal 2:9 refers to the role of James, Cephas and John as 
pillars in the new eschatological temple, consisting of Christians (with e.g. Richard Bauckham, “James and the 
Jerusalem Church,” in The Book of Acts in Its Palestinian Setting (The Book of Acts in Its First Century Setting 4; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995) 415–80.). However, the connotation is ambiguous, and Paul’s audience might 
equally have taken it to mean something like “pillars of the community”, the more common figurative sense, in the 
absence of explicit temple imagery in context, according to Craig S. Keener, “The Pillars and the Right Hand of 
Fellowship in Galatians 2.9,” JGRChJ 7 (2010): 51–58. 
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communities far from Jerusalem whose membership may be predominantly or at least partly 
Gentiles (such as the readers at Corinth and the recipients of 1 Peter and Ephesians), who, unlike 
the Qumran community, had little interest in the Jerusalem priesthood and cult.131 Wardle 
concedes that, although Paul’s primary referent may be the Jerusalem temple, the metaphor may 
speak to Gentiles converted to Christianity who had been displaced from their own temples.132 
Wardle does make brief reference to the relevance of Philo’s understanding of the divine 
indwelling of the mind,133 but otherwise the philosophical context is not considered because of 
his very strongly focused thesis in relation to the Jerusalem temple. 
 
1.2.3.7 Yulin Liu (2013) 
 Yulin Liu’s recently published Ph.D. dissertation seeks to fill a lacuna, claiming that, 
“there is no specific work on linking temple and purity in the Corinthian letters”.134 Liu’s 
objective is to understand Paul’s use of temple and purity language in context by relating Paul’s 
message to the context of both Judaism and the Greco-Roman world.135 Liu rightly notes that the 
historical situation of Corinth and the wider Greco-Roman world as well as the implied 
audience’s likely response to Paul's concern for temple purity needs to be taken into account.136 
What follows is a very thorough study of both of these contexts, but Liu’s distinctive 
contribution lies in his study of three cults whose temples were found in Corinth (Apollo, Isis 
                                                
 131 A similar point concerning Wardle’s handling of the various texts is made by Robert S. Snow, review of 
Timothy Wardle, The Jerusalem Temple and Early Christian Identity, BBR 22.2 (2012): 304–05 at 305. 
 132 Wardle, Temple, 222, citing Stevenson, Power, 179.  
 133 Wardle, Temple, 213.  
 134 Liu, Purity, 3, although I note that Michael Newton does address this very issue, while dealing more 
broadly with the letters of Paul.   
 135 Idem, Purity, 3, 9.  
 136 Idem, Purity, 9–10, 116.  
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and Asklepios)137 and in his reading of particular passages through the lens of temple purity 
(especially 1 Cor 5 and 7). Liu does occasionally engage with Hellenistic philosophical 
literature. His discussion of Philo’s metaphorical temple language is brief.138 His reference to 
Somn. 1.149 specifically relates Philo’s exhortation to his own soul to become the dwelling place 
of God to Liu’s own discussion of Israel as the temple of God, which does not seem to be the 
immediate context in Philo,139 although evidence from Philo is also treated in a number of other 
places.140 Liu does directly relate Philo’s assertion that the body is the “sacred temple for a 
reasonable soul” (Opif. 1.137) to 1 Cor 6:19 but merely describes Paul’s metaphor as a “similar 
idea” without noting key differences.141 Liu also treats the teaching of Epictetus on the 
indwelling of god, but his discussion summarizes Luke Timothy Johnson’s work, including the 
same citation of a text number that is not found in the Loeb Classical Library edition: Disc. 
1.14.69.142 To be fair to Liu, his comprehensive treatment of temple purity demonstrates wide 
reading in a variety of disciplines and for my purposes exhibits a commendable attention to the 
Greco-Roman world of Paul’s audience, but because the focus is temple purity language, the 
metaphorical use of temple imagery in philosophical texts is only discussed in passing. 
 It seems then, that in the many works that have appeared over a number of decades, none 
have sought to review the use of metaphorical temple language in Hellenistic writers in a 
                                                
 137 Idem, Purity, 70–105. 
 138 Idem, Purity, 117. 
 139 Idem, Purity, 117. 
 140 For instance Idem, Purity, 62–65 devotes more space to the subject of temple purity in Philo, and again 
in relation to 1 Cor 6:15–20 in Idem, Purity, 155, and in relation to the priesthood in Idem, Purity, 166–67. 
 141 Idem, Purity, 155. See also the critique of S. Aaron Son, “Temple Purity in 1-2 Corinthians,” Review of 
Biblical Literature 11 (2013): No Pages. Cited 28 August. Online: 
http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/9192_10133.pdf. Online: http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/9192_10133.pdf on this 
point.  
 142 Liu, Purity, 118–19, following Luke Timothy Johnson, Among the Gentiles: Greco-Roman Religion and 
Christianity (AYBRL; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 73. Johnson’s citation of the words of Epictetus 
clearly come from Disc. 1.14.6 (there are only seventeen verses in the Loeb text). Liu, Purity, 81 also alludes to the 
concept of the body as a metaphorical sacred vessel, citing Robert Parker, Miasma: Pollution and Purification in 
Early Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 144–45, 213 as evidence.     
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comprehensive way and to compare the philosophy of these writers with the temple theology of 
Paul in 1–2 Corinthians. 
 
1.3 Temple Imagery in Inter-Testamental Judaism 
 Before proceeding with my study of metaphorical temple language in Hellenistic 
philosophical writings, I shall briefly survey the most significant references to such language in 
two places; firstly, its use in the Dead Sea Scrolls, which has been widely documented, and 
secondly, its use in the Pseudepigrapha and Apocrypha, which is less frequent and therefore has 
attracted less attention. 
 
1.3.1 Metaphorical Temple Language in the Dead Sea Scrolls 
 The Dead Sea Scrolls exhibit a profound concern for temple purity, and purity language 
pervades the literature. However, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine my interest to those 
passages which most obviously speak of priesthood, sacrifice or temple language in a 
metaphorical sense.143 The Rule of the Community contains perhaps the single highest 
concentration of such language. Firstly, atonement is available in the community, yet not through 
literal sacrifices but by the spirit of God and through the obedience of the worshiper,  
For it is by the spirit of the true counsel of God that are atoned the paths of man, all his 
iniquities, so that he can look at the light of life. And it is by the holy spirit of the 
community, in its truth, that he is cleansed of all his iniquities. And by the spirit of 
uprightness and of humility his sin is atoned. And by the compliance of his soul with all 
                                                
 143 Fragments which simply repeat the same words used in other, longer, extant works will not be listed. 
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the laws of God his flesh is cleansed by being sprinkled with cleansing waters and being 
made holy with the waters of repentance.144  
1QS V, 5–6 and VIII, 3–4, 10 also speak of atonement for the community through lives lived in 
holiness.145 Similarly, 1QS IX, 4–5 speaks of atonement through spiritual sacrifices, pointedly 
expressed as, “without the flesh of burnt offerings and without the fats of sacrifice”. Instead the 
sacrifices are right speech/praise and behavior, “the offering of the lips in compliance with the 
decree will be like the pleasant aroma of justice and the perfectness of behavior will be accepted 
like a freewill offering”.146 CD XI, 20–21 changes the wording of Prov 15:8 (The sacrifice of the 
wicked is an abomination to the LORD, but the prayer of the upright is his delight) to give it a 
distinctly cultic flavor, thus depicting prayer as a spiritual sacrifice, “the sacrifice of the wicked 
ones is an abomination, but the prayer of the just ones is like an agreeable offering”. Similarly 
11Q5 XVIII, 9–12 reads, “The person who gives glory to the Most High is accepted like one 
who brings an offering, like one who offers rams and calfs, like one who makes the altar greasy 
with many holocausts, like the sweet fragrance from the hand of just ones.”147 1QS VIII, 1–10 is 
one of the clearest passages in the scrolls to speak of the community in terms reminiscent of the 
temple, “the Community council shall be founded on truth, to be an everlasting plantation, a holy 
                                                
 144 1QS III, 6–9; cf. also 1QS III, 4, 9–12. All translations are taken from Florentino García Martínez and 
Eibert J.C. Tigchelaar, eds., The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition. 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997–1998). 
Michael A. Knibb, The Qumran Community (Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian 
World 200BC to AD200 2; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 92–93 understands ‘spirit’ in lines 6, 7 
and 8 to refer “to the disposition of the individual”, though a variant reading in lines 7b–8a refers to “his spirit of 
holiness”, which would then picture the spirit as God’s spirit, which he has given to the community. Eyal Regev, 
“Abominated Temple and a Holy Community: The Formation of the Notions of Purity and Impurity in Qumran,” 
DSD 10.2 (2003):  243–78 explores a possible reason for righteous behavior functioning as a means of atonement at 
Qumran. 
 145 Though I should note that the scrolls also contain examples of God making atonement for sin, e.g. 1QS 
II, 8; CD II, 5; as cited by Knibb, The Qumran Community, 93. 
 146 1QS XI, 4–5; see also 1QS X, 6, 8, 14 for “the offering of lips”, and cf. 4Q265 7 II, 7–10. 
 147 A very similar wording is also found in Ps 154:10–11 (11QPsa 154) and Ps 154:10–11 (5ApocSyrPs 2) 
of the Pseudepigrapha.  
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house for Israel and the foundation of the holy of holies for Aaron . . . This the tested rampart, 
the precious cornerstone . . . the most holy dwelling for Aaron . . . in order to offer a pleasant 
aroma; and it will be a house of perfection and truth in Israel”148 and similar language is used in 
1 QS IX, 6–7, “the Community shall set apart a holy house for Aaron, in order to form a most 
holy community, and a house of the Community for Israel” and in 1 QS XI, 8–9, “He unites their 
assembly to the sons of the heavens in order (to form) the council of the Community and a 
foundation of the building of holiness to be an everlasting plantation throughout all future 
ages.”149 The most striking, and disputed passage,150 is found in 4QFlor I, 6–7 which is rendered 
by Martínez and Tigchelaar, as “And he commanded to build for himself a temple of man, to 
offer him in it, before him, the works of thanksgiving.”  
 Before I move on, I should note two other types of imagery that may be related to the 
notion of community as temple. Firstly, some scrolls speak of the community as a plantation 
(e.g. 1QS VIII, 5; XI,8; CD I,7; 1QH XV, 19; XVI, 5, 6, 9, 10)151 which is associated with a 
garden and its streams, sometimes related to Eden itself (cf. 1QH XIV, 15–17; XVI, 5–7, 9–
11).152 Eden was often pictured as the first sanctuary.153 Secondly, the reference to “Lebanon” as 
                                                
 148 1QS VIII, 5– 9. 
 149 The latter passage using field, building and temple imagery, rather like 1 Cor 3, which will be examined 
in Chapter 4. 
 150 See the discussion below. 
 151 See also Klinzing, Umdeutung, 168, the references cited in Newton, Purity, n 9, 131–32 and the 
discussion in George J. Brooke, “Miqdash Adam, Eden and the Qumran Community,” in Gemeinde ohne Tempel: 
Zur Substituierung und Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und seines Kults im Alten Testament, antiken 
Judentum und frühen Christentum (ed. Beate Ego, Armin Lange, and Peter Pilhofer; WUNT 118; Tübingen: Mohr 
(Siebeck), 1999), 285–301, at 291–93.  
 152 Hogeterp, Temple, 112. 
 153 Beale, Temple, 66–79, and throughout the study, expands on this theme in some depth, citing e.g., Jub 
18:9: “And he knew that the Garden of Eden is the holy of holies, and the dwelling of the Lord, and Mount Sinai the 
centre of the desert, and Mount Zion—the centre of the navel of the earth: these three were created as holy places 
facing each other.” Copies of Jubilees were found at Qumran and their ideology may have influenced the 
community; see George J. Brooke, “The Ten Temples in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in Temple and Worship in Biblical 
Israel (ed. John Day; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 416–34, at 419–21, 425–26. Idem, “Miqdash,” 285–301, at 289 
translates 4Q174 I, 6 as a “sanctuary of Adam” which relates to the garden of Eden; followed by Cecilia Wassen, 
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the council of the community in 1QpHab XII, 3, 4 has been interpreted as signifying the 
temple.154 Finally I note that spiritual priesthood language is not found at Qumran, since the 
community still functions like the Jewish cult, with distinctions made between laypeople and a 
priestly order.155 
 We observed earlier that, following Gärtner, comparisons have been made between 
Paul’s use of metaphorical temple language and the language of Qumran, with Gärtner and 
others even claiming that Paul is dependent on the theology of the Qumran community. Because 
this is not the focus of my study, my discussion of this subject will be necessarily brief. 
However, I cannot move on before observing that the interpretation of certain passages cited by 
Gärtner from the Dead Sea Scrolls has been disputed in modern Qumran scholarship and the 
situation is more complex and less clear cut than Gärtner assumed.   
 Firstly, not every scholar agrees that all of the references cited above use spiritual temple 
language for the community. The most disputed subject is the reference to the מדא שדקמ (temple 
of man/adam) in 4QFlor I, 6–7. Gärtner’s asserts that the phrase should be translated “a temple 
of men”, meaning “consisting of men” and disputes Yadin’s interpretation “a Sanctuary among 
                                                
“Do You Have to be Pure in a Metaphorical Temple? Sanctuary Metaphors and Construction of Sacred Space in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls and Paul’s Letters,” in Purity, Holiness, and Identity in Judaism and Christianity: Essays in 
Memory of Susan Haber (ed. Carl S. Ehrlich, Anders Runesson, and Eileen Schuller; WUNT 305; Tübingen: Mohr 
(Siebeck), 2013), 55–86, at 65–66. 
 154 In G. Vermes, “The Symbolical Interpretation of Lebanon in the Targums,” JTS IX (1958): 1–12, cited 
by Ernest Best, “Spiritual Sacrifice: General Priesthood in the New Testament,” Int 14 (1960): 273–99, at 291, and 
further in Gärtner, Temple, 43–44. 
 155 For just a sampling of the many passages referring to priests in the community, see e.g. 1QS I, 18–19; II, 
1–2, 19–20; V, 2, 9; VI, 3–10, 19–20; VII, 2–3; VIII, 1–4; 1QSa I, 2; II, 2–3 4QpIsad 1, 2; 4QShirShabba 1 I, 3–8. 
Other passages speak of those belonging to the “seed of Aaron” e.g. 4Q265 7, II, 3; 4Q419 1, 5. For more on the 
literal priesthood depicted in the scrolls, see Florentino García Martínez, “Priestly Functions in a Community 
Without Temple,” in Gemeinde ohne Tempel: Zur Substituierung und Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und 
seines Kults im Alten Testament, antiken Judentum und frühen Christentum (ed. Beate Ego, Armin Lange, and Peter 
Pilhofer; WUNT 118; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1999), 303–319. Wardle, Temple, 143–44 notes the role of priests 
in the eschatological temple (e.g. (1QM II, 5–6; 2Q24 4 = 11Q18 20). 
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men”, which, Gärtner claims, would require a preposition (ב).156 However, Yadin’s case has not 
been as easily dismissed (followed, for instance by Klinzing)157 and though Gärtner’s 
interpretation is still, perhaps, the most popular view, it has not commanded universal assent. M. 
O. Wise, writing over twenty five years later, lists four basic lines of interpretation: (1) “A 
sanctuary made by men, standing among men” (2) “A sanctuary made by God standing among 
men” (3) “A sanctuary made by men consisting of men” (4) “A sanctuary made by God 
consisting of men”.158 Wise himself contends that the phrase refers to an eschatological temple, 
not the community as temple, since CD III, 12–IV, 4 explicitly links the end time temple with the 
name of Adam.159 However, as George Brooke rightly points out, Wise privileges the 
hermeneutical standpoint of both the Temple Scroll (11QT) and the Damascus Document (CD) 
in his interpretation of the disputed phrase, rather than letting the phrase stand in its context.160 
As we shall see below, this is a flawed approach, considering that there may be evidence for 
historical development in the thinking of the community. Brooke’s own approach seems to 
balance the two perspectives well, arguing that ‘temple of adam’ functions both as a reference to 
the community but also as the proleptic last-days sanctuary, anticipating a restoration of Eden in 
an eschatological temple, which will be built by God.161 A growing number of recent studies also 
adopt this broad outline,162 though there is some nuancing of this view, such that Francis 
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Schmidt considers the sanctuary to consist of the priests and laymen who make up the council 
(not the whole community),163 and Devorah Dimant interprets the phrase to speak of the 
congregation of priests only.164 While some, like Brooke, take the reference to mean ‘a temple of 
Adam’ and others, like Gärtner, take it to mean ‘a temple of man’, each of these studies agree 
that the temple is a metaphor for some or all of the community. However, dissenting voices still 
exist. Daniel R. Schwartz follows Yadin’s understanding but translates the phrase as “a man-
made temple”, referring to the construction of Solomon’s temple from a vantage point earlier in 
Israel’s history.165 Allan J. McNicol also follows Yadin, but his understanding is directly counter 
to the interpretation of Schwartz, instead seeing it as a reference to the final eschatological 
temple.166 Though the most common understanding of “a temple of men/Adam” fits what we 
find elsewhere in the scrolls, I must acknowledge this is a probable, rather than certain 
interpretation. Finally, on this topic, the translation of one of the other references cited above has 
also been disputed by a minority of scholars. The preposition ןִמ in 1QS IX, 4–5 often translated 
as “without the flesh of burnt offerings and without the fats of sacrifice” could be translated 
“from the flesh of burnt offerings . . .”167  
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 While Gärtner has a tendency to downplay the role of the future eschatological temple,168 
most recognize that the community as temple is seen as only a provisional response to the 
perceived illegitimacy of the contemporary priesthood in Jerusalem, with the emphasis on the 
greater glory of the temple to be revealed.169 Indeed, Brooke argues that the community sees 
itself as a temple not simply because it understands the Jerusalem temple to be defiled but 
because its worship was to function as an anticipation of God’s intention to establish a new 
temple.170 The restoration of the temple is a particularly strong theme in the War Scroll (1QM), 
which does not describe the community as a temple.171   
 On the basis of these and other possible ambiguities, at least one scholar has gone further 
by questioning whether the Qumran community really saw itself as a temple at all. Jonathan 
Klawans points to the provisional nature of the community’s temple-free existence, the priority 
given to the future eschatological temple, the ambiguity over some of the references noted above 
but most importantly for his case, Klawans notes that the term for sanctuary (שָׁדְּקִמ) is never 
used unambiguously for the community (where the more ambiguous term תִיַבּ “house” is used), 
and asks, in relation to the Damascus Document, “If the author(s) of CD wanted to say that the 
community was truly a temple, why not use the word?”172 Although Klawans argument is well 
made, he seems to underplay the clear point that the community does have its own priests, can 
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make atonement (even if some functions seem inferior to the provisions of the Pentateuch), and 
that other phrases (such as “house”) are also used in the OT when the temple is clearly in view, 
and in conjunction with words with the שׁדק root, such as 1 Chr 29:16; 2 Chr 36:14; Ps 5:7 (5:8 
MT); Isa 56:7; 64:11 (64:10 MT); 66:20 (and as noted earlier, the majority view is that שָׁדְּקִמ is 
used in relation to the community in 4QFlor I, 6). 
 Before concluding my discussion of temple imagery at Qumran, I should note three 
further issues that concern the history of the community behind the text that could have a bearing 
on our interpretation of those texts. Firstly, there is the question of whether the Damascus 
Document presents a different perspective on the sectarians’ relationship to the cult than those 
already considered. Texts like CD XI, 17–20; CD III, 20–4, 2 and XVI, 13–14 provide 
regulations for the conduct of sacrifices. Do these suggest that some of the community 
participated in the sacrificial cult for a time, that they are looking back to an earlier age or are 
these regulations for a later age and a future temple?173 Although we know that there was a 
definite break with the temple it is unclear whether the community continued to participate in 
worship in its early years before attitudes hardened, or whether the reverse is the case? To 
complicate matters, some believe that the Damascus Document may have a complicated history, 
with different levels of redaction.174 It is clear that references to the community as temple are 
strongest in 1QS, limited in CD, disputed in 4QFlor and not found in 1QH, 1QM and many other 
writings.175 McNicol draws attention to the early dating usually given to 1QS and suggests that 
the writings dated post-63 C.E. do not portray the community as a temple.176 Brooke goes so far 
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as to posit a three stage evolutionary approach where a more hierarchical organization gradually 
gave way to a more egalitarian community.177 
 Secondly, archaeological studies have discovered animal bones at Qumran, raising the 
question of whether these provide evidence of animal sacrifice. J. Baumgarten discusses this 
question but, considering the placement of the bones in jars, concludes that these were more 
likely edible remains from communal meals that were preserved in that way as a guard against 
contamination.178 There is no corresponding archaeological evidence for a cultic site and Jewish 
sacrificial regulations contained no requirement for the burying of bones.179 
 Thirdly, there is the question of how to relate seemingly contradictory reports of the 
Essenes by Josephus and Philo respectively and what credence to give to Josephus’s statement 
about sacrifice and the Essenes. Whereas Philo writes that Essenes show themselves to be 
“especially devout in the service of God, not by offering sacrifices of animals, but by resolving 
to sanctify their minds”,180 Josephus writes, “When they send what they have dedicated to God 
into the Temple, they do not offer sacrifices, because they profess to have more pure lustrations, 
therefore they keep themselves from the public precincts of the Temple, but conduct their 
worship separately.” (Ant. 18. 1, 5).181 This ambiguous comment is further complicated by 
conflicting evidence in the Epitome and Latin manuscripts of Josephus that say that the Essenes 
do not perform sacrifices.182 Klinzing simply evaluated Josephus’s evidence as mistaken,183 but 
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Baumgarten takes Philo’s statement not as an absolute denial of sacrifice but as a devaluing of its 
importance to the life of the community,184 and therefore thinks it likely that Josephus’s language 
indicates some limited accommodation to participation in the temple by some of the 
community’s members.185 Others remain agnostic on the issue.186 
 There are clearly parallels between the use of metaphorical temple language in Paul and 
at Qumran. However, the reason for this is harder to come by than some earlier scholars 
confidently assumed. Both communities knew of the use of spiritual sacrifice language in the OT 
and early Judaism, and the situations and self-understandings of their respective communities 
may have led them to similar conclusions for different reasons. Certainly the lack of consistency 
across the Dead Sea Scrolls and the question of dating should make us cautious about positing a 
direct influence on Paul. It is also unlikely that the scrolls would have been known to a 
predominantly Gentile congregation in Corinth and would have influenced their understanding of 
Paul’s words. That said, sources like Philo and Josephus know of the Essenes and speak of them 
to their Diaspora audiences. Qumran may be a witness to the development of spiritual cultic 
language in some segments of early Judaism, a development that is also attested in other ways in 
the Diaspora Jewish source Philo,187 to whom I shall turn in Chapter Three. The question of how 
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the Corinthian audience might have understood 2 Cor 6:14–7:1, a passage often mined for 
parallels with Qumran, will be covered in Chapter Five. 
 
1.3.2 Metaphorical Temple Language in the Pseudepigrapha and the Apocrypha 
 The Pseudepigrapha contains many references to the heavenly temple or to an 
eschatological temple that God will build or send down from heaven at the end of the age.188 
However, since my focus is on metaphorical language (and not upon a heavenly or 
eschatological reality, which would be considered to be real and literal), I shall not examine 
those references here.189 Since among the Jewish groups of which we are aware, only the 
Qumran community spoke of themselves as a temple with priests, the Pseudepigrapha and the 
Apocrypha’s metaphorical temple language mainly deals with sacrifice. These ideas appear in 
occasional verses rather than being developed as a coherent theme as they are in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls. I shall briefly examine the most obvious references by grouping them by category.  
 Firstly, there are several references that emphasize the disposition of the worshiper rather 
than the sacrifice. While it would be possible to read some of these verses to mean that the 
sacrifices are negated, it is more likely in each case that the cultic system is maintained, but 
purity of intention and behavior is understood to give the sacrifices their true value. Judith’s 
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hymn of celebration includes the lines, “For every sacrifice as a fragrant offering is a small thing, 
and the fat of all whole burnt offerings to you is a very little thing; but whoever fears the Lord is 
great forever.”190 In context, it is hard to read Judith’s words (even if originally penned by 
another author)191 as a rejection or even a minimizing of the value of the cult, given that Judith’s 
zeal for the law is emphasized throughout the book.192 Indeed, immediately after the hymn, the 
narrator couples the exemplary worship of God’s people with their sacrificial offerings and the 
sacrifices of Judith in particular (Jdt 16:18–19). The point of Jdt 16:16 seems to be that sacrifices 
need to be accompanied by a true reverence for God,193 a reverence displayed in the account that 
follows the hymn. The Letter of Aristeas contains a similar sentiment. The narrator recounts the 
wise answers of each of the putative translators of the Septuagint, and in one case, to the 
question, “What is the highest form of glory?”, the reply is given, “Honoring God. This is not 
done with gifts or sacrifices, but with purity of heart and of devout disposition.”194 In context, the 
point is not so much a disparagement of the cultic system but an apologetic for the law as the 
highest form of philosophy, a claim not lost on the audience of the dialogue, who respond with 
admiration (Let. Aris. 235).195 The broader context of the letter bears testimony to the narrator’s 
reverence for the temple and priesthood (Let. Aris. 83–99),196 so the statement should be read in 
that light. Second Enoch (‘J’ recension) contains another statement similar to that of Aristeas and 
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Judith, “Does the Lord demand bread or lamps or sheep or oxen or any kind of sacrifices at all? 
That is nothing, but he [God] demands pure hearts, and by means of all those things he tests 
people’s hearts.”197 The assertion comes in the context of the reminder that humanity has been 
made in God’s image (2 En. 44:1) and should act in ways honoring to God and to others (2 En. 
44:1–5) and is similar to the kind of prophetic critique found in places such as Ps 40:6; 51:16 and 
Mic 6:6–8. Later in the book, the sacrificial system is assumed as the right form of worship (e.g. 
2 En. 61:4–5; 62:1; 66:2). 
 The second category concerns passages that view something as an appropriate substitute 
for sacrifices, such as a right heart or right practices, while not necessarily suggesting that 
sacrifices per se are discarded. One of the most striking of these is Tobit’s refrain that almsgiving 
is itself a sacrifice (Tob 4:11) which atones from sin (Tob 12:9) and delivers a person from death 
(Tob 4:10; 12:9). Almsgiving is a particularly important theme for Tobit,198 and the writer has 
reinterpreted passages like Prov 10:2; 11:6; 16:7 (LXX) to emphasize this. The Hebrew word 
הקדצ (righteousness), though translated as δικαιοσύνη in each of these verses, came to include 
the sense of “almsgiving” (ἐλεημοσύνη)199 which is used here and elsewhere in the book (e.g. 
Tob 1:3, 16; 2:14; 3:2; 4:7, 8, 16; 13:8; 14:2, 10, 11). The same theme is picked up in Sir 3:30; 
35:4 and 40:24. Additionally Ben Sira views obedience to the commandment to honor father and 
mother as atoning (Sir 3:3), and counts obedience to the commandments generally as a sacrifice 
(Sir 35:1–2), which is encapsulated in the forsaking of unrighteousness (Sir 35:5). This does not 
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mean, however, that either Tobit or Ben Sira neglect the sacrificial system. Rather, Ben Sira 
insists that sacrifices are only efficacious if accompanied by a true righteousness (in line with 1 
Sam 15:22; Amos 5:21–24 etc.).200 For Ben Sira, the two must go together, “The offering of the 
righteous enriches the altar.” (Sir 35:8), 201 and the importance of the cult is frequently 
emphasized in the work (e.g. Sir 7:29–31; 35:1–12; 38:9–11).202 Similarly, Tobit looks forward 
to a glorious restored temple with right worship (Tob 14:5–6). The writer of Jubilees also views 
the desires of the people (probably referring to their prayers) as “pleasing fragrance, which is 
acceptable before him always” (Jub. 2:22), but this comes from a work which takes a very strict 
view of the importance of devotion to the law, embodied in circumcision (Jub. 15:24–29), 
festivals (Jub. 6:37; 23:19) and sacrifice (Jub. 32:1–15).203 The Prayer of Azariah 15–17 also 
envisages “a contrite heart and a humble spirit” as an acceptable substitute for sacrificial 
offerings. However, the three men found in Daniel are simply unable to make an offering in their 
situation (Pr Azar 15), a situation mirrored in the lives of most of the readers who live far from 
the temple.204 Rather, extenuating circumstances are in view while temple worship is practically 
impossible for many Jews, whether in time of exile or living in the Diaspora. The Psalms of 
Solomon compares praise and worship to a first-fruit offering, when it reflects “a devout and 
                                                
 200 Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira: A New Translation with Notes, 
Introduction and Commentary. (AB 39; Doubleday, 1987), 417–18.   
 201 Benjamin G. Wright III, Praise Israel for Wisdom and Instruction: Essays on Ben Sira and Wisdom, the 
Letter of Aristeas and the Septuagint (JSJSup 131; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 101.  
 202 As noted by Idem, “Ben Sira and the Book of the Watchers on the Legitimate Priesthood,” in 
Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit (ed. Jeremy Corley and Vincent Skemp; CBQMS 38; Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2005), 241–54, at 242. See also the commentary in Hayward, Temple, 73–
84. 
 203 See also Idem, Temple, 85–107 and J. T. A. G. M. van Ruiten, “Visions of the Temple in the Book of 
Jubilees,” in Gemeinde ohne Tempel: Zur Substituierung und Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und seines 
Kults im Alten Testament, antiken Judentum und frühen Christentum (ed. Beate Ego, Armin Lange, and Peter 
Pilhofer; WUNT 118; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1999), 215–227. 
 204 Carey A. Moore, Daniel, Esther and Jeremiah: The Additions (AB 44; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1977), 59; Pieter W. van der Horst and Judith H. Newman, Early Jewish Prayers in Greek (Commentaries on Early 
Jewish Literature; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 210.  
 44 
righteous heart” (Pss. Sol. 15:3), but may go further, in deliberately evoking the sacrifices 
mandated for unintentional sin in Lev 4:1–2, 27; 5:18 while replacing them with fasting and 
humbling, “He atones for (sins of) ignorance by fasting and humbling his soul, and the Lord will 
cleanse every devout person and his house.” (Pss. Sol. 15:3).205 Kenneth Atkinson contends that 
the theological perspective of the Psalms may be similar to that of the Qumran community, in 
believing the temple to be defiled.206 Finally in this category, the Liber antiquitatum biblicarum 
has a particular concern with Genesis 22, and in what sense Abraham’s offering of Isaac could 
be considered a sacrifice (L.A.B. 18:5; 32:2–4; 40:2). To this end, Pseudo-Philo speaks of Isaac’s 
blood having been shed (L.A.B. 18:5) but later, perhaps recognizing that his body was not 
sacrificed, includes an utterance worthy of Philo himself (as we shall see in chapter three), “the 
Lord has made the soul of a man worthy to be a sacrifice.” (L.A.B. 32:3). Again, within the wider 
context of the work, there is a deep appreciation of the Temple and worship.207  
 Finally, the death of a martyr came to be seen as atoning for the people of Israel, in the 
same way that an animal offering could serve for the nation (e.g. Lev 16). This is particularly 
prominent in 4 Maccabees when Elezear prays on behalf of himself and those martyred before 
him, “let our punishment be a satisfaction on their behalf. Make my blood their purification and 
take my life as a ransom for theirs” (4 Macc 6:28–29). This prayer is seen as fulfilled by the 
writer later in the book, “they became, as it were, a ransom for the sin of our nation. Through the 
                                                
 205 Kenneth Atkinson, An Intertextual Study of the Psalms of Solomon: Pseudepigrapha (Studies in the 
Bible and Early Christianity 49; Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 61–63. 
 206 Idem, I Cried to the Lord: A Study of the Psalms of Solomon’s Historical Background and Social Setting 
(JSJSup 84; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 216.  
 207 Cf. Hayward, Temple, 154–167; though possibly some ambiguity in its appreciation of the temple cult of 
his day, see Manuel Vogel, “Tempel and Tempelkult in Pseudo-Philos Lieber Antiquitatum Biblicarum,” in 
Gemeinde ohne Tempel: Zur Substituierung und Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und seines Kults im Alten 
Testament, antiken Judentum und frühen Christentum (ed. Beate Ego, Armin Lange, and Peter Pilhofer; WUNT 118; 
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1999), 251–63.   
 45 
blood of these righteous ones and through the propitiation of their death the divine providence 
rescued Israel, which had been shamefully treated” (4 Macc 17:21–22).208 It is also possible to 
see the Prayer of Azariah (Pr Azar 15–17), mentioned above, as referring not simply to the 
prayer itself as an offering, but to the young mens’ willingness to die a sacrificial death out of a 
desire to atone for the people.209 In summary, writings from the Pseudepigrapha and Apocrypha 
place a righteous disposition and behaviors above sacrifices, while still expecting that sacrifices 
should be performed; some works allow for substitutes for sacrifices, such as purity, praise or 
almsgiving, while not abandoning the belief in the sacrificial system. Some writings consider the 
death of a martyr to have an atoning efficacy on behalf of the nation.   
 My findings so far indicate that metaphorical temple language is not pervasive in 
Intertestamental literature, save for a number of places in the Dead Sea Scrolls, though the 
Scrolls are unlikely to have been known to the audience in Corinth.210  
 
1.4 The Purpose of the Study 
 There is thus something of a lacuna in the literature, with little comprehensive study of 
the most relevant sources of metaphorical temple language that could have influenced the 
Corinthians’ thinking; namely philosophical ideas. My aim is not to claim that Hellenistic 
philosophy is Paul’s own background as the author, nor to claim that it provides the sole 
background for the Corinthians’ own thinking on the topic (which might also include their 
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experience of local idol temples as well as Paul’s own teaching). Rather I aver that Hellenistic 
philosophy is one important background for the audience, which has frequently been neglected, 
and which Paul may seek to address.211  The purpose of this study is to examine the use of 
metaphorical temple language in the most relevant Hellenistic philosophical writings in order to 
understand how they are using this imagery, to what purpose and within what worldview and to 
compare this with what Paul is doing with such language in 1–2 Corinthians. The benefits of this 
study would be twofold. Firstly, more light could be shed on the way that the kinds of 
philosophical thought known in cities like Corinth may have influenced the Corinthians to think 
about metaphorical temple imagery. Secondly, a better understanding of the way that other 
philosophies used such language would throw into sharp relief the similarities and differences 
between Paul’s use and theirs and the different worldview that Paul was seeking to communicate 
to an audience whose thinking and behavior often resembled that of pagans (1 Cor 4:8–21; 5:1; 
6:1–6 cf. 1 Cor 3:1). 
 
1.5 Methodology and Plan of the Work 
 An inductive study will be undertaken of relevant Hellenistic authors in order to discover 
how metaphorical temple language was used in Hellenistic philosophy. The parameters for this 
study cannot be set by searches of relevant words such as ναός, θυσία, or ἱερεύς. Firstly, these 
words are primarily used for literal sacrifices and appear very commonly in ancient literature. 
Secondly, writers can speak of the concept of a temple without using these particular words or 
other technical temple vocabulary.212 Although Palestinian Jewish works will not be ignored 
                                                
 211 This is not to suggest that the Corinthians had read this or that work of philosophy, but rather that 
philosophical ideas common to Stoicism and other philosophies could trickle down to influence the ordinary person, 
as discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
 212 For instance, the often cited example from Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.11–13 contains none of these words.  
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altogether, the focus will be on those writing Hellenistic philosophy in Greek or Latin and, in 
particular, to those closest to the period in which Paul wrote. Obvious examples of this would 
include (but not be confined to) those already referenced by Ferguson and McKelvey, such as 
Epictetus, Plutarch, Seneca and Apollonius of Tyana, all of whom use metaphorical temple 
language.213 These non-Jewish Hellenistic philosophical writers will be examined in Chapter 
Two. In addition, Chapter Three will survey the corpus of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 B.C.E. – 
50 C.E.). Although Philo is a Jewish writer, it would be difficult to neglect his writings, given the 
considerable number of references to sacrifices, priests and temples used metaphorically.214 For 
Philo, the contextualization of Judaism in a Hellenistic environment lies at the heart of his work. 
Peder Borgen summarizes the views of many scholars when he writes, “Philo continues the 
approach seen especially in the Letter of Aristeas, in Aristobulus, and the Wisdom of Solomon to 
interpret the Laws of Moses and Jewish existence by means of Greek ideas and religious 
traditions.”215 Furthermore, Philo drew from the traditions of Stoicism, Middle Platonism and the 
Pythagoreans,216 and as such, is one of our best sources for understanding Hellenistic philosophy, 
given his very sizeable corpus. 
                                                
 213 While noting that the latter needs to be used with caution, since our source for his writings, Philostratus, 
probably completed his work in the early third century. Nevertheless, Apollonius lived in the first century and some 
of Philostratus’s material may reflect the earlier thought of Apollonius himself. 
 214 See for instance, the studies of Valentin Nikiprowetzky, “La spiritualisation des sacrifices et le culte 
sacrificial au temple de Jérusalem chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” Sem 17 (1967): 97–116; Carl Werman, “God’s House: 
Temple Or Universe,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen, I. Interationales 
Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum, 1.-4. Mai 2003, Eisenach / Jena (ed. Roland Deines and Karl-
Wilhelm Niebuhr; WUNT 2/ 172; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2004), 309–22; Andrea Lieber, “Between Motherland 
and Fatherland: Diaspora, Pilgrimage and the Spiritualization of Sacrifice in Philo of Alexandria,” in Heavenly 
Tablets: Interpretation, Identity and Tradition in Ancient Judaism (ed. Lynn Lidonnici and Andrea Lieber; JSJSup 
119; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 193–210 and Jutta Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria (TSAJ 84; 
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2001). 
 215 Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, An Exegete for His Time (NovTSup 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 43.  
 216 Idem, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, 
Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus (ed. Michael E. Stone; CRINT; Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1984), 233–82, at 256. 
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 The study will thus be a comparative one. The insights gained from studying 
metaphorical temple language in the wider literary context of Hellenistic philosophers will be 
compared to Paul’s deliberate use of metaphorical temple language when writing to an audience 
influenced by Greek and Roman philosophical and ethical thought in the life of Corinth. This 
comparison will illuminate Paul’s setting of this language in the wider framework of 1–2 
Corinthians and the purpose for its use in the argument of the letters. Chapter Four will explore 
such language in 1 Corinthians, and in order to provide a focus for the study, one pericope, 2 Cor 
6:14–7:1, will be given special attention in Chapter Five. Whereas 1 Cor 3:16 appears in a 
discussion concerning ministry within the church, and 1 Cor 6:19 relates to the issue of 
prostitution and the physical body, 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 is set in a cultic context and explicitly 
challenges the Corinthians over their pagan associations and worldview. Although many scholars 
have held the pericope to be a non-Pauline interpolation, a growing number of modern studies as 
well as the two most recent major critical commentaries have defended its place within the 
original letter.217 Finally, Chapter Six will summarize and evaluate my findings and suggest 
some paths for future research.  
                                                
  217 A sample would include: Margaret E. Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary 
on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (ICC; London: T&T Clark, 1994), 25–36; Murray J. Harris, The Second 
Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 15, 21–25; 
Adewuya, Holiness, 25–29; Hogeterp, Temple, 365–73; Fredrick J. Long, Ancient Rhetoric and Paul’s Apology: The 
Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians (SNTSMS 131; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 168–72. 
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Chapter Two: Metaphorical Temple Language in Hellenistic Philosophy   
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I shall explore the use of metaphorical temple imagery in Hellenistic 
philosophy. Before I begin, a few preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, I shall not attempt to 
document the reporting of descriptions or attitudes towards actual temple worship in these or any 
other sources (in other words, literal temple language). My more limited aim is to investigate 
metaphorical temple language, just as Paul speaks of temple imagery metaphorically in 1 Cor 
3:16; 6:19 and 2 Cor 6:16.1 To do otherwise would broaden the scope of enquiry beyond 
manageable proportions, and evidence for temple worship in relation to 1–2 Corinthians has been 
adequately surveyed in other studies.2 Similarly, the question of the imperial cult (another focus 
of much attention currently) will not be our interest, though I shall note along the way references 
to the divinity of particular emperors. Thirdly, as mentioned at the end of the first chapter, the 
discussion of temple imagery is not always focused on the use of particular words, since, as we 
shall see, writers frequently express the concept through common vocabulary that is not specific 
to temple worship, such as οἶκος or words for indwelling (and in any case, I shall be surveying a 
number of Latin works, whereas Paul is writing in Greek).3 In this regard, the number of 
references found that specifically use the language of temple (such as ναός, ἱερόν or οἶκος) are 
                                                
 1 On the question of metaphor itself in relation to cultic imagery, see the methodology laid out in Nijay K. 
Gupta, Worship That Makes Sense to Paul: A New Approach to the Theology and Ethics of Paul’s Cultic Metaphors 
(BZNW 175; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 27–51.  
 2 For instance, more recently in Yulin Liu, Temple Purity in 1-2 Corinthians (WUNT 2/ 343; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2013), Timothy Wardle, The Jerusalem Temple and Early Christian Identity (WUNT 2/ 291; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), and in earlier studies, such as Wendell L. Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline 
Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985), and Peter D. Gooch, 
Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8–10 in Its Context (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993).  
 3 A sampling of particularly relevant words can be found, for instance, in Louw & Nida, 534–35 citing 
words relating to sacrifice such as θυσία, σφάγιον, ἱερόθυτος, κορβᾶν, ἀπαρχή, ὁλοκαύτωμα, θυμιάω; θυμίαμα and 
σπένδω, words relating to temple in Louw & Nida, 66, such as ναός, οἶκος or such as ἱερόν, σκηνή, ἅγιον (Louw & 
Nida, 83) or words relating to Priest in Louw & Nida, 66 such as ἱερουργέω, ἱερατεύω, ἱερατεία, ἱεράτευμα, 
ἱερωσύνη, and ἱερεύς. 
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relatively few. However, Hellenistic writers frequently use the imagery of God, the gods, or a 
δαίμων dwelling in or filling the universe or the individual. Since a number of them do so within 
the wider context of describing the world or the individual as a temple in their writings (even 
though not necessarily in the immediate literary context), and since Paul uses the language of 
indwelling in the references which are the focus of my study (οἰκέω in 1 Cor 3:16; “ἐν ὑμῖν” in 
1 Cor 6:19 and ἐνοικέω in 2 Cor 6:16), I have deemed it legitimate to explore the imagery of the 
indwelling God/s when explicit temple language is not always in view. Finally, I shall limit our 
research to the sources more directly relevant to Paul’s period, beginning with the schools that 
marked the start of the Hellenistic era and continued at least into the first century (such as 
Stoicism and Epicureanism) and ending with works no later than the early third century C.E. 
(other than those that report on earlier eras), that show a strong degree of continuity with first 
century works of the same philosophical tradition.4  
 
2.1.1 Philosophy 
 Firstly, I shall briefly lay out some evidence from the primary sources that demonstrate 
the central importance that philosophy played in shaping worldview and behavior in the first 
century.5 There could be no greater endeavor than to study and live out philosophy, according to 
                                                
 4 For a survey of Hellenistic philosophy, see e.g. OCD, 657–58; Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early 
Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 319–95; A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, 
Sceptics (London: Duckworth, 1974); R. W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to 
Hellenistic Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1996); Jacques Brunschwig and David Sedley, “Hellenistic 
Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (ed. David Sedley; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 151–83; Keimpe Algra et al., eds., The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).   
 5 For the relationship between philosophy and religion, see Glenn W. Most, “Philosophy and Religion,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (ed. David Sedley; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 300–22. Michael Trapp, “The Role of Philosophy and Philosophers in the Imperial Period,” in A 
Companion to Plutarch (ed. Mark Beck; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 43–57 at 44 writes of philosophy 
in this period, “It is a comprehensive discipline, operating at the deepest level of understanding across the whole 
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Cicero, since, “philosophy is the richest, the most bounteous, and the most exalted gift of the 
immortal gods to humanity.”6 Seneca has much to say in praise of philosophy. Philosophers 
teach people both how to live7 and how to die and “open to you the path to immortality”. Unlike 
honors and statues, philosophy can never be destroyed and so the wise individual should choose 
to be a son of the philosophers.8 Plutarch notes that philosophy is avoided by those sick of soul, 
but it is their only hope of cure.9 Philosophy brings revelation and opens up new vistas, leading 
us to, “but the sight of things most beautiful that have been wrested from darkness and brought 
into light.”10 This light is for all.11 By contrast, to remove the Reason that philosophy brings is 
likened to removing a candle and plunging the room into darkness, or removing the goatherd and 
scattering the flock.12 Philosophy “enables us to understand things human and things divine”,13 
which can be summed up simply as “wisdom”.14 Philosophy holds out the promise of equality 
with God,15 and is the most appropriate study for a king, who, of all people, most resembles a 
                                                                                                                                                       
range of the real, and embracing all the most central human concerns; in our terms, it combines the authority of 
Science with that of Religion, and other things besides”. For a survey of the relationship between certain 
philosophers and Corinth over time, see Barnes, Women, 126–40.  
 6 Cicero, Leg. 1.22.58 (Keyes, LCL). 
 7 Seneca, Ep. 90.1. 
 8 Seneca, Brev. vit.15.4 (Basore, LCL). 
 9 Plutarch, An. corp. 501A; similarly Cicero, Tusc. 3.3.5–6; 3.6.13.  
 10 Seneca, Brev. vit. 14.1 (Basore, LCL); cf. Plutarch, Virt. prof. 81E, who compares the person who gets 
“inside” philosophy to one who enters a shrine and “has seen a great light”; see also Is. Os. 382D, 382F and Cicero, 
Tusc. 1.26.64.   
 11 Seneca, Ep. 44.2. 
 12 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 1.3.  
 13 Seneca, Ep. 31.8 (Gummere, LCL); cf. Ep. 90.2–3; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 26.1; DL 1.3.63, discussing the 
views of Plato.   
 14 Seneca, Ep. 89.1–6 (Gummere, LCL); or a striving for wisdom, according to Alcinous, The Handbook of 
Platonism (Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers; trans. John Dillon; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 3, 152.2–5. 
F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975), 11, sums up the ancients’ understanding of 
philosophy as “love of wisdom.” 
 15 Seneca, Ep. 48.12; 73.12. The philosopher should therefore, at the very least, be a follower of the gods 
(Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.27). 
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god, according to Dio Chrysostom.16 According to Plutarch, those who look to states governed 
by such a ruler can see the light of the knowledge of his image, “which the blessed and the wise 
copy with the help of philosophy.”17 Musonius Rufus, moreover, asserts that the study of 
philosophy is commanded by Zeus.18 Philosophy is equated with the ideal good.19 Seneca, 
writing to Lucilius, urges him that whichever philosopher he may follow “we must be 
philosophers”, as if the particular philosophy chosen is less important than the choice to follow 
philosophy at all.20 In a similar vein, Seneca speaks with approval of those who learnt directly 
from the lives of philosophers and cites examples from a variety of schools and eras, such as 
Socrates, Zeno and Epicurus,21 Pythagoras, Democritus, Aristotle and Theophrastus.22 Like their 
followers, Seneca exhorts his reader to live as they lived.23 Philosophy has unique authority and 
demands our complete devotion.24 Indeed, according to Dio Chrysostom, the pursuit of virtue in 
character is nothing less than being a philosopher.25 The road chosen by a philosopher will cause 
them to stand apart from the majority in their way of life and even in matters such as their food 
and clothing.26 Yet it is the road we must take, Marcus Aurelius avers, since philosophy is the 
only sure guide on our journey through this transient life.27 The philosopher will be superior to 
                                                
 16 Dio Chrysostom, 2 Regn. 24, 26. A true philosopher will be like a king, in that they learn to rule well: 
whether it be to rule themselves or others (Rec. mag. 3). Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.12 also notes that philosophy 
provides rest from the life of the court.  
 17 Plutarch, Princ. iner. 782A.  
 18 Musonius, frag. 16.104.30–32.  
 19 Musonius, frag. 8.64.37–66.1; frag. 16.104.36–37.  
 20 Seneca, Ep. 16.5 (Gummere, LCL). However, Dio Chrysostom warns of the dangers of those who wear 
only the name of philosopher and fail to improve the lives of their pupils or themselves (Alex. 8, 18, 20; De 
philosopho 10).  
 21 Seneca, Ep. 6.6. 
 22 Seneca, Brev. vit.14.5; Plutarch, Alex. fort. 327E, 328B also mentions Alexander.  
 23 E.g. Seneca, Ep. 5; 6.5–6; 7; 8.1–2, 5. 
 24 Seneca, Ep. 53.8, 9. 
 25 Dio Chrysostom, Exil. 28; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 26.1; 35.6–8; Cicero, Tusc. 3.17.36; 5.1.1. 
 26 Dio Chrysostom, De philosophia 7, 8; De philosopho 6. Thus many, seeing the cost of philosophy, 
neglect it until the necessity of philosophy cannot be avoided (Dio Chrysostom, Compot. 7). 
 27 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.17; similarly Cicero, Tusc. 5.2.5.  
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all in regard to truth and knowledge,28 and philosophy is superior to all other study and brought 
nourishment and wholeness to men such as Socrates and Plato.29 The philosophers have a noble 
purpose, since they seek to win “concord and peace and community of interests” for all,30 and 
equip people to live the good life, guided by justice and law, which is aided by reason.31 
Philosophy comforts those who are sad and enhances the joy of celebration.32 Yet the role of 
philosophy also includes tempering the natural desires, which is compared to a horse-trainer who 
checks the spirit of the colt with bridle and reins.33  
 We shall survey the evidence for metaphorical temple imagery from each Hellenistic 
Philosopher in which it has been found. This evidence will be presented by school, so far it is 
possible to assign the philosopher in question to an individual school, and in approximate 
chronological order within that school. Separate treatment will be given to those who do not fit 
into an obvious category or who are summarizing their understanding of these schools from the 
vantage point of later centuries. In regard to each writer, Sacrifice, Priest and Temple language 
will be discussed separately where the respective evidence presents itself. I have also appended 
three additional categories to the discussion of each writer’s view. In order to understand the 
writer’s conception of God’s indwelling presence, it is important to ask about the writer’s 
understanding of divinity. Thus, where sufficient evidence is available, I consider the character 
of God and Gods in the writings. This then brings us to the question of how the writer 
understands the nature of those in whom God dwells, so the writer’s doctrine of human nature 
will briefly be considered. Finally, since Paul’s doctrine of the Temple of the Holy Spirit/Living 
                                                
 28 Dio Chrysostom, 2 Glor. 1. 
 29 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 22.6; cf. Or. 37.2.  
 30 Plutarch, Alex. fort. 330E (LCL, Babbitt).  
 31 Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1108C; cf. Cicero, Tusc. 5.7.20.  
 32 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 1.2.  
 33 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 1.8; 20.6 cf. Jas 3:2–3.  
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God had practical consequences for how the Corinthians should live their lives (1 Cor 3:16–18; 
6:12–20; 2 Cor 6:14–7:1), it is important to consider what practical consequences each writer 
saw their doctrine having for their readers, so that we can compare the application of their 
doctrine with that of Paul’s in later chapters.  
 
2.2 Introduction to Diogenes Laertius 
 By something of an historical accident, the loss of so many primary sources for 
philosophy has left us dependent on the works of Diogenes Laertius, of whom we know little, 
including the date of his writings (though often dated to the third or fourth centuries C.E. because 
of his omission of Neoplatonism and philosophers after the second century).34 According to the 
translator of the Loeb edition, R. D. Hicks, “In any given passage he is as useful and reliable as 
the source he happens to be quoting at that exact moment”35 but his information is extremely 
valuable in the absence of so many other extant sources. Diogenes provides a history of the lives 
and thought of a considerable number of philosophers from the seventh century B.C.E. through 
to the third century C.E. As there are a number of important references in Diogenes to 
metaphorical temple language, these will be covered in relation to the individual philosopher to 
whose writings or conversation he attributes these views. Because I am dealing with much 
shorter sections than for other writers, a brief summary will be provided for each author rather 
than using the various categories described above. 
 
                                                
 34 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume I: Books 1–5. (LCL 184; trans. R. D. Hicks; 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), xvi–xix. See also OCD, 457. On the question of the scarcity of 
sources in relation to Hellenistic philosophy, see Jaap Mansfeld, “Sources,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3–30.   
 35 Laertius, Lives, xix.  
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2.2.1 Theophrastus, according to Diogenes Laertius 
 Theophrastus (c. 370–286 B.C.E) was a student of Aristotle and later head of the School 
from 323 B.C.E.36 In bequeathing his property to various friends, he expresses the view that 
property should not be devoted purely to private use, and so his house and gardens he gives to 
those desiring to study literature and philosophy, “so that they hold it like a temple (ἱερόν) in 
joint possession and live, as is right and proper, on terms of familiarity and friendship (“οἰκείως 
καὶ φιλικῶς”).”37 The temple image here speaks of something shared and open to all. 
 
2.3 Stoicism 
2.3.1 Introduction to Stoicism 
 Zeno of Citium (c. 333–261 B.C.E.) was the founder of the Stoic school in Athens.38 
Stoicism became best known through the writings of the third head of the school, Chrysippus (c. 
280–207 B.C.E.)39 who both restated and developed the positions of his predecessors, 
distinguishing between logic, physics and ethics, and contending for a strongly materialist, 
determinist, empiricist and pantheistic view of the world, with a stringent call to live in 
accordance with nature, seeing virtue as the only good.40 Stoics aimed to live by a thoroughly 
                                                
 36 DL 5.2.36 and see OCD, 1461.   
 37 DL 5.2.53 (Hicks, LCL).  
 38 See OCD, 1587–88; Sandbach, Stoics, 20–27; Long, Philosophy, 109–113; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Greek 
Philosophers of the Hellenistic Age (trans. Gregory Woods; New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 22–35; 
Ferguson, Backgrounds, 354–55; David Sedley, “The School, From Zeno to Arius Didymus,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7–32 at 8–20.   
 39 See OCD, 316; Long, Philosophy,113–14; Sandbach, Stoics, 112–15; J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 22–36; Kristeller, Philosophers, 60–86; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 355; 
Sedley, “The School,” 7–32 at 15–20; DL 7.179–202.  
 40 For more on Stoicism, see e.g. OCD, 1403–04; Long, Philosophy, 107–209; Sandbach, Stoics; Rist, 
Philosophy; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); 
Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages: I. Stoicism in Classical Latin 
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comprehensive and all-embracing philosophy in which “cosmic Nature embraces all that there 
is” so that God and Nature are equated, humans are integrated with that Nature and so must learn 
the nature of reality in order to live in agreement with it.41 Stoicism was probably the dominant 
philosophy of the first century C.E.42 
 
2.3.2 Zeno according to Diogenes Laertius 
 Zeno has much to say about the wise man, some of which has a bearing on our topic. He 
uses divine indwelling language, claiming of them, “They are also, it is declared, godlike; for 
they have a something divine within them (Θείους τ᾿ εἶναι· ἔχειν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱονεὶ θεόν).43 
There is a reference to priesthood which could be metaphorical, but perhaps has a more literal 
meaning, “The wise too are the only priests” (μόνους θ᾿ ἱερέας τοὺς σοφούς).44 This could mean 
that only the wise are truly priests in a spiritual sense. However, given that the context speaks of 
the wise’s study of sacrifices, temples and purity, it is more likely to relate to literal priesthood; 
either that only the wise priests should be recognized as priests or that priests are only appointed 
                                                                                                                                                       
Literature (SHCT 34; Leiden: Brill, 1985), 7–60; M.E. Reesor, The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy 
(London: Duckworth, 1989); A. A. Long, Stoic Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Susanne 
Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Brad Inwood, 
ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ferguson, 
Backgrounds, 354–69; Brunschwig and Sedley, “Philosophy,” 151–83 at 163–75; Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils, The 
Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Runar M. 
Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 213–
18. On living in accordance with nature, see e.g. I. G. Kidd, “Stoic Intermediaries and the End for Man,” in 
Problems in Stoicism (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 150–72; Sandbach, Stoics, 28–68; Reesor, 
Man, 83–102; Sharples, Stoics, 100–113; Long, Studies, 134–55, 179–223; Brunschwig and Sedley, “Philosophy,” 
151–83 at 172–75; Malcolm Schofield, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad 
Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233–56 at 239–53. On determinism, see, e.g. A. A. Long, 
“Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action,” (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 
173–99 (arguing for a degree of moral choice within a deterministic framework); Sandbach, Stoics, 79–82, 101–08; 
R. J. Hankinson, “Determinism and Indeterminism,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. 
Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 513–41. 
 41 Long, Philosophy, 108.  
 42 Sandbach, Stoics, 16.  
 43 DL 7.1.119 (Hicks, LCL).  
 44 DL 7.1.119 (Hicks, LCL).  
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from among the wise. As with the Stoic writers considered below in greater detail, Zeno equates 
God with, “Reason, Fate, and Zeus”,45 and the world is “a living being, endowed with soul and 
reason, and having aether for its ruling principle”.46 According to Chrysippus, the purer part of 
this aether is “preeminently God”47 and Zeno avers that the world or universe can also be 
equated with God.48 God is the Father of all and known by many names, such as Zeus, Athena, 
Poseidon and Demeter (so these are different names for God, rather than there being many 
gods).49 Since two of the three temple images in 1–2 Corinthians employ πνεῦμα, it is of interest 
that for Zeno, the πνεῦμα constituted the world soul, holds the cosmos together and, “accounts 
for the cohesions of each individual entity.”50 For the early Stoics, the individual, “is corporeal 
pneuma, an aggregate of corporeal qualifications, a single individual quality.”51 As with his 
followers, Zeno believed that the end of humanity was to live in accordance with nature,52 whose 
                                                
 45 DL 7.1.135.  
 46 DL 7.1.139 (Hicks, LCL). On the ruling part of the soul in early Stoicism, see Reesor, Man, 137–47. 
 47 DL 7.1.139.  
 48 DL 7.1.137. Sandbach, Stoics, 79 writes, “Since the world and its events are entirely determined by God, 
thought of as a plan, he can be identified with Nature, with Fate, and with Providence.” For more on this topic, see 
Michael J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology),” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics 
(ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 124–52.  
 49 DL 7.1.147. Keimpe Algra, “Stoic Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad 
Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 153–78 at 166, argues that Zeno “makes room for a form of 
polytheism”, adding “This explains why in Stoicism ‘god’ or ‘the gods’ are in many contexts interchangeable.” 
 50 Reesor, Man, 4, citing SVF, 2.473. See generally, Reesor, Man, 3–4, citing SVF, 2.552–53, 634. Algra, 
“Theology,” 153–78 at 167 speaking of pneuma, writes, “even their basically pantheistic conception of a single god 
could take different forms, accordingly as the monistic or the dualistic perspective was predominant.” Dorothea 
Frede, “Stoic Determinism,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 179–205 at 185 adds, “The Stoics were pantheists in the sense that for them the entire world 
is permeated by the divine pneuma . . . (but) the divine pneuma is not present everywhere in the same form and does 
not give consciousness and reason to all things.”   
 51 Reesor, Man, 21. Frede, “Determinism,” 179–205 at 193 writes, “our inner pneuma is indeed 
independent of the external circumstances and constitutes our personality.” Stoic ontology only recognized bodies as 
“genuinely existent beings” (Jacques Brunschwig, “Stoic Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics 
(ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 206–32 at 210).  
 52 DL 7.1.54, 87.  
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goal is virtue and to which all others things (such as strength, wealth, pleasure or wealth or 
poverty) are indifferent.53 
 
2.3.3 Cicero’s evidence 
 Although Cicero was primarily a Skeptic (see below for biographical information), a 
number of his works provide early evidence for the views of Stoic thinkers. Since he is the 
earliest writer I am considering (reflecting the views of Stoicism from the first century B.C.E.), 
Cicero’s reporting of Stoic positions will be presented here, his reporting of other positions in the 
appropriate sections and his own views under the Skeptics section of this chapter.54 
 
2.3.3.1 Sacrifice language 
 In his work, De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), Cicero articulates the views 
of Stoicism through the protagonist Balbus. Balbus repudiates myths about the gods, but 
recognizes grains of truth in some of the myths in shedding light on, “the personality and the 
nature of the divinities pervading the substance of the several elements” (referring to the earth 
and the sea, in his example).55 Nevertheless, despite his apparent skepticism about these myths, 
Balbus considers it a duty to worship gods such as Ceres and Neptune “under the names which 
custom has bestowed upon them.” However, Balbus continues, “But the best and also the purest, 
holiest and most pious (castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis) way of 
                                                
 53 DL 7.1.88, 89, 93–117; for more on virtue in Stoic thought, see Idem, Philosophy, 189–209; Kidd, 
“Intermediaries,” 150–72. On pleasure in Stoic thought, see Rist, Philosophy, 37–53. For the early Stoic school, see 
Reesor, Man; Sedley, “The School,” 7–32.   
 54 On Cicero in relation to Stoicism, see Colish, Tradition, 61–79, 104–58 and J. G. F. Powell,  
“Introduction: Cicero’s Philosophical Works and their Background,” in Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (ed. 
J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 1–35 at 23–26. For a synopsis of each of Cicero’s philosophical 
works and their sources, see Paul MacKendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1989).  
 55 Cicero, Nat. d. 2.28.71 (Rackham, LCL).  
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worshipping the gods is ever to venerate them with purity, sincerity and innocence both of 
thought and of speech.”56 The true way of worship is internal (thought), expressed in the 
external: speech, without mentioning sacrifices. Balbus distinguishes between religion and 
superstition (following others philosophers) and seems to identify superstition with sacrifices, 
while clearly siding with religion.57 
 
2.3.3.2 The Nature of Divinity 
 Cicero cites Chrysippus (the third head of the Stoic school in the third century B.C.E,  so 
one of our earlier sources for Stoicism)58 as believing that, “divine power resides in reason, and 
in the soul and mind of the universe; he calls the world itself a god, and also the all-pervading 
world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect and 
reason, and the common and all-embracing nature of things”.59 As we shall see, these beliefs are 
echoed in later Stoic works; the idea of the world soul, the divine soul which permeates intellect 
and reason and the identification of the world with divinity, such that all things are connected.60 
For Chrysippus, god is an inference from the superiority of humanity to all other created things, 
and thus to a creative mind which is superior to it.61 In the Stoic theology that Balbus expounds, 
Nature governs and sustains the world62 and the gods, who exist in community,63 govern all 
                                                
 56 Nat. d. 2.28.71 (Rackham, LCL).  
 57 Nat. d. 2.28.72.   
 58 See OCD, 316.  
 59 Nat. d. 1.15.39 (Rackham, LCL). Sandbach, Stoics, 73 says of Stoic theology in relation to this passage, 
“The mistake lies in supposing that the word ‘God’ always denotes the same thing . . . Stoics could call the whole 
world ‘God’ . . . no less than the immanent force that gave it all its character.” 
 60 See also Nat. d. 2.11.30; 2.14.37–2.15.39.  
 61 Nat. d. 2.6.16.  
 62 Nat. d. 2.32.78.  
 63 Nat. d. 2.31.78.  
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things by divine providence,64 exercising great care towards all.65 We also learn from Cicero that 
Stoicism understands God to be the one who cares for the safety of all humanity, as indicated by 
the titles given to him, “Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of 
Battles”.66  
 
2.3.3.3 Living out the Philosophy 
 In the third book of De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Cicero presents the Stoic view that 
Virtue or Moral Worth is the only thing of value, to which all else is the means. Other things are 
indifferent, goodness is absolute and allows of no degrees, and the moral life is thus the only 
happy life.67 M. R. Wright details the way that Cicero develops Stoic ethics in De Finibus in 
terms of life stages, with a movement from self-love to a love that potentially reaches out to all 
of humanity.68    
 
2.3.4 Arius Didymus 
 Little is known of the life of Arius Didymus, but he is presumed to be the author of a 
work providing a short epitome of Stoic Ethics, and to have lived in the latter half of the first 
century C.E.69 Because his writing is so brief, I will summarize the main points of interest 
without employing our usual categories. Arius concurs with later Stoic writers that only the wise 
                                                
 64 Nat. d. 2.29.73–2.30.77.  
 65 Nat. d. 2.65.164–2.66.166.  
 66 Fin. 3.20.66 (Rackham, LCL); see also Michael Frede, “On the Stoic Conception of the Good,” in Topics 
in Stoic Philosophy (ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–94 at 70–74.  
 67 Fin. 3.1.2; 3.3.10–11; 3.6.21; 3.7.25–26; 3.8.28; 3.10.34; 3.14.45–48; 3.15.48–50. For more on Cicero’s 
understanding of this topic see Rist, Philosophy, 97–102 and generally, Frede, Conception, 71–94. 
 68 M. R. Wright, “Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3.” in Cicero the Philosopher: 
Twelve Papers (ed. J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 171–95.  
 69 Arthur J. Pomeroy, ed., Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics (SBLTT 44; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 1999), 1–3; OCD, 164. For a more substantial treatment, see Long, Studies, 107–33. 
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man can be a prophet or a priest.70 In addition to the priest’s knowledge of ritual and his 
experience in the service of the gods, he must also “be inside the divine nature”.71 This 
tantalizing statement is not expanded upon. Certainly Arius contrasts the piety of the worthwhile 
man with the impiety and impurity of the worthless throughout his work.72 Only the worthwhile 
man can prophesy and perform service for the gods.73 
 
2.3.5 Seneca 
 Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger) was born somewhere between 4 B.C.E. 
and 1 C.E. and died in 65 C.E. He was well known in his day as an orator, and had a significant 
involvement in public life, acting initially as tutor and later as political adviser and minister to 
the emperor Nero.74 Seneca produced a very large body of work, but in my survey I shall confine 
myself to the study of those works that deal specifically with philosophy, that includes his letters. 
Seneca identifies himself as a Stoic in his writings,75 and considers the Stoic school to be 
superior to any other.76 
 
 
                                                
 70 Pomeroy, ed., Arius, 5b12, 28–29 (25); 5b12, 4–5 (26).   
 71 Pomeroy, ed., Arius, 5b12, 10–11 (26).  
 72 Pomeroy, ed., Arius, 5b, 5–21 (26); 11k, 4–14, 18–20, 26–29 (84).   
 73 Pomeroy, ed., Arius, 11s, 16–19 (98).  
 74 OCD, 92–95; Sandbach, Stoics, 149–62. For a recent biography of Seneca, see Paul Veyne, Seneca: The 
Life of a Stoic (trans. David Sullivan; New York: Routledge, 2003); the main section of the book (31–155) relates 
Seneca’s life to his Stoicism.  
 75 E.g. Seneca, Ben. 4.2.1; Nat. 3.9.1; 3.13.1; 3.22.1; and cf. his references to “our Stoics” (Nat. 7.19.1; 
7.20.1; 7.21.1); though sometimes disagreeing with them (Nat. 7.22.1). Scholars divide the history of Stoicism into 
Early Stoicism (Zeno–Antipater), Middle Stoicism (Panaetius and Posdionius) and Late Stoicism, and it is the latter 
on whose writings we almost entirely depend (as represented by Seneca, Epictetus and others); see Long, 
Philosophy, 115 and especially Christopher Gill, “The School in the Roman Imperial Period,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 32–58. 
 76 Clem. 2.4.2–3. For further studies, see e.g. Thorsteinsson, Stoicism, 22–27; A. A. Long, “Roman 
Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (ed. David Sedley; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 184–210 at 203–06; Wright, Faithfulness, 219–22. 
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2.3.5.1 Sacrifice language 
 Seneca stresses the intent of the worshipper in offering sacrifice; the object itself is 
considered indifferent, “It is the intention that exalts small gifts, gives lustre to those that are 
mean, and discredits those that are great and considered of value; the things themselves that men 
desire have a neutral nature, which is neither good nor evil”.77 This intent is concerned with the 
piety of the worshipper over the quality of the sacrifice itself in material terms, “the honour that 
is paid to the gods lies, not in the victims for sacrifice, though they be fat and glitter with gold, 
but in the upright and holy desire of the worshippers (recta ac pia voluntate venerantium). Good 
men, therefore, are pleasing to the gods with an offering of meal and gruel; the bad, on the other 
hand, do not escape impiety although they dye the altars with streams of blood.”78 Seneca 
internalizes this imagery still further when speaking of worshipping a vision of virtue in a good 
man’s soul. In this discussion, it would appear that material objects of worship are not involved 
at all; rather, the sacrifice consists of a pure will, “this worship does not consist in slaughtering 
fattened bulls, or in hanging up offerings of gold or silver, or in pouring coins into a temple 
treasury; rather does it consist in a will that is reverent and upright.” (pia et recta voluntate)79 In 
Seneca’s ninety fifth epistle, although the imagery of sacrifice is not used, true and sufficient 
worship is described as imitating the gods (rather than by sacrifice).80 This worship is explicated 
as knowing and believing in the gods.81 
 
 
                                                
 77 Ben. 1.6.2 (Basore, LCL).  
 78 Ben. 1.6.3 (Basore, LCL). 
 79 Ep. 115.5 (Gummere, LCL).  
 80 Ep. 95.50. 
 81 Ep. 95.47–48.  
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2.3.5.2 Priest language 
 There is scant reference to priestly imagery in Seneca. The clearest is the brief allusion to 
“Zeno, Pythagoras, Democritus, and all the other high priests of liberal studies”,82 which is not 
directly relevant to our topic. 
 
2.3.5.3 Temple Language 
 Seneca explicitly uses temple imagery on two occasions. In his work De Beneficiis, 
Seneca distinguishes between the whole of creation, which belongs to the gods, and the things of 
religion which have been expressly consecrated to the gods. Thus, “the whole world (mundus) is 
the temple of the gods” but sacrilege is committed expressly, “in the nook to which has been 
assigned the name of a sanctuary”83 (fani from fanum), that is, an earthy temple or sanctuary. 
Similarly, Seneca speaks of “the vast temple of all the gods—the universe (mundus) itself”84. 
However, though the word for temple may be used rarely in metaphorical sense, the concept of 
the indwelling God or gods appears frequently (cf. 1 Cor 3:16; 2 Cor 6:16). Firstly, Seneca 
speaks often of God pervading all things, to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish between 
God and the universe, “What is god? The mind of the universe. What is god? All that you see, all 
that you do not see. In short, only if he alone is all things, if he maintains his own work both 
from within and without, is he given due credit for his magnitude”.85 God is also described as 
                                                
 82 Brev. vit. 14.5 (Basore, LCL). Additionally the phrase, “Let us, I beseech you, be silent in the presence of 
this proposition, and with impartial minds and ears give heed” (Const. 9.4) is described by translator John W. Basore 
as “priestly” language in Latin (Faveamus, obsecro vos, huic proposito aequisque et animis et auribus adsimus), 
commenting, “That the wise man can suffer no wrong is presented as a sort of divine utterance which is to be 
received in solemn silence.” (76 note a). 
 83 Ben. 7.7.3 (Basore, LCL). 
 84 Ep. 90.29 (Gummere, LCL). The Latin word used is “templum” in both cases. Although Basore 
translates the first example “world” and Gummere the second example “universe”, it is in fact the same word: 
mundus.  
 85 Nat. Preface.1.13 (Corcoran, LCL).  
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mind and reason in its most complete form.86 In his De Vita Beata, Seneca seems to equate God 
with the universe, referring to him as “the all-embracing world and the ruler of the universe.”87 
In fact, terms such as God (deus), Nature (natura), Reason (ratio), Fate (fatum), Fortune 
(fortuna), Providence (providentia) and the Universe (mundus) can be used interchangeably in 
Seneca’s writings. In one place Seneca asks, “For what else is Nature but God and the Divine 
Reason that pervades the whole universe and all its parts?”88 and in addition, “If likewise you 
should call him Fate, it would be no falsehood”89 This is because of the pantheistic nature of 
Stoic doctrine, “In whatever direction you turn . . . there is no Nature without God, nor God 
without Nature, but both are the same thing, they differ only in their function”90 and, “So, if you 
like, speak of Nature, Fate, Fortune, but all these are names of the same God”91 Earlier in the 
same work, Seneca speaks of complaints against nature and the gods and contrasts them with the 
gifts of nature and the gods which merit gratitude. In these lines, ‘nature’ and ‘the gods’ are 
spoken of in parallel as if they are synonyms.92 In the same manner, in Naturales Quaestiones, 
Seneca says of the supreme God, Jupiter, “Any name for him is suitable. You wish to call him 
Fate? You will not be wrong. It is he on whom all things depend, the cause of causes. You wish 
                                                
 86 Nat. Preface.1.14. Algra, “Theology,” 153–78 at 167 avers that rather than being a Platonizing intrusion, 
this belongs to a strand “that had been present in orthodox Stoicism all along.” 
 87 Vit. beat. 8.4 (Basore, LCL). 
 88 Ben. 4.7.1 (Basore, LCL). Aetius, the first-second century B.C.E. philosopher speaks of the Stoic view of 
God as “a designing fire”, “a breath pervading the whole world”, see Aetius 1.7.33 (SVF 2.1027, part), translation 
from A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, 
with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 46A, 276. Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, a philosopher from c. 200 C.E. refers to the Stoic view of God, “They say that god is mixed with 
matter, pervading all of it and so shaping it, structuring it, and making it into the world” (Alexander, On mixture 
225, 1–2 (SVF 2.3.10, part), translation from Idem, Philosophers Vol 1, 45H, 273. Similarly, Sextus Empiricus, a 
third century C.E. writer also discusses the Stoic view of God, “it is probable that this is nothing else than some 
power which pervades it, even as our soul pervades ourselves” (Phys. 1.75 (Bury, LCL).)   
 89 Ben. 4.7.2 (Basore, LCL).  
 90 Ben. 4.8.2 (Basore, LCL).  
 91 Ben. 4.8.3 (Basore, LCL). Long, Philosophy, 168 speaks of “Uncreated and imperishable Nature, God, 
pneuma or universal logos . . .” See also Michael Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature, First to Third 
Centuries A. D.,” ANRW 36.3:1379–1429 at 1399–1400 on the spiritus that permeates and penetrates all things in 
e.g. Seneca, Nat. 2.6.5; 6.16.1; 3.29.2; Helv. 8.3. 
 92 Ben. 2.29.1–6; cf. also Marc. 17.6–7; Nat. 5.18.5, 13–15 for a similar phenomenon.  
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to call him Providence? You will still be right.”93 and further, “ You wish to call him Nature? 
You will not be mistaken. It is he from whom all things are naturally born, and we have life from 
his breath. You wish to call him the Universe? You will not be wrong. He himself is all that you 
see, infused throughout all his parts, sustaining both himself and his own.”94  
 Specifically, Seneca speaks of God or a divine spirit dwelling in a person. In one key 
epistle, Seneca explicitly contrasts the proximity and intimacy available with God by his 
indwelling holy spirit with his accessibility in an idol’s temple. By claiming that “We do not 
need . . . to beg the keeper of a temple to let us approach his idol’s ear, as if in this way our 
prayers were more likely to be heard”,95 Seneca, though not speaking of indwelling using the 
vocabulary of a temple, indicates that God’s presence in a person is equal or even superior to 
what might be available in a temple, “God is near you, he is with you, he is within you . . . a holy 
spirit indwells within us (sacer intra nos spiritus sedet) . . . in each good man “A god doth dwell, 
but what god know we not”” (Quis deus incertum est, habitat deus).96 In another epistle, Seneca 
speaks of an upright soul as “a god dwelling as a guest in a human body.”97 In a further epistle, 
Seneca writes of reason in much the same way as he has done of God and the soul, “Reason, 
however, is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit (pars divini spiritus) set in a human 
body.”98 Elsewhere he writes, “God comes to men; nay, he comes nearer,—he comes into men. 
No mind that has not God, is good . . . Divine seeds are scattered throughout our mortal bodies” 
but it is up to the individual to choose whether to receive and tend the seed, for it is possible to 
                                                
 93 Nat. 2.45.1–2 (Corcoran, LCL). 
 94 Nat. 2.45.2–3 (Corcoran, LCL); and see Ben. 6.23.5 for Nature spoken of as creator, and “Fortune” 
spoken of in the same terms used earlier for “God” in Prov. 4.5–12. 
 95 Ep. 41.1 (Gummere, LCL).  
 96 Ep. 41.2 (Gummere, LCL). The final quotation is taken from Virgil, Aen. 8.352. 
 97 Ep. 31.2 (Gummere, LCL).  
 98 Ep. 66.12 (Gummere, LCL).  
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kill off the seed, causing tares to grow where there might have been wheat.99 While Seneca says 
that the Stoics appropriated from their ancestors the idea of a Genius in every person,100 he 
personally stresses the presence of God in the upright man. Into the perfect soul a part of God is 
poured out,101 for a wise man’s soul ought to be the proper dwelling place for a God102 and this 
being so, he asks, “why should you not believe that something of divinity exists in one who is a 
part of God? All this universe which encompasses us is one, and it is God; we are associates of 
God; we are his members.”103 God can come even into the “very midst” of a person’s 
thoughts.104 Thus it is possible for the mind to commune with the gods,105 since the mind is 
“kindred to the gods”106 and can enjoy “the noblest spectacle of things divine”.107 To take 
pleasure in the virtues is to take pleasure in the mind of God himself.108 
  
2.3.5.4 The Nature of Divinity 
 Because of Seneca’s pantheism, at times he seems almost agnostic about the character of 
God, when he refers to, “the great creator of the universe, whoever he may be (quisquis formator 
universi fuit), whether an all-powerful God, or incorporeal Reason contriving vast works, or 
divine Spirit pervading all things from the smallest to the greatest with uniform energy, or Fate 
                                                
 99 Ep. 73.16 (Gummere, LCL); cf. Matt 13:24–30. This theme also appears in Ben. 4.6.6, where Seneca 
speaks of the “seeds” of every provision of God: “In us are implanted the seeds of all ages”.   
 100 Ep. 110.2.   
 101 Ep. 120.14.  
 102 Ep. 92.3.  
 103 Ep. 92.30 (Gummere, LCL).   
 104 Ep. 83.1 (Gummere, LCL); and a similar phenomenon can occur when theophanies are received in 
nature, cf. 41.2–4. 
 105 Ben. 6.23.6.  
 106 Helv. 11.7 (Basore, LCL); cf. also Ep. 124. 23. 
 107 Helv. 20.2 (Basore, LCL). On Stoic psychology, see A. A. Long, “Stoic Psychology,” in The Cambridge 
History of Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 560–84. 
 108 Ben. 4.8.3. 
    67
and an unalterable sequence of causes clinging one to the other . . .”109 However, Seneca may be 
conceding various possibilities to avoid alienating his audience, since the exact nature of God is 
not germane to his argument. Certainly, Seneca emphasizes that the ways of God are mysterious, 
“they both fill and elude our vision. Either their subtlety is greater than the human eye-sight is 
able to follow or such a great majesty conceals itself in too holy a seclusion” and consequently, 
“the greatest part of the universe, god, remains hidden”.110 In other places, however, Seneca 
alludes to the character of the gods.111 In De Ira, Seneca describes the gods as “by nature mild 
and gentle, as incapable of injuring others as of injuring themselves.”112 In De Clementia, he 
speaks of their kindness by which all, both good and evil, without consideration of their relative 
merits, are brought forth into the light (presumably a reference to their creation, since it includes 
those who are evil).113 Later in the same work, Seneca’s guidelines for the model prince assumes 
that the gods are merciful and forgiving,114 and in the next paragraph describes them as “merciful 
and just”.115 In the same vein, the gods send providential blessings like sun, rain, wind and 
nutrients for the soil upon both the grateful and ungrateful, without thought for the gods’ own 
self-interest.116 Nevertheless, as we shall see below, a special relationship exists between the 
gods and the upright, for the gods “are ever best to those who are best.”117 Seneca’s sixty fifth 
epistle cites Plato with approval in affirming God’s goodness118 and adds that while all things are 
                                                
 109 Helv. 8.3 (Basore, LCL). 
 110 Nat. 7.30.4 (Corcoran, LCL). 
 111 For the purposes of our study, our attention will not be focussed on the imperial cult, but Seneca refers 
to the divinity of Caesar in e.g. Clem. 1.1.2–6; 1.5.1, 7; 1.14.2; Polyb. 12.3, 5; 13.1, 3; 14.1–2; 15.3–4; Marc. 14.1–
2; Tranq. 14.9; Brev. vit. 4.2, 5.    
 112 Ira. 2.27.1 (Basore, LCL).  
 113 Clem. 1.5.7.  
 114 Clem. 1.7.1. 
 115 Clem. 1.7.2 (Basore, LCL). 
 116 Ben. 4.25.1; 4.26.1–3; 4.28.1, 3; cf. Matt 5:45.   
 117 Prov. 1.5 (Basore, LCL). 
 118 Ep. 65.10. For the integration of Platonism with middle Stoicism, see Sedley, “The School,” 7–32 at 20–
24. 
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made up of matter and of God, God is more powerful than matter and controls it.119 Yet, despite 
this being so, the supreme God submits himself to the same Fate which binds people and gods, 
“although the great creator and ruler of the universe himself wrote the decrees of Fate, yet he 
follows them.”120 
 
2.3.5.5 The Nature of Humanity 
 Unlike the apostle Paul, Seneca does not consider humanity to be inherently sinful by 
nature but holds rather “that his natural bent is good”,121 while recognizing, like Paul, “We have 
all sinned.”122 Seneca infers the existence of God since, like Paul, he recognizes that a 
conception of God has been  granted to each individual, “there is implanted in everyone an idea 
concerning deity.”123 Moreover, the human mind itself has the divine not merely as its source, 
but also as its essence, since it “has been formed from the self-same elements as these divine 
beings.”124 Like Stoic teaching in general, Seneca has much to say about the soul.125 The soul is 
the “peculiar property” of people, where reason is brought to perfection, and this distinguishes 
them from other creatures.126 The soul is pre-existent,127 is preserved by God,128 and so there are 
                                                
 119 Ep. 65.23. See further, Sandbach, Stoics, 73–75. 
 120 Prov. 5.9. (Basore, LCL); cf. Nat. 3. Preface.12 (Corcoran, LCL), which asserts that, “all things happen 
in accordance with a decree of god”. For more on the Stoic conception of divinity, see Algra, “Theology,”153–78. 
For Stoic understandings of Providence, see Frede, “Determinism,” 179–205. 
 121 Ira. 2.15.3 (Basore, LCL) cf. Rom 3:9; 5:12–21; 6:6, 17, 20; 8:2; Gal 3:22.  
 122 Clem. 1.6.3 (Basore, LCL); cf. Rom 3:23.  
 123 Ep. 117.6 (Gummere, LCL); cf. Rom 1:19–20.  
 124 Helv. 6.8 (Basore, LCL). 
 125 See e.g. Long, Philosophy, 170–78; cf. Sandbach, Stoics, 82–85, on Stoic teaching on the soul. 
 126 Ep. 41.8 (Gummere, LCL). 
 127 Ep. 44.5 (Gummere, LCL). 
 128 Ep. 57.7–9; 58.27–28 (Gummere, LCL).  
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no limits set upon it, “except those which can be shared even by the gods.”129 This same soul 
comes from above to grant a person a “nearer knowledge of divinity”.130 
 
2.3.5.6 Living out the Philosophy 
 In common with other Stoic writers, Seneca urges those who recognize the truth of his 
doctrine to to make it their goal to, “to live according to Nature, and to follow the example of the 
gods”.131 Yet, unlike the gods, who, as we have seen, shower their blessings on both the just and 
the unjust, the Stoic cannot do good to a bad man.132 Those who direct their thoughts “on high” 
are able to commune with the gods,133 and can be delivered from fear of people, God and death, 
so as to dedicate themselves to virtue.134 This is the freedom from (mental disturbance)135 which 
is extolled by so many Stoic writers.136 The good person’s response to the gods should be 
“goodwill” (in gratitude)137 and virtue, which brings about friendship with the gods.138 The 
person of virtue is to be an imitator of God.139 This virtue is sufficient for happiness regardless of 
circumstances, and promises “mighty privileges and equal to the divine”, to the end that “you 
may body forth God” (deum effingas).140 God sends trials and adversities as a way of training the 
good person in virtue, commenting in a manner strikingly reminiscent of NT teaching, “God 
                                                
 129 Ep. 102.21 (Gummere, LCL).  
 130 Ep. 41.5 (Gummere, LCL).  
 131 Ben. 4.25.1 (Basore, LCL); cf. De otio. 5.8; Vit. beat. 3.3; 8.1.  
 132 Ben. 5.12.3. 
 133 Ben. 6.23.6; cf. Col 3:1–2 .  
 134 Ben. 7.1.7; 7.2.4; cf. also Ep. 74.17–18 on freedom from fear of death and gods.  
 135 Ben. 7.2.3; cf. Ira. 3.6.1; and Seneca’s entire treatise, De tranquillitate animi.  
 136 See e.g. Idem, Philosophy, 206–07. 
 137 Ben. 7.15.4.  
 138 Prov. 1.5; cf. Ep. 31.9.  
 139 Vit. beat. 15.6; Ep. 95.50. Virtue needs a guide or director according to Nat. 3.30.8.  
 140 Vit. beat. 16.1–2; since all that is not directly related to virtue is neither good nor evil in itself, cf. Prov. 
5.1. On the Stoic notion that “All sins are equal” see the chapter with that title in Rist, Philosophy, 81–96.  
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hardens, reviews, and disciplines those whom he approves, whom he loves.”141 Therefore, the 
good person is simply to offer themselves willingly, not begrudgingly, to whatever occurs,142 and 
in this way to despise pleasure and overcoming all obstacles, ascend to the highest peak.143  They 
do so by means of reason.144 Yet while fate is unchangeable,145 in a mysterious way some of 
fate’s actions can come about in response to prayer and sacrifice.146 The person who grasps these 
truths and lives them out is the Stoic “wise man” who bears a striking resemblance to the gods in 
almost every respect, “the wise man is next-door neighbour to the gods and like a god in all save 
his mortality.”147 The soul who holds its ties to earth and the body loosely enjoys a blessed 
release and a speedy journey to the gods,148 finally rewarded by a washing away of all impurity 
and a serene apprehension of the divine, “There eternal peace awaits it when it has passed from 
earth’s dull motley to the vision of all that is pure and bright.”149 This heavenly journey to its 
source can be attained when the soul casts off sin and, “in purity and lightness, has leaped up into 
celestial realms of thought.”150 Therefore, to attain that state the righteous person must be aware 
                                                
 141 Prov. 4.7 (cf. Heb 12:5–6) and cf. also Prov. 1.5–7; 2.1–9; 3.1, 3.   
 142 Prov. 5.8; cf. Ep. 107.12.  
 143 Const. 1.1; 2.1  
 144 Ep. 74.20.  
 145 Nat. 2.36.1. 
 146 Nat. 2.37.2; though Seneca notes the futility of prayer to change the length of a person’s life in Marc. 
21.5–6. 
 147 Const. 1.1; 7.2; similar sentiments are expressed in Ep. 124.14; cf. Clem. 1.19.9 who describes the 
benevolent ruler (the emperor) as “second only to the gods” and Tranq. 2.3; Ep. 87.19. 
 148 Marc. 23.1–2; cf. Polyb. 9.3, 8; Helv. 11.6. See Ep. 41.5 for the soul who, though associating with the 
body, “cleaves to its origin”. 
 149 Marc. 24.5; cf. Helv. 20.2. The alternate visions, presented in Ep. 71.16, of the soul dwelling with deity 
or being mingled with nature after death, either expresses an agnosticism concerning its fate or the latter pertains to 
the soul of an unrighteous person. 
 150 Ep. 79.12.  
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of God’s judgment of his works,151 and judge themselves on their own progress in virtue.152 The 
wise person, thus, should pray and live openly before God, seeking to hide nothing.153 
 
2.3.6 Dio Chrysostom 
 Dio Chrysostom (c. 40/50–110/120 C.E.) enjoyed a varied career as an orator, public 
intellectual and writer.154 His reference to the Stoics as “our sect” firmly identifies him as one of 
their own.155 
 
2.3.6.1 Sacrifice language 
 Dio Chrysostom has several references to the supremacy of purity over the physical act of 
sacrifice. As we read through the Discourses, we can see a steadily increasing emphasis on the 
right spirit of the offerer and a correspondingly decreasing emphasis on literal sacrifices. In his 
third Discourse on kingship, Dio, speaks of the model king’s conception of the gods, who 
believes that, “the gods also do not delight in the offerings or sacrifices of the unjust, but accept 
the gifts made by the good alone.”156 As in Seneca and Epictetus, the one presenting their 
offering must be righteous in the sight of gods for their offering to be acceptable. However, Dio 
goes further still to argue that an increase in piety will necessitate a decrease in physical 
sacrifices, perhaps implying that the reverence of the worshiper will be received as a kind of 
                                                
 151 Ep. 41.2  
 152 Ep. 26.4–7.  
 153 Ep. 10.4–5. For more on the ethics of Seneca, see Thorsteinsson, Stoicism, 22–39. For Stoic ethics 
generally, see Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 675–738; and Schofield, 
“Ethics,” 233–56. 
 154 OCD, 452; C. P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1978).  
 155 Dio Chrysostom, Borysth. 29 (Cohoon, Lamar Crosby, LCL).  
 156 3 Regn. 52 (Cohoon, LCL). 
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spiritual sacrifice that will take the place of the sacrifices themselves, “the more god-fearing 
(from εὐσεβής) and pious (from ὅσιος) you become, the less frankincense and fragrant offerings 
and garlands there will be among you, and you will offer fewer sacrifices.”157 A Discourse that is 
later still, raises the possibility not only of lesser sacrifices being acceptable in the case of a 
righteous person, but of sacrifices being done away with altogether, “And as for the gods, you 
know, I presume, that whether a person makes a libation to them or merely offers incense or 
approaches them, so long as his spirit is right, he has done his full duty; for perhaps God requires 
no such thing as images or sacrifices at all.”158 Finally, in his thirty-third Discourse, Dio 
reiterates the qualities that make men pleasing to the gods, and these do not include offerings, “it 
is not river or plain or harbour that makes a city prosperous, nor . . . treasuries of the gods—
objects to which deity pays no heed . . . instead it is sobriety and common sense (σωφροσύνη καὶ 
νοῦς) that save. These make blessed those who employ them; these make men dear to the gods, 
not frankincense or myrrh, God knows”.159 
 
2.3.6.2 Priest Language 
 There were no spiritual priest references found in Dio, other than an exhortation not to 
shy away from imitating even “priests of purification” (though the usual word for priest, ἱερεύς, 
is not used) in the hope of winning souls from wickedness and leading them to virtue.160  
 
                                                
 157 Exil. 35 (Cohoon, LCL).  
 158 Rhod. 15 (Cohoon, Lamar Crosby, LCL).  
 159 1 Tars. 28 (Cohoon, Lamar Crosby, LCL). There is also an imaginary discourse between Alexander the 
Great and Diogenes, who tells the king to propitiate his δαίμων. Alexander wrongly imagines he must do so through 
sacrifices and purifications (4 Regn. 76.) 
 160 4 Regn. 89 (Cohoon, LCL). This is Cohoon's translation of τὰ καθάρσια, and is an ironic statement 
considering, according to Cohoon, (LCL, 209 note 2) “The kathartai were regarded as charlatans, as we see from 
Hippocrates and Plutarch.” 
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2.3.6.3 Temple Language 
 There are no references in Dio that explicitly make use of temple imagery. However, in 
his Fourth Discourse, Dio alludes to the later Stoic understanding of δαίμων that dwells in the 
soul of each person.161 In this case, the “genius” or “guardian spirit” will be received when the 
person has sufficiently matured in their understanding and their relationship with reason, “But 
come, let us attain a pure harmony . . . and extol the good and wise guardian spirit (δαίμονα) or 
god—us who the kindly Fates decreed should receive Him when we should have gained a sound 
education and reason.162 Elsewhere, Dio alludes to the belief that this guiding spirit is divine and 
expresses his opinion that there is no such thing as a bad δαίμων.163 Dio also articulates the 
belief that the universe is the dwelling place of God, or “home of Zeus”, but using the metaphor 
of household and home, rather than temple.164   
 
2.3.6.4 The Nature of Divinity 
 Dio speaks frequently of God as Zeus. He describes him using a variety of titles to 
indicate his nature such as “Father”, “King”, “Protector”, “God of Refuge” and “God of 
Hospitality”, “these and his countless other titles signifying goodness and the fount of 
goodness.”165 He is supremely just and good,166 peaceful, gentle,167 beneficent to all and the 
“common protector and father of men and gods.”168 Dio asserts God’s governance of the 
                                                
 161 See Rist, Philosophy, 261–71 on the development of this theology in later Stoic thought. For a 
comparison of Stoic and Epicurean theology, see Jaap Mansfeld, “Theology,” in The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 452–78 at 452–75.  
 162 4 Regn. 139 (Cohoon, LCL).  
 163 Fel. sap. 10.  
 164 Borysth. 36.  
 165 1 Regn. 39 (Cohoon, LCL); cf. also Dei cogn. 22,74, 75; Borysth. 32.   
 166 1 Regn. 16.  
 167 Dei cogn. 74.  
 168 2 Regn. 26 (Cohoon, LCL); cf. Hom. 12.  
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world,169 and his “watchful care” over humanity, revealing the future, disclosing wisdom to them 
for their benefit and providing for them all that is for their good.170 There is a happy “partnership 
of god with god” (speaking of the stars) in the heaven, where the gods exist as friends, free from 
strife.171 Dio prays to multiple gods172 though the gods have limitations: it is difficult for them to 
be in many places at once,173 and the law has such power that even the gods rely on its help.174 In 
fact, it is known as “king of men and gods”.175 
 
2.3.6.5 The Nature of Humanity 
 Dio describes both the dark and light side of humanity. Humanity is capable of devoting 
itself to wanton pleasure176, a love of glory177 and captive to “difficult and savage emotions”.178 
Those who are depraved flee from the voice of reason179 that alone could guide them on the right 
path. The source of evil comes from within, “for it is through man’s folly and love of luxury and 
ambition, that life comes to be vexatious and full of deceit, wickedness, pain, and countless other 
ills.”180 Yet there has been placed within humanity an innate recognition of God181 and a desire 
to worship and honor him.182 There exists a kinship between God and humanity and the 
                                                
 169 1 Regn. 42, 56; 3 Regn. 50. 
 170 Alex. 12–14; cf. Nicom. 18. 
 171 Borysth. 22, 23; cf. Nicom. 11.  
 172 Nicaeen 8; though in another Discourse dealing with Greek myth, the gods spoken of there are described 
as a “democratic rabble” (Invid. 25). 
 173 2 Regn. 107.  
 174 De lege 5.  
 175 De lege 2. 
 176 4 Regn. 102.  
 177 4 Regn. 118; 126.  
 178 4 Regn. 126 (Cohoon, LCL).  
 179 Alex. 17. 
 180 Alex. 15 (Cohoon, Lamar Crosby, LCL); cf. Matt 15:19; Mk 7:20–23; Rom 1:21, 29–31; Tit 3:3; Jas 
3:16. 
 181 Dei cogn. 27.  
 182 Dei cogn. 60; cf. Rom 1:19–21.  
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progenitors of humanity have lived in close relationship to God.183 Since that intimate fellowship 
was broken, good people are still loved by the gods184 but wicked and wanton people hold no 
pleasure for him.185 
 
2.3.6.6 Living out the Philosophy 
 Those who seek to be the kind of people who are loved by the gods can be called “sons of 
Zeus”. Their identity as those of his seed can be discerned by their self-controlled lives.186 They 
should seek to imitate the power and goodness of God.187 The philosopher needs “no ruler other 
than reason and God”.188 Reason is “the only sure and indissoluble foundation for fellowship and 
justice.”189 The King should model himself and his rule on Zeus,190 and his prayers should be 
appropriate (not asking selfishly or for that which is wicked).191 The gods do not leave people 
alone in their quest but send signs and omens to teach them how to live.192 Consequently, those 





                                                
 183 Dei cogn. 28.  
 184 1 Regn. 16; 3 Regn. 51, 53; 1 Tars. 28; Rhod. 58; Virt. (Or. 69) 4 and in particular, the king tries to make 
the gods his friends (3 Regn. 115).  
 185 1 Regn. 16; 1 Tars. 23; Virt. (Or. 69) 4. 
 186 4 Regn. 23.  
 187 3 Regn. 82.  
 188 Rec. mag. 3; cf. also Rec. mag. 6, 7, 12, 14.  
 189 Borysth. 31.  
 190 Hom. 11–12.  
 191 2 Regn. 62–63. 
 192 Nicom. 18.  
 193 1 Serv. lib. 17; Gen. 1; Fel. sap.  
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2.3.7 Epictetus 
 Epictetus (c. 55 – 135/50–120 C.E.) was a former slave who became a pupil of the Stoic 
philosopher Musonius Rufus. He established his own school in Nicopolis, and although no 
writings of his own composition survive, his pupil Arrian published his lecture notes as his 
Discourses, which are summarized in a shorter manual or Enchiridion. These writings 
propounded Stoicism and are said to have greatly influenced the emperor Marcus Aurelius.194 
 
2.3.7.1 Sacrifice language 
 There are no obvious examples of metaphorical sacrifice imagery in Epictetus, but twice 
he speaks of the necessity of the offerer approaching sacrifices with the right intent, “with his 
mind predisposed to the idea that he will be approaching holy rites”195 and again, “to give of the 
firstfruits after the manner of our fathers, and to do all this with purity, and not in a slovenly or 
careless fashion”.196 For Epictetus, right sacrifice has to involve more than correct performance. 
A pure motivation and a reverent disposition must govern the action of the worshiper.  
 
2.3.7.2 Priest language 
 There is a brief reference to the Cynic philosopher as a ὑπηρέτης of Zeus,197 a word that 
can be used as an assistant to a priest.198 This seems the closest I could find to a spiritual priest 
reference in Epictetus.  
                                                
 194 See e.g. OCD, 512–13; Sandbach, Stoics, 164–70; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 366–69; Thorsteinsson, 
Stoicism, 55–58; Wright, Faithfulness, 223–27 and especially A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to 
Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); see 7–17 for his setting, 27–96 for more on his philosophy, 
framework and method and 97–104 on his Stoicism.   
 195 Epictetus, Diatr. 3.21.14 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 196 Ench. 31.5 (Oldfather, LCL); emphases we find in a later and much different kind of writer such as 
Marcus Cornelius Fronto, in his Epist. Graecae. 8.3, 7.  
 197 Epictetus, Diatr. 3.22.82.  
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2.3.7.3 Temple Language 
 Epictetus has much to say about the indwelling presence of God. He stresses the unique 
status of humanity within the created order. All other created things, such as animals or 
vegetation are born to serve humanity; they are not “portions of Divinity” (μέρη τοῦ θεῶν).199 
This contrasts with the way a person should see themselves, so Epictetus urges his audience, 
“But you are a being of primary importance; you are a fragment of God [ἀπόσπασμα]; you have 
within you a part of Him.”200 Epictetus emphasizes this here, “God himself is present within 
you”201 and elsewhere, “you are not alone; nay, God is within, and your own genius (δαίμων) is 
within.”202 This a point of which his audience obviously needs reminding, “Have you not God 
there, where you are?”203, since Epictetus seems to assume that God is present within all, 
speaking as an example of “this fellow” who is ignorant of his presence within him.204 So great is 
this ignorance for some, that Epictetus uses quite stark and striking imagery to drive home the 
point, “Whenever you mix in society, whenever you take physical exercise, whenever you 
converse, do you not know that you are nourishing God, exercising God? You are bearing God 
about with you, you poor wretch, and know it not?205 Indeed, they are privileged to be bearing 
the one who governs the universe within them.206 I shall return to the practical consequences of 
this doctrine in a later section, but for now we must note that Epictetus goes further to draw out 
the implications of the deep unity that exists between God and humanity for his Stoic pantheistic 
                                                                                                                                                       
 198 “ὑπηρέτης,” BDAG, 1035.  
 199 Diatr. 2.8.11 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 200 Diatr. 2.8.11 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 201 Diatr. 2.8.14 (Oldfather, LCL). 
 202 Diatr. 1.14.14 (Oldfather, LCL); and cf. Diatr. 1.14.12 on the place of a “particular genius” in each 
person. Long, Epictetus, 165 comments “Here Epictetus speaks as if the daimôn were an alter ego or at least a 
superego.” This daimôn, Long, Epictetus, 166–67 speaks of as close to “the ideally rational or normative self” (166). 
  203 Diatr. 2.8.17 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 204 Diatr. 2.8.15–16.  
 205 Diatr. 2.8.12 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 206 Diatr. 2.16.33.  
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understanding of this union, “if our souls are so bound up with God and joined together with 
Him, as being parts and portions of His being, does not God perceive their every motion as being 
a motion of that which is His own and of one body with Himself?”207 and so, “you possess a 
faculty which is equal to that of Zeus”.208 Although in one place Epictetus describes the cosmos 
as if it is identified with God,209 while not uncharacteristic of Stoicism, it is uncharacteristic of 
Epictetus,210 and so it is possible to speak of the distinctive qualities of God and the gods.  
 
2.3.7.4 The Nature of Divinity 
 Epictetus speaks frequently of Zeus211 as the supreme God, and he pictures a serene deity 
who, “communes with himself, and is at peace with himself”.212 The true nature of good is found 
in him and he can be described using abstractions such as, “intelligence, knowledge, right 
reason”.213 He governs the universe,214 provides for all its needs,215 and is faithful, beneficent, 
high-minded and free to act as he chooses.216 Even the motives and thoughts of a person cannot 
be hidden from him,217 who looks down from above upon all that takes place and requires that 
                                                
 207 Diatr. 1.14.6 (Oldfather, LCL). Alexander of Aphrodisias, a philosopher from c. 200 C.E. says, of Stoic 
belief, that “the world is a unity which includes all existing things in itself and is governed by a living, rational, 
intelligent nature” and thus, “They say that the very fate, nature and rationale in accordance with which the all is 
governed is god.” (Alexander, On fate 191,30–192,28 (SVF 2.945)); translation from Long and Sedley, Philosophers 
Vol 1, 55N, 337–38. 
 208 Diatr. 1.14.12 (Oldfather, LCL), and like other Stoics, ascribes the same attributes to both God and 
Nature.  
 209 Frag. 3.  
 210 See 443 note 1, on Frag. 3 (LCL), though see also Diatr. 1.14.10 and the comment on it in Lapidge, 
“Cosmology,” ANRW 36.3.1414–1415.  
 211 E.g. Diatr. 1.1.10, 24; 1.12.25; 1.19.9, 12; 1.22.15–16; 1.25.3, 5; 2.17.22, 25; 2.23.42; 3.7.36; 3.11.5–6; 
3.22.56–59; 3.24.16, 19; 4.1.131; 4.4.34. Long, Epictetus, 143 notes that Epictetus speaks more frequently of Zeus 
than any other proper name other than Socrates. 
 212 Diatr. 3.13.7 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 213 Diatr. 2.8.2 (Oldfather, LCL). Although Frag. 8 suggests that divine beings can change, this may be a 
reference to the “heroes” or to other divinities, such as the stars. 
 214 Diatr. 2.14.25–26; 2.16.33. 
 215 Diatr. 2.14.11; 3.13.7; 3.26.28.  
 216 Diatr. 2.14.13.  
 217 Diatr. 2.14.11.  
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his creatures should live to please him rather than people.218 This same one guides their thoughts 
and gives them promptings and directions.219 When speaking in general of the gods, Epictetus 
describes them as “pure (καθαρός) and undefiled (ἀκήρατος)”.220 
 
2.3.7.5 The Nature of Humanity 
 God is described as the father of men as well as gods,221 thus humanity are his children 
and there is a close kinship between humanity and gods.222 One dominating theme of Epictetus’ 
writings is that the gods have given to us our reasoning faculty,223 which is a part of God’s own 
being224 and with it the power to make “correct use of external impressions”.225 We cannot 
necessarily change situations in which we find ourselves but we have been given the power of 
                                                
 218 Diatr. 1.30.1; cf. Rom 2:29; Col 3:22–23; Gal 1:10; 1 Thess 2:4; Eph 6:5–6.  
 219 Diatr. 1.25.5–6, 13. See Long, Epictetus, 144–47 for more on the nature of God. Long considers how 
the Stoics held together both a pantheistic and yet theistic or “personalist” conception of God, and contends that 
Epictetus tends to emphasize theism over pantheism (147–48). 
 220 Diatr. 4.11.3 (Oldfather, LCL). In passing, we should also note that Epictetus refers to the practice of 
worshiping Caesar as a god in Diatr. 4.1.60–61, though his argument seem to undercut this particular premise for 
worshiping him. 
 221 Diatr. 1.3.1; 1.9.7.  
 222 Diatr. 1.9.1–7, 22–26; cf. Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus (SVF 1.537), 1 who says of all mortals “we are your 
offspring” (translation from Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 54I, 326). 
 223 Diatr. 1.1.4; Aetius, the first-second century B.C.E. philosopher refers to the “reasoning faculty” that is 
also the “commanding faculty”; the “soul’s highest part”; see Aetius 4.21.1–2 (SVF 2.836, part); translation from 
Idem, Philosophers Vol 1, 53H, 315. 
 224 Diatr. 1.17.27. Long, Epictetus, 145–46 identifies God as “cosmic rationality” in the thought of 
Epictetus 
 225 Diatr. 1.1.7 (Oldfather, LCL); also 1.20.5–7; 1.27.15–19; 1.28.1–28; 2.1.4; 4.10.2, 14–17, 36; Frag. 4, 
9; see also Aetius of Antioch, 4.21.1–4, cited by Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 315; Idem, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers. Volume 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 314. The use of impressions was a key question for Stoicism, see e.g. F. H. Sandbach, “Phantasia 
Katalēptikē,” in Problems in Stoicism (ed. A. A. Long; London: Athlone Press, 1971), 9–21; Long, Philosophy, 
123–31, 172–75; Sharples, Stoics, 20–23; Reesor, Man, 32–82, 103–117; Michael Frede, “Stoic Epistemology,” in 
The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 295–322; Brunschwig and Sedley, “Philosophy,” 151–83 at 166–67; Tad Brennan, “Stoic Moral 
Psychology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 257–94; R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad 
Inwood; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59–84. 
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moral choice,226 so that we desire the things that are good, and cultivate an aversion towards 
what is evil, counting all other things as indifferent, and this results in virtue.227 These choices 
are also made possible because we have an innate concept of what is good and what is evil.228 
Moral choice is in our hands alone and neither another person, nor even Zeus, is able to 
overcome the moral purpose of a person.229 This faculty of reason is one which humanity alone 
possesses of all created things230 and enables us to have communion with God, “being 
intertwined with him through the reason.”231 The goal of reason and moral choice is to will each 
thing to be exactly as it is, not concerning oneself with matters beyond our control,232 and thus to 
live in accordance with nature.233 The result of this life will be a freedom from disturbance, since 
it is only a person’s own judgments that have power to disturb them.234 It is the way to follow 
God’s path,235 and in fact to be free from fear as a friend of God.236 Consequently, in exercising 
these moral choices Epictetus urges his reader, “you possess the faculty of understanding the 
divine administration of the world”237 Yet, the “little soul” of a person is only “carrying around a 
corpse”238 that, one day, shall be separated from the spirit.239 
                                                
 226A particular focus of the whole of Diatr. 4.1 as well as 1.25.1; 2.6.9; 2.10.1; 4.4.47; 4.9.17; Ench. 1.1–5. 
See further on this topic, Bobzien, Determinism, 330–57 and Long, Epictetus, 27–34. 
 227 Diatr. 1.4.1, 4; 1.29.2–8, 24; 1.30. 3–4; 2.1.5; 2.2.3, 7, 14; 2.6.1; 2.22.1–3; 2.23.19; 3.2.1–5; 3.10.18; 
3.12.1–12; 3.18.1–5; 3.24.24; 4.8.12; Ench. 2.2; 13; 19; 34. 
 228 Diatr. 2.11.2–3.  
 229 Diatr. 1.1.23; 1.29.60; 2.13.10; 3.3.10; 4.5.23, 34; 4.12.7. In contrast to Pauline teaching here, it is 
assumed that the will of a person is not in bondage and captive to sin (cf. Rom 6:15–23; 7:7–25), “For it is within 
you that both destruction and deliverance lie” (Epictetus, Diatr. 4.9.17). The will of the individual and their ability 
to make choices is a key theme in Epictetus; see Long, Epictetus, 207–30. 
 230 Diatr. 1.6.15.  
 231 Diatr. 1.9.4–5 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 232 Diatr. 1.4.19; 1.11.33, 37; 1.12.16; 1.25.1; 2.5.8; 2.17.22; Ench. 8.  
 233 Diatr. 1.4.18; 1.6.20–21; 1.15.5; 1.26.1–2.  
 234 Diatr. 1.19.7–8; 2.2.3; 2.6.8.  
 235 Diatr. 1.20.15; 1.30.5.  
 236 Diatr. 2.17.29; 4.5.35; 4.7.9; Frag. 4.   
 237 Diatr. 2.10.3 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 238 Frag. 26 (Oldfather, LCL).  
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2.3.7.6 Living out the Philosophy 
 Epictetus urges responses from those who understand that the divine spirit dwells within 
them and who become aware of their duties to exercise moral choice and indifference towards 
external matters. Firstly, they should have right opinions about the gods,240 and then to set their 
minds to obey them and to submit to what happens.241 They should look to God as guide,242 and 
honor the one within.243 Since they are bearing God in their bodies, his audience must attend to 
their inner life (so as not to defile God by impure thoughts) and to their outer life (so as not to 
defile him with “filthy actions”,244 that may include the reference to intercourse with women).245 
The person must live to imitate God,246 and offer themselves completely to him.247 Since, 
whatever happens is what God wants, submitting to whatever happens (see above) is the same as 
wanting what God wants.248 In desiring to become pure in the presence of God,249 they wish to 
be of of one mind (ὁμογνωμονέω) with God,250 showing themselves to be those who have set 
their heart upon changing into a god.251 Such a person can live as a friend of God, without 
                                                                                                                                                       
 239 Diatr. 2.1.17. See Long, Epictetus, 156–62 for the tendency of Epictetus to denigrate the body as an 
obstacle to kinship with God and even to God’s work itself, in a way that Long sees as going beyond traditional 
Stoicism.    
 240 Ench. 31.1. See Long, Epictetus, 180–89 on how much of his moral philosophy stems from right 
understanding of God/s. 
 241 Diatr. 1.14.16–18; 3.24.95–102; 4.12.12; Ench. 31.1.  
 242 Diatr. 2.7.11. So, for example, since Epictetus has within him the true diviner who can reveal to him the 
true nature of good and evil, divination is rendered unnecessary (Diatr. 2.7.3). 
 243 Diatr. 2.8.18–22.  
 244 Diatr. 2.8.12–13.   
 245 Diatr. 2.8.12; cf. 1 Cor 6:15–20.  
 246 Diatr. 2.14.13. {Thiselton, 2000, #27996}{Thiselton, 2000, #27996}{Bartchy, 1973, #19254}{Martin, 
1990, #74716}{Lightfoot, 1895, #52791}{Schrage, 1995, #58923}{Lang, 1986, #86747}{Collins, 1999, 
#52919}{Fee, 2014, #26727}{Schnabel, 2006, #3181}{Schrage, 1995, #58923}{Robertson and Plummer, 1914, 
#51357}  
 247 Diatr. 2.16.42; cf. the command in 4.1.172–73. 
 248 Diatr. 2.17.22; Ench. 53.  
 249 Diatr. 2.18.19.  
 250 Diatr. 2.19.26. 
 251 Diatr. 2.19.27. Long, Epictetus, 146–47 contends that in the thought of Epictetus, assimilation to the 
divine, “gives persons a potential status that virtually eliminates the qualitative difference between the ideal human 
and the divine.” (147) See also Long, Epictetus, 168–72 on becoming a person of virtue and like God. 
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fear,252 since God has set them free from the slavery of bondage to others’ esteem or rules.253 In 
order to live in this state, the hearers of Epictetus should exercise right judgments in regard to 
sense impressions (as discussed above) and in that way, their soul will be pure.254 Thus there is 
the need to purify their judgments,255 destroy desire,256 love their fellow,257 and so, seek the 
common good.258 That is, philosophy should bear real fruit in the lives of its adherents.259 The 
fruit of the right use of external impressions is, “freedom, serenity, cheerfulness, steadfastness; it 
is also justice, and law, and self-control, and the sum and substance of virtue”,260 the ability to 
choose and to live by a certain standard of character and values.261 This is to say that the true 
philosopher must be devoted to the mind, and specifically to the philosophic principles.262 There 
is the need to count the cost of such a life in a thoughtful and considered manner,263 
remembering that both people and things are only mortal.264 Thus, the philosophic life may 
involve a difficult road. At times, God sends ordeals and difficulties of various kinds in order to 
test the person, so that they may become a victor in the moral life, like an Olympic champion.265 
 
 
                                                
 252 Diatr. 2.17.29; 3.24.60; 4.3.9.  
 253 Diatr. 4.7.9, 17. 
 254 Diatr. 4.11.3, 5.  
 255 A command in Diatr. 4.1.112. 
 256 Diatr. 4.1.175.  
 257 Implied by Diatr. 4.4.27.   
 258 Diatr. 4.10.12.  
 259 Diatr.4.8.20, 32, 36. 
 260 Frag. 4 (Oldfather, LCL) (cf. Gal 5:22–23). See also Long, Epictetus, 189–206 on external impressions 
and 244–54 on feelings in the philosophy of Epictetus.  
 261 Ench. 33.1ff.  
 262 Ench. 41; 46; 48; 52.  
 263 Diatr. 3.6; 3.15.1–7, 11–12.   
 264 Diatr. 3.24.84–89. See Long, Epictetus, 154–56 for the balance in Epictetus between his awareness of 
our mortality and transience, while also highlighting the way that individuals are ‘parts’ of God himself by their 
minds, citing Diatr. 1.12.26; 2.5.13; 4.7.6–7 and 2.8.10–11. 
 265 Diatr. 1.24.1; cf. 1 Cor 9:24–27; 2 Tim 2:5; Jas 1:12. For more on the ethics of Epictetus, see 
Thorsteinsson, Stoicism, 58–70. 
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2.3.8 Marcus Aurelius 
 Marcus Aurelius (121–180 C.E.) reigned as emperor from 161–180 C.E., having been 
previously adopted in Hadrian’s family and married to his cousin. Marcus studied with a number 
of famous teachers, including the orator Fronto, and was greatly drawn to philosophy. He was 
heavily influenced by Epictetus and is most associated with Stoicism.266 
 
2.3.8.1 Priest Language 
 Marcus describes a man who lives in total integrity, whose thoughts are guided by reason 
away from all vice and whose character and actions are transparently good, “all that is in thee is 
simple and kindly and worthy of a living being that is social and has no thought for pleasures”.267 
His description of the, “one who no longer puts off being reckoned now, if never before, among 
the best, is in some sort a priest and minister of the Gods”,268 could refer to a kind of spiritual 
priest towards the divine, but it is more likely to be a straightforward reference to one who acts 
as God’s priest towards others. Just before this section Marcus contemplates what lies beyond 
death, whether it be life with the gods or merely a state of non-sensation. In regards to the latter 
possibility, he makes a passing reference to “that which ministers” to the bodily vessel 
(presumably the soul),269 using the verb λατρεύω, which is often used in cultic contexts.270 It is 
possible that this too is a cultic metaphor, and pictures the soul acting as a priest to the body. 
 
                                                
 266 OCD, 210; Sandbach, Stoics, 172–77; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 367–68; Long, “Roman,” 184–210 at 
207–08; Wright, Faithfulness, 227–28. For a comprehensive study, see R. B. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus 
Aurelius: A Study (OCM; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), especially xv–xviii, 1–89 for background to the 
work and Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (trans. Michael Chase; Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially 1–34. 
 267 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 3.4.2 (Haines, LCL); cf. his injunctions in Med. 7.54. 
 268 Med. 3.4.3 (Haines, LCL). 
 269 Med. 3.3.2 (Haines, LCL).  
 270 See “λατρεύω,” BDAG, 587.  
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2.3.8.2 Temple Language 
 Marcus speaks frequently of an indwelling divine presence. In one place he refers to “the 
god that is in thee” (ὁ ἐν σοὶ θεὸς)271 and elsewhere speaks of “one God immanent in all things” 
(θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων),272 a subject to which I shall return below. When Marcus is not speaking 
of the unity of God with all things, but of a presence dwelling in the life of an individual human 
being, he does not commonly use the language of θεός. Rather, Marcus typically uses the 
language of the indwelling δαίμων. Although in one place this is rendered by C. R. Haines as 
“the very deity enthroned in thee”273 his translations for Loeb prefers phrases such as “the divine 
genius” within a person.274 On one occasion Marcus couples the two names, averring that, “it is 
in my power to do nothing contrary to the God and the ‘genius’ within me (ὅτι ἔξεστί μοι μηδὲν 
πράσσειν παρὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ δαίμονα).275 Since the two nouns, θεός and δαίμων are 
governed by the same article, neither is impersonal, neither is plural and neither is a proper 
name, this seems to be an example of the Granville Sharp rule, where the second noun in the 
construction refers to the same person denoted by the first noun.276 Hence θεός and δαίμων refer 
to one person and not two, demonstrating that Marcus can speak of (a) God and δαίμων 
interchangeably. Accordingly, elsewhere Marcus can either refer to “that which in thee is divine” 
(καὶ τὸ ἐν σοὶ θεῖον),277 using θεῖος, a cognate of θεός, or remind his audience that “thou hast in 
thyself something better and more god-like” (κρεῖττόν τι καὶ δαιμονιώτερον ἔχεις ἐν σαυτῷ) 
                                                
 271 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 3.5.1 (Haines, LCL).   
 272 Med. 7.9 (Haines, LCL).  
 273 Med. 3.6.2 (Haines, LCL).  
 274 Med. 2.13, 17; 3.3.2; 3.12, 16; 5.27  (Haines, LCL).  
 275 Med. 5.10.2 (Haines, LCL).   
 276 For further explanation, see Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical 
Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 270–72. As Idem, Grammar, 272 note 42, explains, 
θεός can be pluralized, and hence is not a proper name, thus fitting the rule.     
 277 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.1.2 (Haines, LCL).  
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employing a cognate to δαίμων. Terms from both the roots θεo- and  δαίμ- are apparently used 
by Marcus without any great differentiation of meaning. Reason is sometimes paired with the 
divine presence within,278 or this δαίμων is completely identified with intelligence and reason.279 
Marcus reminds his readers that, “each man’s intelligence is God and has emanated from Him” 
(ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεός καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐρρύηκε).280 As we shall see in our next section, God can be 
equated with reason and intelligence.281  
 
2.3.8.3 The Nature of Divinity 
 Marcus’s conception of God is strongly pantheistic, in common with Stoic doctrine 
generally.282 In the same paragraph, Marcus speaks of providence being “the works of the Gods”, 
the “control of Providence”, the co-dependence of “Fortune” and “Nature” and “the Nature of 
the Whole” which brings about good for every part of Nature.283 Or again, Marcus avers, “there 
is both one Universe, made up of all things, and one God immanent in all things, and one 
Substance, and one Law, one Reason common to all intelligent creatures, and one Truth.”284 It is 
hard to distinguish between God/s, Fortune, Providence and Nature in Marcus’s worldview 
                                                
 278 E.g. Med. 12.1.2.   
 279 Med. 5.27.  
 280 Med. 12.26.  
 281 The references to “That which holds the mastery within us” (Τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῦον) in Marcus Aurelius, 
Med. 4.1 (Haines, LCL), and to “that Hidden Thing within us” (ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον ἐγκεκρυμμένον) in Med. 10.38. 
may also be allusions to this same god/genius. See further Long, Epictetus, 163–67, 177–78.  
 282 Long, Philosophy, 150 avers that “Fundamentally, Stoic theology is pantheist.” Algra, “Theology,” 
153–78 at 165 elaborates that the Stoic conception of God or gods is, “as an at first sight perhaps surprising mixture 
of pantheism, theism and polytheism.”; cf. Hadot, Citadel, 147–63, who makes the connection between Marcus and 
Seneca, Nat. 2.45.1 (158), quoted above.  
 283 Med. 2.3 (Haines, LCL). Marcus also speaks of the “Nature of the Whole” as a Creator who felt 
compelled to create the universe in Med. 7.75 (Haines, LCL) and of the “Begetter and Upholder of all things” in 
Med. 10.1 (Haines, LCL). 
 284 Med. 7.9 (Haines, LCL); cf. Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus (SVF 1.537), 54I, 327 who speaks of “the 
universal law” Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1. 
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because all is one.285 Therefore, he admonishes his readers “to think of the Universe as one living 
Being, possessed of a single Substance and a single Soul.”286 At the same time, Marcus says that 
all go back to a single source, that is “sentience”,287 “the all-embracing intelligence”,288 
“Universe” (addressed in the vocative singular: ὦ κόσμε)289 or controlling Reason.290 So 
interconnected are all things, that what “contributes to the health of the Universe” contributes to 
the well being of Zeus himself, since “there is one harmony of all things.”291 This is also 
conceptualized as a “universal Substance” (συμπάσης οὐσίας or Ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία), of which 
all are a part.292 We also learn from Marcus that the gods lend aid to all,293 can give freedom 




                                                
 285 According to the fourth century philosopher, Calcidius, Chrysippus also believed that “everything in 
accordance with fate is also the product of providence, and likewise everything in accordance with providence is the 
product of fate”, whereas Cleanthes distinguished between the two; see Calcidius 144 (SVF 2.933); translation from 
Idem, Philosophers Vol 1, 54U, 331. Aulus Gellius (c. 125 – after 180 C.E.) also discusses Chrysippus’s view of 
Providence in a now lost work, On Providence, in Gellius, Noct. att. 7.1.1–13; 7.2.3–12. On the philosophy of 
Cleanthes, see Kristeller, Philosophers, 35–40. 
 286 Med. 4.40 (Haines, LCL); see 90 note 1. The Christian theologian Origen (184/185 – 253/254 C.E.) later 
writes of the “god of the Stoics” who “sometimes has the whole substance as his commanding-faculty; this is 
whenever the conflagration is in being; at other times, when world-order exists, he comes to be in a part of 
substance.” (from Origen, Against Celsus 4.14 (SVF 2.1052, part); translation from Long and Sedley, Philosophers 
Vol 1, 46H, 276.) 
 287 Med. 4.40 (Haines, LCL). Med. 8.23 pairs the gods with “the Source of all things”.  
 288 Med. 8.54 (Haines, LCL).  
 289 Med. 4.23 (Haines, LCL); see 380 note 3. Marcus speaks of “the Nature of the Universe” as creator and 
sustainer in both Med. 8.26 and 9.1 (Haines, LCL). 
 290 Med. 5.1; 6.36.2 (Haines, LCL). This is of the essence of Stoicism, as attested by the very early Hymn to 
Zeus by Cleanthes (c. 330– c. 230 B.C.E, the second head of the Stoic school; see OCD, 329), that speaks of, “the 
universal reason [κοινὸν λόγον] which runs though all things and intermingles with the lights of heaven both great 
and small” and claims that all things “share in a single everlasting reason”, Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus, 2–3 (SVF 
1.537); translation from Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 54I, 326–27. 
 291 Med. 5.8.1–2; cf. 6.37–38 (Haines, LCL). See his discussion of the “Universal Nature” in Med. 12.26. 
 292 Med. 5.24; 6.1; 12.30, 32 (Haines, LCL). Sometimes Haines translates this phrase (ὅλη οὐσία) as 
“Universal Nature”, e.g. Med. 7.5.  
 293 Med. 9.27. 
 294 Med. 9.40. 
 295 Med. 9.10. 
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2.3.8.4 The Nature of Humanity 
 Marcus repeatedly stresses the connection between the human and the divine (as we saw 
above), emphasizing that even an evil doer shares a kinship with him, “partaker of . . .  
intelligence and a morsel of the Divine.” (νοῦ καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας)296 Humans are both soul and 
body, or to put it another way “the Causal and the Material.”297 The soul is the ruling part of the 
person and “the Soul alone deflects and moves herself”, forming her own judgments about all 
things.298 Just as Marcus speaks of God as “ruling Reason”, he frequently uses the same term 
(ἡγεμονικός) for the reason within.299 This is a reason which comes from God and is shared in 
common with the Gods,300 though some are at variance with “the Reason that administers the 
whole Universe.”301 The soul, or reason, is the well-spring from which all attitudes, motivations 
and designs flow, “for every conviction and impulse and desire and aversion is from within, and 
nothing climbs in thither.”302 Although Marcus ascribes all that happens to the Universal Nature, 
this does not absolve wrongdoers of responsibility for their evil.303 Throughout Marcus’s 
writings he is keen to reiterate the frailty and dependence of human beings on other forces and 
their short mortal lives. In his second book he calls his reader to realize, “as an emanation from 
what Controller of that Universe thou dost subsist.”304 As one who subsists from that controller 
as part of a greater whole, their destiny is to return to the source from which they came, “Thou 
shalt vanish into that which begat thee, or rather thou shalt be taken again into its Seminal 
                                                
 296 Med. 2.1 (Haines, LCL).  
 297 Med. 5.13 (Haines, LCL).   
 298 Med. 5.19 (Haines, LCL).   
 299 Med. 4.38; 7.16; 8.43, 61; 9.7; 11.20; 12.1 (Haines, LCL). Frede, “Determinism,” 179–205 at 185 
explains that in the Stoic view, “Human beings . . . are also ruled by a portion of the pneuma in its purest form, 
namely reason (dianoia).” 
 300 Med. 6.35 (Haines, LCL).  
 301 Med. 4.46 (Haines, LCL).  
 302 Med. 5.28 (Haines, LCL); cf. Matt 15:18; Mk 7:21–23. Thus, impulses must be restrained (Med. 9.7).   
 303 Med. 12.26; 9.38.  
 304 Med. 2.4 (Haines, LCL). On the question of Marcus’ “pessimism”, see Hadot, Citadel, 163–79. 
    88
Reason by a process of change” (τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν).305 In other places, 
however, Marcus seems uncertain as to whether the end of the soul will be, “extinction or 
translation”,306 though death can be welcomed as an emergence of the soul from its captivity (as 
with Platonism).307 
 
2.3.8.5 Living out the Philosophy 
 In light of the deep connection between Nature, the Universe, God/the gods and humans, 
Marcus reasons that “there is nothing to prevent” him from beginning “at once” in living 
according to nature.308 This can also be described as living according to reason,309 or being in 
tune with the Universe,310, thinking , “in unison with the all-embracing Intelligence”311 or even 
doing “nothing contrary to the God and the ‘genius’ within me.”312 The philosopher should seek 
to live as they are: a fellow citizen of Gods and people in a common “World-City”.313 There is 
great danger in cutting ones’ soul off from “the soul of all rational things” which also severs their 
link to the universe and their comprehension of all the things within it, which includes the life of 
the community.314 In order not to be cut off in this way, “That which holds the mastery within 
                                                
 305 Med. 4.14 (Haines, LCL); similarly on the eventual dissolution of the soul, Med. 4.21.1; 4.23; 7.10, 19; 
8.18. For further discussion, see Rutherford, Meditations, 206–08. 
 306 Med. 5.33 (Haines, LCL); similarly Med. 6.4, 24; 10.7.2.   
 307 Med. 9.3.1; cf. Med. 6.28. Some, though, fear death: Med. 8.58. Rutherford, Meditations, 244–50 notes 
the preoccupation with death in Marcus, and see also Hadot, Citadel, 275–88. 
 308 Med. 9.5 (Haines, LCL); cf. Med. 5.3; 7.55.1; 7.56; 7.70; 8.7; 12.1.2. The corollary Marcus draws from 
this doctrine of providence is that, “Nothing befalls anyone that he is not fitted by nature to bear.” Med. 5.18 
(Haines, LCL); cf. 1 Cor 10:13. See generally, Hadot, Citadel, 183–208.  
 309 Med. 4.1; or people “following narrowly their own ruling reason” Med. 4.38 (Haines, LCL); Med. 12.1; 
cf. the opposite behavior in Med. 4.46.  
 310 Med. 4.23.  
 311 Med. 8.54 (Haines, LCL).   
 312 Med. 5.10 (Haines, LCL).   
 313 Med. 10.1, 15 (Haines, LCL). For more on this topic, see Dirk Obbink, “The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic 
City,” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy (ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 178–
95. 
 314 Med. 4.29 (Haines, LCL).  
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us”315 (most likely a reference to the ruling Reason) will adapt itself to whatever happens to it, so 
long as it is living in accordance with nature.316 Accordingly, the wise person should be 
indifferent to what nature treats as indifferent.317 In this life according to the nature of the 
universe, death is “just a function of nature” and no longer something to be feared.318 Similarly, 
since the soul is preeminent, the body fulfills a lowly function, of little significance, “To the 
body indeed all things are indifferent, for it cannot concern itself with them.”319 The mind, on the 
other hand, is only indifferent towards those matters which are external to its affairs.320 Yet at the 
same time, Marcus urges his audience to resist bodily inclinations uncompromisingly.321  
 So, practically speaking, how is this life to be lived? At the heart of it all is our attitude to 
the divine genius, or reason, or intelligence, living within a person. Marcus instructs his reader to 
serve the δαίμων by keeping it pure,322 and this kind of service is elaborated as, “to keep it pure 
from passion and aimlessness and discontent with anything that proceeds from Gods or men.”323 
In other words, this genius is to be “lord of all pleasures and pains”324. Marcus repeatedly 
stresses the need for this genius or god to rule, with injunctions like, “let the god that is in thee be 
lord of a living creature,”325 and refers to this “very deity” as “enthroned” in the person by 
                                                
 315 Med. 4.1 (Haines, LCL).   
 316 Med. 2.12; cf. thus a person should keep their ruling Reason sound (Med. 8.43). 
 317 Med. 9.1.4; cf. Med. 4.39; 11.16.  
 318 Med. 2.12 (Haines, LCL). So, life should be lived with a conscious awareness of our own mortality 
(Med. 4.48). 
 319 Med. 6.32 (Haines, LCL); cf. 1 Cor 6:13. Rutherford, Meditations, 243–44 refers to the “revulsion from 
the physical and condemnation of worldly objects” in Marcus, suggesting a “more transcendent view of deity”. 
 320 Med. 6.32.  
 321 Med. 7.55.1–2. For more on Marcus’ guiding principles, see Hadot, Citadel, 35–53.  
 322 Med. 2.17. Elizabeth Asmis, “The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius,” ANRW 36.3:2228–52 at 2243 
comments, “This notion of the intellect as an inner deity may be traced back to Posidonius . . . Nowhere, however, is 
the notion as prominent as in Marcus’ writings; it forms the basis of his ethics.” Rutherford, Meditations, 237 speaks 
of the “notorious” difficulties of pinning down the referent to the δαίμων in later Stoic writers and whether they 
would even distinguish between God, the best part of a person or their guiding spirit.   
 323 Med. 2.13 (Haines, LCL).  
 324 Med. 2.17 (Haines, LCL). 
 325 Med. 3.5.1 (Haines, LCL).  
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bringing all desires “into subjection to itself”.326 Reason is described as having a kingly, 
legislative function, “in its royal and law-making capacity.”327 It is to have first place in a 
person’s life.328 Accordingly, the one devoted to his own intelligence and good genius will lead a 
life of virtue.329 The theme of purity and cleanliness often occurs in relation to the divine 
indwelling. Marcus urges his audience to keep their “divine genius” in its “virgin state” (actually 
καθαρός);330 or conversely not to “sully” (φύρω, “with a sense of mixing so as to spoil or 
defile”331) the divine genius, which, he reminds them, again using ruling language, “is 
enthroned” in their bosom.332 The true follower of reason will always be ready to be corrected; a 
turnabout that Marcus describes as a ‘conversion’ (from μετάγω).333 Marcus’s writings are filled 
with injunctions designed to lead his readers towards this goal, and below I list the most obvious 
ones, in two categories. 
 Firstly, Marcus deals with the inner life as it relates to the genius within and to relations 
with the gods. He urges his readers to “walk with the Gods!”, by carrying out the will of that 
genius within, identified with intelligence and reason334 and by keeping their thoughts on God at 
all times.335 This is what it means to “rest in philosophy”,336 and to return to the harmony within 
in order to gain control of it.337 At the same time, the wise person is to be attentive by looking 
                                                
 326 Med. 3.6.2 (Haines, LCL). 
 327 Med. 4.12 (Haines, LCL); cf. Jas 2:8. Hadot, Citadel, 123–25 identifies the δαίμων with “reason” in 
Marcus. 
 328 Med. 3.6.1–3; thus one's ruling reason should be kept “sound” (Med. 9.7.).  
 329 Med. 3.7.  
 330 Med. 3.12 (Haines, LCL).  
 331 “φύρω”, LSJ 1963.  
 332 Med. 3.16 (Haines, LCL).  
 333 Med. 4.12 (Haines, LCL).  
 334 Med. 5.27 (Haines, LCL).  
 335 Med. 6.7, and so leave no room for wrong thoughts, cf. Med. 7.54.  
 336 Med. 6.12 (Haines, LCL).  
 337 Med. 6.11 (Haines, LCL).  
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within to seek out the “special quality or worth” of each thing.338 The “fountain of Good” is to be 
found within.339 Such a wise person will welcome what “Universal Nature” has designed for 
it,340 and live each day at peace with themselves, as if the day were their last.341 The person who 
has been schooled in philosophy and who is humble of heart will say to Nature, “Give what you 
will and take back what you will”.342 They should disdain wrong sense-impressions (like 
Epictetus, above).343 They can do all this because they live by axioms (δόγμα) which guide all 
their impulses and actions. These axioms concern the nature of good and evil, and look to the 
goal of what makes a person, “just, temperate, manly, free.”344 Though Marcus repeatedly 
stresses providence and destiny, he also emphasizes the free judgment and action of the 
individual.345 The gods can be prayed to since they have power to give freedom from wrong 
impulses, such as fear or lust.346 Good people can have “the closest commerce with the Divine” 
and “the most intimate fellowship with it” by pious behavior and acts of worship.347   
 Secondly, Marcus stresses the social dimension of the philosopher and instructs them in 
how to live with other people. He urges his readers not to look around at the affairs of others and 
to compare themselves with other people348 but rather, “run straight for the goal”,349 and thus live 
                                                
 338 Med. 6.3 (Haines, LCL).  
 339 Med. 7.59.   
 340 Med. 8.7, 25.  
 341 Med. 7.69.  
 342 Med. 10.14; cf. Job 1:21. See also Med. 12.11.  
 343 Med. 8.26; or not go beyond initial impressions (Med. 8.19).  
 344 Med. 8.1. See further, Hadot, Citadel, 101–27. 
 345 Med. 8.16. Frede, “Determinism,” 179–205 at 186 comments that despite the deterministic nature of 
Stoic philosophy, “individual entities have a certain autonomy. It is the inner makeup of human reason that 
determines the way in which a person interacted with his or her environment.”  
 346 Med. 9.40. For more on prayer in Marcus, see Rutherford, Meditations, 200–205.  
 347 Med. 12.5. Med. 1.17.6 also speaks directly of communication with the gods, see Rutherford, 
Meditations, 192–95.   
 348 Med. 4.17; cf. Med. 8.56.  
 349 Med. 4.17 (Haines, LCL); cf. Phil 3:13–14; 1 Cor 9:24; Heb 12:1.   
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the life of the content person.350 However, in case Marcus be misunderstood as dismissing the 
relations between the wise person and their fellows, Marcus reminds them to test every case to 
see how it may affect the community and to respect its judgment, “if the community be not hurt 
by this, neither am I hurt; but if the community be hurt, there is no need to be angry with him 
that hath done the hurt, but to enquire, In what hath he seen amiss?”351 The wise person should 
seek the common interest.352 In their behavior towards others they should neither do nor speak 
evil to anyone.353 There is a strong social element in Marcus’s injunctions. Each person is to see 
themselves as, “a limb of the organized body of rational things”354 and so should love all 
people,355 even those who stumble.356 They should deal righteously with their neighbors.357 This 
concern for each person, whatever their relationship to them, is enabled by encouraging a sense 
of empathy with everyone, “Enter into every man’s ruling Reason, and give every one else an 
opportunity to enter into thine”,358 since humankind was created for the sake of each another.359 
This perspective on life is even described by Marcus as “salvation” (Σωτηρία) which involves an 
accurate comprehension of reality and “on our doing what is just and speaking what is true with 
all our soul.”360 
 
 
                                                
 350 Med. 4.25; cf Med. 7.54; 2 Cor 12:10; Phil 4:11; 1 Tim 6:8; Heb 13:5.  
 351 Med. 5.22 (Haines, LCL). 
 352 Med. 11.12. See Hadot, Citadel, 210–31.  
 353 Med. 5.31; also Med. 8.26. Cf. Tit 3:2; Jas 4:11; 1 Pet 3:10. 
 354 Med. 7.13 (Haines, LCL); cf. 1 Cor 12:12–26. 
 355 Med. 7.31; 11.1.2.  
 356 Med. 7.22; e.g. by forbearing to be angry with those who do not return thanks for their love, and even to 
care for them (Med. 8.8; cf. Lk 6:35), or seeking to convert them to the right path (Med. 9.11.).  
 357 Med. 7.54, for instance by not lying to them or committing injustice (Med. 9.1.1–2.).  
 358 Med. 8.61.  
 359 Med. 8.59; cf. Med. 9.1.1; 11.18.1.  
 360 Med. 12.29 (Haines, LCL).  
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2.3.9 Hierocles 
 Heirocles was a Stoic writer from the second century C.E., sometime around the reign of 
Hadrian (117–38 C.E.). He left behind some of his Elements of Ethics, as well as other fragments 
and excerpts from his writings.361 
 
2.3.9.1 Temple and Priest Language 
 There is one fleeting metaphorical temple reference in Hierocles. In his treatise On 
Marriage, Hierocles considers his parents worthy to be honored as gods, since the filial 
relationship between child and parent is even closer than that between people and gods.362 Indeed 
they can be compared to “domestic gods” and this naturally leads Hierocles to consider how we 
should serve these gods, “we must consider ourselves as kinds of ministers and priests in our 
home as in a temple (νομιστέον ἑαυτοὺς καθάπερ ἐν ἱερῷ τῇ οἰκίᾳ ζακόρους τινὰς καὶ ἱερέας), 
elected and consecrated by nature itself and entrusted with the tendance of our parents.” This is 
expressed through care for their bodies, but more especially, for their souls.363 
 
2.3.9.2 The Nature of Divinity 
 According to Hierocles, the gods are fixed in their judgements, since “changelessness and 
firmness” typify their virtues. They do chastise and sometimes natural disasters such as famines, 
droughts and floods are caused by them.364 Hierocles, however, wants to stress that the gods are 
                                                
 361 OCD, 682–83; Sandbach, Stoics, 170–72.  
 362 Ilaria Ramelli, Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts (SBLWGRW 28; trans. 
David Konstan; Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 82–83.  
 363 Idem, Hierocles, 82–87. This whole section corresponds to SVF, 4.79.53 (3:95,30–99, 9 Meineke; cf. 
Anth. 4.25.53 = 4:640,4–644,15 Wachsmuth and Hense). 
 364 Idem, Hierocles, 64–65, from the treatise How Should One Behave toward the Gods? This section 
corresponds to SVF, 1.3.53–54 (1:63,6–27–1:64, 1–14 Wachsmuth and Hense). 
    94
responsible for good because they themselves are good, since they are filled with all the 
virtues.365 Zeus can be described as the first god and parent.366 
 
2.3.9.3 The Nature of Humanity 
 A human being is a mix of body and soul, which are intermingled, with the soul itself 
understood as corporeal.367 Evil in the world comes about as a result of vice, not because of 
God’s judgments, and people choose evil freely. Matter is a second cause of evils, after vice.368 
 
2.3.10 Summary of our Findings from Stoicism 
2.3.10.1 Summary of Sacrifice Language  
 As I have surveyed temple language in Stoicism, a number of themes have stood out. 
Some, like Seneca, Dio Chryostom and Epictetus have, in places, continued to stress the need for 
physical sacrifices but have also emphasized the vital role of the motivation and inner purity of 
the worshiper. Seneca speaks in other places of the holy desire and the upright will of the offerer, 
almost in place of the victim. For Seneca, knowing, believing and imitating the gods itself is 
worship. Dio Chrysostom’s work appears to show a development, as the emphasis on purity 
increases, so the focus on literal sacrifices appears to decrease. In fact, for Dio, the more pious 
the worshiper, the fewer sacrifices are needed. Indeed, a later discourse makes sobriety and 
common sense a sacrifice in its own right. Cicero’s evidence also emphasizes purity of thought 
and speech instead of a literal sacrifice. 
                                                
 365 Idem, Hierocles, 66–69. This section corresponds to SVF, 2.9.7 (2:181,8–182, 30 Wachsmuth and 
Hense). 
 366 Idem, Hierocles, p. 68–69. This section corresponds to SVF, 3.39.34 (3:730,17–731,15 Wachsmuth and 
Hense). 
 367 From the treatise Elements of Ethics in Idem, Hierocles, 11, III.60; IV.5–20. 
 368 Idem, Hierocles, 66–69, from the treatise How Should One Behave toward the Gods? This section 
corresponds to Stobaeus, Anthology 2.9.7 (2:181,8–182, 30 Wachsmuth and Hense). 
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2.3.10.2 Summary of Priest Language 
 There were fewer obvious use of metaphorical priest language. Zeno and Arius Didymus 
claim that only the wise and godlike are priests. Marcus Aurelius says that a true priest is a man 
of integrity, guided by reason, who avoids pleasure. Hierocles compares the offspring of parents 
as priests to them.  
 
2.3.10.3 Summary of Temple Language and the Nature of Divinity 
 Since many of the writers fuse their understanding of divine indwelling with their 
observations of the character of divinity, I shall combine these two sections in this summary. 
Seneca explicitly speaks of the world as being the temple of the gods. Within that context, God is 
spoken of as infused through the whole universe. Indeed, God is described by him as the mind of 
the universe, and sometimes equated with Nature, Reason, Fate and Fortune. Reason elsewhere 
is described as a portion of the divine spirit. In this, Seneca is following Zeno, who speaks of the 
world as a living soul and also appears to identify God with Reason and Fate (later followed by 
Marcus Aurelius). Cicero confirms this evidence, describing the world as God and speaking of 
the all-pervading soul as Reason. Marcus Aurelius also speaks of God as immanent in all things 
and the source of reason and intelligence. Epictetus, on the other hand, seems to envisage a more 
distinct role for God than other Stoics, speaking of him as separate from the universe. Seneca 
also avers that God or the Holy Spirit dwells in individuals; sometimes specified as in each good 
person and assumes that communication with the gods is possible. Dio Chrysostom also speaks 
of the divine in each person, here meaning each person’s δαίμων (sometimes translated as 
“genius” or “guardian spirit”), but adds that they are received when a person matures. Epictetus 
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similarly puts the emphasis squarely on the individual’s relationship to God; having much to say 
about the God within (even within someone who is ignorant, unlike the view of Dio Chrysostom) 
who is carried around wherever they go. Marcus Aurelius speaks of the person’s δαίμων, god 
and the “god-like” and “divine” inside a person fairly interchangeably. Hierocles, alone of these 
writers, uses the temple imagery for the home and compares parents to “domestic gods”. Seneca 
describes the character of the gods as beneficent; gentle, merciful, forgiving and providing for 
all, especially the good. Dio Chrysostom uses similar imagery and portrays a harmonious 
partnership between the gods. However, for Dio the gods are not entirely self-sufficient, since 
they rely on the law. Epictetus uses abstractions to describe God, such as intelligence, knowledge 
and right reason. The gods are pure and undefiled and govern the universe. Marcus Aurelius also 
sees the gods as benevolent beings who lend to all and bring freedom from fear and evil. 
Hierocles portrays the gods as good and changeless, and likens Zeus to a parent, though one who 
can punish his children.     
 
2.3.10.4 Summary of the Nature of Humanity 
 Seneca’s view of humanity balances an understanding of the natural goodness of 
humanity with their tendency to sin. The human mind is formed from the divine essence and so 
alone of all creatures, humans have a conception of divinity. The soul is pre-existent and 
preserved by God, who grants to it knowledge of divinity. Dio Chrysostom stresses the evil 
within each individual but also the ability to recognize, worship and have kinship with the gods. 
Epictetus sees humanity as God’s children. They can understand the divine ways and live as 
friends of God. They have reasoning powers and the ability to desire the good and make right 
moral choices. They can live according to nature if they choose, and will all things to be as they 
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are. Humans can follow God’s path and be free from fear and inward disturbance about their 
own judgments.  According to Marcus Aurelius, human beings partake of the divine intelligence; 
they are a morsel of the divine. The soul, or Reason, rules the body and is the source of impulses 
and aversions. People are frail and Marcus seems ambivalent about the soul’s destiny (once 
speaking of its extinction but another time envisaging its translation to a different sphere).   
 
2.3.10.5 Summary of Living out the Philosophy 
 The Stoics, such as Zeno, Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius commonly call their 
audience to live in accordance with nature, that is to will everything to be as God, Nature, 
Reason, Fate or the gods have allowed it. Both Seneca and Epictetus elaborate on this as a call to 
follow the example of the gods by living a life of virtue and thus become like them. Seneca calls 
his readers to commune with the gods in order to enjoy freedom from disturbance. The one who 
follows God may find themselves trained by him through various trials, according to both Seneca 
and Epictetus. Seneca says that their soul should cling loosely to the things of the body which 
speeds their return to God. The emphasis of Epictetus is on having right opinions about the gods 
and our own judgments. They should honor the one within and live in purity both within and 
without. This will include destroying selfish desires, loving their fellows and seeking good. 
Marcus also stresses this theme and calls his reader to keep their inner genius pure, allowing the 
deity within to rule. This rule encompasses both the relationship to the gods by avoiding wrong 
sense-impressions concerning them, and in relationship to others, by running straight for the goal 
without being distracted by the opinions of others. At the same time, Marcus urges his readers to 
seek the common interest and to empathize with the experience of others.   
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2.4 Middle Platonism 
 The term “Middle Platonism” is usually given to the Platonism of the era roughly 
between Antiochus of Ascalon (d. c. 68 B.C.E.) and Plotinus (b. 205 CE), whose writings herald 
the start of Neoplatonism. This development of Platonism was eclectic and drew freely on the 
thinking of other schools, such as the Stoics, the Peripatetics and the Neopythagoreans. Most 
Middle Platonist works have been lost, with the notable exception of the large literary corpus of 
Plutarch and Philo.369 
 
2.4.1 Plutarch 
 Plutarch of Chaeronea (c. 45–120 CE) moved in influential circles as a lecturer, 
philosopher and biographer and was also a priest at Delphi for the last thirty years of his life. He 
left behind him a voluminous collection of writings. Despite the reputation and extent of his 
Parallel Lives, these works will not be considered in this section, since they are more 
biographical than philosophical and, instead, I shall concentrate on his philosophical works that 
reveal Plutarch as indebted to Middle Platonism.370 
 
2.4.1.1 Sacrifice language 
 Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris (his retelling of the Egyptian myth), offers advice for his 
readers in order that they may avoid superstition on the one hand, and atheism on the other, in 
                                                
 369 OCD, 1158; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 387–89. See especially John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 
B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), Preface xiv, 1, 115. Philo will be covered separately 
in the following chapter. 
 370 See OCD, 1165; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 389–90; Mark Beck, ed., A Companion to Plutarch (Malden, 
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 13–42. For Plutarch’s life, see D. A. Russell, Plutarch: Classical Life and Letters 
(London: Duckworth, 1973) and Robert Lamberton, Plutarch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) and, 
briefly, Dillon, Platonists, 185–86; Frederick E. Brenk, “An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of 
Chaironeia,” ANRW 36.1:248–349 at 250–56, and for more on Plutarch’s Platonism, John Dillon, “Plutarch and 
Platonism,” in A Companion to Plutarch (ed. Mark Beck; Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 61–72. 
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their interpretation of the stories about these divinities. They must believe that, “no sacrifice that 
you can offer, no deed that you may do will be more likely to find favor with the gods than your 
belief in their true nature.”371 In this instance, a true understanding and trust in the gods is of 
greater value than sacrifice, making it a kind of spiritual sacrifice. That said, this clause is 
conjoined to a preceding one which adds an important condition here, “if you always perform 
and observe the established rites of worship”,372 so Plutarch is not dismissing the necessity of 
literal sacrifices. Earlier in the same work, there are two references that are perhaps a little more 
ambiguous, but may also point to metaphorical sacrifice language. The first concerns “a longing 
for the divine” that focuses itself on the effort to arrive at the truth about their nature. This effort 
will involve study and investigation of “sacred subjects”, and “it is a work more hallowed than 
any form of holy living or temple service.” (ἁγνείας τε πάσης καὶ νεωκορίας ἔργον 
ὁσιώτερον).373 Since the word translated by Frank Cole Babbitt “temple service” (νεωκόρος) is 
associated more with one who is responsible for the maintenance and security of the temple 
(whether an individual, a city, or a deity)374 than it is for the service of offering sacrifices in the 
temple, Plutarch cannot be said to be directly comparing such a work with sacrifice. At the very 
least, however, he does identify study and seeking after divine truth as the holiest (ὅσιος) form of 
work. In the same book, Plutarch seeks to explain the etymology of the shrine of Isis, the Iseion, 
by the Greek word οἶδα (to know) to stress that a true worshiper can only understand the divine 
realities of that which they worship by a pure and holy disposition, “we shall comprehend reality 
if in a reasonable and devout frame of mind we pass within the portals of her shrines.”375 Like 
                                                
 371 Plutarch, Is. Os. 355D 11 (Babbit, LCL).  
 372 Is. Os. 355D 11 (Babbit, LCL). 
 373 Is. Os. 351E 2 (Babbit, LCL).  
 374 See “νεωκόρος,” BDAG, 670.  
 375 Plutarch, Is. Os. 2, 352A (Babbit, LCL).  
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the earlier reference in Isis and Osiris, the emphasis lies on motivation, attitude and 
comprehension rather than the physical act of sacrifice. That said, Plutarch elsewhere speaks in a 
disparaging manner of those who reject belief in divine providence and the divinity of the 
planets, who are appropriately worshiped through sacrifice as well as prayer.376 Again, Plutarch 
does not seem to be repudiating physical sacrifices. 
 There are two further references that may bear indirectly on the subject of spiritual 
sacrifices. Firstly, in Plutarch’s discourse On Brotherly Love, he comments on duty to parents in 
view of the greatest honor that Nature and the Law have assigned to parents after the gods, and 
avers that, “there is nothing which men do that is more acceptable to gods than with goodwill 
and zeal to repay to those who bore them and brought them up the favours “long ago lent to them 
when they were young.” ”377 This return of favor is more acceptable (κεχαρισμένον from 
χαρίζομαι) to the gods than anything else which could be offered, and that, presumably, by 
implication, would include the offering of sacrifices. Finally, in a discourse against the 
Epicureans, Plutarch insists that sacrifices and feast days are meaningless and do nothing for a 
person if the god’s presence is not felt, “if the god is not present at the sacrifice as master of rites 
(so to speak) what is left bears no mark of sanctity or holy day and leaves the spirit untouched by 
the divine influence.”378 For this to happen, people must bring these thoughts close to God and 
honor and reverence him.379 It can even be necessary for the sacrifice itself to, “both in body and 
in soul, be pure, unblemished, and unmarred.”380 
 
                                                
 376 Adv. Col. 1123A.  
 377 Frat. amor. 479F (Helmbold, LCL).   
 378 Suav. viv. 1102A (Einarson, De Lacy, LCL). 
 379 Suav. viv. 1102B. 
 380 Def. orac. 437B.  
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2.4.1.2 Temple Language 
 Plutarch’s On Tranquillity of Mind is in agreement with Seneca (see Seneca, Ben. 7.7.3; 
Ep. 90.29 earlier) in affirming that, “the universe is a most holy temple and most worthy of a 
god”.381 Human beings enter the world as a spectator of its images, not the kind of images 
crafted by hand and placed in a temple, but, “of those sensible representations of knowable 
things that the divine mind . . . has revealed.”382 Similarly, in his Platonic Questions, also 
acknowledging his debt to Plato, Plutarch states that the universe “has in it a large portion of 
vitality and divinity, which god sowed from himself in the matter and mixed with it”,383 and 
speaking of the soul of the universe he adds, “The soul, however, when it has partaken of 
intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to 
be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.”384 The universe, 
then, is infused with god, deriving its life from him and even identified with divinity.385 In the 
next question, Plato deals with the same subject, speaking of the god who stretched the soul 
through everything in the universe and thus preserved its corporeal state from dissolution (unlike 
the body of human beings which is “subject to mortality”).386 Plutarch also compares an 
individual to a temple in How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue. He speaks 
of the man making progress in the path of virtue, for whom no sin is too small to overlook, and 
no vice is condoned. Unlike the sloppy laborer who uses whatever materials come to hand to 
finish a wall, his life has a “golden foundation”.387 His life is compared to “some holy temple or 
                                                
 381 Tranq. an. 477C (Helmbold, LCL).  
 382 Tranq. an. 477C (Helmbold, LCL), alluding to Plato’s Timaeus, 92C and Epinomis, 984A.   
 383 Quaest. plat. 2, 1001B (Cherniss, LCL).  
 384 Quaest. plat. 2, 1001C (Cherniss, LCL).   
 385 See also Quaest. plat. 8.  
 386 Quaest. plat. 2, 1002C (Cherniss, LCL). There is also a passing reference in Amat.762E 
to “a god within”, citing the words of Telemachus from Homer, Od. 19.40. 
 387 Virt. prof. 86A (Babbitt, LCL) (citing Pindar, Frag. 206.1.).  
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regal palace” where each action is fitted into the place prepared for it “using reason to guide 
them.”388  
 
2.4.1.3 The Nature of Divinity 
 God orders all things,389 and “through noiseless ways advancing, guides by Justice all 
affairs of mortal men.”390 God is the creator (although the soul of the universe was not brought 
into being by him, but is self-moved, being regulated and ordered by him).391 God is the source 
of the radiant vision of philosophy, “that beauty which is for men unutterable and 
indescribable”,392 since he is great and majestic.393 God is timeless,394 he binds together the 
substance of the world and keeps it from dissolution,395 and sustains the universe.396 God’s 
qualities are described in passing as including “justice, benevolence and kindness.”397 and 
“goodness, magnanimity, kindliness, and solicitude.”398 He is the father of all that is honorable, 
and so it is his nature to bless and to help. He is ready to help because he is always standing 
near.399 Plutarch’s treatise, On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, as its name suggests, 
assumes the premise that God does repay the wrongdoer, but considers the reasons why divine 
punishment is sometimes delayed. God is the great physician, knowing when it would be 
                                                
 388 Virt. prof. 86A (Babbitt, LCL). The reference to “the god in his holy temple” in Def. orac. 437A. 
 concerns a sacrifice performed in a god’s temple in order to discern his will.  
 389 Is. Os. 382B; Dillon, Platonists, 199. 
 390 Is. Os. 381B (Babbitt, LCL), citing Euripides, Tro. 887–888 (see Plutarch, Is. Os. 172 note a). 
 391 An. procr. 1013ABC, 1014BC, E, 1015E, 1016C, 1027A; cf. Quaest. conv. 720C.  
 392 Is. Os. 383A (Babbitt, LCL).   
 393 Praec. ger. rei publ. 822B. 
 394 E Delph. 393A (Babbitt, LCL).  
 395 E Delph. 393F.  
 396 Exil. 601B; Adv. Col. 1124F.  
 397 Def. orac. 423D (Babbitt, LCL).  
 398 Superst. 167F (Babbitt, LCL).  
 399 Suav. viv. 1102D.  
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beneficial to delay punishment;400 sometimes because he wants people to learn not to be vengeful 
in applying punishment themselves,401 and at other times because he knows which souls will 
respond with repentance, given a period of grace.402 In other cases, he will punish preemptively, 
rooting out the evil in someone predisposed to it before they commit wrong.403  
 There is one Reason and one Providence which watches over all peoples, though the gods 
may be known by different names in different places, according to local custom.404 The gods are 
their own masters, not subject to anyone’s control,405 and indestructible.406 They are good 
governors,407 and are described as acting with, “moderation, adequacy, excess in nothing, and 
complete self-sufficiency.”408 In accordance with their own nature, the gods derive, “their only or 
their chief enjoyment” from “the good deeds and noble actions” of those who engage in public 
affairs.409 Indeed, they are the most important friends of people.410 Plutarch has Heracleon in On 
the Obsolescence of Oracles advance the opinion that Providence acts like “a benign and helpful 
mother, who does everything for us and watches over us.”411 This provision includes things like 
sight, hearing and medicinal agents.412 Like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch can speak of 
Nature using the same language that he uses to speak about God. But Plutarch distinguishes 
himself from the Stoics in respect to Nature. Unlike them, he does not understand there to be one 
                                                
 400 Sera 549F.  
 401 Sera 550 E–551 C. 
 402 Sera 551D.  
 403 Sera 562D. For more on Plutarch’s conception of God, see Brenk, “Heritage,” ANRW 36.1:248–349 at 
262–75.  
 404 Is. Os. 377F. 
 405 Def. orac. 426C.  
 406 Comm. not. 1074EF–1075D, against the Stoics’ claim that, though Zeus was eternal and indestructible, 
other gods were eventually consumed (since the planets were considered to be gods). 
 407 Adv. Col. 1124F.  
 408 Def. orac. 413F (Babbitt, LCL).  
 409 An seni 786B (Fowler, LCL).  
 410 Conj. praec. 140D.  
 411 Def. orac. 413C (Babbitt, LCL); see also the treatment of this topic in Stoic. rep.  
 412 Def. orac. 436D.   
    104
good, governing force, such as Reason, which doles out both good and evil as part of its good 
purposes. Rather, Nature has, “commingled” within itself two opposing principles, one of which 
guides us in a straight line to the right path, but the other down a different path, “Nature must 
have in herself the source and origin of evil, just as she contains the source and origin of 
good.”413 Nature takes the initiative in many matters, even acting above God. Nature, together 
with the Law, is described as assigning honor to gods.414 Nature is repeatedly described as the 
source of life and limbs,415 called “the most holy and great of sacred things”416 and is the one 
who implants emotions in her creatures417 and introduces people “to a conception of justice and 
law and to the worship of the gods.”418 (rather than the initiative lying with God).   
 
2.4.1.4 The Nature of Humanity 
 Plutarch puts into the mouth of one of his characters the view that, “men are divine and 
dear to God”419 Their very birth and their “becoming”, “are a gift of God to make him 
known.”420 In particular, the king is in the “image” (εἰκών) of God, and forms himself in the 
“likeness” (ὁμοίωμα) of God by his virtue,421 “and thus creates a statue most delightful of all to 
behold and most worthy of divinity”, provided the ruler upholds righteous decisions “in God’s 
likeness” (θεουδής422).423 Some the Gods wish to make divine, whereas others, having been set 
                                                
 413 Is. Os. 369D (Babbitt, LCL); see also Dillon, Platonists, 202–04.  
 414 Frat. amor. 479F.  
 415 E.g. Frat. amor. 478DEF; 479CD; 480B.  
 416 Frat. amor. 479D (Helmbold, LCL).  
 417 Am. prol. 494F.  
 418 Am. prol. 495C (Helmbold, LCL).  
 419 Gen. Socr. 593A (De Lacy, Einarson, LCL).  
 420 Lat. viv. 1129F (De Lacy, LCL).  
 421 Princ. iner. 780E (Fowler, LCL); cf. also Princ. iner. 781A.  
 422 The definition of θεουδής is “fear of God” according to “θεουδής,” LSJ, 792, but adds that it can be 
taken as θεοειδής, meaning “godlike” in works later than Homer; cf. “θεοειδής,” LSJ, 790.  
 423 Princ. iner. 780F (Fowler, LCL).  
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free from the body, become daemons that watch over people.424 They are like retired athletes, 
who cheer on those who are still running the race of life, and encourage them to reach their 
goal.425 Vice and depravity come from the soul itself and become its sickness.426 Elsewhere, 
Plutarch, citing Homer, avers that the body is the dwelling of both good and evil.427 In line with 
Plato’s own thought, souls are wanderers, exiled from their true home, who are imprisoned 
within their bodies,428 viewed as, “the encasement of their souls”.429 For this reason, persons 
should have as little association with the body as is possible in their earthy life.430 The body is 
the instrument of the soul, but the soul is granted a far loftier role; it is the instrument of God.431 
After death, the soul will be set free from the body, and travels to the realm of things invisible 
and pure where God truly rules as their king.432 The soul is imperishable and thus will never 
die.433 The honor or punishment due to the soul for its life on earth is awarded to it after death,434 
but in one passage in On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, Plutarch envisages these rewards 




                                                
 424 Gen. Socr. 593D. Dillon, Platonists, 46–47 notes the development of the theory of daemons in Plutarch 
and subsequent Middle Platonic thinkers. 
 425 Gen. Socr. 593DEF; cf. 1 Cor 9:24–27; 1 Tim 6:12; 2 Tim 2:5; 2 Tim 4:7; Heb 12:1–3; Jude 3. On this 
notion of daemons and guardian spirits in Plutarch, see Dillon, Platonists, 217–21, and Brenk, “Heritage,” ANRW 
36.1:248–349 at 275–94. 
 426 An. corp. 500C; cf. Dillon, Platonists, 208. 
 427 Virt. prof. 122E, citing Homer, Od. 4.392.  
 428 Exil. 607D.  
 429 Is. Os. 353A (Babbitt, LCL).  
 430 [Cons. Apoll.] 108CD; a common view in Middle Platonism, see Dillon, Platonists, 47. 
 431 Sept. sap. conv. 163E. For more on the soul in Plutarch, see Dillon, Platonists, 194, 202–08, 211–13. 
 432 Is. Os. 383A; cf. Suav. viv. 1105D.  
 433 Cons. ux. 611EF, 612A.  
 434 Sera 560F; cf. Suav. viv. 1105C.   
 435 Sera 561A.  
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2.4.1.5 Living out the Philosophy 
 Because Plutarch’s Moralia is such a large corpus (nearly eighty works) and since ethics 
is such a major concern of those works, it is not possible in a brief survey of this nature to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which Plutarch’s understanding of God’s 
relationship to humanity should affect how people live. Instead, I shall provide a very brief 
representative sample of his advice by drawing on some of the works cited in earlier sections. 
Wise people should ask for good things from the gods and in particular that they may gain a 
knowledge of the gods themselves, that is, a revelation of true reality.436 The true worshiper 
cannot simply rely on the knowledge of religious rites communicated to them; they must use 
reason to understand the truth.437 This reasoning must come from Philosophy.438 This is the most 
divine possession available to humanity, especially the capacity to reason concerning the gods, 
and nothing has greater power to bring true happiness.439 Those who are wise should honor the 
inanimate and incorporeal objects which point towards the Divine, recognizing them as 
instruments of God for that purpose.440 In particular, Reason directs the passions towards the 
right course.441 Reasons provides guidance in matters as diverse as, for example, caring for 
wives,442 knowing how to speak succinctly and show restraint in speech,443 how to handle 
wealth,444 avoiding envy and hate,445 and rage,446 and how to praise oneself for the right 
                                                
 436 Is. Os. 351D. 
 437 Is. Os. 352C.  
 438 Is. Os. 378A.  
 439 Is. Os. 378CD c.f. Cupid. divit. 527F. 
 440 Is. Os. 382AB.  
 441 See generally, Virt. mor. 
 442 Frat. amor. 491DE.  
 443 E.g. Garr. 510DE. 
 444 E.g. Cupid. divit. 526AB. 
 445 Inv. od. generally.  
 446 Sera 550E–551C.  
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reasons,447 among many other topics. In each of these areas of life, and many more, the person of 
virtue should copy and aspire to, “the beauty and the goodness that are his.”448 Above all, the 
soul should be ready to yield itself to the service of God, “for Him to direct it and turn it in 
whatsoever course He may desire.”449 This emphasis corresponds to a wider pattern in Middle 
Platonism. Such philosophers tended to see the telos of existence as knowing and imitating God, 
rather than the Stoic goal of living in accordance with nature.450 
 
2.4.2 Alcinous 
 Alcinous is one of two second century Middle Platonic philosophers with whom I shall 
deal briefly. Although they are both later than Paul (and even the second century dating of 
Alcinous is the best reasonable conjecture, rather than an established date),451 their ideas are 
congruent with earlier writers influenced by Middle Platonism, such as Plutarch and Philo.452 In 
the absence of other extant Middle Platonic works earlier than or contemporaneous with Paul, I 
shall draw on Alcinous and Maximus of Tyre to support our observations from Plutarch (and, in 





                                                
 447 De laude generally.  
 448 Sera 550E (De Lacy, Einarson, LCL).  
 449 Sept. sap. conv. 163E (Babbitt, LCL).  
 450 See Dillon, Platonists, 43–44, 192–93, 229. 
 451 See OCD, 53; Alcinous, Handbook, Preface, and ix–xl.   
 452 John Dillon’s commentary in Idem, Handbook, 51–211, draws out the way Alcinous’ work is directly 
dependent upon and often cites (or alludes to) the work of Plato. The sections with which I will engage evince a 
particular dependence on Plato’s Timaeus.  
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2.4.2.1 Temple Language 
 The main allusion to God’s indwelling presence, is the statement that, “by his own will 
he has filled all things with himself”, in reference to a “rousing up” of the soul of the world 
which gives it its intellect.453  
 
2.4.2.2 The Nature of Divinity 
 Alcinous surmises that whatever is prior to actualized intellect, as actualized intellect is 
superior to potential intellect, and potential intellect is to the soul, must be God, the “unmoved 
mover” of Aristotle.454 Since nothing finer than God’s thoughts can be conceived, God must be 
eternally thinking about his own thoughts,455 and his own thoughts are eternal and unchanging.456  
This God is also perfect in every way; in beauty, truth and goodness and the Father of all 
things.457 God has no parts, and so, is incorporeal.458 The world always existed but God endowed 
it with soul and intellect and brought order to the world soul, that has also existed eternally.459 
On the other hand, God created the other divinities (including daemons).460 Of all species, 
Alcinous considers humanity to be “most akin to the gods” and so God himself created people, 
and sent down the appropriate number of souls to earth (equal to the stars) and expounded his 
revelation of the order of things to them (as opposed to animals, fish and birds, whose creation is 
attributed to lesser gods).461 
                                                
 453 Idem, Handbook, 165.10.3.1–2 (18). The numbers in parentheses denote the page numbers in Dillon’s 
translation.  
 454 Idem, Handbook, 164.10.2.18–26 (17) and see Dillon’s commentary on 103.  
 455 Idem, Handbook, 164.10.3.27–29 (17–18).  
 456 Idem, Handbook, 163.9.30–35 (16).  
 457 Idem, Handbook, 164.10.31–41 (18).  
 458 Idem, Handbook, 165.34–166.14 (19).  
 459 Idem, Handbook, 169.14.3–170.4 (23–24).  
 460 Idem, Handbook, 171.15.1.15–2.23 (25).  
 461 Idem, Handbook, 171.1.38–172.2.12 (26), drawing on Plato, Tim. 41.BCD.  
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2.4.2.3 The Nature of Humanity 
 The soul who engages in contemplation of the divine and its thoughts achieves a state of 
wisdom which is described, by negation as, “no other than likeness to the divine”.462 The soul’s 
nature is to rule and it is, “imperishable and indestructible.”463 
 
2.4.2.4 Living out the Philosophy 
 Despite being described as “ineffable”, it is possible for the seeker after him to grasp him 
by the intellect. Alcinous outlines a number of paths to do so, by meditating on his attributes, by 
analogy, by contemplating his beauty by a series of steps; from beauty in bodies, to souls, to laws 
and on to a final “intuition of the Good”, that becomes like a light shining on the soul as it 
ascends on its path towards God.464 Likeness of God, declares Alcinous, following Plato, 
consists  at least in being just, and preferably in being, “intelligent, and just, and pious.”465 This 
likeness to God is attained by those who have a “suitable nature” and who, further, train that 
nature by the right habits and disciplines of philosophy, reason and education. This must be 
coupled by a distancing of oneself from worldly concerns, and a correspondent intimacy with 
“intelligible reality”.466 Perhaps surprisingly for a Jewish or Christian reader, however, is that the 
god whose likeness Alcinous says souls should imitate is not the supreme God, but the “god in 
the heavens” described in chapter 10.467 The goal of the souls is to return to their “kindred star” 
                                                
 462 Idem, Handbook, 153.2.5–8 (4); cf. 177.25.34 (33); 181.28.1.19–20 (37), citing Plato.  
 463 Idem, Handbook, 177.25.33–35 (33).  
 464 Idem, Handbook, 165.10.4–6 (18–19).  
 465 Idem, Handbook, 181.28.22–30 (37), and see the references from Plato cited there and the commentary 
on (170).  
 466 Idem, Handbook, 182.4.3–8 (38).  
 467 Idem, Handbook, 181.28.3.44–46 (38).  
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and the key to achieving this goal is to achieve dominance over the sensations that would seek to 
attach themselves to them from the body.468 
 
2.4.3 Maximus of Tyre 
 Little is known of Maximus of Tyre, other than his second century C.E. date. We have 41 
extant Lectures or Philosophical Orations, that seems to have been delivered during the reign of 
Commodus in Rome. His work clearly draws on Middle Platonic thought.469 
 
2.4.3.1 Sacrifice language 
 Although Maximus does not directly use the language of sacrifice, he does speak of the 
kind of worship that the gods require. In his oration on the images of the Gods, he emphasizes 
that the gods do not need images, statues or dedications; rather, this is more for the benefit of 
humanity in its own weakness. Yet, “People whose memories are strong, and who can reach 
straight out for the heavens with their souls and encounter the divine, may perhaps have no need 
of images”.470 Those who are advanced in their understanding of their worship, “honour them, 
but by word of mouth alone, believing that the gods have no need of images and dedications”,471 
that would include sacrifices. Direct encounter with the divine and the prayers and praises of the 
lips are what is needed, rather than literal sacrifices. 
   
 
                                                
 468 Idem, Handbook, 172.16.2.10–19 (26), drawing on Plato, Tim. 42AB.  
 469 See OCD, 915 and the introduction to M. B. Trapp, Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
 470 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 2.2. All translations are taken from Idem, Maximus,  
 471 Or. 2.1.  
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2.4.3.2 Temple Language 
 There are two obvious instances of ‘indwelling’ language in Maximus. The first of these 
reads, “God has breathed expectation of the Good into the human race like a spark of life”472 but 
the second says that Nature “has breathed into him [man] an invisible spark to ensure his 
survival, a spark which men call intelligence, thanks to which his continued survival is 
assured.”473 Though Maximus uses the language of ‘spark’ in both instances, one statement 
refers to an expectation of “the Good” (used by Maximus for the ideal of virtue, as we shall see 
below) and the other to intelligence.474 However, what is of interest is that in the first sentence 
the subject is God, and in the second it is Nature. I shall also observe below the way that 
different functions are attributed to God and to Nature in Maximus’s philosophy. 
 
2.4.3.3 The Nature of Divinity 
 God is described in a number of places as Father and Creator.475 He is immortal and free 
from emotion.476 He is wiser than man,477 and the source of all beauty, himself beautiful.478 God 
is not divided between soul and body, as humans are, but rather, he is incorporeal, “of a single 
nature, pure intelligence and knowledge and reason.”479 God is understood as “the most perfect 
form of intellect . . . which thinks all things for ever at the same time,”480 prompting the 
translator, Michael B. Trapp, to compare Maximus to the writer I have just surveyed, Alcinous, 
                                                
 472 Or. 29.6. 
 473 Or. 31.4.  
 474 A further reference to a spark, this time to philosophy, that knows and communicates to humanity the 
way to pray, can be found in Or. 5.8.   
 475 Or. 2.10; 11.5; 11.9, 12; 41.2.  
 476 Or. 9.2.  
 477 Or. 6.1.  
 478 Or. 11.11.  
 479 Or. 27.8.  
 480 Or. 11.8; cf. 11.9.  
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“where one sees the same slide from God as supreme Intelligible to God as supreme 
Intelligence.”481 In one revealing Oration that addresses the topic of prayer, Maximus 
distinguishes between the jurisdiction of different powers, “Of all the things which men pray to 
obtain, some are under the control of Providence, some are enforced by Destiny, some are at the 
mercy of fickle Fortune, and some are regulated by Science. Providence is God’s work, Destiny 
the work of Necessity, Science the work of man, and Fortune the work of blind Chance.”482 
Therefore, the object and goal of prayer must be related to the particular power that might 
determine the answer and in some cases, prayer is unnecessary since ineffectual, “nothing that 
falls under the heading of Providence is to be requested or prayed for.”483 Although the examples 
I have examined from Stoic writers sometimes suggest fine distinctions between, for instance, 
Nature and God, many of them blur the boundaries considerably. Maximus, by contrast, 
demarcates quite separate roles for Nature, Providence, Necessity and Chance in a way that 
seems foreign to Stoicism.484 Fate is impersonal, acting in a regular, impartial manner.485 God is 
also described as King;486 he administers the heavens,487 and governs skillfully with “beauty and 
artistry and knowledge”, a knowledge which consists in virtue.488 His government and direction 
of the universe is compared to a master musician and conductor, a mechanic who understands 
perfectly the machines he operates (compared to the human power of reasoning), a helmsman 
                                                
 481 Trapp, Maximus, 102–03; comparing this passage with Alcinous, Handbook, 164.10 (18), that was cited 
in the discussion on the “Nature of Divinity” in Alcinous.   
 482 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 5.4.  
 483 Or. 5.4.  
 484 Alexander of Aphrodisias, a philosopher from c. 200 C.E., referring to the Stoic view of freedom, 
writes, “everything they do is done of necessity” (Alexander, On fate 181,13–182,20 (SVF 2.979)); translation from 
Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 62G, 389–90. For more on fate and necessity in Stoicism, see Rist, 
Philosophy, 112–32 and especially Bobzien, Determinism.  
 485 Or. 13.4.  
 486 Or. 11.5.  
 487 Or. 8.8.  
 488 Or. 27.8.  
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who watches the sea, and a doctor whose knowledge of disease and patients leads to the right 
diagnosis.489 Despite what I have noted about the separate dispensations of God, Fate, 
Providence and Chance, at the same time, Maximus claims that in governing, he is assisted by 
“Chance and Opportunity” but that they are merely “secondary influences”; God is the “all-
controlling agent in human affairs.”490 Having made the claim that God is all-controlling, 
Maximus is quick to point out that evil does not come from the hand of God, nor through Fate.491 
In this, as Trapp points out, Maximus distances evil from Fate and Providence in a way quite 
different to Stoic writers, who speak more of only seeming evils that turn out for the best.492 
Sometimes these evils arise from God’s work but they are ancillary, not caused or intended by 
God, like the anvil and heat from the furnace that are “necessary consequences” of the work 
done by the master craftsman (this image again), rather than the direct product of his work.493   
 Gods also exist and lend their aid to humanity.494 Although the Universe is the shared 
home of both gods and people, the gods do not dwell in the earth but in heaven.495 Below the 
gods are the daemons, who are superior to men, since they relate more closely to God than 
people do. Daemons share in kinship with both, and form a kind of bridge between God and 
humanity.496 These daemons share in God’s immortality but are susceptible to emotions in a way 
that God is not.497 They are disembodied souls who became daemons and act as watchers or 
guardian angels; acting on behalf of the good and punishing the wicked.498 
                                                
 489 Or. 13.3–4; cf. also Or. 41.4 for the craftsman analogy.  
 490 Or. 13.7, citing Plato, Leg. 709bc. 
 491 Or. 13.8.  
 492 Trapp, Maximus, 123 note 33.  
 493 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 41.4; cf. 41.5.  
 494 Or. 2.1.  
 495 Or. 13.6.  
 496 Or. 8.8.  
 497 Or. 9.2.  
 498 Or. 9.6–7; 13.6.  
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2.4.3.4 The Nature of Humanity 
 Maximus assumes that the soul is very close to God and like him in nature.499 The soul is 
a compound of both the mortal and the immortal, that has different functions in relation to its 
components, including perception, intellect and prudence, and “in virtue of its immortal 
component it unites with the divine, in that it is capable of thought, reasoning, learning, and 
knowledge”500 There is a “sparse”, yet real, element of good in human nature that can reap a 
harvest in the lives of great pupils if they fan into flame the “living, breathing spark that alone 
knows how to pray” by availing themselves of philosophy.501 Since the soul comes from “the 
same stock as Beauty itself”, it is able to recollect the true Beauty that is “immortal and 
ineffable.”502 There are rewards and punishments for people, awarded to them by God (vice to 
those of a wicked nature and virtue to those of a good nature).503 This assumes that virtue and 
vice come from within the souls of people,504 and, despite Maximus’s idea of providence and 
fate, vice can be freely chosen in such a way that God is blameless for the fault.505 Despite this, 
elsewhere, Maximus contends that Virtue is distributed by God, and yet God’s assistance is 
needed in the fight between Virtue and Vice, to enable individuals to be victorious in the 
struggle.506 The soul rules over the body,507 holding it together as if a ship in the stormy sea of 
life.508 On earth, the soul is like a captive to the body and life is like dreaming while it is still 
                                                
 499 Or. 2.3, and thus, unlike the animals, in that humans can know God by virtue of reason (see Or. 41.5).  
 500 Or. 6.4; cf. also Or. 9.6; 33.7. 
 501 Or. 5.8.  
 502 Or. 21.7–8.   
 503 Or. 8.7.   
 504 Assumed by Or. 34.3.   
 505 Or. 41.5.  
 506 Or. 38.6.  
 507 Or. 7.2; 9.6.  
 508 Or. 9.6; 40.5.  
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entrapped in the flesh.509 The soul and body are intertwined and, “the one is implicated in the 
discomforts and pleasures of the other.”510 However, the soul has innate knowledge (“self-
taught”) that can be awakened by Reason, and Reason then allows the soul to at least dimly 
perceive reality.511 Reason is described as acting like a midwife to the pregnant soul,512 but in 
this analogy the soul is the procreator; it has its own powers of discovery, “which are self-
generated, natural and innate.”513 However, the soul longs to be free from the body and feels no 
regret to shed its skin, like a prisoner set free from confinement or a man who swims free to 
shore.514 At this point reality is at last visible to the soul who joins the gods, “as a member of the 
divine host led and commanded by Zeus.”515 The virtuous soul becomes a “daimon”, who 
watches over its former peers for whom it feels pity.516 
  
2.4.3.5 Living out the Philosophy 
 In order for the soul to ascend to God it must focus its attention on him. The intellect will 
see and hear the things of the Divine, “by bringing to bear an upright, vigorous soul, by fixing its 
gaze firmly on that pure light . . . and entrusting its guidance to true Reason and vigorous 
Love,”517 and eventually by stripping off the clothing of the body.518 On this earth, the good 
person should live a life of virtuous action,519 doing no wrong.520 For this, moral education is 
                                                
 509 Or. 10.3–5.  
 510 Or. 28.2.   
 511 Or. 10.3, 9.  
 512 Or. 10.4.  
 513 Or. 10.5.  
 514 Or. 7.5; 9.6; cf. 10.9.  
 515 Or. 10.9.   
 516 Or. 9.6.  
 517 Or. 11.10.   
 518 Or. 11.11.  
 519 Or. 15.6, 10.  
 520 Or. 12.  
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needed,521 and people should imitate God (for instance, his “preservative and affectionate and 
paternal qualities”),522 and seize hold of “the Good”, the highest and greatest of all virtue, which 
can neither be increased nor decreased.523 At the same time, the soul must resist vice, restraining 
its impulses by preserving its recollections of God, like a charioteer who restrains the impulses of 
the horses driving the chariot.524  
 
2.4.4 Summary of our Findings from Middle Platonism 
 
2.4.4.1 Summary of Sacrifice Language 
 Plutarch emphasizes a pure motivation in worship, but also speaks of other things that 
could count as a sacrifice, such as trusting in and understanding the gods and study and seeking 
after divine truth. Additionally, the return of favor to parents is compared to a sacrifice in the 
temple. Maximus of Tyre allows for worshiping God with prayer and contemplation as if this 
could function as a substitute for a physical sacrifice. 
 
2.4.4.2 Summary of Temple Language  
 Plutarch speaks of the universe as a holy temple (as Seneca did also), which has been 
sowed with divinity and is identified with God. A person can also be a temple, guided by reason 
in the path of virtue, where each action is fitted in its rightful place, just as with each part of the 
temple. Alcinous agrees that God fills all things with himself, and Maximus says that God and 
Nature have breathed into people the expectation of good and the spark of intelligence.   
                                                
 521 Or. 27.9.  
 522 Or. 35.2; cf. 26.9.  
 523 Or. 39.1, 3; 40.3, 4.  
 524 Or. 41.5.  
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2.4.4.3 Summary of the Nature of Divinity 
 Plutarch speaks of God as the creator and sustainer of the universe and the source of 
philosophy. He is beneficent, timeless and incorporeal. There is one Reason and Providence, and 
God sends or delays punishment at the appropriate time. The gods are known by different names 
in different places and act as good governors. Unlike the Stoics, Plutarch sees Nature as the 
source of both good and evil. It can take the initiative and act almost independently of God. 
Alcinous sees God more as pure intellect, a kind of Aristotelean unmoved mover. God is 
occupied with thinking about his own perfect thoughts. He endowed the pre-existing world with 
intellect or soul and brought order to the world soul. He communicates with people and created 
both divinities and daemons. Maximus speaks of God as father, creator, immortal incorporeal 
(like Alcinous) and source of all beauty and goodness. Like Alcinous, God is conceived as 
perfect intelligence. Yet not everything is under his control, and Maximus envisages separate 
roles for Nature and Providence. Elsewhere he speaks of God governing with the assistance of 
Chance and Opportunity. Evil is not the direct result of God’s work and is distinct from Fate and 
Providence. The gods help people but they reside in the heavens, not the earth. 
 
2.4.4.4 Summary of the Nature of Humanity 
 Plutarch understands humanity as divine, and very dear to God. The king in particular is 
an image of God and can become like God. Some are made divine by God, others are set free 
from the body and become daemons after death. Both good and evil resides in the soul. After 
death the soul is set free and travels to the divine realm. Honor and punishment are meted out 
after death, but to living descendants. Alcinous, like Plutarch, sees humanity as most akin to the 
gods. The soul who contemplates the divine can become like it and is imperishable. Maximus 
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agrees with both writers that the soul is like God, and since it is a compound of both the mortal 
and immortal, it can unite with the divine. Humans can recollect the beauty of the divine and fan 
into flame the divine spark within them. Virtue and vice come from within and are appropriately 
rewarded or punished. God can aid these virtues. The soul rules the body and can be awakened 
by reason and set free. 
 
2.4.4.5 Summary of Living out the Philosophy 
 Plutarch urges his audience to use reason to seek the revelation of God. A person should 
honor what points to the divine, and follow Reason’s guidance with the passions and live a 
temperate life by imitating God’s beauty and goodness and let themselves be directed by God’s 
design. Alcinous claims that one can grasp God by the intellect and become like him in his 
virtues, although, unlike the other writers, he concedes that it is not the supreme God whom we 
can imitate but only the “god in the heavens”. This process comes about through discipline, 
moral education and by distancing oneself from the body and worldly concerns. Maximus calls 
his readers to be guided by Reason and thus fix their gaze on the divine. They should live a life 
of virtue and imitate God through moral education; seizing the good and resisting Vice.  
 
2.5 Skepticism 
 The “Academy” was the name given to the school founded by Plato in the fourth century 
B.C.E. The “New Academy” was associated more with Skepticism than Platonism,525 and under 
heads such as Carneades (214/3–129/8 B.C.E.),526 and Philon of Larissa (159/8–84/3 B.C.E.),  
argued for the impossibility of certain knowledge and therefore the suspension of judgment on 
                                                
 525 OCD, 2.  
 526 OCD, 282; Kristeller, Philosophers, 87–99.  
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all matters, though Philon, following Carneades, argued for a theory of “plausible impressions” 
that would allow Skeptics to follow the view they deemed most convincing. Cicero was a 
devoted follower of Philon.527  
 
2.5.1 Cicero 
 Here I shall be considering Cicero’s own views, as distinct from his summaries of other 
schools covered elsewhere in this chapter. Marcus Tulles Cicero (106–43 B.C.E.), came from a 
wealthy and well-connected family, and rose through the ranks to become consul. He studied 
both philosophy and rhetoric and wrote widely in both fields, through varying political 
fortunes.528 In this survey I shall limit my investigations to his philosophical works.    
 
2.5.1.1 Sacrifice Language 
 At the start of the second book of De Legibus, Cicero uses the metaphor of adoption to 
speak of the relationship between Rome and its citizens. Although, in common with other 
Italians, they might be expected to give allegiance to the fatherland in which they were born, 
Cicero uses a sacrificial image to urge total consecration to Rome, “For her it is our duty to die, 
to her to give ourselves entirely, to place on her altar, and, as it were, to dedicate to her service, 
                                                
 527 OCD, 1133; Idem, Philosophers, 99–103.  
 528 OCD, 1514–19; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 380–82. For overviews of Cicero’s philosophical thought, see 
e.g. Long, “Roman,” 184–210 at 198–200; MacKendrick, Cicero, 1–28; Powell, “Introduction,” 1–35 and Malcolm 
Schofield, “Writing Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Cicero (ed. Catherine Steel; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 73–87. For biographies of Cicero, see W. K. Lacey, Cicero and the End of the 
Roman Republic (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978); Kathryn Tempest, Cicero: Politics and Persuasion in 
Ancient Rome (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), and Anthony Corbeill, “Cicero and the Intellectual Milieu of 
the Late Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Cicero (ed. Catherine Steel; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 9–24 and for a biographical portrait that allows Cicero to speak for himself, see D. R 
Shackleton Bailey, Cicero. Classical Life and Letters (New York: Scribner, 1971).  
    120
all that we possess.” (pro qua mori et cui nos totos dedere et in qua nostra omnia ponere et quasi 
consecrare debemus).529 
 Later, in Cicero’s laws on religion, he requires that the worshiper approach the gods in 
purity, “bringing piety”.530 Although the requirement of purity is the normal standard for worship 
of the gods, Cicero then clarifies his instructions with the expansion, “that is, purity of mind, for 
everything is included in that” and, while still requiring bodily purity in worship, he avers, “we 
ought to be much more careful about the mind.”531 Further, the rule that piety should be brought 
“means that uprightness is pleasing to God” as well as open access to his presence for all.532 
While the requirements of literal sacrifice are not waived,533 Cicero is clear that mental and 
spiritual purity are even more important. 
 
2.5.1.2 Temple Language 
 Philosophy teaches us to know ourselves, according to Cicero. The one who knows 
himself, will recognize something essential to his being, “he has a divine element within him, 
and will think of his own inner nature as a kind of consecrated image of God.”534 He cites, 
seemingly with approval, the view of Socrates that a divine influence (δαιμόνιον) constrains him 
and ought to be obeyed.535 In his work De divinatione, Cicero understands that the universe, “is 
wholly filled with the Eternal Intelligence and the Divine Mind” which influences the human 
                                                
 529 Cicero, Leg. 2.2.5 (Keyes, LCL).   
 530 Leg. 2.8.19 (Keyes, LCL).   
 531 Leg. 2.10.24 (Keyes, LCL).  
 532 Leg. 2.10.25 (Keyes, LCL).  
 533 And see Leg. 1.15.43 (Keyes, LCL), where he upholds “rites and pious observances in honour of the 
gods”, and that “the sacred rites and ceremonies” should be retained in order to preserve “the institutions of our 
forefathers” according to Div. 2.72.148 (Falconer, LCL).  
 534 Leg. 1.22.59 (Keyes, LCL). 
 535 Div. 1.54.122; cf. 1.53.120.  
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soul who is brought into contact with it, usually in sleep.536 This same idea that the Gods fill the 
universe is expounded using temple terminology in the second book of De Legibus, where 
Cicero substantiates his argument that shrines to the gods should not be shut up in homes or 
temples, “seeing that this whole universe is their temple and home” (quorumque hic mundus 
omnis templum esset et domus),537 in agreement with Seneca and Plutarch. Cicero then connects 
the dedication of Roman temples to the deification of intellect, piety, virtue and good faith, and 
says of these qualities, “the purpose being that those who possess them (and all good men do) 
should believe that the gods themselves are established within their own souls.”538 Cicero cites, 
with approval, the words of Thales of Miletus (the pre-Socratic seventh-sixth century B.C.E. 
philosopher), “that men ought to believe that everything they see is filled with the gods.”539 In 
particular, though all have immortal souls, the souls of those who are brave and good can be 
described as “divine”.540 The final book (Book 6) of De republica narrates the mystical dream of 
Scipio (Somnium Scipionis), a Roman general from an earlier era. As such, it is difficult to be 
sure whether the beliefs expressed by Scipio are identical to those of Cicero and some of his 
ideas may be influenced by Stoicism. Since Cicero does not provide a riposte to the views 
expressed, they are narrated here rather than in the section on Stoic writings. In the dream, Scipio 
is visited by his father Paulus, who, in passing, alludes to his conviction that everything which 
                                                
 536 Div. 1.49.110 (Falconer, LCL); cf. also Div. 1.52.118. 
 537 Leg. 2.10.26 (Keyes, LCL). We should also note in passing that Cicero makes mention of Xerxes 
burning the temples at Athens, for “he thought it sacrilege to keep the gods whose home is the whole universe shut 
up within walls.” (Resp. 3.9.14 (Keyes, LCL).) The universe is described as their home (domus) rather than temple, 
but in the immediate literary context the contrast with the Athenian temples could suggest that the universe is a 
superior temple to the Athenian temples.   
 538 Leg. 2.11.28 (Keyes, LCL).  
 539 Leg. 2.11.26 (Keyes, LCL), which is taken from Aristotle, De an. 1. 411 A, according to 403 note 3. 
 540 Leg. 2.11.27 (Keyes, LCL).  
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Scipio sees is God’s temple.541 Later in the dream, Africanus claims that Scipio is a god, “if a 
god is that which lives, feels, remembers, and foresees, and which rules, governs, and moves the 
body over which it is set, just as the supreme God above us rules this universe”, comparing the 
“immortal spirit” ruling his body to the eternal God ruling the universe.542 This again is 
suggestive of the concept of the divine ruling the body (the idea of a genius or daemon) which 
we saw in Stoic literature.  
 Further, in Tusculanae disputationes, Cicero contends for the importance of the view that 
there are divine elements in souls.543 Whatever else he knows about the soul, “it is divine” and 
resembles the soul of God.544 In a passing comment, Cicero alludes to “the God who is master 
within us” (dominans ille in nobis deus).545 
 
2.5.1.3 The Nature of Divinity 
 God is a divine mind and a god “of transcendent power.”546 He knows “to their innermost 
depths” all that people think and do.547 God is the one who begets human beings and yet, 
“Nature, alone and unaided, goes a step farther” by strengthening the reason of people,548 and 
sustaining the universe.549 Law also is pictured as a god-like figure, since it is, “something 
eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition.” It is nothing 
                                                
 541 Resp. 6.15.15. The one caveat to this finding is that the translator Clinton W. Keyes, remarks that 
“Templum originally meant a region of the sky marked off for purposes of divination.” (Keyes, LCL, 267 note 1). If 
this is relevant to the saying, it makes the reference a less certain one for our purposes. That said, we have seen 
elsewhere that the universe is frequently considered to be the temple of the gods.  
 542 Resp. 6.24.26 (Keyes, LCL).  
 543 Tusc. 1.24.56.  
 544 Tusc. 1.25.62 (King, LCL); so also Tusc. 1.26.65; 1.27.66–67; Parad. 1.14.  
 545 Tusc. 1.30.74 (King, LCL).  
 546 Leg. 1.7.23 (Keyes, LCL). 
 547 Div. 1.11.17 (Falconer, LCL).  
 548 Leg. 1.7.26–27.  
 549 lib. inc. fr. 2.  
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less than, “the primal and ultimate mind of God”,550 equated with reason and contemporary with 
God, who would not be able to function without it, “it is coeval with that God who guards and 
rules heaven and earth. For the divine mind cannot exist without reason”.551 Yet, elsewhere God 
is described as the “author”, “promulgator” and “enforcing judge” of this Law.552 The gods rule 
over all things but they are benevolent, while also taking account of the good and evil characters 
of people.553 Either the gods or mother nature appoint the day of death.554 There is at least one 
recorded instance of a man (Romulus, the founder of Rome) being added to the number of the 
gods.555  
  
2.5.1.4 The Nature of Humanity 
 According to Cicero, humanity has a highly exalted status. The human soul has the divine 
soul as its source.556 Human beings are the only creatures who share with God in reason and 
thought and so can attain to wisdom.557 This is particularly so of those who practice divination 
and “seem to approach very near to the divine spirit of the gods”.558 This right reason is 
expressed in Law and so it follows that humans share Law in common with the gods.559 Gods 
and human beings share the universe as one commonwealth.560 The soul was generated by God 
and thus share a kind of “blood relationship”. Following this, only humans of all creatures have a 
                                                
 550 Leg. 2.4.8 (Keyes, LCL).  
 551 Leg. 2.4.8–10 (Keyes, LCL).  
 552 Resp. 2.22.23.  
 553 Leg. 2.7.15–16. Their existence is believed in by “natural instinct” and their nature “by the exercise of 
reason” according to Tusc. 1.16.36 (King, LCL). 
 554 Tusc. 1.49.118; cf. Div. 1.51.117.  
 555 Resp. 2.10.17.  
 556 Div. 1.32.70; 1.49.110; cf. Amic. 4.13.  
 557 Leg. 1.7.22–23.  
 558 Div. 1.18.34 (Falconer, LCL).  
 559 Leg. 1.7.23; cf. Leg. 1.6.18–19, where the Law is seen as the highest reason, implanted in Nature, an 
intelligent power that preceded any written law.  
 560 Leg. 1.7.23; Resp. 1.13.20.  
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knowledge of God.561 Humans share in his likeness and can exhibit Virtue, which is Nature at its 
pinnacle,562 or reason “completely developed.”563 The life of the mind that is free from the body 
can be like that of a god (divina vita est),564 since it is immortal and can see all that there is in 
nature.565 Cicero records the teaching of the ancients that after death, life continues in a new 
mode “which often served as a guide to heaven for illustrious men and women”, some of whom 
became as gods.566 Cicero also alludes to the view that humans’ ultimate destination is to be gods 
or to be in company with the gods.567 
   
2.5.1.5 Living out the Philosophy 
 According to De Legibus, the person who realizes that they have within themselves this 
divine spark will examine themselves, grasp the means given to them to attain wisdom, perceive 
the path to be a good and happy man and, “so he will always act and think in a way worthy of so 
great a gift of the gods.”568 Their mind will always and only meditate on divine and eternal 
subjects.569 According to the god at Delphi, this will cause it to, “feel its union with the divine 
mind” and its desire for gaining immortality will be kindled.570 Such a person will abandon their 
bondage to their body and its desires, know virtue, leave behind fear of suffering and death and 
know itself. This will include recognizing all who are joined to them by Nature, and take up, “the 
worship of the gods and pure religion”. Their mental and spiritual vision will concern itself with 
                                                
 561 Leg. 1.7.24.  
 562 Leg. 1.7.25.  
 563 Leg. 1.16.45 (Keyes, LCL); cf. Div. 1.30.65.  
 564 lib. inc. fr. 2; cf. Div. 1.57.129.  
 565 Div. 1.51.115; 1.57.131.  
 566 Tusc. 1.12.27–1.13.29 (King, LCL).  
 567 Tusc. 1.32.76.  
 568 Leg. 1.22.59 (Keyes, LCL).  
 569 Resp. 1.17.28.  
 570 Tusc. 5.25.70 (King, LCL).  
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choosing the good and rejecting the bad, and recognizing the place of each being in the universe, 
whether it be divine and eternal or mortal and transient. They shall come to see their place as a 
“citizen of the whole universe” and give themselves to the, “ruler and governor of the 
universe.”571 Virtue is attained by knowing the “principles of right living” but bad habits can 
breed a corruption which stamps out the sparks of fire kindled within people by Nature.572 
  
2.6 Neopythagoreanism 
 Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.E., c. 582–500 B.C.E.) founded a school of philosophy that 
became known as Pythagoreanism. This philosophy contained both scientific and religious 
aspects. The religious tradition emphasized the superiority of the soul over the body, especially 
in relation to its teaching on the immortality and transmigration of the soul (or metempsychosis), 
that led to vegetarianism and the forbidding of animal sacrifice (since a soul may take up 
residence in an animal).573 During the Hellenistic era, there was a renewed interest in 
Pythagoreanism, now known as Neopythagoreanism.574 Much of the writings of the most 
important Neopythagorean writers (such as as Nigidius Figulus, Nicomachus of Gerasa, 
Moderatus of Gades or Numenius of Apamea) have either not survived, survived in very 
fragmentary form or do not contain anything of significance for our enquiry. However, via the 
work of Philostratus, a late second or early third century writer,575 we have been left significant 
traditions concerning both the life and letters of Apollonius of Tyana, to whom I now turn.  
 
                                                
 571 Leg. 1.23.60–62 (Keyes, LCL).  
 572 Leg. 1.11.32–1.12.33.  
 573 OCD, 1245–46. See also Seneca, Ep. 108. 19–22; Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 3.19.1.  
 574 OCD, 1008; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 382–84.  
 575 OCD, 1137.  
    126
2.6.1 Apollonius of Tyana, according to Philostratus 
 According to his biographer, Philostratus, Apollonius was born in Tyana, in Cappadocia 
around the beginning of the first century C.E. and died during the reign of Nerva. Philostratus 
portrays him as an itinerant ascetic wandering holy man and Neoplatonic philosopher.576  
 
2.6.1.1 Sacrifice Language  
 As we have seen, Pythagoras, like those who followed after him, disdained animal 
sacrifices, instructing, “not to let victims be brought for sacrifice to the gods, and to worship only 
at the altar unstained with blood.”577 Philostratus elaborates on the sacrifices which Pythagoras 
offered in their place; “he never defiled altars with blood (μὴ γὰρ αἱμάττειν τοὺς βωμούς); 
instead honey cakes, frankincense, and hymns were this Master’s offerings to the gods (καὶ τὸ 
ἐφυμνῆσαι, φοιτᾶν ταῦτα τοῖς θεοῖς παρὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου).578 Here it is clear that 
Pythagoras offered inanimate physical sacrifices (such as honey cakes and frankincense) but that 
hymns were also considered a kind of sacrifice. When Apollonius defends the philosophical path 
he chose, he points to the greatness and “ineffable wisdom” of Pythagoras because, “he 
approached altars in purity, he kept his stomach undefiled by the flesh of living things.”579 These 
“humble sacrifices” give greater pleasure to the gods, “than those who spill the blood of bulls for 
them.”580 In the same vein, Philostratus emphasizes the continuity between Pythagoras and the 
first century Apollonius, when he reports that during the latter’s visit to the tomb of the 
Achaeans, he made many funeral speeches, “and many heroic sacrifices of a bloodless and pure 
                                                
 576 OCD, 124; Idem, Backgrounds, 384–86.  
 577 DL 8.1.22.   
 578 Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 1.1.1 (Jones, LCL, 2005).  
 579 Vit. Apoll. 6.11.3 (Jones, LCL, 2005). 
 580 Vit. Apoll. 6.11.6 (Jones, LCL, 2005).  
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kind” (πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἀναίμων τε καὶ καθαρῶν καθαγίσας).581 It is not specified, however, 
whether these are physical sacrifices or spiritual sacrifices (such as hymns). What truly pleases 
the gods is not sacrifices, but the acquisition of wisdom and good works towards the 
deserving.582 Eusebius, a Roman historian and Christian apologist of the third and fourth 
centuries also cites a purported fragment of Apollonius, that states that God rejects physical 
sacrifice in favor of pure speech and a noble mind.583 In an earlier passage Apollonius claims to 
know how the deity chooses to receive worship, as well as the identity of virtue, justice and 
chastity. These things can only be discerned by the soul, “If it is pure and unblemished when it 
apprehends them, in my opinion it soars much higher than the Caucasus here.”584 Additionally, 
one such who prophesies “become divine” (θεῖοί) under its influence, “with no pollution 
besmirching his soul, and no scars of sin traced on his mind.”585   
 
2.6.1.2 The Nature of Divinity 
 God is the creator of the universe; everything comes from him.586 The “eternal god” 
(θεὸς ἀίδιος) is also the “first substance” who acts and is acted upon and is at one with all.587 The 
gods reveal themselves to people, especially those who pursue philosophy, and in contexts like 
the temple of Asclepius.588 As we have seen, the deity cares for people and loves to receive 
                                                
 581 Vit. Apoll. 4.11.1 (Jones, LCL, 2005); cf. also his aversion to animal sacrifices recorded in Vit. Apoll. 
1.10.1–2; 1.24.3; 1.31.1–1.32.2.1; 1.38.1; 8.7.30; Ep. 27. 
 582 Ep. 26. 
 583 Eusebius, Praep. ev. 4.13.  
 584 Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 2.5.3 (Jones, LCL, 2005).  
 585 Vit. Apoll. 3.42.1–2 (Jones, LCL, 2005). 
 586 Vit. Apoll. 8.7.22.  
 587 Ep. 58.3. Sextus Empiricus, the third century C.E. philosopher documents the view of Pythagoras and 
others that “there is one spirit which pervades, like a soul, the whole Universe” (Sextus Empiricus, Phys. 1.128 
(Bury, LCL).)  
 588 Vit. Apoll. 1.1.1–3, 7; 2.5.3.  
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worship. They reward the sincere and those who are free from sin with every blessing.589 This 
worship does not need to consist of sacrifices.590 They provide for all but give preference, firstly 
to “virtuous students of wisdom” and next to “innocent people”.591 Neither God nor people can 
“absolve” (or purify; ἀπονίπτω) a murderer.592 Human should not “pry into the intentions of the 
gods”.593 
 
2.6.1.3 The Nature of Humanity 
 As we have already observed, Apollonius, in common with Pythagoras, understood souls 
to transmigrate; moving from one body to another.594 Human beings have a kind of kinship with 
the gods that they do not share with any other creature.595 Their soul is immortal.596 There is no 
such thing as a true death, but only a passing from one thing to another, as when the whole 
dissolves into its parts or vice versa.597 At death a person is both described as becoming a god 
(ὅταν θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γένηται) and going to God.598 A later second century C.E. writer, 
Atticus Gellius, claimed that Pythagoreans located evil impulses within people, who harm 
themselves “by their own purpose and determination”.599  
  
 
                                                
 589 Vit. Apoll. 1.1.11.  
 590 Ep. 26.  
 591 Vit. Apoll. 2.39.3.  
 592 Vit. Apoll. 8.7.23 (Jones, LCL, 2005).  
 593 Vit. Apoll. 8.23.1 (Conybeare, LCL, 1912), which seems more accurate than Jones’ more recent 2005 
translation, which renders θεῶν βουλάς as “decisions of heaven” rather than those of God. 
 594 Vit. Apoll. 3.19.1.  
 595 Vit. Apoll. 8.7.20.  
 596 Vit. Apoll. 8.31.3.  
 597 Ep. 58.1–2.  
 598 Ep. 58.4.   
 599 Aulus Gellius, Noct. att. 7.2.12–13 (Rolfe, LCL).  
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2.6.1.4 Living out the Philosophy 
 Pythagoras himself is of course the model for Apollonius’s teaching and practice, and he 
was familiar with the gods, who revealed their identities to him.600 Apollonius was said to exhibit 
a wisdom that was even more inspired than that of Pythagoras, “by which he came close to being 
thought possessed and inspired.” (ὑφ᾿ ὧν ἔψαυσε τοῦ δαιμόνιός τε καὶ θεῖος νομισθῆναι).601 
Apollonius was led by his guardian spirit or δαίμων.602 The consequence of choosing this path is 
to be self-controlled, just and envious of no one and to cause tyrants to fear them rather than the 
other way around. Revelation is given to such a one so that they will be able to recognize gods 
and distinguish them from “insubstantial ghosts”.603 Those who follows the gods should be led 
by wisdom and their guardian spirit (δαίμων).604 Those who love prophecy can “become divine 
under its influence” and even “act for the salvation of mankind” (θεῖοί τε ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς γίγνονται 
καὶ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἀνθρώπων πράττουσι). Such a one must be utterly pure of soul and free from 
sin.605 Those who take hold of the virtues that come from God “are close to the gods and holy.” 
Further, “men who are good have some part in God” (καὶ φημὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
θεοῦ τι ἔχειν).606 A man who truly resembles God can divert others from the passions and in fact 
the description of such a man seems to be set in apposition to a reference to God, as if this man is 
a god (ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀνδρὸς ὃς ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ περὶ αὐτὰς κόσμου, θεὸς ὑπὸ σοφίας ἥκων).607 A 
true Pythagorean will have true greatness of mind, soul and of manner, piety and knowledge and 
                                                
 600 Vit. Apoll. 1.1.1–2.  
 601 Vit. Apoll. 1.2.3 (Jones, LCL). This is quite a different translation from the original Loeb one by F. C. 
Conybeare in 1912 which speaks of, “the habits and temper of wisdom by means of which he succeeded in being 
considered a supernatural and divine being.”  
 602 Vit. Apoll. 1.18.1; cf. also Vit. Apoll. 2.39.3.  
 603 Vit. Apoll. 6.11.3 (Jones, LCL).  
 604 Vit. Apoll. 1.18.1.  
 605 Vit. Apoll. 3.42.1–2.  
 606 Vit. Apoll. 8.7.21–22.  
 607 Vit. Apoll. 8.7.23.  
    130
friendship with both gods and other spirits. They will be frugal, restrained, self-sufficient and at 
ease in their perceptions.608  
 
2.7 Epicureanism 
 Epicureanism, though a major philosophy of the first century, will prove to be the least 
relevant for our enquiries, which is why it has been treated last. For this reason, and due to 
constraints of space, I shall offer only a brief summary of the features of Epicureanism that 
directly relate to our topic, followed by one possible spiritual sacrifice reference from an 
Epicurean writer. This summary should demonstrate that relationship to the gods did not play an 
important role in the life of an Epicurean, and so we would not expect to find an abundance of 
spiritual temple language. Epicurus of Samos (341–270 B.C.E.) founded a school in Athens in 
307/6 B.C.E., known as “the Garden”, where he lived with his followers, both men and women, 
slaves and free, and avoided public life.609 According to Epicurus, although nature has imprinted 
upon the minds of all a conception of the gods, many hold to wrong understandings of their 
nature.610 God is an “imperishable and blessed creature”.611 The gods live a peaceful and blissful 
existence, “far removed and separated from our affairs”, they do not need humans for anything 
and Lucretius, an Epicurean, says of divinity, “it is neither propitiated with services nor touched 
by wrath.”612 Rather, the world was not designed for the sake of humanity, and Nature orders its 
                                                
 608 Ep. 52.  
 609 OCD, 513–14; Ferguson, Backgrounds, 370–79; DL 10.1–11 speaks of the life and teaching of 
Epicurus; Lucr. 1.62–79; 3.1–15; 5.6–12; 6.1–30 sing the praises of Epicurus, whose discoveries about the gods 
liberated those weighed down by wrong thoughts about them. Seneca, Const. 16.1 (Basore, LCL) speaks of 
Epicurus, “who most of all indulged the flesh”.  
 610 Cicero, Nat. d. 1.15.42–17.44.  
 611 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–24, cited in Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 140.  
 612 Lucr., 1.44–49 (Smith, LCL); cf. 2.1094–95; 3.18–24; 5.73–90, 146–49; 6.54–67; DL 10.123, 139; 
Cicero, Nat. d. 1.17.45; 1.19.51; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 1.12.1–3. See also Sharples, Stoics, 56–58.  
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path without recourse to the gods.613 Epicurus places great emphasis on sensations and the 
“perceptions of mental presentations” as the standard by which ideas can be judged.614 Only two 
states of feeling exist; pleasure or pain.615 In order to maximize pleasure (that is the absence of 
pain) and minimize pain, the wise person should, by the right use of reason, attend to wrong 
feelings and sense perceptions. These wrong perceptions interfere with the kind of blissed 
existence lived by the gods that is the model for the Epicurean.616 Since death is merely the 
absence of sensation, not the gateway to immortality, it holds no fear for the Epicurean.617 It is 
possible for those who follow this teaching to live like a god among men.618 The wise person is 
always happy and should live a life unconcerned and uninvolved with anything that might 
disturb that life, such as responsibility for a wife and family or involvement in politics.619  
 
2.7.1 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 
 The work of Lucretius (first century B.C.E.) on the nature of things (De Rerum Natura) 
expounds Epicurean philosophy and contains one possible spiritual sacrifice reference.620 He 
opines that because of humanity’s false conception of the gods, they practice a false piety that 
includes turning towards stones, approaching every altar, and falling prostrate before the shrines 
                                                
 613 Lucr., 2.1–1104; 5.198–99; DL 10.77–78; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.20.53.  
 614 DL 10.31–33; Seneca, Nat. 1.3.10.   
 615 DL 10.34.  
 616 DL 10.82, 117, 127–31; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.20.53. In fact, according to Cicero, “complete absence of pain 
Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure” (Cicero, Fin. 1.11.38 (Rackham, LCL)). 
 617 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 124–27, cited in Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 144; cf. Lucr., 
3.580–930; DL 10.123–25, 133; see also Norman Wentworth DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1954); Sharples, Stoics, 93–99 and now James Warren, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Epicureanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
 618 Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 135, cited in Long and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 144; cf. Lucr., 3.322. 
 619 DL 10.118–22 Cicero, Nat. d. 1.20.53; 3.16.26; Seneca, De otio. 3.2. For further on Epicureanism, see 
e.g. Brunschwig and Sedley, “Philosophy,” 151–83 at 155–162. 
 620 Little is known of the life of Lucretius; see OCD, 863–65.  
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of the gods with covered heads.621 Instead of coming, “to sprinkle altars with the blood of beasts 
in showers and to link vow to vow” (nec aras sanguine multo spargere quadrupedum, nec votis 
nectere vota) the truly pious person should rather, “be able to survey all things with tranquil 
mind” (sed mage placata posse omnia mente tueri).622 Unless the worshiper recognizes that no 
sacrifice is required and that the gods have no interest in meting out wrath to their followers, 
“you will not be able to approach their shrines with placid heart, you will not have the strength to 
receive with tranquil peace of spirit the images which are carried to men’s minds from their holy 
bodies, declaring what the divine shapes are.”623 In this case, Lucretius does not intend the call 
for a tranquil mind and placid heart to be a spiritual sacrifice, since the gods do not require any 
kind of sacrifice at all.624 
 Further, most rejected the teaching of the Epicureans and it was attacked and ridiculed by 
many of the leading philosophers of their day. Through the character of Cotta, Cicero voices 
ridicule of Epicurus’s belief in gods as virtuous but not active, and holy while disdaining interest 
in anyone’s affairs but their own.625 Epicureans themselves are attacked for their self-indulgence 
and slavery to pleasure.626 Their philosophy is both expounded, then critiqued, at length by 
Cicero.627 Epictetus accuses them of severing the bond between people by their self-centered 
focus on pleasure and for ignoring sense-perceptions when they should be listening to them.628 
Dio Chrysostom accuses the Epicureans of keeping the gods from being recognized, banishing 
                                                
 621 Lucr., 5.1194–1200.    
 622 Lucr., 5.1200–1203 (Smith, LCL).  
 623 Lucr., 6.75–78 (Smith, LCL).  
 624 See also Anonymous Epicurean treatise on theology (Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 215) 1.4–24, cited in Long 
and Sedley, Philosophers Vol 1, 144.   
 625 Cicero, Leg. 1.12.39. 
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after pleasure and eschew pain may also be a scarcely veiled reference to the Epicureans.  
 627 See Cicero, Fin. 1.5.13–1.21.72 (exposition); Fin. 2.1.1–35.119 (critique); cf. also Cicero, Tusc. 
5.26.73–74 for further brief critique.  
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gods from the universe, leaving the universe with no purpose or direction, and in essence making 
‘pleasure’ the only goddess.629 Seneca ridicules Epicurus’s teaching for making the gods both 
harmless and powerless,630 and for linking virtue inseparably with pleasure.631 Plutarch scorns 
Epicurus for calling Providence a myth,632 and for praising his own impassiveness and 
inactivity.633 Since their aim is to be rid of anxiety rather than to fear God, they remove both 
good and evil from their gods and leave themselves no hope of divine favor, no confidence in 
prosperity, and no refuge in God in adversity.634 Epicureans, like animals, have no conception of 
divine justice or reverence for virtue and so only live for pleasure.635 Yet, in their hypocrisy they 
still sacrifice to the Gods who need no sacrifice.636 This sort of ignorance about the gods leads to 
atheism, in Plutarch’s view.637 Maximus of Tyre simply ridicules Epicurean doctrines as odd, 
idle, careless, and ignorant of the gods.638 In conclusion then, Epicureanism does not offer a 
fruitful field of comparison with Paul’s imagery when considering spiritual temple language.          
    
2.8 Miscellaneous 
 Finally, there are two brief references to metaphorical temples but without the kind of 
philosophical underpinning found in the other writers explored above. Valerius Maximus, a first 
century C.E. writer of a handbook of Memorable Deeds and Sayings,639 compares friendships to 
                                                
 629 Dio Chrysostom, Dei cogn. 36–37.   
 630 Seneca, Ben. 4.19.1; Ep. 90.35; Apol. 8.  
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 638 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 4.8; 4.9.  
 639 OCD, 1534.  
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temples. He understands friendship as being essential to the fabric of human life. It is due, 
“almost as much reverence as to the rituals of the immortal gods” since, as public welfare 
depends on these rituals and traditions, so too the private welfare of individuals depends on 
networks of friendships. This inspires Valerius to compare the two, “As temples are the sacred 
domiciles of the one, so the loyal hearts of men are like shrines of the other, filled with a holy 
spirit” (atque ut illarum aedes sacra domicilia, harum fida hominum pectora quasi quaedam 
sancto spiritu referta templa sunt).640 Similarly, in the second century Latin novel 
Metamorphoses (or The Golden Ass) by Apuleius, there is a reference to one character entrusting 





2.9.1 Temple Language 
 Many Stoic writers retained a place for physical sacrifices, while emphasizing a pure 
motivation but I noted a stronger focus on purity of thought and deed in place of sacrifices. 
Plutarch, whose affinities lie more with Middle Platonism, also speaks of purity in worship but 
envisages substitutes for sacrifice like trusting in the gods, searching after divine truth and study 
of divine things. Maximus conceives of prayer and contemplation as a substitute for sacrifice. 
Plutarch specifically gives the example of returning what is due to parents as being a spiritual 
                                                
 640 V. Max., 4.7. ext. 1 (Shackleton Bailey, LCL).  
641 Apuleius, Metam. 3.15. {Collins, 1999, #52919}{Hays, 1997, #23416}{Fitzmyer, 2008, 
#60227}{Keener, 2005, #45253}{Wright, 2013, #36350}{Thiselton, 2000, #27996}{Fee, 2014, #26727}{Harner, 
1973, #18361}{Fee, 2014, #26727}{Wallace, 1996, #98519}{Fee, 2014, #26727}{Thiselton, 2000, 
#27996}{Collins, 2008, #72639}{Witherington III, 1995, #42786}{Conzelmann, 1975, #3318}{Shanor, 1988, 
#29932}{Garland, 2003, #82700} 
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sacrifice. Cicero, though a Skeptic, also emphasizes the purity of the worshiper over the purity of 
the physical sacrifice itself. Apollonius, like his mentor Pythagoras, rejected animal sacrifices 
and substituted other inanimate offerings or hymns, because of his vegetarianism stemming from 
his philosophy of the transmigration of souls. Apollonius may have also spoken of pure thought 
and speech as a sacrifice. Lucretius contrasted the adoption of a tranquil mind with the offering 
of sacrifices, though as an Epicurean, this would not constitute a spiritual sacrifice, since the 
gods do not require any kind of sacrifice.  
There were few obvious references to metaphorical priests in Stoic writers and none 
among the Middle Platonists; some of our Stoic examples were ambiguous and another seemed 
like a rare analogy with no extant parallels among other Stoic authors. Seneca significantly spoke 
of the universe as being the temple of the gods as did Plutarch. Among the Stoics, Epictetus 
seems to make a more ready distinction between God and the world. Many Stoics, such as Dio, 
Epictetus and Marcus, speak of the divine dwelling within the individual, understood as their 
δαίμων. Hierocles alone uses the image of the home as a temple with parents understood as gods 
to their children. Plutarch also pictured the individual as a temple, guided by right reason. 
Alcinous pictures the world as filled with God and Maximus identifies the roles of God and 
Nature as breathing things into individuals. Cicero’s understanding is remarkably similar to the 
Stoics, placing the same emphases on the world as the temple of the gods (like Seneca and 
Plutarch), the filling of the universe with the divine intelligence, and the place of god or a 
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2.9.2 The Nature of the Divinity 
 God is often identified in a pantheistic way with Nature, Fate, Fortune and Reason within 
Stoicism. Reason is also spoken of using divine language, dwelling within a person. God is 
immanent in the world and identified with it and there is a close likeness between God and 
people. Later Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus make a closer identification of God with 
intelligence. The Middle Platonists, Alcinous and Maximus seem to take this further and speak 
of God as simply intelligence. Alcinous emphasizes the abstract nature of God who is 
preoccupied with his own thoughts. Apollonius also conceives of a God who is at one with the 
Universe. For the Stoics, the gods are universally viewed as benevolent and governing, though 
according to Dio, they depend on the law. Cicero goes further and imagines the Law as having 
god-like characteristics. Maximus and Alcinous stress the perfect qualities of God. For Plutarch, 
Nature seems to be able to act almost independently of God and appears to be a more dualistic 
entity, with good and evil flowing from it. Cicero also imagines Nature acting self-sufficiently of 
God and sustaining the world. Maximus imagines different roles for Nature and Providence, and 
God governs with the assistance of Chance. Evils are only the indirect consequence of his 
government. Like the Stoics, the Middle Platonic thinkers speak positively of the gods in their 
benevolence and envisage roles for daemons and other divinities (as does Cicero). Apollonius 
emphasizes the gods’ beneficence to this who are virtuous. 
 
2.9.3 The Nature of Humanity 
 Stoics understand humanity alone as being formed of the divine essence and able to have 
kinship with the gods. The soul is pre-existent and is able to comprehend the divine, yet evil also 
comes from within (in this, Cicero concurs). Humans have the ability to live according to Nature 
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(the one things truly are in their unity and comprehensiveness) and can be free of fear and inner 
disturbance. Soul or Reason is separate from and superior to the body and rules it, responding to 
both impulses and aversions. Plutarch, Alcinous and Maximus also stresses kinship with God 
and the capability of the soul to unite with the divine and become like it. Both good and evil 
come from within. The soul is set free after death and some become daemons. Cicero, though 
ostensibly a Skeptic holds remarkably similar views on each of these topics. Apollonius spoke of 
the soul passing from one creature to another, though ultimately a person will become a god.   
 
2.9.4 Living out the Philosophy 
  The Stoics call their readers to live according to Nature and imitate the gods. People are 
called to exercise right judgments about the gods, themselves and their own judgments 
(especially in Epictetus). They are to cultivate inner purity by obeying their inner genius/δαίμων 
and to avoid wrong sense impressions. They are to seek the good, leave the path of self and do 
good to others. Cicero concurs that the good person should meditate on the divine, choose the 
good, think rightly of reality and avoid evil, especially that associated with the body. Although 
the Middle Platonists do not use the vocabulary of “living according to nature” they do speak of 
avoiding passions, grasping God’s nature and imitating his character and ways through 
contemplation of the divine, reason, discipline and education.642 Alcinous adds the caveat that it 
is not the supreme God, but a lesser god that they shall be imitating. Apollonius placed his 
emphasis on being led by his inner daemon and choosing the path of self-control and virtue.  
                                                
 642 Dillon, Platonists, 43–44, 122–23 documents the way that Middle Platonist writers like Plutarch, 
following Eudorus of Alexandria, abandoned the Stoic goal of ‘living in accordance with nature’ in favor of the 
more Platonic ideal of likeness to, or imitation of, God.     
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Chapter Three: Metaphorical Temple Language in Philo of Alexandria 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 I have reserved a separate chapter for Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BCE – 50 CE)1 for two 
main reasons. Firstly, unlike those writers surveyed in the last chapter, Philo is clearly Jewish. 
Philo thus stands in a class of his own in relation to my focus in this study. Moreover, he is a 
legitimate source for our understanding of Hellenistic philosophy, because, like the writers 
surveyed in the previous chapter, he is strongly influenced by Hellenistic thought and his 
Judaism is mediated through philosophy.2 John M. Dillon’s seminal study The Middle Platonists, 
remains, despite its age, the standard work in this field. He describes Philo as a “fully-fledged 
Middle Platonist”,3 and devotes a considerable section of his monograph to Philo.4 Dillon 
                                                
 1 Helpful introductions to Philo’s thought and writings include Edwin R. Goodenough, An Introduction to 
Philo Judaeus (2nd ed.; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963); Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Idem, “Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, His Writings, and 
His Significance,” ANRW 21:1: 3–46; Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Jewish Writings of the Second 
Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus (ed. Michael E. Stone; 
CRINT; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 233–82; Ronald Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo 
(Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World 200 BC to AD 200 Volume 1, Part 2; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time 
(NovTSup 86; Leiden: Brill, 1997); Kenneth Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2005); Adam Kamesar, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
especially the first three chapters, that deal with Philo’s life and times, his works and his hermeneutical method. See 
also now, Torrey Seland, ed., Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014).  
 2 Philo sheds some light on his own philosophical education in Congr. 74–76. For recent overviews of this 
topic, see George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Philo Among Greeks, Jews and Christians,” in Philo und das Neue 
Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen I. Internationales Symposium Zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum. 1.-4. 
Mai 2003, Eisenach/Jena (ed. Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr; ed. 172; WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2004), 53–72; Erkki Koskenniemi, “Philo and Classical Education,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to 
Philo of Alexandria (ed. Torrey Seland; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 102–28 and Gregory E. Sterling, ““The 
Jewish Philosophy”: Reading Moses Via Hellenistic Philosophy According to Philo,” in Reading Philo: A 
Handbook to Philo of Alexandria (ed. Torrey Seland; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 129–54, as well as older 
works such as Goodenough, Philo, 90–111 and Borgen, “Philo,” 233–82 at 254–56. For an assessment of Philo’s 
response to the philosophical challenges encountered by Hellenistic Judaism in comparison to other writings, see 
David Winston, “Philo and the Hellenistic Jewish Encounter,” SPhilo 7 (1995): 124–42.   
 3 John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 143.  
 4 See Idem, Platonists, 139–43, and further John Dillon, “Reclaiming the Heritage of Moses: Philo’s 
Confrontation with Greek Philosophy,” SPhilo 7 (1995): 108–23.  
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understands Philo’s thought, “as essentially adapting contemporary Alexandrian Platonism, 
which was itself heavily influenced by Stoicism and Pythagoreanism, to his own exegetical 
purposes”5 and sees the philosophy of Philo (and Eudorus) as “the true foundation of Middle 
Platonism.”6 Furthermore, Philo has a lengthy corpus, is one of our best and most extensive 
sources for Middle Platonism, and by far the greatest number of references to metaphorical 
sacrifice, priest and temple language in any ancient writer is found in Philo, as I shall shortly 
demonstrate.7 Unlike the last chapter, I shall not devote separate sections to “The Nature of 
Divinity”, “The Nature of Humanity” and “Living out the Philosophy.” This has mainly been 
done in the interests of space. Moreover, these topics were addressed in the last chapter in 
relation to other Middle Platonic writers, and insofar as Philo supports the evidence of these 
writers, it is not essential to revisit them. Because Philo is Jewish, he holds some views that are 
at variance with other Middle Platonists (such as some of his understanding of God) but he also 
holds some that are peculiar to him (such as his understanding of the Logos in relation to God 
                                                
 5 Dillon, Platonists, 182; cf. 143–44; and similarly Borgen, “Philo,” 233–82 at 256. For a brief survey of 
the influences of Plato and Stoicism on Philo, see Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils, “Stoicized Readings of Timaeus in 
Philo of Alexandria,” SPhilo 7 (1995):  85–102, who argues that the influences of Plato’s Timaeus and the Stoics 
converge in Philo, agreeing with earlier works such as Sandmel, Philo, 4, 14–16, 19–21, 25–26, 28. In an earlier 
thesis, the influential Philo scholar Edwin R. Goodenough argued that Philo’s religion was akin to a Greek mystery 
religion in its thought, in Edwin R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1935). However, his pupil and eminent Jewish scholar, Samuel Sandmel opposed this 
thesis in Sandmel, Philo, 140–47. Subsequent Philo scholars have also dissented from Goodenough’s position; see 
e.g. Borgen, Philo: Exegete, 1–3; Gregory E. Sterling, “The Place of Philo of Alexandria in the Study of Christian 
Origins,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen I. Internationales Symposium Zum 
Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum. 1.-4. Mai 2003, Eisenach/Jena (ed. Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr; 
WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 21–52 at 26–27, and in the same work, Naomi G. Cohen, “The 
Mystery Terminology in Philo,” 173–87; Schenck, Philo; Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “Philo as a Jew,” in Reading Philo: 
A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria (ed. Torrey Seland; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 20. 
 6 Dillon, Platonists, 183. For a recent reflection of the debate on Philo and Middle Platonism among senior 
Philo scholars, see the special section of Studia Philonica V (1993): Gregory E. Sterling, “Platonizing Moses: Philo 
and Middle Platonism,” 96–111; David T. Runia, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist? A Difficult Question Revisited,” 
112–40;  David T. Runia, “Response to Runia and Sterling,” 141–46; Thomas H. Tobin, “Was Philo a Middle 
Platonist? Some suggestions,” 147–50; John Dillon, “A Response to Runia and Sterling,” 151–55. Despite 
differences of opinion, all agree that Philo is influenced by Middle Platonism and uses its thought in his exegesis. 
 7 E.g. note the comment of Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: Symbolism and 
Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142; “Philo’s is the most 
thorough symbolic exposition of sacrificial ritual known from ancient Jewish times.”  
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and humanity). Since recording these views do not serve my purposes (to shed light on Middle 
Platonism and its use of metaphorical temple language), I have not given special attention to 
them, although some attention to Philo’s distinctive views will appear in passing.  
 Two more caveats are in order. My main focus will be on metaphorical temple language 
in order to illustrate what Philo’s approach has in common with other Hellenistic philosophical 
writers and thus a comprehensive survey of Philo’s understanding of the cult will not be 
attempted.8 Therefore, my aim is not to propose a thesis that explains all the origins of Philo’s 
metaphorical temple language, especially vis-à-vis Judaism.9 Secondly, Philo’s expositions 
concentrate almost exclusively on the Pentateuch (especially Genesis and Exodus); the sacrifices 
made by Abraham relate to a period before the tabernacle, and the commentary on Exodus 
describes a period before the temple was built. However, Philo himself lived in the second 
temple era and his language is indebted to this wider motif of temple symbolism that we have 
surveyed. Philo’s corpus also provides the largest exploration of this imagery that is extant for 
the relevant period and for Middle Platonism.10     
                                                
 8 For the most extensive discussion of Philo’s presentation of Jewish worship in all its dimensions (both 
literal and metaphorical) see Jutta Leonhardt, Jewish Worship in Philo of Alexandria (TSAJ 84; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2001). 
9 I noted briefly in Chapter One that the Pseudepigrapha sometimes speaks of a heavenly temple or an 
eschatological temple that God will build or will send down from heaven at the end of the age (especially in 
eschatological works such as 1 En. 14:1–25; 24–26; 71:5; 4 Ezra 10:25–28; 2 Bar. 4:1–7). I also surveyed the use of 
metaphorical sacrifice language in second temple Jewish literature. Additionally, I examined the use of metaphorical 
temple language in many parts of the Dead Sea Scrolls. All this evidence indicates that other Jewish literature, that 
does not appear to have been greatly influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, could use metaphorical temple language. 
However, Philo is also greatly influenced by Hellenistic philosophical thought, as argued above.   
10 I also note that Philo frequently refers to the subject of philosophy in his works. There are over two 
hundred references that use the φιλόσοφ- root in Philo. Moses himself was trained in philosophy by teachers from 
various nations (Mos. 1.21–23; cf. Mos. 1.48; 2.66), later Philo claims that Moses “had attained the very summit of 
philosophy” (Philo, Opif. 8) and he speaks elsewhere of the law as the philosophy according to Moses (κατὰ 
Μωυσῆν φιλοσοφοῦσιν) in Mut. 223. The creation narrative itself is described as a philosophical account (Fug. 68). 
Philosophy is described as the greatest thing of all for humanity (Opif. 53; Spec. 1.336; 3.186); even the thing by 
which man becomes immortal (Opif. 77). Philo avers that philosophy leads to virtue (Leg. 1.57; cf. Leg. 3.72) and is 
the most perfect of studies (Ebr. 51). Indeed, Philo describes his own journey with philosophy (Congr. 74–80), 
which he elucidates as the study of wisdom, itself the knowledge of divine things (Congr. 79; cf. Spec. 3.1). 
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3.2 Sacrifice Language 
  3.2.1 Literal Sacrifices must be offered with reverence and respect for the rite  
 Philo by no means discounts the sacrificial system of the Jerusalem cult. In fact, he 
affirms the continuing role of the temple as the center of Judaism, the only proper place for 
sacrifice, and attacks the thought that other altars, whether pagan or otherwise, are legitimate 
places to offer sacrifice.11 Although Philo’s work is notable for allegorizing the various laws on 
sacrifice,12 he is at pains to stress that this should not be at the expense of actual practice: “Why, 
we shall be ignoring the sanctity of the Temple and a thousand other things, if we are going to 
pay heed to nothing except what is shewn us by the inner meaning of things.”13 His various 
commentaries on the scriptures repeatedly emphasize the necessity of a respectful and 
appropriate approach to the sacrifices. In more than one work, Philo critiques the offering of 
Cain. In De agricultura Philo says of Cain that, “the conditions of his sacrifice had not been holy 
and perfect” and he was reprimanded for not bringing his offering properly.14 In De plantatione, 
Philo speaks approvingly of the proper preparations for sacrifice, such as avoiding drunkenness, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Philosophy is also said to have come down from heaven (Spec. 3.185). Philo represents Moses as speaking of 
philosophy as the royal road (ὁδὸς . . .  βασιλική) that leads to God (Post. 101), which he then equates with the word 
and reason of God (Post. 102).  
 11 E.g. Philo, Spec. 1.67–70; see Borgen, Philo: Exegete, 18–21; Schenck, Philo, 36–37; Andrea Lieber, 
“Between Motherland and Fatherland: Diaspora, Pilgrimage and the Spiritualization of Sacrifice in Philo of 
Alexandria,” in Heavenly Tablets: Interpretation, Identity and Tradition in Ancient Judaism (ed. Lynn Lidonnici 
and Andrea Lieber; JSJSup 119; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 193–210 at 198–201; Paul Robertson, “Towards An 
Understanding of Philo’s and Cicero’s Treatment of Sacrifice,” SPhilo 23 (2011): 41–67 at 44–58; Sandelin, 
“Philo,” 19–46, at 33–34.   
 12 For more on Philo’s allegorical approach to biblical interpretation, see e.g. Sandmel, Philo, 17–28; 
Burton L. Mack, “Philo Judaeus and Exegetical Traditions in Alexandria,” ANRW 21:1: 227–71 at 250–62; 
Williamson, Philo, 144–75; Ellen Birnbaum, “Allegorical Interpretation and Jewish Identity Among Alexandrian 
Jewish Writers,” in Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen (ed. David E. Aune, Torrey 
Seland, and Jarl Henning Ulrichsen; NovTSup 106; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 307–29; Adam Kamesar, “Biblical 
Interpretation in Philo,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 65–91. 
 13 Philo, Migr. 92 (see more generally Migr. 89–93); cf. Everett Ferguson, “Spiritual Sacrifice in Early 
Christianity and Its Environment,” ANRW 23:2: 1151–89 at 1160; Williamson, Philo, 4. All translations are taken 
from the Loeb Classical Library, unless otherwise stated. 
 14 Philo, Agr. 127.  
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“in order that both the recollection of their sacrifices and their reverence for the place might lead 
them to celebrate a festivity in actual truth most holy, sinning neither in word nor deed.”15 Philo 
speaks in passing of this act as a purification of both body and soul.16 Thus, Philo by no means 
discounts literal sacrifices. 
 
3.2.2 Literal Sacrifices can only be offered with a pious life and spirit 
 At the same time, these references also betray a deep concern for the state of mind and 
life of the worshiper. In De ebrietate, Philo alludes to the prohibition on wine given to Aaron 
when entering the tent of meeting in Lev 10:9 and applies it to all those who may find 
themselves needing to sacrifice, which he refers to as “sacrifices of thanksgiving”, and he adds, 
“these need sober abstinence and a close and ready attention.”17 Philo’s claim that Abraham left 
country and kindred to sacrifice “in a religious spirit”18 implies that such a spirit is commendable 
in worship. In his meditation on Exod 12:8, Philo thinks it appropriate that worship should take 
place at night, so that only the stars bring glory to the humble worshipers who wish, “to repent 
and purify their souls.”19 The worshiper must prepare both soul and body, by giving up 
themselves to God and in their body, “by abstaining from uncleanness in holiness and purity.”20 
As Philo says elsewhere, “For God does not delight in the fleshiness or fatness of animals, but in 
the blameless (ἀνυπαίτιος) intention (διάθεσις) of the votary,”21 or again, “even the least morsel 
of incense offered by a man of religion is more precious in the sight of God than thousands of 
                                                
 15 Plant. 162.  
 16 Plant. 162.  
 17 Ebr. 129.   
 18 Spec. 1.68.  
 19 QE 1.13. 
 20 QE 1.2.  
 21 Spec. 2.35.   
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cattle sacrificed by men of little worth.”22 Philo is still speaking of literal offerings, but the 
emphasis is squarely on the personal piety of the worshiper.23 
 
3.2.2.1 Consequently the literal sacrifices are of no worth if offered by an impious person 
 Philo frequently disparages those who offer the prescribed sacrifices but live impure 
lives, such as drunken men,24 the arrogant25 or those in, “whose heart is the seat of lurking 
covetousness and wrongful cravings”,26 or as thieves27 or murderers.28 In such a case, Philo says, 
“if the worshipper is without kindly feeling or justice, the sacrifices are no sacrifices (ἄθυτοι 
θυσίαι καὶ ἀνίεροι ἱερουργίαι) . . . it is not a remission but a reminder of past sins which they 
effect.”29 The sacrifices of the wicked can be called, “the first-fruits of unholiness”.30 Similarly, 
an insincere repentance can actually worsen the condition of the worshiper (who is compared to 
the goat of the burnt-offering in Lev 10:16–20).31 There is no possibility that the righteous judge, 
“would ever accept the ministries of the impious”.32 So solemn is this charge that, “for such a 
one it were a sacrilege that he should even from a distance behold the sacred fire.”33 When such 
a sinner enters to sacrifice, their sin “invades and violates the most sacred temples”34 making the 
sacrifices unholy. Their white robes and unblemished animals contrast ironically with the 
                                                
 22 Spec. 1.275  
 23 cf. Jean Laporte, “Sacrifice and Forgiveness in Philo of Alexandria,” SPhilo 1 (1989): 34–42; Leonhardt, 
Worship, 235–53. 
 24 Philo, Ebr. 131.   
 25 Spec. 1.269.  
 26 Spec. 1.270. 
 27 Plant. 107.  
 28 Ebr. 66.  
 29 Mos. 2.107; cf. also Spec. 1.215. 
 30 Spec. 1.279.  
 31 Fug. 157–60 and see 96 note a, in the same Loeb volume.   
 32 Mos. 2.279; see also Mos. 2.162.  
 33 Ebr. 131. In Ebr. 79, Philo implies that had men such as these not followed impious ways, their sacrifices 
could have been atoning and turned away evil sent by God.  
 34 Cher. 94.  
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wounds of their souls and their mutilated virtues (ἀρετή).35 The intent of the heart is what counts, 
and no matter the quantity or quality of the offering made by the sinner, it is the motivation that 
is judged, “He turns His face away from those who approach with guilty intent, even though they 
lead to His altar a hundred bullocks every day”.36 To offer sacrifices unwillingly is like making 
no sacrifice at all, and the worshiper is self-deceived and forgotten (presumably by God).37 Since 
the mind is “the most essential victim”, it is blemished, and as no blemished thing can approach 
the altar, a “bad man” cannot really perform a sacrifice.38 The mind that is only concerned with 
human aspirations rather than divine virtue is compared to the scape-goat that is sent into the 
wilderness.39 Therefore, the “soul which sacrifices” should have no room in their head for evil 
and the passions.40 
 
3.2.2.2 A person should take care to offer literal sacrifices with a rational and noble mind41 
 For Philo, the unblemished state of the mind of the worshiper is more significant than the 
unblemished state of the animal being sacrificed. In fact, in De specialibus legibus, Book 1, 
Philo negates the OT stipulations for worship altogether in order to emphasize this point, “So he 
who intends to sacrifice must consider not whether the victim is unblemished but whether his 
                                                
 35 Cher. 95–97.   
 36 Plant. 108, later adding in the same verse, “He takes no delight in blazing altar fires fed by the 
unhallowed sacrifices of men to whose hearts sacrifice is unknown. Nay, these sacrifices do but put Him in 
remembrance of the ignorance and offences of the several offerers.” 
 37 QE 2.50. 
 38 Plant. 164.  
 39 Her. 179; and similarly: Plant. 61. The goat used in sacrifice is also understood symbolically in Her. 126; 
Fug. 157–60; Post. 72; QG 3.3. 
 40 QE 2.100. For the passions in Philo, see Carlos Lévy, “Philo’s Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Philo (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146–71 at 154–64.  
 41 What follows adapts some material from Philip Richardson, “What are the Spiritual Sacrifices of 1 Peter 
2:5? Some light from Philo of Alexandria,” EvQ 87.1 (2015): 3–17 at 10–14. This section of the article was an 
earlier and much briefer version of my research that was restricted to Philo’s metaphorical uses of θυσία in relation 
to spiritual sacrifices. The following sections develop and significantly expand that material with many more 
examples and more specific categories.  
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own mind (διάνοια) stands free from defect (ὁλόκληρος) and imperfection (παντελής).”42 
Philo’s thought, though focused here on the offering of a literal sacrifice, is beginning to move in 
the direction of the spiritual sacrifices that we shall come to below, “he holds the sacrifice to 
consist not in the victims but in the offerer’s intention (διάνοια) and his zeal (προθυμία) which 
derives its constancy and permanence from virtue (ἀρετή)”,43 and likewise, what is precious to 
God is not how many victims are sacrificed, “but the true purity of a rational spirit in him who 
makes the sacrifice.”44 Similarly, Philo avers that God does not rejoice in sacrifices per se, but in 
the intent and virtue of the offerer, “He rejoices in the will to love Him and in men that practise 
holiness”.45 In a highly allegorical interpretation of Genesis 31 in De somniis, Book 1, Philo 
describes what he sees as the author of Genesis’s view of Joseph’s offering of a sacrifice, “He 
held no one worthy of offering sacrifices who has not first come to know himself and 
comprehended human nothingness, inferring from the elements of which he is composed that he 
is nothing worth”.46 In De migratione Abrahami, Philo comments on the descriptions of Moses 
and Aaron’s sacrifices, recorded in Leviticus 8 and 9. The various washings are interpreted 
allegorically as a cleansing of the soul,  “that the better portion of the soul, the rational part 
(λογικός), that is left, may exercise its truly free and noble impulses towards all things 
beautiful”.47 In summary, literal sacrifices only have value in so far as the worshiper exhibits the 
piety of soul seen in one who possesses a rational mind. 
 
                                                
 42 Philo, Spec. 1.283. Younge’s translation captures the literal sense here: “but whether his mind is sound, 
and entire, and perfect.” (Philo, The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged. New Updated Edition (trans. C.D. 
Yonge; Grand Rapids: Hendrickson, 1993), 561.) 
 43 Spec. 1.290.    
 44 Spec. 1.261.  
 45 Spec. 1.271.  
 46  Dreams 1.212.  
 47 Migr. 67.  
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3.2.3 The True Sacrifice is Spiritual and does not have to be a Literal Sacrifice 
 In the following section I shall identify the various categories of spiritual sacrifices 
described by Philo. He notes that the soul and mind can be offered as a spiritual sacrifice. Purity 
and virtue can be an offering to God and praise itself can be considered a sacrifice. 
 
3.2.3.1 The offering of the soul and mind 
 Much of Philo’s exegetical writings attempt to contextualize OT laws, presenting 
allegorical interpretations of them which speak to the new context of his Jewish audience but 
which also make them palatable to the Greek world.48 Valentin Nikiprowetzky describes Philo as 
standing at the crossroads between biblical and Greek philosophical understandings of 
sacrifice.49 In many places Philo speaks of sacrifices that are not physical and literal. Frequently 
he speaks of the offering of the soul (ψυχή).50 For instance, in De somniis, he asserts, “For that 
which prays, which gives thanks and offers sacrifice truly without blemish, must be as he says a 
“one” only, the soul.”51 In the passage just cited, Philo is giving an allegorical interpretation of 
the grain offering in Lev 2:1–2, and yet concentrates on the offering of the soul. However, in De 
vita Mosis, Book 2, Philo goes further, “if he is pure of heart and just, the sacrifice stands firm, 
though the flesh is consumed, or rather, even if no victim at all is brought to the altar. For the 
                                                
 48 For more detail on this topic see e.g. Borgen, Philo: Exegete, 124–57.   
 49 Valentin Nikiprowetzky, “La spiritualisation des sacrifices et le culte sacrificial au temple de Jérusalem 
chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” Sem 17 (1967): 97–116 at 99 and see generally 97–102.  
 50 For a recent discussion of the concept of ψυχή in Philo see Torrey Seland, “The Moderate Life of the 
Christian Paroikoi: A Philonic Reading of 1 Pet 2:11,” in Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige 
Wahrnehmungen I. Internationales Symposium Zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum. 1.-4. Mai 2003, Eisenach/Jena 
(ed. Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr; ed. 172; WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 241–64 at 
245–51. For more on Philo’s emphasis on the inward and symbolic sacrifice, see e.g. Seland, “The ‘Common 
Priesthood’ of Philo and 1 Peter: A Philonic Reading of 1 Peter 2.5, 9,” JSNT 57 (1995): 87–119 at 114–16; Lieber, 
“Between Motherland,” 193–210 at 202–09. 
 51 Philo, Somn. 2.72.  
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true oblation, what else can it be but the devotion (εὐσέβεια) of a soul which is dear to God? The 
thank-offering of such a soul receives immortality, and is inscribed in the records of God”.52  
 For Philo, the presence or absence of a ‘victim’ (an animal sacrifice) is irrelevant to 
determining whether a true sacrifice took place. In this example, it is the piety of the soul being 
offered which is really important. This piety in life is rooted in the single minded self-offering of 
the worshiper. In De specialibus legibus, Book 1, Philo speaks of the vow of the Nazirite in 
Numbers 6. According to Philo, the man himself resembles the sacrifice of the entire burnt 
offering, the sin-offering and the offering for preservation.53 This is so because, “the penitent is 
preserved and the person preserved from the maladies of his soul repents, and both of them are 
pressing forward to that perfect and wholly sound frame of mind of which the whole-burnt-
offering is a symbol.”54 The word translated perfect (ὁλόκληρος) and its cognate ὁλοκαύτωμα 
often appear in the LXX in relation to sacrifices (cf. Lev 23:15; Deut 27:6; Josh 8:31; 1 Macc 
4:47).55 All of this is concerned with the offering of the whole person to God. The washing and 
then the burning of a burnt offering on the altar of Lev 9:14 is allegorized in the same way, “for 
the wise man consecrates his whole soul as being worthy to be offered to God, owing to its 
freedom from voluntary or involuntary blemish” (ὅλην γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀξίαν οὖσαν θεῷ 
προσάγεσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν μήθ᾿ ἑκούσιον μήτ᾿ ἀκούσιον μῶμον ὁ σοφὸς καθαγιάζει).56 
The washing of the belly in Lev 8:21 is interpreted to mean a cleansing away of every kind of 
desire. When that is effected, the worshipper can offer, “the whole burnt offerings of the soul”.57 
                                                
 52 Mos. 2.108.  
 53 Spec. 1.252.  
 54 Spec. 1.253.  
 55 Cf. Paul’s use of the word using sacrificial language in a spiritual sense in 1 Thess 5:23: “Now may the 
God of peace himself sanctify you completely (ὁλοτελής), and may your whole (ὁλόκληρος) spirit and soul and 
body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ”.  
 56 Philo, Leg. 3.141. 
 57 Migr. 67.  
    148
In De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, Philo recalls that Lev. 2:14 says an offering is to be “new, 
roasted, sliced, pounded”. These four things are understood allegorically, including, “the fire-
tested and invincible reason” and “the persistent practice and exercise in what the mind has 
grasped”. When the worshipper acknowledges these things to be what God wills, he “will bring 
an offering of the first-fruits, even the first and best offspring of the soul.”58  
 The image of first-fruits is used elsewhere to describe “the ransom of our souls” that 
brings liberty,59 and “the ripe fruits of the soul” are related to, “everything in the soul that tends 
to peace and friendship and agreement”.60 The first-fruit offering is, “the word of thanksgiving, 
sent up out of a true and sincere mind.”61 Likewise, Philo explains that the first-fruit offering of 
Deut 24:6 concerns the reaping of, “the true harvest of the mind”, when the, “fruit-bearing of 
ourselves” is offered to God. This is the product of, “the basket of our reasoning faculties”62 A 
similar thought is also found in Philo’s meditation on Lev 27:30, 32 concerning the tithe. We are 
to offer the first-fruits of the “unreasoning creatures” within (the senses), yet, “the first and best 
thing in us is the reason, and it is only right that from its intelligence, its shrewdness, its 
apprehension, its prudence and the other qualities which belong to it, we should offer first-fruits 
to God, who gave to it its fertility of thinking.”63 When Philo considers the propitiation offered in 
Lev 5:7ff., he considers the “best and most perfect form of purification” to be the offering of 
speech and mind together, in true speech that originates in pure thoughts.64 Abel’s offering of the 
firstlings of his flock (Gen 4:4), show that, “the gladness and richness of the soul, all that 
                                                
 58 Sacr. 87.  
 59 Sacr. 117.  
 60 Migr. 202.   
 61 Sacr. 74.  
 62 Somn. 272.  
 63 Congr. 98; see generally Congr. 96–98. 
 64 Mut. 240; see Mut. 245–47, 249–51.  
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protects and gives joy, should be set apart for God.”65 In such a case, Philo distinguishes between 
the parts of the animal related to the body (such as excrement and fat), that should be cast off and 
the rest that, “show a soul wholly complete in all its parts” that, “should be given in their entirety 
as a burnt-offering to God.”66 These kinds of soul should be completely free from blemish, that is 
“innocent and purified.”67 
 Philo sometimes compares specific sacrifices to the offering of the soul. The libation is 
one such, that is compared to “the blood of the soul”68 or to the mind,69 once it abstains from the 
passions. In Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, Philo interprets the division of blood in Exod 24:6 
to speak of divine and human wisdom. The divine kind of wisdom, being without mixture is a 
reflection of God’s own nature, and “therefore is poured as an offering (σπένδω) to God”70 (the 
same verse is expounded elsewhere with reference to the unmixed soul that is consecrated to 
God).71 The mind and the soul are spoken of in parallel, as if Philo makes no distinction between 
them, and when the mind/soul is filled with divine inspiration, free from all mixture and “in its 
perfect purity” it, “is fitly rendered in its entirety as a holy libation (σπονδή) to Him”.72 The goal 
of the offering is that the mind should be purified from all “objects of sense” and become 
entirely rational.73 The blood that is poured in a circle around the altar represents, “a libation of 
the life-principle”. This is explained as concerning the mind “whole and complete” where every 
word and intention shows that the mind is offered willingly in God’s service.74 In Philo’s 
                                                
 65 Sacr. 136.  
 66 Sacr. 139.  
 67 Fug. 80.  
 68 Leg. 2.56.   
 69 Ebr. 152–53.  
 70 Her. 182–83; cf. the metaphorical use of σπένδω in Phil 2:17; 2 Tim 4:6.  
 71 See QE 2.33. 
 72 Her. 184.   
 73 Her. 185.  
 74 Spec. 1.217.  
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commentary on Exodus, “every soul desirous of moral excellence is a libation”, which, Philo 
elaborates, “that is if one first pours out and dedicates one’s virtue to God.”75 In De somniis, 
Philo speaks of the person who pours the libation (ὁ σπονδοφόρος), as the great high priest, who 
offers, “the libation of himself.”76  
 Philo occasionally speaks of incense as a spiritual sacrifice;77 the libation just described is 
also compared to incense,78 incense is explicated in one place as, “the incense of consecrated 
virtues”79 (καθαγιάζων ἀρετὰς ἐκθυμιᾷ, using the verb ἐκθυμιάω, to burn as incense),80 incense 
is likened to the offering of reason (λογισμός),81 the offering of the whole world that is 
consumed morning and evening in the censer (and also described as an offering of thanks by the 
world to its maker),82 and in one instance he compares incense to the offering of the whole mind 
to God.83 
 In the first book of De specialibus legibus, the shaving of the Nazirite’s hair in Num 6:18 
is described as the consecration of a portion of himself as representative of the whole, “the 
                                                
 75 QE 2.71. See Jean Laporte, “The High Priest in Philo of Alexandria,” SPhilo 3 (1991): 71–82 at 75, 77, 
on the libation of the soul. 
 76 Somn. 2.183. Note the emphatic placing of ἑαυτόν at the end of the sentence, in apposition to the 
preceding noun phrase ὅλον τὸ σπονδεῖον ἀκράτου μεθύσματος (“an entire libation full of unmixed wine”, 
Younge), both in the accusative singular, defining the libation as the person himself.  
 77 Cf. Ps 141:2 (Ps 140:2 LXX), which could also be a source for Philo’s thought here.   
 78 QE 2.71.  
 79 Somn. 2.232.  
 80 “ἐκθυμιάω,” LSJ, 507.  
 81 Philo, Ebr. 87.  
 82 Her. 199–200. Cf. also Somn. 1.243 that speaks of the whole world and heaven made a votive offering 
(ἀνάθημα) to God, which is set in parallel with the offering of “God-beloved souls” (θεοφιλής) who are consecrated 
to God (cited by Laporte, “Priest,” 71–82 at 75). This is perhaps the only place where a cosmic sacrifice is described 
(compared to the numerous references to a cosmic/heavenly temple or a cosmic High Priest); noted also by Nijay 
Gupta, “The Question of Coherence in Philo’s Cultic Imagery: A Socio-literary Approach,” JSP 20.4 (2011): 277–
97 at 288.   
 83 Philo, Leg. 2.56. See also Congr. 114–115, that speaks of a censer of incense that emits “perfumes 
exhaled by wisdom and every virtue” and Spec. 1.171, that portrays the incenses offerings as a symbol of gratitude 
for the rational spirit of a person and the blood offerings as a thank offering for the physical nature of the person.  
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votary has vowed to bring himself, . . . that some part of him should be sacrificially offered.”84 In 
another place, Philo compares different sacrifices (here the offerings of Abraham, described in 
Gen 15:9) with different parts of a person that align themselves with reason and order (so 
a soul, “which can easily receive guidance and instruction and ruling”, speech that is equipped to 
defeat sophisms and develop analytical arguments, the sense that relates to the sensible world 
and the turtle-dove and pigeon that represent “divine and human reason”).85 Similarly, in his 
treatment of the burnt offering in Gen 8:20, Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin, Philo depicts 
the beasts as the senses and the birds the mind of the wise man, which come to fruition as a 
thank-offering offered, “as immaculate and unblemished offerings.”86 The willing dispositions 
are equated with first-fruit offerings.87 All these parts are indicative of the whole person and their 
life as it is lived before God, “though the worshippers bring nothing else, in bringing themselves 
they offer the best of sacrifices, the full and truly perfect oblation of noble living”,88 since, Philo 
asks elsewhere, “what votive offering (ἀνάθημα) is more hallowed or more worthy of reverence 
than a man?”89  
 Both faith and works can be offered as sacrifices. The one who can bear fruit as their 
virtue because they understand and receive the fruit that comes from God, will offer to him, “the 
blameless and fairest sacrifice of faith”. The Loeb translation might suggest a sacrifice produced 
by faith or a faithful sacrifice, but the Greek is a neuter accusative noun followed by a feminine 
                                                
 84 Spec. 1.254.   
 85 Her. 125–26.  
 86 QG 2.52. In QG 3.3, Philo interprets the different animals offered in Gen 15:9 as different parts of the 
universe.  
 87 QE 2.50.  
 88 Spec. 1.271, also cited below in connection with another topic.  
 89 Decal. 133. In Spec. 1.66, the stars are compared to votive offerings. This passage is explored in more 
detail below.  
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accusative noun, with no genitive involved (ἄμωμον καὶ κάλλιστον ἱερεῖον οἴσει θεῷ πίστιν).90 
This could be described as an “Accusative in Simple Apposition”91 so Younge’s translation 
might be more appropriate: “will bring to God a faultless and most excellent offering, namely 
faith”.  Philo also characterizes good deeds done eagerly and without hesitation as a first-fruits 
offering.92  
 In several of his works, Philo takes the festival of Passover to depict the life of virtue as a 
passing over from one state to the next. In one place it is explained as, “the passage from the life 
of the passions to the practice of virtue”93 and in another, similarly, to the mind passing away 
from the passions and towards giving thanks to God.94 The mention of a tenth offered to 
Melchizedek by Abram in Gen 14:20 speaks of, “the soul’s passover, the crossing from every 
passion and all the realm of sense to the tenth, which is the realm of mind and of God”, until the 
radiant soul offers its own progress as, “innocent and spotless victims”.95 What Philo refers to as 
“the crossing-festival” (διαβατήρια, speaking of the Passover)96 represents a crossing, “from the 
body and the passions”,97 as does the lamb of the Passover itself, that symbolizes the progress of 
the soul towards a harmony that unites “counsel and justice”.98 Both the mind and the soul have a 
kind of Passover; the soul from the passions of ignorance, vice, fear, greed and injustice to 
education, wisdom, confidence, justice and equality, and the mind from the realm of the senses 
                                                
 90 Cher. 85.  
 91 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 198–99.  
 92 Philo, Sacr. 53.  
 93 Sacr. 63.  
 94 Migr. 25.  
 95 Congr. 106. 
 96 Cf. Mos. 2:224.  
 97 Spec. 2.147.  
 98 QE 1.3.  
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to outward looking thoughts that emulate and love others.99 Later in the same work, the lamb 
represents a passing over from the material, passive, bodily and the perceptions of the senses to 
the active, rational and incorporeal, “more akin to mind and thought” that symbolizes a virtuous 
soul that desires perfection.100 This emphasis on a passing over from the corporeal to the 
incorporeal can also be found in Philo’s contention that the, “true sacrifice of God-loving souls” 
is from visible splendor to an invisible one.101 To repel the passions that dwell within until they 
have been completely removed is, “to make atonement over them,” (ἐξιλάσασθαι ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν102 
from ἐξιλάσκομαι, to make expiation, that is to appease God).103 Once the mind is free from the 
passions, replaced by good things, it can make its first-fruit offerings to the Lord.104 
Additionally, Ephraim and Manasseh represent two types of groups who offered sacrifices at 
different times and are compared respectively to “fruitful memory” (those who sacrificed the 
Passover in the first month and separated themselves immediately from the passions in Egypt) 
and “recollection” (that is seen as inferior, and thus awarded second place; these are those who 
looked back to Egypt).105 
 
3.2.3.2 The offering of purity and virtue 
 In De specialibus legibus, Book 1, this single-minded piety is defined as ἀρετή (virtue), 
which is viewed as the supreme good. Philo says that the person offering a sacrifice must cleanse 
their soul before their body, “The mind is cleansed by wisdom and the truths of wisdom’s 
                                                
 99 QE 1.4.  
 100 QE 1.7–8; cf. also the reference to the Passover lamb in relation to forward motion in Leg. 3.165. 
 101 QE 1.13.  
 102 Post. 72.  
 103 “ἐξιλάσκομαι,” BDAG, 350.  
 104 Philo, Plant. 97–99.  
 105 Leg. 3.94.   
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teaching . . . and by the sacred company of the other virtues and by the practice of them shewn in 
noble and highly praiseworthy actions.”106 The goal of this cleansing is “contemplation (θεωρία) 
of the universe and all that is therein”,107 the same as in a later section, “the contemplation of 
things immaterial and conceptual” (πρὸς θεωρίαν τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ νοητῶν). This goal is 
achieved by knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) that guides reason (λογισμός).108 Here the altar itself is 
depicted as the soul of the wise person, made up of perfect virtue, upon which the sacred light 
(wisdom) is kept burning.109 In the same section, Philo emphasizes the need for both body and 
soul to be pure before a sacrifice; the body from “passions (πάθος) and . . . every viciousness 
(κακία) of word and deed”, the body from defilement.110 Unlike an animal sacrifice, the offering 
of a person is not consumed since, “the holiness of the sacrifice remains, for sacrifice is not flesh 
but the pure and unstained life of a holy (person).”111 The person who cleanses themselves can 
offer themselves as a sacrifice.112  
 In a different work, Philo’s meditation on the head offered with the feet and inner parts in 
Exod 12:9 leads to the explanation that for a person, “it is fitting for him who is purified to purify 
his entire soul with his inner desires” and this will lead to words and deeds that accord with this 
purity.113 The prohibition against mixing the blood of the sacrifice with leaven in Exod 23:18 is 
interpreted as a total consecration of the person to God that despises sensual pleasures and 
conceit.114 It is “cultivated and fruit-yielding virtue”, planted in the soul and bearing fruit free of 
                                                
 106 Spec. 1.269.  
 107 Spec. 1.269.  
 108 Spec. 1.288.  
 109 Spec. 1.287.  
 110 Spec. 1.257, and generally, Spec. 1.257–60.  
 111 QE 2.98.  
 112 Spec. 1.270.  
 113 QE 1.17.  
 114 QE 2.14.  
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blemish that should be placed on the altar of sacrifice (Gen 2:8).115 “Righteous conduct, virtues, 
and virtuous actions” are “first in worth and value” and should be offered as first-fruits.116 The 
first-fruit offerings are also compared to the “sacred impulses” in a person that accord with virtue 
and must be dedicated to God. These perfect virtues, unsullied by any taint of evil, are also 
compared to the undivided sacrifices and burnt offerings that are presented to God.117 The 
modesty and chastity of women in marriage reflecting the beauty of their soul, is also compared 
to first-fruit offerings.118  
 Philo explains that the young worshipers of Exod 24:5 are the youthful principles of the 
soul that represent action and complement the elderly principles of the soul that engage in 
contemplation. Together the two add up to a virtuous life.119 A thank-offering “of those things 
which belong to a sound life” combines the, “heart of a pious mind” with a soul of, “sound and 
full reason”.120 The blood smeared upon the candidate admitted to the priesthood indicates 
figuratively that, “the fully-consecrated must be pure in words and actions and in his whole 
life.”121 Philo allegorizes the sacrificial regulations concerning purification and unblemished 
animals this way, “Mind belongs to a genus wholly superior to sense as man is to woman; 
unblemished and purged, as perfect virtue (ἀρετή) purges, it is itself the most religious of 
sacrifices and its whole being is highly pleasing to God.”122 The mind of the worshiper must be 
sanctified “by exercise in good and profitable thoughts and judgements” and their life must be 
                                                
 115 Leg. 1.49–50.  
 116 Sacr. 73.  
 117 Sacr. 109–11.  
 118 Mos. 2.137–39.   
 119 QE 2.31.  
 120 QE 2.99.  
 121 Mos. 2.150; see more generally Mos. 2.148–51.  
 122 Spec. 1.201.   
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consistent with these judgements.123 The same idea is expressed in De plantatione, where Philo 
asserts, “God delights in altars beset by a choir of Virtues (ἀρετή), albeit no fire burn on 
them.”124 Philo compares favorably those who do not perform a literal sacrifice with those who 
do, since the former demonstrate the highest quality of a sacrifice: the virtues; this is in contrast 
to those who simply go through the motions, but whose lives are full of the opposite of those 
virtues: impiety. According to Otto Bauerfeind, in his emphasis on virtue (ἀρετή), Philo is 
drawing on “a leading tool in the language of Greek moral philosophy . . . (which) formed an 
important medium in the dealings of Judaism with the Hellenistic world”.125 According to 
Samuel Sandmel, Philo sees the true virtues arising from the soul which contemplates a “generic 
virtue” which exists in the intelligible, rather than the material and sensible world,126 showing 
again Philo’s debt to Platonic thought. Outward ethical conduct exemplified in obedience to 
Mosaic law is the counterpart and imitation of the heavenly virtue.127   
 These virtues are linked to other qualities in various places in Philo. In the passage from 
De somniis, Book 2 (cited above), Philo asks, “What then is the offering of an unbodied soul?” 
What is the fine wheaten flour?” He answers his own rhetorical question this way, “What but the 
fine flour, the symbol of a will (γνώμη),128 purified by the councils of instruction (παιδεία).”129 
So the Priest is commanded, “to offer the best of sacrifices, even the whole soul, brimful of 
truths (δόγμα) of all sincerity (εἰλικρινής) and purity (καθαρός) —a soul, too, rich with fatness, 
                                                
 123 Spec. 1.203.  
 124 Plant. 108.   
 125 Otto Bauernfeind, “Ἀρετή,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Vol I (ed. Gerhard Kittel; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 457–61 at 458.  
 126 Sandmel, Philo, 113–14.   
 127 Goodenough, Philo, 118–23. According to Idem, Philo, 122, Philo’s concern is both with individual 
laws as applications of the principle of natural law expressed in the Decalogue, and with how they manifest the 
primary (Greek) virtues.  
 128 “that which is purposed or intended, purpose, intention, mind, mind-set” according to “γνώμη,” BDAG, 
202, and translated “mind” by Younge.  
 129 Philo, Somn. 2.73.  
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gladdened by light divine and perfumed with the breaths exhaled from justice and the other 
virtues”.130 In order to exhibit the virtues, the mind and the soul must have been purified by 
instruction in the right doctrine. Such a soul can offer up truth as its sacrifice, as Philo recounts 
in his work Quod deterius potiori insidari soleat when describing the expectations of God, “who 
welcomes genuine worship of every kind . . . Genuine worship is that of a soul bringing simple 
reality as its only sacrifice”.131 If a person comes to the shrine full of good (in contrast to the 
“empty hands” referred to in Exod 23:15) and thus ready to receive spiritual illumination, their 
soul will be filled with knowledge and wisdom.132 
  
3.2.3.3 The Sacrifice of Praise 
 In offering up these kind of sacrifices of virtues, the true worshiper is offering a sacrifice 
of praise,133 in hymns and songs, “And indeed though the worshippers bring nothing else, in 
bringing themselves they offer the best of sacrifices, the full and truly perfect oblation of noble 
living (καλοκἀγαθία), as they honour with hymns and thanksgivings their Benefactor and 
Saviour, God, sometimes with the organs of speech, sometimes without tongue or lips, when 
within the soul alone their minds recite the tale or utter the cry of praise.”134 The praise offering 
of Lev 7:12f. is understood as “hymns and benedictions and prayers and sacrifices”.135 Indeed, 
the noblest of virtues according to Philo, is gratitude, as he recounts in his work De plantatione, 
                                                
 130 Somn. 2.74.  
 131 Det. 21.  
 132 QE 2.7.  
 133 Of course, Philo does also have a precedent for this in the OT in passages such as Ps 51:15–17 (50:17–
19 LXX); Jonah 2:9 (2:10 LXX) and possibly, Pss 50:14 (49:14 LXX); 107:22 (106:22 LXX); 116:17 (115:8 LXX).   
 134 Spec. 1.272. Cf. Spec. 1.286, “all perfect sacrifices consisted in thanksgiving” (Younge’s translation. 
The Loeb translation understands πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τοῦ τελείας ἐν εὐχαριστίαις εἶναι a little differently). 
 135 Spec. 1.224; cf. Spec. 1.193, that says that the practices of worship, such as hymns, prayers, and 
sacrifices are designed in order to, “make them [the worshiper] enamoured of continence and piety.”; cf. also Spec. 
1.195–96. 
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“it is not possible genuinely to express our gratitude to God by means of buildings and oblations 
and sacrifices . . . for even the whole world were not a temple adequate to yield the honour due 
to Him. Nay, it must be expressed by means of hymns of praise”.136 Yet here too Philo has not 
relapsed into counting the mere singing of hymns a sacrifice, since this would be as great an 
error as counting physical offerings a sacrifice, so he is at pains to explain that the hymns of 
which he is speaking, are to be sung, “and these not such as the audible voice shall sing, but 
strains raised and re-echoed by the mind too pure for eye to discern.”137 Philo’s narrative 
continues with an “old story” concerning the creation of the world, where the only thing wanting 
in the perfection of all that God had made was, according to one of his heavenly ministers, 
“namely the word to sound their praises”.138 In response to this wise answer, God creates a 
people who, “should be capable of receiving all learning and of composing hymns of praise”.139 
Even here, when speaking of praise, Philo is drawn back to the beauty of the rational mind and 
the ability to praise is fundamentally tied to the reasoning powers of the worshiper, as he goes 
on, “the mind that blesses God . . . was himself the fruit that is really “holy and for praise to 
God,” fruit borne not by earth’s trees but by those of a rational and virtuous nature.”140 In 
another instance, a cultivated spirit of thanksgiving purifies the worshiper of wrong and washes 




                                                
 136 Plant. 126. Leonhardt, Worship, contends that thanksgiving is at the heart of Philo’s understanding of 
worship, and makes this the central theme of her study. 
 137 Plant. 126. 
 138 Plant. 128. Young translates this as, “namely for reason, which should be able duly to praise it all”.  
 139 Plant. 129 (Younge’s translation).  
 140 Plant. 134.  
 141 Deus. 7.  
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3.2.3.4 Summary of Sacrifice Language 
 For Philo it is never sufficient merely to perform the right sacrifices in the manner 
prescribed by the OT. Rather, a sacrifice must be offered with due reverence for the occasion and 
in accord with the personal piety of the worshiper, as demonstrated in a holy life. The converse 
of this sentiment is also true; the sacrifices of an impious person count for nothing. Therefore, a 
person must offer sacrifices with a mind and reason that is pure and noble. Here we see a 
development that is closer to the Hellenistic thought-world of the Diaspora than it is to the 
context of Israelite religion. Moreover, Philo agrees with Stoics such as Seneca and Dio 
Chrysostom and Platonists such as Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre (as well as Cicero) that a true 
sacrifice can be spiritual rather than literal. This is exemplified in the offering of the whole of 
one’s mind and soul to God as well as the offering of purity and virtue in thought, speech and 
deed. Praise and thanksgiving can also constitute a sacrifice (as we also find in Maximus of 
Tyre).       
 
3.3 Priest Language 
3.3.1 Priest represents divine direction in the soul 
 Philo uses priest language for an internal guide who speaks to the person from God. 142 
He characterizes this guide in several different ways, although each of these seem to be a 




                                                
 142 For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the role of the High Priest in Philo, see Laporte, 
“Priest,” 71–82. Note also Seland, “Common Priesthood,” 87–119 at 87–99. 
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3.3.2 Priest as Reason 
 In his meditation on Melchizedek the priest (Gen 14:18–20), Philo identifies the wine 
offered by Melchizedek with the strong drink suitable for souls, “For he is a priest, even Reason 
(λόγος), having as his portion Him that is, and all his thoughts of God are high and vast and 
sublime”  (ἱερεὺς γάρ ἐστι λόγος κλῆρον ἔχων τὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑψηλῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ 
ὑπερόγκως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς λογιζόμενος).143 A little further on, Philo speaks of the 
Reasoning faculty (here λογισμός) entering the Holy Place when Aaron himself enters, acting as 
Priest.144 Philo speaks of this λογισμός almost synonymously with his reference to Reason 
(λόγος) a little earlier,145 and in parallel with the mind (νοῦς) just afterwards.146 In De somniis, 
Book I, Philo refers to two temples (addressed below). The High Priest of the temple of the 
universe is, “His First-born, the divine Word” (ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτοῦ θεῖος λόγος) and that of the 
“rational soul” (λογικὴ ψυχή) is the “real Man”.147 Unusually for Philo, two High Priests are 
pictured; one who ministers to the universe and one to the soul, but in both cases words with the 
λογ– root are used and the emphasis is on word and reason. In an allegorical passage in De 
ebrietate, Philo compares “moderate learning” with a mother and Reason with a Father.148 Those 
who adhere closely to the words of the Father, “right reason” (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος) judges worthy of 
the priesthood, seen as the highest honor.149 The true Priesthood is for those who obey right 
reason and resist false arguments and the impulses of the flesh.150 None can be a true priest who 
                                                
 143 Philo, Leg. 3.82.  
 144 Leg. 3.125. 
 145 Leg. 3.123.  
 146 Leg. 3.126.  
 147 Somn. 1.215. The “real man” seems to be a picture of the perfect man, set in contrast with the one who 
is still progressing towards perfection; see Laporte, “Priest,” 71–82, at 80.  
 148 e.g. Ebr. 68, which places Father (πατήρ) and “right reason” (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος) in apposition, both in the 
dative case. 
 149 Ebr. 65.  
 150 See Ebr. 68–76.  
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is still at war with the vain opinions contrary to reason.151 A little further on in the same work, 
Philo identifies Aaron the Priest directly with the reason, “He is the reason (λογισμός) whose 
thoughts are lofty and sublime, not with the empty inflated bigness of mere vaunting, but with 
the greatness of virtue (ἀρετή)”.152 The one who stays away from the path of indiscipline and 
folly and instead follows the path of “sober abstinence” will gain “the greatest of headships, the 
priesthood.”153 The High Priest is also identified as Reason in De migratione Abrahami, where 
ἀρχιερεύς is placed in apposition with λογισμός, both in the accusative singular.154 Thus, the 
Holy place is discernible by the intellect alone (νοητός),155 that is, “which only mind can 
apprehend”.156 Philo stresses that it is the soul (ψυχή) that enters the holy place and the 
“necessaries” that it requires are, “the good things of the mind”.157 Just as Reason (λόγος), 
sometimes portrayed as divine reason, entered the holy place, now it is the mind/soul that enters. 
 
3.3.3 Priest as Judge of Conscience 
 Elsewhere in De fuga et inventione, Philo explicitly states that, “the High Priest is not a 
man, but a Divine (θεῖος) Word (λόγος)”.158 In an elaborate allegory, the father of the High 
Priest (who is the Divine Word) is God and his mother is Wisdom. His anointing means that, 
“his ruling faculty (ἡγεμονικός) is illumined with a brilliant light”,159 his mind is purified, and he 
                                                
 151 Ebr. 76.  
 152 Ebr. 128. We will have more to say about the identification of the Priesthood with virtue below.  
 153 Ebr. 125–29.  
 154 Ebr. 102.  
 155 Ebr. 103. That is “falling within the province of νοῦς”, according to “νοητός,” LSJ, 1178. 
 156 Philo, Ebr. 104. Despite the translator using the word “mind” instead of “intellect”, as he did earlier, 
both words translate the same Greek adjective νοητός (cf. Young is clearer here, by using “intellect” both times). 
 157 Ebr. 105. Indeed νοητός is used six times in this short passage (Ebr. 102–105). 
 158 Fug. 108, the latter word obviously the same translated “Reason” in other works by Philo. For 
commentary on Fug. 106–112, see Williamson, Philo, 138–43. 
 159 Philo, Fug. 110.  
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is “betrothed” to a pure virgin, like one wedded to virtue.160 He is incapable of committing 
involuntary sin.161 Philo then advises his reader to pray that this High Priest should dwell in their 
soul, that is as “Monitor” (ἔλεγχος) “on the seat of justice”.162 In the second book of De somniis, 
Philo refers to a High Priest who is himself the libation (cf. the previous section on sacrifice). 
This High Priest receives bounties from God and pours them out as himself.163 He is not only, 
“able to sow the seed of undefiled and virgin thoughts, but a father also of holy intelligences.”164 
The Loeb translator, F. H. Colson explains in two notes how this role symbolizes the relation of 
the Logos to God.165 This same High Priest is understood as πρύτανις and δημιουργός, translated 
by Colson as “its president, its chief magistrate”.166 Colson writes of the latter, “The term, used 
in various Greek states, would be quite familiar to Philo through Thucydides and 
Demosthenes”,167 and his figure represents “a whole judgement-court, a whole senate”,168 
emphasizing his judicial role in relation to the soul.169 In Quod Deus sit immutabilis, the priest is 
explicitly identified with “divine reason” (ὁ θεῖος λόγος). Prior to his entry into the soul of a 
                                                
 160 Fug. 114–15.  
 161 Fug. 115.  
 162 Fug. 118; ἔλεγχος appears twice in this passage, translated in one place as “conscience” and in another 
as “judge and convictor” by Younge.  
 163 Somn. 2.183.  
 164 Somn. 2.185.  
 165 See Philo. On Flight and Finding. On the Change of Names. On Dreams. Translated by F. H. Colson, G. 
H. Whitaker. LCL 275. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934, 524 note a; 529 note c. Philo’s 
understanding of Logos has generated much discussion, see e.g. Goodenough, Philo, 100–110; Dillon, Platonists, 
154–65; Sandmel, Philo, 94–99; Borgen, “Philo,” 233–82 at 273–74; David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology 
in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985); Williamson, Philo, 103–43; M. Barker, 
“Temple Imagery in Philo: An Indication of the Origin of the Logos?,” in Templum Amicitiae: Essays on the Second 
Temple Presented to Ernst Bammel (ed. W. Horbury; JSNTSup 48; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 70–102; Laporte, 
“Priest,” 71–82; Schenck, Philo, 58–62; Cristina Termini, “Philo’s Thought Within the Context of Middle Judaism,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 95–
123 at 97–101; Scott D. Mackie, “Seeing God in Philo of Alexandria: the Logos, the Powers, or the Existent One?,” 
SPhilo 21 (2009), 25–47; Roberto Radice, “Philo’s Theology and Theory of Creation,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Philo (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124–45 at 135–40. 
 166 Somn. 2.187.  
 167 (529 note a. in the foregoing translation).  
 168 Somn. 2.188.  
 169 Later in Somn. 2.189 and 2.230–32, the High Priest is understood to be transformed into a kind of 
perfected man, whose thoughts are transfixed on God alone.  
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person there is no sense of guilt for shameful thoughts and actions, for there is no understanding 
of sin.170 But when the true priest arrives, twice named as “Conviction” (ἔλεγχος), he exposes 
the condition of the soul with a pure ray of light, in order that it be healed.171 
 
3.3.4 Priest as Purity of the soul 
 In his Legum allegoriae, Philo notes that Aaron did not wear his robe when he entered 
into the Holy of Holies (Lev 16:1–4), and compares the idea of the high priest, “laying aside the 
garment of opinions and impressions of the soul” to that of the soul that loves God disrobing 
itself of the body and all that is dear to it, in order to gain a foundation in the perfect doctrines of 
virtue.172 Similarly, in Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, Philo speaks of a man who is divine, not 
human (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπινος, ἀλλὰ θεῖος) when his mind ministers to God in purity.173 He is 
like a High Priest whose heart is perfect; that is, one whose soul turns towards God and away 
from the body, as a stranger sojourning in a foreign land on this earth.174 Similarly, Philo 
elsewhere compares the body of a priest with an immortal soul. Philo’s interest lies not in the 
body, but in the need for the soul to be unblemished just as the Priest’s body is required to be 




                                                
 170 Deus. 134.  
 171 Deus. 135.  
 172 Leg. 2.55–56.  
 173 Her. 84.  
 174 Her. 82–85. Like the work we explored in the previous chapter (such as Plato, Exil. 607D; Plutarch, Is. 
Os. 353A; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 7.5; 9.6; 10.9), we see Platonic influences in references to “the prison-houses of 
the body” (Her. 85). 
 175 Spec. 1.82  
    164
3.3.5 Priest represents different actors 
 The Priest can represent the Universe acting as a “fellow-ministrant” (συλλειτουργέω) 
with the High Priest,176 just as the Priest’s garment can transform him, “from a man into the 
nature of the world.”177 Angels, who are pure intelligent bodiless souls, are described as priests 
in the temple of the universe.178 The nation of Israel acts like a priest during the Passover 
(ἱεράομαι) and yet is guiltless,179 just as they are priest to the whole world.180 As a microcosm of 
this image, each household or congregation can act as a pure priest who sacrifices, “with one 
character and one soul.”181  
 
3.3.6 Garments of the Priest 
3.3.6.1 Garments are a symbol of the soul that is pure inside and out 
 The two robes of the Priest are interpreted as symbols of a soul that is pure, both inwardly 
in its relations to God and outwardly in its relations to the world of the senses and to other 
people.182 Philo returns to the garments of Aaron described in Lev 16:4, and claims that the 
passage speaks in riddles (αἰνίσσομαι), but its symbolic meaning concerns those who worship in 
purity without deceit (ἄδολος), and reject that which is merely human (ἀνθρώπειος), mortal 
(θνητός) and false (ψευδής), that is dear to the darkness, and instead aim at immortality 
(ἀφθαρσία) and live in the light of truth.183  
 
                                                
 176 Spec. 1.95; cf. Spec. 1.96.  
 177 Mos. 2.135.  
 178 Spec. 1.66.  
 179 Spec. 2.145.  
 180 Spec. 2.163.  
 181 QE. 1.10. On the role of macrocosm and microcosm in Philo’s use of cultic imagery, see the helpful 
analysis and chart in Gupta, “Question,” 277–97 at 291–95. 
 182 Mut. 44.  
 183 Somn. 1.218.  
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3.3.6.2 Garments are associated with Reason 
 As we have already seen, the High Priest is identified as the Logos, but his garments are 
also said to owe their source to powers of the mind (νοητός) and the senses (αἰσθητός).184 The 
signet/seal and the flowers and bells are also related to the former and latter respectively.185 In 
Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum Book II, the garments of the High Priest represent truth,186 
the Logos,187 that described as Reason, restrains the passions.188  
 
3.3.6.3 Garments represent the virtues 
 The garments can represent the virtues such as prudence and truth189 or simply all the 
virtues.190 Truth adorns the robe of the high priest in the sacred place where the soul resides. 
Truth and δήλωσις (“clear showing” in the Loeb translation or “manifestation” in Younge) are 
placed together and represent the inner and outer qualities or thoughts and actions that are in 
accord with wisdom.191 
 
3.3.6.4 Garments represent the world 
 The garments of the Priest represent the whole world when the Priest enters the 
sanctuary, since different aspects of the garments correspond to different element of the 
                                                
 184 Migr. 102.  
 185 Migr. 103.  
 186 QE 2.107, 116.  
 187 QE 2.110, 111, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124.   
 188 QE 2.115; cf. QE 2.118. Cf. also Mos. 2.124–25, 127–30. 
 189 Ebr. 361–63.  
 190 QE 2.112.  
 191 Spec. 4.69.  
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universe.192 Their arrangement signifies the rational ordering of the universe in accord with 
reason,193 and express to the mind, “the philosophical conceptions which its parts suggest.”194 
 
3.3.7 Summary of Priest Language 
 The Priest is often pictured by Philo as an internal guide that provides direction to the 
soul. It is most often described as Reason, who can act as a judge or arbiter of the conscience and 
enacts purity within the soul. In other places the Priest is compared to the universe, angels, the 
nation of Israel and even the household itself. Philo also concentrates attention on the garments 
of the priest that can symbolize the purity of a soul in relation to God and to the world. The 
garments are sometimes associated with Reason and can represent the virtues as well as 
representing the cosmos itself. I found very little evidence of metaphorical Priest language in 
other Hellenistic writers with which to compare this, but Philo’s emphasis on Reason, virtue and 
inward purity accords generally with what we find in Hellenistic philosophy.   
 
3.4 Temple Language 
3.4.1 The soul is the dwelling place of God 
 In common with other Middle Platonic texts cited in the previous chapter, Philo 
frequently refers to the soul as the dwelling place of God. However, the soul must be prepared, 
just as a temple must be set apart as a dwelling place fit for a holy God. Philo urges his readers to 
make their souls, “as beautiful as we may, to be a lodging fit for God.”195 The word used for 
“lodging” is ἐνδιαίτημα, which does not have a specific cultic connotation. However, it is used 
                                                
 192 Mos. 2.133, 135; Fug. 110; QE 2.109, 112–114, 120.  
 193 Spec. 1.88–89, 93  
 194 Spec. 1.95.  
 195 Cher. 98.  
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at least once in Philo with reference to the tabernacle,196 and elsewhere with reference to the 
temple of the soul197 and in our present passage, Philo follows this comment by averring that 
even a temple is not sufficient for God, but “One worthy house there is—the soul that is fitted to 
receive Him”198 It is important to build the house of the soul in right order; first, laying the 
foundations of goodness and teaching, then the virtues and noble actions are built upon these and 
finally the whole building is ornamented with “the reception of the learning of the schools” (ἡ 
ἀνάληψις τῶν ἐγκυκλίων προπαιδευμάτων).199 Philo compares the soul to a dwelling place 
(ἑστία) into which the divine reason (ὁ θεῖος λόγος) enters.200 Philo asks rhetorically what house 
in all creation could be worthier of God’s dwelling than a soul that is “perfectly purified” and 
considers the “only good” to be “moral beauty”,201 that is, virtue.202 In De somniis Book I, Philo 
makes reference to Lev 26:12 to assert that a soul must be purged of evil “to the utmost” 
(ἄκρως),203 in order that God may dwell within. He speaks as if to himself, “Be zealous 
therefore, O soul, to become a house of God, a holy temple, a most beauteous abiding-place” 
(σπούδαζε οὖν, ὦ ψυχή, θεοῦ οἶκος γενέσθαι, ἱερὸν ἅγιον, ἐνδιαίτημα κάλλιστον).204 The same 
Levitical passage is expounded in his second book, where the city in which God will walk is 
understood to be the soul.205 It is worth noting that Paul seems to allude to this very passage from 
Leviticus in 2 Cor 6:16 with reference to the Corinthians as the temple of God. Philo also speaks 
                                                
 196 Congr. 116.  
 197 Somn. 1.149, covered below and also in Spec. 1.270, addressed earlier, where ἐνδιαίτημα is in 
apposition to the spiritual temple where a person offers himself as a sacrifice.  
 198 Cher. 100.  
 199 Cher. 101; cf. 1 Cor 3:10–15 that also speaks of building a house with right foundations prior to Paul’s 
temple metaphor in 1 Cor 3:16–17.  
 200 Deus. 134.  
 201 Sobr. 62; cf. Sobr. 68.  
 202 Agreeing here with the Stoics; see Dillon, Platonists, 148.   
 203 From ἄκρον; see “ἄκρον,” BDAG, 40; “ἄκρον,” LSJ, 57.  
 204 Somn. 1.149.  
 205 Somn. 2.248.  
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of the “rational soul” (λογικός ψυχή) as a temple of God.206 In an allegorical exposition of Gen 
23:9, 11, Philo compares the body and soul to a “double cave”. The virtuous man shuts himself 
off from the outer cave. Reason reigns within his “god-loving soul”, “receiving holiness and 
purity and the possession of a blameless life” and this is compared to the holy of holies within 
the tabernacle.207 Philo also speaks of a divine inspiration (using θεοληπτέομαι),208 that 
sometimes possesses his soul.209  
 
3.4.2 The mind is the dwelling place of God 
 In one place Philo describes the mind (διάνοια) of a wise man as, “a palace and house of 
God.”210 In another, Philo warns the one who purifies his body and yet enter temples with an 
impure soul and an unrepentant heart, “he shall never escape the eye of Him who sees into the 
recesses of the mind (διάνοια) and treads its inmost shrine.”211 The word translated “shrine” in 
LCL is ἄδυτον, the neuter of ἄδυτος, which is often used substantively for the innermost 
sanctuary or shrine.212 Younge translates the noun as “secret places”, which might cast doubt on 
its cultic connotations but there are numerous instances in Philo where it is clearly used in the 
context of a temple,213 and the comparison with the literal temple in context makes the referent 
very likely. In De vita Mosis Book 2, Philo uses the same word (ἄδυτον) again to speak of τὰ 
                                                
 206 Somn. 1.215.  
 207 QG 4.80.  
 208 “θεοληπτέομαι,” LSJ, 790; cf. Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 1.2.3. 
 209 Cher. 27.  
 210 Praem. 123.  
 211 Deus. 9 (see Deus. 8–9 more generally). 
 212 “ἄδυτος,” LSJ, 25. 
 213 See Philo, Leg. 1.62; Cher. 95; Post. 173; Ebr. 135; Her. 82; Congr. 168; Fug. 162; Somn. 2.232; Mos. 
2.87, 95, 152, 154, 174, 178; Spec. 1.84, 231, 274, 275, 297; Praem. 75; Legat. 188, 306, 308. It is worth noting that    
each of these examples is translated by Younge with a cultic sense, such as “innermost shrine” or “holy of holies”. 
The term never appears in the LXX, and in the Pseudepigrapha it appears only in Sib. Or. 8.56, 487; 12.170, each 
time in a clearly cultic context. 
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ἄδυτα τῆς σκηνῆς (the inmost sanctuary of the tabernacle) as symbolically (συμβολικῶς) 
referring to the mind (νοητός).214 Indeed, Philo claims that when God was looking to establish 
his goodness among people, “He found no worthier temple on earth than the reasoning faculty” 
(νεὼν ἀξιοπρεπέστερον οὐχ εὗρεν ἐπὶ γῆς λογισμοῦ, here using λογισμός).215   
 Similarly, Philo cautions against seeking for Jerusalem and its temple (the “vision of 
peace”) on earth, “for what grander or holier house could we find for God in the whole range of 
existence than the vision-seeking mind . . .?”216 The mind is promised that if it rejects passions 
and all evils and instead “art worthily initiated and canst be consecrated to God,” then it may 
become “an animate shrine of the Father.” A divine vision of holiness is possible for the person 
who makes their soul “a sanctuary and altogether a shrine of God.”217 Philo views the mind 
(νοῦς) as “an inseparable portion [ἀπόσπασμα] of that divine and blessed soul”218 and there are 
tantalizing references to the head being the temple of the mind,219 that are not further developed. 
 
3.4.3 People in their embodiment described as temples 
 In two places Philo seems to come closer to Paul’s understanding of the body as temple 
than other ancient writers. In his account of the creation of humanity after God’s image in Gen 
1:26–27, Philo pictures God selecting only the very best materials for “his structure”, which in 
context seems to be a clear reference to the human body, “for a sacred dwelling-place220 or 
                                                
 214 Mos. 2.82.  
 215 Virt. 188. In his commentary on this verse Walter T. Wilson, Philo of Alexandria. On Virtues: 
Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (PACS 3; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 389 also cites SVF 1.146: “It is not 
necessary to build temples for the gods, but to have the divine in the mind alone.”  
 216 Philo, Somn. 2.250–51.  
 217 QE 2.51.  
 218 Det. 90.  
 219 QG 1.5; QE 2.100.  
 220 Or more literally, “abode” (Younge) translating οἶκος.  
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shrine221 was being fashioned for the reasonable soul, which man was to carry as a holy image 
[ἀγαλματοφορέω],222 of all images [ἄγαλμα] the most Godlike [θεοειδής].”223 The reader has 
already been told that the divine (θεῖος) breath or spirit (πνεῦμα) has been breathed into this 
being,224 so the overall image is closer to 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19 than any other Hellenistic writer we 
have examined.225 A very similar concept is described in Philo’s exposition of the life of Moses, 
when Moses’ audience is astonished at the control of his reason over the impulses of his soul. 
His mind is pictured as dwelling in his body, “like an image in its shrine” (ἀγαλματοφορέω).226 
In one place the congregation itself is described as a temple. Philo explains that in the time of 
Moses, there being no temple at that time, “the dwelling together of several good persons in the 
home was a temple and altar”.227 
 
3.4.4 The Universe as Temple 
3.4.4.1 The World is a temple 
 Philo describes the whole created order as a temple in a number of places.228 In De 
plantatione, Philo describes the world as, “God’s house in the realm of sense-perception”, which 
he explicates as, “a sanctuary” (ἁγίασμα) an outshining of sanctity, so to speak, a copy of the 
                                                
 221 Actually two words, “νεὼς ἱερὸς”, so better, “sacred temple” (Younge).  
 222 On this, an example of compound words much loved by Philo (see David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria. 
On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (PACS 1; Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 103), consult Idem, Creation, 141, 227, 254, 335.   
 223 Opif. 137.  
 224 Opif. 135. See Runia, Creation, 326 on the role of πνεῦμα in Philo, Plato and Stoicism. 
 225 Similarly, note in agreement the remarks of Idem, Creation, 335. However, Seland, “Common 
Priesthood,” 87–119 at 93 notes that Philo is reluctant to speak of a man and his body as a temple, and asserts that 
the idea is only used of Adam and not of human beings in general, who are only copies of the archetypal man.  
 226 Philo, Mos. 1.27.  
 227 QE 1.10.  
 228 George W. MacRae, “Heavenly Temple and Eschatology in the Letter to the Hebrews,” Sem 12 (1978): 
179–99 at 184 speaks of the notion of a “Temple-structured Universe” in Philo.  
    171
original”229 that has been prepared “by the “hands” of God”.230 Here Philo seems to accept both 
the Stoic theory of sense-perceptions/impressions231 and the Platonic understanding of 
otherworldly archetypes that form a pattern or model for earthly phenomena.232 In one place 
Philo claims that there are two temples of God; the soul and the world itself,233 and in another the 
“whole universe” (ὁ σύμπας κόσμος).234 When discussing the furnishings of the temple in Exod 
26:1, Philo claims that the world existed as a universal temple before the holy temple existed.235 
In a number of places, Philo expresses the view that even the whole world is not a temple 
sufficient for God’s honor.236 Finally this world is described as “that greatest of houses or 
cities.”237 Although in the latter citation the metaphor is not that of the temple (and the word used 
is οἰκία not οἶκος), it does comport with the previous references to the house as a temple and, for 
our purposes, it is of interest that the metaphor makes reference to the material and construction 





                                                
 229 A likely reference to the heavenly temple, cf. Philo, Leg. 1.78, discussed below.   
 230 Plant. 50; cf. the reference to the temple “not made with [human] hands” (ἀχειροποίητος,) in Mk 14:58; 
cf. also 2 Cor 5:1. 
 231 Though here using the adjective αἰσθητός rather than the one more commonly used in Stoic thought; 
καταληπτικός. See Dillon, Platonists, 146.  
 232 See e.g. R.J. McKelvey, The New Temple: The Church in the New Testament (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 38–40; MacRae, “Temple,” 179–99 at 283–92.  
 233 Philo, Somn. 1.215.  
 234 Spec. 1.66.  
 235 QE 2.85.  
 236 Plant. 33, cf. also Plant. 126; Leg. 1.44.   
 237 Cher. 127.  
 238 Cf. the reference in 1 Cor 3:10–17 to God as the master builder of the house that is described as a temple 
in 1 Cor 3:16–17.   
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3.4.4.2 Heaven is a temple 
 Heaven alone is sometimes pictured as a temple.239 When God created heaven and earth 
(Gen 1:1), he made heaven first because, “it was destined to be the most holy dwelling-place 
(pairing οἶκος with ἱερὸς) of manifest and visible gods”.240 Elsewhere, the stars are described as 
divine images that God placed in heaven, which are explicitly compared to a temple, “as in the 
purest temple belonging to corporeal being.”241 In a reference just cited, Philo distinguishes 
between the universe as a temple (ἱερόν) and its sanctuary, that is heaven (using ναός, which is 
often specified as the holy of holies).242   
 
3.4.4.3 God fills all things 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Stoic writers referred to God filling the whole 
universe with his presence.243 Philo expresses similar sentiments in a number of places, and these 
accord with the idea of the universe being the dwelling place of God. Philo writes that, “God fills 
and penetrates all things, and has left no spot void or empty of His presence”,244 he, “has left 
                                                
 239 For more detail, see e.g. Carl Werman, “God’s House: Temple Or Universe,” in Philo und das Neue 
Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen, I. Interationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum, 1.-4. 
Mai 2003, Eisenach /Jena (ed. Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr; WUNT 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2004), 309–22. For the OT and ANE background that would also have provided a source for Philo’s thought, see 
Gregory K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of God (NSBT 
17; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2004), 31–60. 
 240 Philo, Opif. 27, speaking of the stars. See Runia, Creation, 160, for this surprising concession to 
Hellenistic thought.  
 241 Opif. 55; cf. the influence of Plato in passages such as Tim. 37c7, also reflected in Seneca, Ep. 90.28, 
cited by Runia, Creation, 204.  
 242 Spec. 1.66. Here we see the occasional privileging by Philo of heaven as a temple above the universe as 
a whole; see e.g. Gupta, “Question,” 277–97 at 282. 
 243 E.g. Cicero, Div. 1.49.110; 1.52.118; Leg. 2.11.28; Alcinous, Handbook, 165.10.3.1–2 (18).   
 244 Leg. 3.4; see also Fug. 75.  
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nothing empty or destitute of Himself, but has completely filled all things”,245 or to put it another 
way, he has filled the universe with himself.246   
 
3.4.5 The Dwelling of Wisdom 
 Wisdom, or prudence (φρόνησις) can be either particular or general. The particular 
prudence that dwells in an individual is destined to die with them, but universal prudence, “has 
for its abode the wisdom of God (here σοφία) and His dwelling-place” and it is imperishable, 
because “it abides in an imperishable dwelling-place”.247 Within the wider context of second 
temple Judaism, the reference to an imperishable house, though not specified, is most likely to 
refer to a temple.248 Wisdom can also be compared to the tabernacle or tent in which the wise 
man “tabernacles (κατασκηνόω) and dwells (ἐνοικέω)”.249 In another work, Reason itself 
(λόγος) appears to be identified with the “high and heavenly doctrine” and also with a “house” 




                                                
 245 Post. 6; see also Conf. 137–38.  
 246 Post. 14, 30. Gig. 27 is another possible reference but it depends on whether the sense is that the Spirit 
fills all things or that the Spirit is “filled up in all its parts, so as to have no interstices and thus be indivisible”, 
according to Philo. On the Cherubim. The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain. The Worse Attacks the Better. On the 
Posterity and Exile of Cain. On the Giants. Translated by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker. LCL 275. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929, 459 note a. 
 247 Leg. 1.78.  
 248 E.g. 1 Chr 29:16; 2 Chr 36:14; Ps 5:7 (5:8 MT); Isa 56:7; 64:11 (64:10 MT); 66:20; 1 En. 14:10, 13, 15, 
21; 25:5 and throughout the Dead Sea Scrolls, as highlighted in the first chapter.  
 249 Leg. 3.46  
 250 Plant. 53.  
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3.4.6 Tabernacle Language251 
 In one place Philo contrasts the tabernacle unfavorably as a symbol of what is earthly, 
mutable and changeable with the temple that represents heaven, that is unchangeable and 
consistent.252 The tabernacle can also be spoken of as the world where God dwells, but without 
being compared negatively with heaven.253 However, elsewhere the tabernacle figuratively 
represents human virtue,254 incorporeal virtue,255 wisdom,256 and truth (with its contents “a 
representation and copy of wisdom”), and the presence of the tabernacle in the midst of 
uncleanness enables the people to wash away all that defiles them.257 
 
3.4.7 Summary of Temple Language 
 Philo frequently speaks of the soul or the mind as the dwelling place of God, as do Stoics 
like Seneca, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom and Marcus Aurelius and Middle Platonists like Plutarch 
and Maximus of Tyre. There is also an exceptional reference to a person in their embodiment 
compared to a temple (though Seland contends that this is only used of the original human, 
Adam, and not of humanity in general). Philo also compares the whole universe to a temple, or 
contrasts the heaven and the earth as temples, or the heaven as the sanctuary (or holy of holies) 
of the universe. We hear that God fills all things and Wisdom is said to dwell as in a temple. 
Tabernacle language is also used for the world and for virtue, wisdom, purity and truth. This 
                                                
 251 MacRae, “Temple,” 179–99 at 181 argues that we can legitimately speak of temple symbolism when 
discussing the use of tabernacle imagery in both Philo and Hebrews, “not only because the biblical accounts of the 
tabernacle are generally thought to reflect temple structure, but because both authors are strongly influenced by 
contemporary temple symbolism in their exegesis.”  
 252 QE 2.83. Just as in QG 2.4, Noah’s ark is understood as corruptible, compared to the ark of the Temple 
that symbolizes incorruptibility, stability and the divine nature. 
 253 QE 2.51. 
 254 Det. 160.  
 255 Ebr. 134.  
 256 Congr. 116–117.  
 257 Her. 112–113.  
    175
cosmic language has analogues with the language and thought of Stoics such as Seneca and 
Marcus Aurelius and Middle Platonists like Plutarch and Alcinous. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 My purpose in this chapter has not been to provide a definitive account of Philo’s 
understanding of the cult or even to defend a particular thesis for the origin of his metaphorical 
sacrifice, priest and temple imagery. Nor am I claiming that Philo is influenced purely by 
Hellenistic philosophy in his use of imagery. Clearly, many of Philo’s emphases could be seen as 
a legitimate development of the critique of sacrifices and the emphasis on spiritual sacrifices 
found in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, and indeed in the OT itself. Rather, my more 
limited aim has been to examine the use of metaphorical temple imagery in Philo in order to see 
to what extent his language is consonant with the emphases already found in other Hellenistic 
philosophical writings. Here we have noted similar concepts to those found in Stoic and Middle 
Platonic writers; namely that the soul and the mind can be a sacrifice, as can purity and virtue in 
thought, speech and deed; and that the soul can be a temple for reason, or God, just as the 
universe itself (or one of its components) is a temple for God, who fills all things. Additionally, 
Philo’s almost unique use of metaphorical Priest language echoes similar themes to those found 
in Hellenistic writers, emphasizing the place of reason, virtue and purity. My next task will be to 
compare my findings with the use of these themes in 1–2 Corinthians, to see how Paul’s 
application of metaphorical temple language might speak to an audience whose familiarity with 
such language originated in a very different world view.      
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Chapter Four: Metaphorical Temple Language in 1 Corinthians  
4.1 Introduction 
 I shall address Paul’s use of metaphorical temple language in First Corinthians in this 
chapter, by comparing Paul’s use of this imagery to convey a particular message within his 
worldview and context, with the use of temple imagery in the worldview and context that I 
examined in the previous two chapters.1 Paul was using language that would have spoken to an 
audience familiar with Hellenistic philosophy.2 However, this is not to claim that he borrows 
from Stoicism or Platonism. Rather, the language and imagery that Paul chose was used for his 
own purposes to express his own theology but both resonated with and challenged those 
influenced by the philosophical milieu of the day.3  
                                                
 1 Given the number of issues discussed in this epistle and the variety of potential backgrounds proposed for 
each issue, there is little scholarly agreement on any of them. It is hardly surprising then that the scholarly literature 
on First Corinthians continues to multiply at an extraordinary rate. Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians (NICNT; Revised ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), xvi–xvii, commenting on the twenty-five year 
gap between the first edition of his commentary and the second, remarks, “in terms of articles in the scholarly 
journals alone, the bibliography has in the past twenty-five years multiplied over 300 percent in relationship to all 
such material in the preceding two centuries!” Therefore, I will be necessarily selective in citing scholarly literature, 
given that I am commenting, not only on the relevant passages (1 Cor 3:16–17; 6:19), but on the letter as a whole.    
 2 Bruce M. Metzger, The New Testament: Its Background, Growth, and Content (New York: Abingdon, 
1965), 64, speaks of the Paul presented by Luke in Acts as, “one fluent in the popular philosophies of the day and 
able to turn his knowledge of them to missionary advantage as a point of contact with the audience” (cited by David 
deSilva, “Paul and the Stoa: A Comparison,” JETS 38.4 (1995): 549–64 at 549). deSilva notes that Metzger evaluates 
the Paul of his letters quite differently, concluding that parallels between Paul and Stoic teaching were limited to 
words, not ideas. deSilva tests out this theory by examining not only verbal parallels but possible conceptual 
parallels, common topoi and figures, and common forms. deSilva’s survey concludes that Paul was familiar with 
Stoic teaching but deployed this language and forms within a different theological framework.   
 3 See the similar comments of Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ (SNTSMS 137; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23–24, especially: “Paul did not have to be a Stoic philosopher to 
use the language of the Stoics to speak to a community familiar with these ideas to convey his own message about 
Christ and the eschatological community” (24). Timothy A. Brookins, Corinthian Wisdom, Stoic Philosophy, and 
the Ancient Economy (SNTSMS 159; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 104–52, tries to reconstruct 
the social world of Corinth to question the conclusions of Bruce W. Winter and others that Corinth was thoroughly 
Roman in this period. Rather, Brookins contends, Greek and Roman influences overlapped and he suggests that 
some elite members of the Corinthian church could have had access to Greek philosophical training. Idem, Wisdom, 
153–200, ambitiously attempts to relate every issue in the letter to Stoicism. Nathan J. Barnes, Reading 1 
Corinthians with Philosophically Educated Women (Eugene, Oreg.: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 122–40, provides 
a helpful summary of the evidence for the philosophical heritage of Corinth, concluding, “Corinth . . . had always 
been tolerant of the most popular philosophies in the ancient world . . . The Isthmian games attracted philosophers . . 
. and Corinth produced many Cynics and Stoics” (165). Robert S. Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: 
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 I shall explore Paul’s use of temple imagery in 1 Cor 3:16–17 and 6:19. I will note that in 
1 Cor 1:10–4:17 Paul contrasts wisdom of any kind outside of the revelation of the Spirit with 
the identity of the Corinthians as the temple in which the Spirit dwells (3:16–17). I will seek to 
demonstrate the corporate dimension of Paul’s understanding of this temple there and its 
exclusiveness to those who belong to Christ and are indwelt by the Spirit, in sharp contrast to the 
philosophical understanding of indwelling, which is more individual and inclusive. In my 
discussion of 6:19 and its setting I shall stress Paul’s focus on the body and its importance as the 
place where holiness is expressed. Paul’s unashamed use of body language, in which the body is 
the location of the indwelling Spirit, is very different from the indifference or even disdain 
shown to the body in philosophy. Additionally, Paul maintains the emphasis on the exclusive 
nature of this temple and its corporate identity, even when discussing individual bodies. Finally, 
I shall explore some of these themes as they are taken up in the letter as a whole, including Paul’s 
strong opposition to idolatry that contrasts with the philosophical acceptance of multiple gods. I 
will conclude the chapter by comparing and contrasting the understanding of God, humanity and 
what it means to live out their philosophy, in both Paul and the philosophers.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context (JSNTSup 271; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 
especially 95–167, makes a strong case for the opportunities for a Greek gymnasium education for the educated elite 
in Corinth. Brookins, Wisdom, 132–52 agrees with Dutch and seeks to extend his case, especially with relationship 
to a philosophical education. We might note the caution of Timothy A. Brookins, “Reading 1 Corinthians with 
Philosophically Educated Women” Review of Biblical Literature 7 (2015): No Pages. Cited 2 October 2015. Online: 
http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/9820_10852.pdf, that there might not have been any “elite” in Corinth, strictly 
speaking. Nevertheless, a more educated minority (1 Cor 1:26) may have had access to this education and could 
have influenced others. For the co-existence of both Greek and Roman influences in Corinth to support the case of 
Brookins and Dutch, see e.g. Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and James C. Walters, eds., Corinth in 
Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society (NovTSup 134; Leiden: Brill, 2010), Chapters Two, Three, 
Four and Five. 
   178
4.1.1 Paul’s Introduction to 1 Corinthians 
Before I consider the metaphorical temple references in First Corinthians, it is important 
to set them in their proper context within the epistle. Most commentators recognize at least 1 Cor 
1:1–9 as Paul’s introduction to his letter,4 set apart from Paul’s address that begins in 1 Cor 
1:10;5 further, others who pay special attention to the epistolary forms used in Greco-Roman 
letters, have identified 1 Cor 1:1–3 separately as the epistolary prescript.6 Paul’s concern for 
purity appropriate to a temple is evident from the outset of the letter since it features in this 
prescript. His address to the church in 1 Cor 1:2 is unique for such a prescript in a Pauline epistle 
                                                
 4 I am assuming that First Corinthians is a single letter. Although this has been disputed in works such as 
Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1971), and Robert Jewett, "The Redaction of 1 Corinthians and the Trajectory of the Pauline School,” 
JAARSup 46 (1978): 398–444, the case for unity has been convincingly argued by, among others, John C. Hurd, The 
Origin of 1 Corinthians (London: SPCK, 1965), 43–47; Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of 
Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 1991), passim; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 1 Kor 1,1-6,11 
(EKKNT 7.1; Zürich: Benziger, 1991), 63–71; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 36–39 and Fee, 1 Corinthians, 16.  
 5 E.g. Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First 
Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; 2d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914), xxv; C. K. Barrett, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians (BNTC; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1968), 28–29; Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. 
Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), vi–xii; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, 
First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 32; Yale University Press, 2008), 
viii–ix; Fee, 1 Corinthians, vii–xi. 
 6 Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Hermeneia; 
trans. James W. Leitch; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), vi–viii; Friedrich Lang, Die Briefe an die Korinther (NTD 7G; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 15; Mitchell, Rhetoric, x–xi; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-6,11, 97; Ben 
Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), vi–ix; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (SP 7; Collegeville, Minn.: 
Liturgical Press, 1999), vii–x; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, v–xiii; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians (BECNT; Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), vii–viii; Craig S. Keener, 1–2 Corinthians (NCBC; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 20; Eckhard J. Schnabel, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther (Wuppertal: R. 
Brockhaus, 2006), 55; Dieter Zeller, Die erste Brief an die Korinther (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 
48; cf. also David E. Aune, The New Testament in Its Literary Environment (LEC; Philadelphia: Westminster John 
Knox, 1987), 163, 170; Linda L. Belleville, “Continuity or Discontinuity: A Fresh Look at 1 Corinthians in the Light 
of First-Century Epistolary Forms and Conventions,” EvQ 59.1 (1987): 15–37 at 16–18 (noting “The major concerns 
and themes of the letter often appear in the modifying phrases of the basic A to B, χάρις . . . formula of the Pauline 
letter opening (16), noting that four of the major themes of the letter are introduced in 1 Cor 1:1–3 (16–17)). 
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since, in addition to addressing them as κλητοῖς ἁγίοις (“to [the] called holy people/ones”),7 it 
combines this with ἡγιασμένοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (“to those who are sanctified in Christ 
Jesus”).8 Paul appropriates language used for the people of God in the LXX and applies it to a 
largely Gentile congregation,9 while stressing the fact that they have been set apart for God. 
Other epistles begin by addressing the congregation as those called holy (Rom 1:7; cf. 2 Tim 1:9) 
or as holy ones (2 Cor 1:1; Phil 1:1; cf. Eph 1:1; Col 1:1) but only here do we find two cognate 
terms sharing the same root as ἅγιος (ἅγιος and ἁγιάζω), denoting that which is set apart or 
consecrated for cultic purposes and commonly used by the LXX to translate the Hebrew שׁדק.10 
This unusual opening for Paul is suggestive of a major concern that permeates the letter and 
relates closely to my topic. As Paul will demonstrate, the Corinthians need reminding that they 
are the temple of God and are supposed to be set apart from all that would defile them (the kinds 
of issues addressed in subsequent chapters). 
Paul’s succinct exhortation in 1:10 functions as a thesis statement or the propositio or 
prothesis in rhetorical terms11 and names the immediate problem confronting the Corinthians as 
                                                
 7 1 Cor 1:2 is usually taken as a verbless clause, with εἶμι supplied in the infinitive, and translated as if 
κλητός was functioning like a participle form of καλέω: “those called to be saints” (something still to be attained). 
But the phrase makes sense as it stands in apposition to what precedes (ἡγιασμένοις ἐν Χριστῷ). The Corinthians 
are the “called saints”, the same people who form the Church in Corinth; those sanctified in Christ Jesus. This is 
recognized in the translation of Collins, 1 Corinthians, 41 and the explanation of 46; cf. also recently N. T. Wright, 
Paul and the Faithfulness of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 1027; and also recognized in the explanations (even 
if not necessarily reflected in the translations) of Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians (Int; Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 1997), 15; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 21; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 126.   
 8 Taking the perfect participle to emphasize present result.   
9 κλητός is often combined with ἅγιος in the LXX to speak of a “holy convocation” in the phrase κλητὴ 
ἁγία found in e.g. Exod 12:16; Lev 23:2–37; Num 28:25 (also noted by Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 22 note 32. 
God’s people are described as holy in Exod 19:5–6 and subsequently in passages such as Deut 7:6; 26:19; Jer 2:3; 
Dan 7:18–27; Pss. Sol. 17:26, as noted by Fee, 1 Corinthians, 29 and Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 56. Paul also 
uses the phrase κλητοῖς ἁγίοις in addressing the Romans (Rom 1:7). 
 10 “ἁγιάζω,” BDAG, 9–10; “ἅγιος,” BDAG, 10–11; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 76; Zeller, Korinther, 73. 
Schnabel, Korinther, 61, links this passage with the identity of Israel as priests to God in Lev 19:6; similarly Collins, 
1 Corinthians, 52, noting its “cultic or political connotations”. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 28–29, comments, “Believers are 
set apart for God, just as were the utensils in the Temple.” 
 11 See Mitchell, Rhetoric, 68–70, 198–200; Witherington III, Conflict, 98–99; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 69. 
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σχίσμα (cf. also 11:18; 12:25).12 For this reason, Margaret M. Mitchell has made a strong and 
convincing case for unity as a dominant topic throughout the letter; in her view, the controlling 
theme of the epistle.13 Yet, while her case is well made, the concern for unity in 1:10 is not 
always the main issue in the letter as a whole14 (e.g. Paul’s forceful case for the resurrection in 1 
Cor 1515) and even when it clearly has a strong part to play in passages such as 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 
(though even here, the central emphases of 1 Cor 9:1–10:22 seem very different) or 1 Cor 11:17–
34, Paul sometimes appears to side with the weaker against the stronger party (e.g. 1 Cor 8:9–13; 
10:14–22, 28–29).  
In relation to this question, Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner document something of 
an emerging consensus among recent commentators on 1 Corinthians: that Paul is addressing a 
number of problems that appear to stem from the continuing influence of Roman/Corinthian 
culture and values on the church.16 I would concur with Ciampa and Rosner that purity, and thus 
                                                
 12 For further exploration of this topic, see e.g. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 71–74 and Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-
6,11,138–39.  
 13 Mitchell, Rhetoric, passim.  
 14 Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 23, perhaps expresses a note of caution in referring to 1 Cor 1:10 as the thesis, 
“(at least for the immediate matter)”.  
 15 Note the comment of Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 12, “the issues in 1 Cor 15, for example, do not easily 
reduce to this theme”; and see the concerns of Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 20–21, 73.  
 16 Idem, Corinthians, 4–6, citing the work of Bruce W. Winter, Richard B. Hays, Wolfgang Schrage, 
Anthony Thiselton, R. B. Terry and David E. Garland and see the evaluation of N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of 
the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 279–80. Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995), 38–86 posits a division between “high” and “low” status Christians as a 
comprehensive explanation for the various issues faced (following Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline 
Christianity: Essays on Corinth (trans. John H. Schütz; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 69–119 and others). While 1 
Cor 11:22 gives credence to the position that some inevitably had more wealth (such as the ability to take others to 
court in 1 Cor 6:1; for which see e.g. Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and 
Social Change (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 58–75; John K. Chow, Patronage and Power: A Study of Social 
Networks in Corinth (JSNTSup 75; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 38–112, 123–30; Andrew D. 
Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1–6 
(AGJU 18; Leiden: Brill, 1993), 59–71) and status than others (see Theissen, Setting, 145–74; although 1 Cor 1:26 
suggests that the majority did not), Martin’s explanation is not the most likely one for every issue, although it was 
undeniably one of the factors in many of the situations Paul addressed (such as 1 Cor 6:1–8; 8:1–11:1; 11:17–34). 
John M. G. Barclay, “Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity,” JSNT 47 (1992): 49–74 at 
65 note c, suggests, “It is quite possible that the Corinthians . . . were . . . combining their Hellenistic theological 
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the need to draw careful boundaries, are central to Paul’s discourse, and that the rejection of 
sexual immorality and idolatry (the two intertwined vices singled out in both Jewish and 
Christian literature as most likely to lead God's people astray from worship and service) are 
prominent in this letter.17 I will also aim to show that the temple references in this letter stress 
both the corporate and bodily nature of God’s people and that this agrees with another central 
concern for Paul.   
 
4.2 1 Corinthians 3:16 
4.2.1  1 Corinthians 3:16–17: Literary Context 
 Our first temple reference, 1 Cor 3:16–17 takes its place within a section that most 
commentators regard as a distinct unit, 1 Cor 1:10–4:21.18 Paul counters the obvious divisions in 
the church (1:11–12)19 with the message of the cross (1:18), which is contrasted with the wisdom 
of the world (e.g. 1:20). Between the transitional verse 1 Cor 1:17 (concluding the narratio of 
                                                                                                                                                       
culture with Jewish terms and traditions taught by Paul.” Brian J. Tucker, “The Role of Civic Identity on the Pauline 
Corinth,” Didaskalia 72.8 (2008): 71–91 has developed Barclay’s point about the Corinthians’ lack of external 
opposition, by exploring the transitional nature of civic identity in Corinth that may have influenced the Corinthian 
Christians. 
 17 Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 21–25 with supporting literature. They cite these two vices as the sins 
common to NT passages such as Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; Gal 5:19–21; Eph 5:5; Col 3:5; Rev 22:15.   
 18 E.g. Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 28–29; Mitchell, Rhetoric, x–xi; Witherington III, Conflict, vi–ix; Collins, 1 
Corinthians, vii–x; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, v–xiii; Garland, 1 Corinthians, vii–viii; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 
viii–x; Fee, 1 Corinthians, viii. 
 19 It falls outside the scope of this chapter to survey the complex debate and the various attempts to identify 
the different parties, but for a helpful analysis, see e.g. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 123–33; cf. also Helmut Merklein, 
Der erste Brief an die Korinther. Kapitel 1–4. (OTKNT 6/1; Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1992), 134–48; Adams and 
Horrell, Corinth, 13–16, 51–9, 61–70, 79–84, 85–95; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-6,11, 142–52. Contributors to this 
discussion have considered how far Corinthian divisions may have been affected by differences in social 
stratification, e.g. Theissen, Setting, 54–67, 69–119; David G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian 
Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 112–17; 
131–37. Other studies have considered the influence of “secular” models of leadership on the perceptions of the 
Corinthians (Clarke, Leadership, 89–107); the influence of patrons within the congregation (Chow, Patronage, 
passim) and the influence of the sophists, who propagated a competitive spirit and won adherents to them as 
individual teachers (see Bruce W. Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian 
Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 180–202 and Idem, Corinth, 31–
43.  
   182
1:11–17 and also introducing the section that begins with 1:18),20 and the end of the section (1 
Cor 3:23), there are a high preponderance of words with the σοφ- root. Σοφία (wisdom) appears 
in 1 Cor 1:17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 30; 2:1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13; 3:19 (as well as later in 12:8 in a very 
different context). In each of these verses a wisdom that is described as of this world (κόσμος in 
1:20, 21; 3:19) or “human” (ἄνθρωπος in 2:5) is contrasted with the wisdom of God (1:20, 21, 
24; 2:7), which is revealed as Christ himself (1:24) who has become wisdom from God for the 
Corinthians themselves (1:30). Even the wisdom of the wise (τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν) is judged 
worthy only of destruction (1:19, citing Isa 29:14). Paul goes so far as to imply that to preach the 
gospel in a word of wisdom (ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου) would be to empty it of its power (1:17 cf. 2:5). 
By contrast, Paul’s speech is quite deliberately presented as lacking the kind of wisdom sought 
by those who value eloquent speech or superiority (ὑπεροχή in 2:1; cf. 1:17; 2:1, 4, 5, 13). In 
particular, Paul targets the wise person (σοφός; e.g. 1:19, 20, 26, 27; 3:18, 19, 20; cf. 6:5 which 
uses the word in quite a different context).  
A number of recent studies have connected the reference to the σοφός with the place of 
Greco-Roman rhetoric in the culture and identify Paul’s critique with the kind of itinerant orators 
whose use of rhetorical convention and persuasive strategies contrast with Paul’s presentation of 
the gospel.21 Bruce W. Winter has further argued that the targets of Paul’s argument are the self-
serving Sophists of the “Second Sophistic”, for which evidence can be found in the mid-first 
                                                
 20 Agreeing with Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 27;   
 21 E.g. Stephen M. Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians (SBLDS 134; 
Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1992), passim; A. Duane Litfin, St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation: 1 
Corinthians 1–4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
especially 137–209; Jeffrey S. Lamp, First Corinthians 1-4 in Light of Jewish Wisdom Traditions: Christ, Wisdom 
and Spirituality (Studies in Bible and Early Christianity 42; Lewiston, NY.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 114–15.   
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century.22 Winter’s use of evidence has been recently critiqued by Timothy A. Brookins, who 
contends that some references to σοφός in Winter’s sources refer to philosophers not sophists per 
se,23 and that all of Winter’s arguments for a pre-second century date for the sophistic movement 
rely on late first and early second century sources (at least forty years after Paul’s letter was 
written.24 At the very least, Paul’s comment that Greeks (Ἕλλην) seek wisdom (1:22), and his 
contrast between the wisdom of the world and of this age (αἰών in 2:6) and the wisdom that 
comes specifically from the Spirit (2:10, 13), granted by revelation alone (2:7, 10, 14), suggests 
an implicit wider critique of worldly (philosophical) wisdom, not restricted merely to the sophists 
and orators of the day.25 This critique would naturally apply to Greek philosophy (1:22) in its 
claim to have discovered wisdom by natural means.26 Additionally, the hapax legomenon 
συζητητής in 1:20 is related to the verb συζητέω and in the Greek philosophical tradition it could 
be used in relation to a philosopher, or a seeker after the truth in philosophy.27 Paul’s dismissal 
of philosophy would have contrasted sharply with the overwhelmingly positive view of 
                                                
 22 See Winter, Philo, 180–202, applied to 1 Cor 1:10–4:21; followed by Witherington III, Conflict, 124–26; 
Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 163. 
 23 Brookins, Wisdom, 41–42, 46–47. 
 24 Idem, Wisdom, 49–50. 
 25 Idem, Wisdom, 8–61 provides a critique of the theses of Pogoloff, Litfin and Winter, arguing from 
primary sources that “wisdom language was associated in a technical way with philosophy in way that it apparently 
was not with rhetoric.” (43) George H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, 
Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity (WUNT 
232; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2008), 262–68 provides strong evidence that philosophical writers like Plato, 
Plutarch, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus disparaged sophism by comparison with philosophy, and 
compares this to Paul’s rhetorical strategy in both First and Second Corinthians. But, could it be that, in fact, Paul is 
lumping both sophism and philosophy together, as it were, so that his critique covers every wisdom of this age?      
 26 Cf. Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 28, “The specific quest for wisdom, however, is attributed especially to 
Greeks, known for their philosophy (1:22)” and a possible reference to Greek philosophy in general is also alluded 
to by Lang, Korinther, 29, 30; Hays, Corinthians, 30; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 74–75; 77–78; Pogoloff, Logos, 115–19; 
Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 170; Schnabel, Korinther, 121.   
 27 See H. Greeven, “ζητέω, ζήτησις, κτλ,” TDNT 2:892–96 at 893; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 69; Fitzmyer, 
First Corinthians, 156; Zeller, Korinther, 108.   
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philosophy that I highlighted in chapter two;28 a view that seemed to hold little regard for which 
philosophy was being discussed.29 As noted in the same chapter, philosophy was sometimes 
described specifically as wisdom, or as a search for wisdom.30 Yet for Paul the only true wisdom 
is the wisdom of God (2:7), which has been revealed in Christ and his cross (1:23–24, 30; 2:2).  
 Paul apparently includes the Corinthians with himself as those who have received the 
Spirit of wisdom and revelation (2:10, 12),31 he then addresses them as “brothers” (fellow 
Christians in 3:1a),32 and ultimately identifies them as the temple of the same Holy Spirit (3:16–
17). It is therefore striking that he also refers to them as those who are “fleshly” (σάρκινος in 3:1 
and σαρκικός in 3:3), and behaving in a merely human rather than spiritual way (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον 
περιπατεῖτε in 3:3). In many ways, Paul’s depiction of his audience in 3:1, 3 sounds suspiciously 
like those described as unspiritual (pertaining to ψυχικός) in 2:14. Yet they are clearly those who 
are sanctified (1:2) and not lacking any χάρισμα (1:2). Paul’s frustration with them was already 
made clear in 1:10–17 (reiterated at 3:3–4); he should be able to address them as the spiritual 
person of 2:15; those who are mature (2:6 from τέλειος) but instead he must address them as 
infants (from νήπιος in 3:1). Paul has repeatedly stressed that the πνεῦμα is at work in believers, 
                                                
 28 See, e.g. Cicero, Leg. 1.22.58; Tusc. 1.26.64; 3.3.5–6; 3.6.13; 5.2.5; Seneca, Ep. 31.8; 53.8, 9; 90.1–3; 
Brev. vit. 14.1; 15.4; Plutarch, An. corp. 501A; Virt. prof. 81E; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 1.2–3; 22.6; 26.1; 37.2; 
Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.17; Dio Chrysostom, 2 Glor. 1. 
 29 Seneca, Ep. 16.5. 
 30 Seneca, Ep. 89.1–6; Alcinous, Handbook, 3, 152.2–5.  
 31 Taking the “ἡμῖν” of 2:10 and the “ἡμεῖς” of 2:12 to be inclusive, speaking of the Corinthians as well as 
Paul and his co-workers; with Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 43, 45; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-6,11, 256; 
Witherington III, Conflict, 126; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 132, 134; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 255, 261–62; Andreas 
Lindemann, Der Erste Korintherbrief (HNT 9.1; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2000), 68; Schnabel, Korinther, 145; 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 179; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 121 note 10; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 117, 120; 
against Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 65. As Thiselton, Fee and others note, the most obvious referent of the personal 
pronoun in 2:10 is the “those who love him” of 2:9 and the recipients of the δόξα in 2:7. Within the immediate co-
text of Paul’s description of his ministry and message to the Corinthians (2:1–16 as a whole), it would seem unlikely 
that they are excluded from this, or that this is merely the self-description of an elite few. Those who receive the 
things “ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα” (from χαρίζομαι; 2:12) are most likely those “μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ 
χαρίσματι” (from χάρισμα; 1:7), which clearly describes all the Corinthians.  
 32 Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 186. 
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given by God himself, who grants them revelation and understanding that is not available from 
σοφία (2:4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; see especially 2:13 where Paul pointedly contrasts the 
ἀνθρώπινος nature of wisdom with the divine source of the Spirit noted in 2:12, 14). 
This sharp contrast between human wisdom and the divine Spirit at work in them 
prepares the way for Paul’s point in 1 Cor 3:16–17: they are failing to live in accordance with 
their true identity, as one unified temple of the Holy Spirit. In preparation, Paul emphasizes that 
all share a common work (3:5–9) since the one who assigns them their task is one κύριος (3:5) 
and θεός (3:6–7).33 In one pithy phrase, Paul uses three images to summarize his argument and to 
mark the transition to the next. Paul depicts the apostles as fellow workers (συνεργοί as in 3:5–8) 
and the Corinthians as the field in which they worked (γεώργιον as in 3:6–8),34 who he further 
describes with the metaphor explicated in the new few verses, the building (οἰκοδομή). The 
building image is elaborated upon in 3:10–15. For the purposes of this discussion I note that Paul 
describe himself as a master-builder (ἀρχιτέκτων),35 modified by the adjective σοφός (in context 
meaning “skilled”, yet the implicit comparison with those who have merely human wisdom in 
                                                
 33 It seems likely that at this juncture κύριος refers to Jesus Christ rather than sharing the same referent as 
θεός in 3:7; cf. Collins, 1 Corinthians, 145. So far in the epistle, κύριος has either been used unambiguously of Jesus 
(1:2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10; 2:8) or seems the likely referent on contextual grounds (in 1:31 referring back to the subject of 
1:30); see Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 28; Jacob Kremer, Der Erste Brief an die Korinther (RNT; 
Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1997), 47; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 113; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 165; Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 91; and in 2:16a, in parallel to Χριστός in 2:16b; see Robert Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A 
Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 377;  Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-6,11, 267; Collins, 1 
Corinthians, 137; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 275–76; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 137–38; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 
127; against Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 194. 
 34 There was sometimes an association between the Temple and the garden in Jewish literature; see Albert 
L. A. Hogeterp, Paul and God’s Temple: A Historical Interpretation of Cultic Imagery in the Corinthian 
Correspondence (Biblical Tools and Studies 2; Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 318; Cecilia Wassen, “Do You Have to be 
Pure in a Metaphorical Temple? Sanctuary Metaphors and Construction of Sacred Space in the Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Paul’s Letters,” in Purity, Holiness, and Identity in Judaism and Christianity: Essays in Memory of Susan Haber (ed. 
Carl S. Ehrlich, Anders Runesson, and Eileen Schuller; WUNT 305; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2013), 55–86 at 73, 
and particularly Gregory K. Beale, The Temple and the Church’s Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling 
Place of God (NSBT 17; Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2004), 26, 48, 66–78, 123–29 and especially 246–50 on 1 Cor 3.   
 35 For more detail, see J. Shanor, “Paul as Master-Builder: Construction Terms in First Corinthians,” NTS 
34 (1988): 461–71.  
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1:19–20 cannot be ignored); that the foundation of the building is Jesus Christ (3:11); and that in 
view of the testing (δοκιμάζω) of the coming judgment, it is critical to build with the right 
materials, and that those listed of great value (3:12a) correspond to the ones used in the building 
of Solomon’s temple (cf. 1 Chron 29:2; 22:14–16; 2 Chron 3:6).36 Additionally, we can note that, 
though the fire of eschatological judgment (3:13, 15) has clear and numerous parallels in 
Judaism, it could also have spoken to an audience influenced by Stoicism of the great fiery 
conflagration to come.37 This building imagery sets the scene for Paul’s temple metaphor in 
3:16–17 and underscores the vital importance of living rightly as the temple of God that Paul will 
develop subsequently. Paul’s use of the rhetorical device Οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι” (also in 5:6; 6:2, 3, 9, 
15, 16, 19; 9:13, 24) to introduce 3:16–17 expresses strong feelings of dismay at their lack of 
knowledge of something fundamental.38 
 
4.2.2  1 Corinthians 3:16–17: Main Features 
For the purposes of my topic I note the following features of 3:16–17 that might have 
struck an audience influenced by philosophy. Firstly, I observe that Paul’s image is corporate.39 
He is at pains to emphasize that the congregation is the temple of God/the Spirit, rather than the 
                                                
 36 D. R. deLacey, “οἵτινές ἐστε ὑμεῖς: The Function of a Metaphor in Paul,” in Templum Amicitiae: Essays 
on the Second Temple presented to Ernst Bammel (ed. William Horbury; JSNTSup 48; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1991), 391–409 at 404; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 150–51; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 150–53 
in some detail; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 152 note 396. 
 37 E.g. Wolfram Strack, Kultische Terminologie in ekklesiologischen Kontexten in den Briefen des Paulus 
(BBB 92; Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1994), 229; deLacey, “Metaphor,” 391–409 at 405; Hogeterp, Temple, 321 
note 76. For more on Greco-Roman understandings of judgment, see David W. Kuck, Judgement and Community 
Conflict: Paul’s Use of Apocalyptic Judgement Language in 1 Corinthians 3:5–4:5 (NovTSup 66; Leiden: Brill, 
1992), 96–149, who concludes that within Hellenistic philosophy, those influenced by Plato maintained the classical 
notion of postmortem judgment, but other philosophical schools rejected it (115–20). 
 38 See especially Fee, 1 Corinthians, 158; John R Lanci, A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and 
Archaeological Approaches to Pauline Imagery (Studies in Biblical Literature 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 
119–20.  
 39 Agreeing with e.g. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 316.  
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individual (see my comments below on 6:19). The verb οἶδα appears in the second person plural, 
as does the verb εἶμι and the final ὑμῖν. Secondly, Paul uses the word ναός rather than ἱερόν, 
almost certainly because ναός typically (though not exclusively) indicates the inner sanctuary, 
whereas ἱερόν is always used for the whole temple, including its precincts and other buildings.40 
The word order suggests that ναός is in an emphatic position; that is, Paul is drawing attention to 
it.41 It is also unlikely, according to Daniel B. Wallace’s study of “Colwell’s Construction”, that 
ναός is to be understood as indefinite (i.e. a temple of God).42 Thirdly, it is the πνεῦμα that 
constitutes the Corinthians as the ναός τοῦ θεοῦ,43 and in the preceding discussion the πνεῦμα is 
only given to certain people, not all. These people are those who have received the πνεῦμα who 
gives revelation (2:10–14), and a spiritual person (πνευματικός) cannot be evaluated by other 
people (2:15) for the spiritual person has received the mind of the Lord, that is the mind of 
Christ. The Spirit, therefore, is tied very specifically to Jesus Christ. This also connotes the 
strongest possible association between Christ with God and the Spirit.44 The Spirit that produces 
the mind of Christ, who is identified as Lord (2:15), is the same Spirit whose presence signifies 
that the temple belongs to God.45 Fourthly, as well as speaking of God’s presence, the temple 
                                                
 40 “ἱερόν,” BDAG, 470; “ναός,” BDAG, 365–66; O. Michel, “ναός,” TDNT 4:880–90; cf. Witherington 
III, Conflict, 134; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 158–59. 
  41 See Stephen H. Levinsohn, Discourse Features of New Testament Greek: A Coursebook on the 
Information Structure of New Testament Greek (2d ed.; Dallas: SIL International, 2000), 38, citing this example.  
 42 Wallace, Grammar, 256–70, especially at 269–70, draws on Philip B. Harner, “Qualitative Anarthrous 
Predicate Nouns: Mark 15:39 and John 1:1,” JBL 92.1 (1973): 75–87, maintaining that anarthrous pre-verbal 
predicate nouns are rarely indefinite and that this conclusion is even more likely when the construction is a-
copulative (lacking a verb altogether), as in the case of 1 Cor 3:16 (however, when Wallace, Grammar, 261 cites 
“Harner’s study” of “all pre-verbal predicate nominatives”, in context this only means all pre-verbal predicate 
nominatives in Mark and John, not the NT as a whole. Harner also spends little time on the potential indefiniteness 
of these nouns). 
 43 Johannes Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), 85 speaks of the 
καί in 3:16 as explicative, that is, they are the temple of God because the Spirit of God dwells in them.    
 44 As was noted above in the discussion of references to κύριος in First Corinthians.  
 45 See this theme developed in Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters 
of Paul (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994), 112–18.  
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image speaks of his holiness, and those who are responsible for the temple’s destruction will 
themselves be destroyed (3:17a).46 This indicates that the temple is sacred and has very strict 
boundaries and that to defile the temple in any way brings very serious consequences. John R. 
Levison rightly notes how striking it is that the man who has sexual intercourse with his father’s 
wife will only be ostracized temporarily (5:1–8) but, here in 1 Cor 3:17, “dividers of the Church 
are subject to destruction or severe damage, torn apart as they have torn apart the Church . . . It is 
inconceivable that the spirit of God should dwell in a portion of the holy of holies without filling 
the whole of it.”47 The reference to this temple is sandwiched between two discussions that give 
it its wider context. The foundation of this building (temple) is Christ (3:11). The quality of the 
work done on the building will be evaluated and revealed for its true worth in a coming judgment 
(3:12–15). Their labor as the temple has eternal significance. True wisdom does not boast in 
human terms/matters (3:21a). Rather the Corinthians should recognize that all things belong to 
them corporately (3:21b–22; so the temple is not to be divided up among them nor claimed by 
                                                
 46 The verb used here, φθείρω, has a semantic range including “destroy, ruin, corrupt, spoil” (“φθείρω,” 
BDAG, 1054; “φθείρω,” LSJ, 1928) but contextually it is more likely that the formula with the repeated verb means 
“If anyone destroys the temple, God will destroy them” than “If anyone corrupts the temple, God will corrupt them.” 
Arguments have been made for the meaning “damage” rather than “destroy” here (see Shanor, “Master-Builder,” 
461–71, at 470–71 & Lanci, Temple, 66–68, followed by Raymond F. Collins, The Power of Images in Paul 
(Collegeville, MN.: Liturgical Press, 2008), 161; Yulin Liu, Temple Purity in 1-2 Corinthians (WUNT 2/ 343; 
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2013), 122–23. Liu avers that the verb is used with the sense “to corrupt” in other NT 
passages, but two of the texts he cites, 2 Pet 2:12 and Jude 10, are usually translated “to destroy”, and later Idem, 
Purity, 134–35 supports a different argument by citing with approval the translation “destroy” for φθείρω when 
used by Brian Rosner and David Raymond Smith. Cf. the similar formulas of LXX Gen 9:6 and especially Josh 9:5 
and the well-rounded arguments for the contextual meaning of “destroy” made by Kent L. Yinger, Paul, Judaism, 
and Judgment According to Deeds (SNTSMS 105; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224–25, 
supported by G. Harder, “φθείρω,” TDNT 9:93–106 at 102; and followed by Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 71, 78; 
Witherington III, Conflict, 134–35; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 317–18; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 120–21; Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 160–61. Earlier, Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 67, argued for the same translation, adding, 
“all sin is a defiling of the Temple and is destructive of its consecrated state.” There is a minor textual variant here, 
with the second instance of φθείρω read as the present tense φθείρεῖ rather than the future tense φθερεῖ. The 
external support for the NA28 reading is strong (p46 A B C) and the main variant can best be explained as a 
replication of the present tense of φθείρεῖ immediately before it; cf. Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the 
Greek New Testament (2d ed.; Stuttgart: United Bible Societies, 1994), 484; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 157 note 417.  
 47 John R. Levison, “The Spirit and the Temple in Paul’s Letters to the Corinthians,” in Paul and His 
Theology (ed. Stanley Porter; Pauline Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 189–215 at 192.  
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any one person),48 yet they belong to Christ, who is of God (3:23). Thus the discussion ends with 
God himself, again in the closest possible association with Christ, to whom the Corinthians 
belong. Their identity is centered in God, Christ and the Spirit.  
  
4.2.3  Comparing 1 Cor 3:16–17 with Hellenistic Philosophy 
4.2.3.1. Philosophy 
How would this have compared to the understanding of an audience influenced by 
philosophy? In the writings of Philo I noted one reference to a group of people who were 
counted as a temple and altar prior to the building of the Jerusalem temple.49 However this is an 
isolated incident and peculiar to this particular strand of Hellenistic Judaism. Within different 
strands of philosophy we see two common emphases instead: divine indwelling in an individual 
or divine indwelling in the cosmos as a whole, so that everything is filled with the divine 
presence.  
 Firstly, to summarize the most pertinent of the evidence I have already presented, some 
writers speak simply of God or a divine spirit dwelling in a person,50 and specifically of a good51 
or wise person.52  This presence is sometimes named as a δαιμόνιον,53 and at other times as 
                                                
 48 The names in εἴτε Παῦλος εἴτε Ἀπολλῶς εἴτε Κηφᾶς (3:22) intentionally pick up on three of the four 
used in 1 Cor 1:12 and appear in the same order. It is noteworthy that Χριστός is removed from the first list and 
instead appears at the climax of the discussion in conjunction with the name of θεός to whom he belongs, yet in a 
different category than any human figure.   
 49 Philo, QE 1.10  
 50 Seneca, Ep. 41.1; 83.1; 110.2; Ben. 6.23.6; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 3.5.1; Philo, Somn. 1.149, 215; 2.248, 
250–51; Virt. 188; Det. 90. Philo speaks of the temple of the soul: Somn. 1.149; Spec. 1.270; Epictetus, Diatr. 
2.8.14; 2.16.33. 
 51 Seneca, Ep. 31.2; 41.1–2; 73.16; 120.14; Cicero, Leg. 2.11.26–28; Philo, Cher. 98, 100; Sobr. 62, 68; 
Praem. 123; QG 4.80; QE 2.51. 
 52 Seneca, Ep. 92.3; DL 7.1.119; Philo, Leg. 3.46.  
 53 Cicero, Div. 1.54.122; Dio, 4 Regn. 139; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.17; 5.10; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.14. 
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Reason, or a divine spirit or element.54 Many writers make no real distinction between this 
δαιμόνιον, θεός or λόγος (or its cognates), or intelligence.55 Some speak of this Reason, 
δαιμόνιον or genius as residing in each person, regardless of the person’s goodness or wisdom.56 
Other writers see such a close fusion between the person and the divinity that dwells within, that 
there is little to distinguish the two; a person’s motions are that of God; their faculty is equal to 
that of God.57 Still other writers speak of either a loyal heart being a temple,58 or of a god-fearing 
one.59 Paul describes the Corinthians as a temple of the πνεῦμα. Either πνεῦμα60 or its equivalent 
in Latin (Spiritus)61 are described as dwelling within a person in the philosophers.  
 As I noted earlier, Philo envisages the soul as a building with three layers: the 
foundations of goodness and teaching; a ground floor of virtues built upon it, and the reception 
of right teaching as its crowning glory.62 Similarly, Plutarch compares a person’s life to a holy 
temple whose life has a “golden foundation”, and who builds upon it with the right materials. 
This is the person who makes progress in the path of virtue.63 This concept has some parallels 
with Paul’s metaphor of the building of the church, whose foundation is Jesus Christ and upon 
which the right materials must be carefully chosen by the builder, since the Day of judgment will 
prove the materials by fire (1 Cor 3:10–15). 
                                                
 54 Seneca, Ep. 66.12; Cicero, Leg. 1.22.59; Tusc. 1.24.56; 1.25.62; 1.26.65; 1.27.66–67; 1.30.74; Parad. 
1.14; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 3.12, 16; 4.1, 12; 6.35. 
 55 Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.13, 17; 3.3.2; 3.6.2; 3.12, 16; 3.5.1; 3.6.2; 4.1; 5.10; 5.27; 10.38; 12.1.2, 26; 
Philo,  Cher. 27; Maximus, Or. 31.4.  
 56 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.12; 2.8.11, 15–17; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1 (speaking of an evil doer); 4.38; 
7.16; 8.43, 61; 9.7; 11.20; 12.1.  
 57 See Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.6, 12; Frag. 3 (explored further below in relation to the philosophers’ 
conception of divinity). 
 58 V. Max., 4.7. ext. 1.  
 59 Apuleius, Metam. 3.15, though here not in the context of a philosophical writing.   
 60 SVF, 2.473. 
 61 Seneca, Ep. 41.2; 66.12; Cicero, Resp. 6.24.26. 
 62 Philo, Cher. 101.  
 63 Plutarch, Virt. prof. 86A (Babbitt, LCL).  
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 The second common theme in the philosophers is that God fills all things,64 or less 
personally, that the universe is filled with eternal intelligence or the divine mind.65 The πνεῦμα is 
said to hold the cosmos together66 and the world itself is described as the temple of the gods.67   
 
4.2.3.2 Paul 
 When I compare my findings from the philosophical writers with Paul’s words in 1 Cor 
3:16–17, a number of points stand out. Firstly, some philosophers speak of the divine presence 
inhabiting the life of the individual. This is the natural consequence of the doctrine that God’s 
presence fills all things. Paul, by contrast, speaks corporately of the Corinthians, not simply of 
them as individuals. This is indicated by the second person plurals that I observed but also by the 
context, that pictures the Corinthians as together making up a building (3:10–15). It is 
noteworthy that, although the philosophers certainly had very distinct schools or groups (such as 
the Stoics and Epicureans), they do not see membership of those specific groups as the basis for 
divine indwelling, since none of them refer to the theme in relation to their own group.68  
Secondly, some writers speak of a divine presence inhabiting all individuals, whereas 
others stress this presence in the good or the wise. For Paul, the temple of God are those who are 
sanctified and called holy people (1:2a). We have already had cause to note the critiques of the 
wisdom of the world Paul makes in 1 Cor 1:18–2:16, and in 3:18–19 (the verses that 
immediately follow our text) but the Corinthians have the spirit of God dwelling within them, not 
because many of them were wise (1:26) or good and certainly not because of their impressive 
                                                
 64 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.9; Alcinous, Handbook, 165.10.3.1–2 (18); Cicero, Leg. 2.11.26; Philo, Leg. 
3.4; Fug. 75; Post. 6, 14, 30; Conf. 137–38. 
 65 Cicero, Div. 1.49.110; 1.52.118.  
 66 E.g. citing Zeno in SVF, 2.473.  
 67 Cicero, Leg. 2.10.26; Resp. 6.15.15; Seneca, Ben. 7.7.3; Ep. 90.29. 
68 I owe this observation to Dr Craig S. Keener.  
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growth as spiritual people (3:1–3), but because they have been set apart as God’s people (1:2), as 
those who call upon the name of their Lord Jesus Christ (1:2b) and for whom Jesus Christ is the 
foundation of the οἰκοδομή (3:9), that is, his temple (3:16). Unlike the philosophers, for whom 
the πνεῦμα sustains and fills the cosmos, for Paul τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου (2:12a) is to be 
avoided. Rather the spirit of God (2:12b) dwells only in spiritual people who have been taught by 
the Spirit (2:12–15). They are those in whom the Spirit of God dwells, as the presence of God 
dwells in a temple (3:16).69 Finally, it is the temple as God’s people (ὑμεῖς in 3:17b) that is holy 
and distinct. It is not every individual in the world, or particularly good individuals or indeed the 
world itself without distinction. Rather, these people are a sacred dwelling who belong to Christ 
as he belongs to God (3:17b, 23) and if anyone is to cause destruction to come upon this temple, 
God will destroy them (3:17a). This warning is posed to those who threaten the sanctity of the 
community; quite a different understanding from the Stoic view of the world’s conflagration or 
the Middle Platonic notion of the destruction of the individual’s body.70    
 
4.3 1 Corinthians 6:19 
4.3.1 1 Corinthians 6:19: Literary Context 
 I now turn to the second metaphorical temple reference in First Corinthians, 1 Cor 6:19. 
Firstly, we need to examine the wider literary co-text of this verse. The overwhelming majority 
                                                
 69 Wright, Faithfulness, 1369–1370 and Sang-Won (Aaron) Son, Corporate Elements in Pauline 
Anthropology: A Study of Selected Terms, Idioms, and Concepts in the Light of Paul’s Usage and Background 
(AnBib; Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2001), 139, both note the distinction between the Stoic 
pantheistic divine indwelling and the select blessing of the Spirit envisaged by Paul. See the excellent essay: James 
Ware, “Moral Progress and Divine Power in Seneca and Paul,” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman 
Thought (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; New York: Routledge, 2008), 267–83 for a succinct exploration of what this means 
for Seneca and how it can be distinguished from Paul’s theology, despite some surface structural similarities.   
 70 The reader from a non-Jewish background might also have been struck by the emphasis on the temple, 
rather than the multiplicity of temples found in cities in the Greco-Roman world (with e.g. R. J. McKelvey, The New 
Temple: The Church in the New Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 102), but this is not so relevant 
to my own study since I am necessarily limited to metaphorical temple references in Hellenistic Philosophy. 
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of commentators recognize 1 Cor 5:1 as the start of a new section. Following Paul’s response to 
the divisions and immaturity of the church in 1 Cor 1:10–4:21, Paul turns to a number of specific 
issues that have come to his attention through a variety of means. In 5:1–13 he refers to a report 
of πορνεία among them that has reached his ears (5:1), during which he seems to address a 
possible misunderstanding of a previous letter (5:9–13). In 6:1 he turns his attention to another 
topic altogether, involving lawsuits. Paul cites what might be a Corinthian slogan in 6:12 and 
then deals with another topic that has been brought to his attention,71 before responding to a 
matter that seems to have been raised by the Corinthians themselves, signaled by the use of Περὶ 
δὲ (7:1).72 Most commentators would class 1 Cor 5:1–6:20 as a unit,73 with some including 1 Cor 
7:1–40 within that same section.74 Scholars propose quite different reasons for dividing up the 
material as they do. Anthony C. Thiselton treats 5:1–6:20 as a distinct unit because the topics 
dealt with “expound what for Paul constitute clear-cut moral and ethical issues” whereas 7:1–
11:1 addresses more “grey areas”.75 Gordon Fee takes 5:1–6:20 as sharing a common theme: a 
“crisis of authority” in which Paul’s apostolic authority is challenged in a number of different 
areas.76 I would agree with Raymond Collins and Ciampa & Rosner in seeing connections within 
5:1–7:40 that speak of the purity of God’s holy people.77 They note that sexual immorality is a 
pervasive theme, as is exemplified by the recurrence of words with the πορν- root in this section 
                                                
 71 E.g. Collins, 1 Corinthians, 205; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 192–94.   
 72 A view held by Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 115; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 272 and Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 295 as just a few modern examples of a long history of interpretation. The formula is used again in 1 
Cor 7:25; 8:1; 12:1 and 16:12, with περί used by itself but in a similar way in 8:4. Margaret M. Mitchell, 
“Concerning Περὶ δὲ in 1 Corinthians,” NovT 31.3 (1989): 229–256 and Idem, Rhetoric, 190–91 has argued 
convincingly that the formula is a topic marker that Paul uses to introduce his own chosen topics rather than 
indicating the issues about which the Corinthians wrote, but either way they help to signal a new topic in the letter.  
 73 E.g. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, vii–viii; Witherington III, Conflict, vi–ix; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, v–
xiii; Garland, 1 Corinthians, vii–viii; Fee, 1 Corinthians, viii.  
 74 E.g. Mitchell, Rhetoric, x–xi; Collins, 1 Corinthians, vii–ix; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, vi–xiii.   
 75 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 381.  
 76 Fee, 1 Corinthians, 212. 
 77 Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 21–25; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 203–04. 
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(5:1 [twice], 9, 10, 11; 6:9, 13, 15, 16, 18 [twice]; 7:2). It should also be noted that at the start of 
Paul’s reply to the issue raised in 1 Cor 7:1, the problem of πορνεία is given as the grounds for 
Paul’s advice in what follows (7:2).78 Purity issues and the proper boundaries in relation to 
purity, the Christian community and those outside of it, are a notable motif (e.g. 5:1, 2, 5, 6–8, 9–
13; 6:1–8, 9–11, 12–20; 7:12–16, 34 etc). This concern is even present in 6:1–11, a passage that 
is frequently seen as the “odd one out” because its subject matter is the law courts rather than the 
body and sexual relationships.79 There are also frequent references to the σῶμα in this section 
(e.g. 6:13 [twice], 15, 16, 18 [twice], 19, 20; 7:4 [twice], 34 [twice]), and in general Paul is 
concerned with the use and abuse of the body in 5:1–13; 6:9–20. The considerable attention that 
Paul pays to the whole question of marriage and celibacy in 1 Cor 7 speaks of his concern for life 
in the body, as well as the proper place for sexual relationships and attachments, by contrast with 
the improper ones described in 5:1–13 and 6:12–20.  
 From the outset of this section, Paul’s stated concern is with an instance of πορνεία (5:1), 
and the puffed up attitude of the Corinthians (5:2).80 In chapter one, I noted good indicators that 
the Corinthians are a majority gentile congregation, so it is striking that Paul should say such 
immorality is not even (οὐδέ) among the Gentiles/the nations (ἔθνος), considering that his 
                                                
 78 For negative evaluations of πορνεία in both the Jewish and Greco-Roman world, see e.g. Liu, Purity, 
146–53.  
 79 Commentators have struggled to make sense of the place of 6:1–11 (or more properly 6:1–8) within the 
sequence found in 5:1–6:20. Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 192–93 are the latest in a line of interpreters to see 
loose connections between references to judging and legal matters in 5:1–13 and 6:1–11; e.g. Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 
134–35; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 213, 250; R. Kempthorne, “Incest and the body of Christ, a study of 1 Corinthians 6:12-
20,” NTS 14:4 (1968): 568–69. Will Deming, “The Unity of 1 Corinthians 5–6,” JBL 115 (1996): 289–312 postulates 
that 1 Cor 5–6 is Paul’s response to the failed attempt by some of the Corinthians to take the incestuous man of 1 
Cor 5:1–13 to court (hence 1 Cor 6:1–8), that resulted in disunity in the Church. Peter Richardson, “Judgment in 
Sexual Matters in 1 Corinthians 6:1-11,” NovT 25.1 (1983): 37–58 had previously argued that 6:1–11 addressed a 
sexual matter which related to 7:1–7 rather than 5:1–13. Richardson’s article is very wide-ranging in its attempt to 
deal with the whole of the letter and multiple possible backgrounds and is necessarily very speculative.   
 80 Whether this is over the sin of the “such a one” in 5:1 or over his social status; see Chow, Patronage, 
130–41 and Clarke, Leadership, 73–88.   
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audience are Gentiles. This is a clear indicator that they are to be distinct and set apart from 
others. Paul elaborates on the implications of the πορνεία by insisting that the offender should be 
removed (αἴρω, 5:2) from among them. Within the confines of this discussion, I cannot consider 
the question of what precisely Paul means by, “to hand this man over to Satan for the destruction 
of the flesh” (5:5),81 but whatever the exact referent, the Corinthians are to be purified by his 
removal. The parabolic saying of 5:6–7 confirms this interpretation. According to Thiselton, 
Paul’s illustration of the leaven shows, “the disastrous consequences of letting the church 
become distorted and misshaped by a tainting element which permeates the whole”.82 At the end 
of the chapter, Paul adds further confirmation with a command from Deut 17:7 (LXX) to drive 
out the evil doer from their midst. As Richard B. Hays notes, a command, originally given to 
Israel, is applied quite unselfconsciously by Paul to this majority Gentile congregation.83 They 
are now the saints of God who must not be contaminated by evil. This has implications for how 
they are to live, meaning that they must exclude the influence of a πόρνος from their midst (5:9–
11),84 and illustrated by a sacrificial metaphor in 5:7–8 that makes clear reference to Passover 
(πάσχα). This is not a case of the Corinthians making a spiritual sacrifice, since it is Christ who 
has already been sacrificed (θύω) as the Passover lamb (though no reference is made here to a 
lamb, Χριστός must be understand as the object of sacrifice in apposition to πάσχα and thus, the 
                                                
 81 For a thorough survey, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 393–400.  
 82 Idem, 1 Corinthians, 401; cf. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 236–37; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 1,11-6,11, 379–85; 
following C. L. Mitton, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: iv, Leaven,” ExpTim 84 (1973): 339–43 and J. K. Howard, 
“‘Christ our Passover’: A Study of the Passover-Exodus theme in 1 Corinthians,” EvQ 41.2 (1969): 97–108. 
 83 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 
96–97, cited by Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 417–18; and see now, in more depth, Richard B. Hays, The Conversion of 
the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 1–24. 
 84 Additionally, Brian J. Rosner, “Temple Prostitution in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20,” NovT 40 (1998): 336–51 
thinks that 1 Cor 3:16–17 provides the “theological framework” for understanding the expulsion of the immoral man 
in 1 Cor 5:1–13 and traces the progression from purifying the temple in 5:1–6 to celebrating the Passover in 5:7–8. 
Liu, Purity, 127–45 seeks to provide further support for this argument.   
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Passover lamb).85 Nevertheless, the Corinthians are to celebrate this Passover festival and to do 
so with ἄζυμος (the opposite of which, ζύμη, leaven, from 5:7–8, often stands for that which 
negatively permeates and influences those around them, e.g. Matt 16:6; Lk 12:1; Gal 5:9), which 
is explicated as ἐν (in/with) εἰλικρίνεια (sincerity or purity of motif) and ἀλήθεια, or in other 
words, their celebration consists of a pure and truthful life. I have already noted that in Philo, 
Passover can represent a multitude of different “passings”: a passing over from passions to 
virtue,86 that might include a crossing away from the body,87 and for the soul from senses to 
thoughts;88 a passing over to thankfulness to God89 or the offering of the soul’s own progress as a 
passover sacrifice.90 In Philo, the Passover lamb itself can symbolize the progress of the soul 
towards a harmony of counsel and justice.91 I shall note shortly that Paul’s “passover” does not 
emphasize the soul at the expense of the body, in contrast to Philo, and other writers influenced 
by Platonism. 
 
4.3.2  1 Corinthians 6:19: The Context of 1 Corinthians 6:12–20 
 The very beginning of 1 Cor 6 sets up the contrast that is at the heart of this chapter: 
between the ἄδικος and the ἅγιος. Although the subject matter of 6:1–8 differs greatly from that 
of 6:12–20, this distinction between those who belong to Christ and God (3:23) is fundamental to 
both issues. Between the discussion of the two topics stands 6:9–11 which opens with the 
familiar phrase οὐκ οἴδατε, drawing attention to their neglect of a fundamental principle 
                                                
 85 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 405; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 242; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 214; in more 
detail: Dean O. Wenthe, “An Exegetical study of 1 Corinthians 5:7b,” The Springfielder 38.2 (1974): 134–140.   
 86 Philo, Sacr. 63.   
 87 Spec. 2.147.  
 88 QE 1.4 cf. QE 1.7–8, where the Passover lamb is spoken of using similar language.   
 89 Migr. 25.  
 90 Congr. 106.  
 91 QE 1.3; cf. also QE 1.13; Post. 72. 
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(interestingly, six of the ten uses of this phrase occur in this chapter: 6:2, 3, 9, 15, 16, 19). What 
they should have known is that ἄδικοι θεοῦ βασιλείαν οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν (6:12). At the head 
of the list of those unrighteous ones are the two types that I highlighted in my introduction, the 
πόρνοι and the εἰδωλολάτραι, who are often associated in Jewish thought. 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 deals 
with the latter, but 1 Cor 6:12–20 focuses on the former.92 Paul reaffirms their identity as distinct 
from the unrighteous, reminding them in distinctly cultic language that they have been washed 
(ἀπολούω),93 set apart (ἁγιάζω) and justified, again carefully connecting God and Jesus. This 
time it is in the name of the Lord Jesus and “in” or “by” (taking ἐν as a preposition of agency or 
instrument)94 the Spirit of “our” God (6:11). I note the kind of incipient trinitarianism found 
here95 with Jesus, God and the Spirit intertwined and the emphasis on the empowering of the 
Holy Spirit,96 a theme that could be derived from the earlier passage I examined (3:16), and 
appears in the passage I will shortly explore (6:19).   
 One of the immediate challenges an interpreter faces in 6:12–20 is knowing which words 
reflect the views of Paul and which reflect the views of the Corinthians (or possibly Paul’s 
characterization of their views). This issue must be addressed if we are to rightly contrast the 
philosophical views that could have influenced the Corinthians with Paul’s own position. There 
is considerable unanimity among scholars that the opening statement Πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν (6:12, 
                                                
 92 B J. Oropeza, “Situational Immorality: Paul’s ‘Vice Lists’ at Corinth,” ExpTim 110.1 (1998): 9–10 argues 
that these vices were actually being practiced in Corinth.  
 93 See the evidence presented in Nijay K. Gupta, Worship That Makes Sense to Paul: A New Approach to 
the Theology and Ethics of Paul’s Cultic Metaphors (BZNW 175; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 71–72.  
 94 E.g. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 455; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 270; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 258. 
 95 Witherington III, Conflict, 167; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 271, developed especially in relation to Romans 8:9–
11 in Idem, “Christology and Pneumatology in Romans 8:9–11 – and Elsewhere: Some Reflections on Paul as a 
Trinitarian,” in Jesus of Nazareth: Lord and Christ: Essays on the Historical Jesus and New Testament Christology 
(ed. Joel B. Green and Max Turner; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 312–31; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 
244; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 258. 
 96 Fee, 1 Corinthians, 272–73. 
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“All things are permitted for me”)97 reflects the position of the Corinthians (cited again in 10:23, 
which strengthens this case).98 However, there is disagreement about the verse that follows. The 
vast majority of commentators would agree that in 6:12 Paul twice quotes the Corinthian maxim 
I have just noted, followed each time by his response, and that 6:13a is another Corinthian 
slogan. However, most translations’ omission of quotation marks around ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην 
καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει (“and God will destroy both one and the other”; 6:13b) suggest that they 
consider these words to belong to Paul,99 though most modern scholars attribute the phrase to the 
Corinthians.100 The subject becomes even more disputed in regard to later verses in this same 
passage.  
                                                
 97 The sense is nicely captured by translations like “Liberty to do anything” (Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 461) 
or “I have the right to do anything” (Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 245). 
 98 E.g. see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 461 note 192, who cites J. C. Hurd’s list of twenty-three writers up to 
1965, including himself, who held the phrase to be a Corinthian slogan. Thiselton himself agrees with this position 
and also cites Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 1 Kor 6,12-11,16 (EKKNT 7.2; Zürich: 
Benziger, 1995), 17; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 
251 and Collins, 1 Corinthians, 243 in agreement. To Thiselton’s list, we can also add Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 
108; Witherington III, Conflict, 167; Hays, Corinthians, 102; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 57; Schnabel, Korinther, 
333; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 263; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 252. Fee, 1 Corinthians, 280–81 proposes 
“a perfect parallelism (with chiasm in the first member of each)” (280). In both Cynic and Stoic circles the wise 
were free to act as they wish, though often this was circumscribed by the assumption that the wise or the good 
person understands what is either forbidden by law or is regarded as improper; see for instance Epictetus, Diatr. 
4.1.1, 4, 14, 18; Dio, 1 Serv. lib. 17–18; cited by Garland, 1 Corinthians, 227–28 and the wider discussion at 225–
29.  
 99 E.g. RSV, NEB, NRSV, ESV, NLT, HCSB, with the NIV 2011 bucking the trend. This is also the 
position of Fee, 1 Corinthians, 281 note 294; Witherington III, Conflict, 168 is ambivalent. Jan Lambrecht, “Paul’s 
Reasoning in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,” ETL 85.4 (2009): 479–486 at 481, 485 accepts that this is Paul’s position, with 
the caveat that Paul means that the stomach (κοιλία) will be destroyed; the destiny of the body is different. 
 100 E.g. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 110; Robert H. Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on 
Pauline Anthropology (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 54–56; Brendan Byrne, 
“Sinning against One’s Own Body: Paul’s Understanding of the Sexual Relationship in 1 Corinthians 6:18,” CBQ 
45.4 (1983): 608–16 at 611–612; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 6,12-11,16, 20; Hays, Corinthians, 102; Collins, 1 
Corinthians, 245; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 462–63, following the earlier Idem, “Realized eschatology at Corinth,” 
NTS 24.4 (1978): 510–26, at 517; Karl Olav Sandnes, Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles (SNTSMS 120; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 191–99; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 264; Denny Burk, 
“Discerning Corinthian Slogans through Paul’s Use of the Diatribe in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,” BBR 18.1 (2008): 99–
121; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Corinthian Slogans in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20,” in Keys to First Corinthians: 
Revisiting the Major Issues (ed. Jerome Murphy O’Connor; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 22–25; Ciampa 
and Rosner, Corinthians, 252; Brookins, Wisdom, 84–85; and more generally on the question of method, see Jay E. 
Smith, “Slogans in 1 Corinthians,” BSac 167 (2010): 68–88. Benjamin Fiore, “Passion in Paul and Plutarch: 1 
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 I want to give close attention to 1 Cor 6:18b (πᾶν ἁμάρτημα ὃ ἐὰν ποιήσῃ ἄνθρωπος 
ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν, that is, “Every sin that a person commits is outside the body”) because 
of its relevance to 6:19 and the comparison between temple language used by Paul and its use by 
philosophers. Might 6:18b reflect the Corinthian position and on what basis can we evaluate 
these claims? C. F. D. Moule thought it “possibly worth considering” that 6:18b might reflect the 
Corinthian position.101 Jerome Murphy O’Connor drew attention to the parallels found in the 
structure of 6:13–14, the contrast between καταργέω (13) and ἐξεγείρω (14), and the 
proliferation of the particle δέ in these verses to suggest that Paul takes up the Corinthians’ own 
words each time in formulating his response. Thus 6:13b (using καταργέω) is a Corinthian 
slogan. Murphy O’Connor takes 6:18b as another Corinthian slogan which displays the same 
lack of concern for the body (found in 6:13), which is “morally irrelevant”.102  
                                                                                                                                                       
Corinthians and 5–6 and the Polemic Against Epicureans,” in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of 
Abraham J. Malherbe (ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 
135–43 speculates that Paul is confronting Epicurean influence in 1 Cor 5–6 and especially here, relying on 
Plutarch’s treatise against the Epicureans. It is possible that this is a factor, but more than this is hard to say, and I 
would not wish to restrict the influences on the Corinthians to the Epicureans. Graham Tomlin, “Christians and 
Epicureans in 1 Corinthians,” JSNT 68 (1997): 51–72 explores the possible influence of Epicureanism more 
comprehensively and makes a convincing case for the contribution that it could have made to the problems 
discussed in 1 Cor 5–7 (62–64) while recognizing that Corinth was a melting point for various philosophical and 
religious influences (70–71). 
 101 C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek (2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959), 196–97. 
 102 Murphy-O’Connor, “Slogans,” 20–31 at 22. This would also explain the need to argue for a physical 
resurrection against those who dispute it in 1 Cor 15:12 (24). The article was originally published in CBQ 40 (1978), 
391–96. Murphy O’Connor is followed by UBS Translation Consultant Roger L. Omanson, “Acknowledging Paul’s 
quotations,” BT 43.2 (1992): 201–13 at 207; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 248; Hays, Corinthians, 105. Jay E. Smith, “The 
Roots of a ‘Libertine’ Slogan in I Corinthians 6:18,” JTS 59.1 (2008): 63–95 at 65 note 6, notes the mixed signals 
found in Thiselton (cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, comparing 459 with 471–74). Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 58 
indicates that he is open to the possibility. Kempthorne, “Incest,” 568–74 at 571–72 agrees with Moule and Murphy-
O’Connor that 6:18b is a Corinthian slogan but takes σῶμα to mean the body of believers, argued also by E. 
Schweizer, “σῶμα, σωματικός, σύσσωμος,” TDNT 7:1070. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 120 note 338 assumes that the “body 
of Christ” metaphor is a “prevailing image” of the letter and that 6:15 refers to this, and to the Corinthians’ prior 
instruction in the matter. This seems unlikely in light of the presence of τὸ ἴδιον in 6:18b and since σῶμα in 6:18a is 
clearly used of the physical body. Gundry, Sōma, 73, asks pointedly, “did Paul expect the Corinthians to read ch. 12 
before ch. 6?” This difficulty is recognized by Fee, 1 Corinthians, 283 note 300 and 289 note 323. 
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However, scholars such as Gordon Fee follow Brendan Byrne in arguing that the slogan 
is Paul’s,103 and Fee proposes that the δέ is “exceptive” (suggesting the translation “all other 
sins”, where the word other is supplied).104 Yet, Denny Burk draws attention to the authoritative 
study of J. William Johnston of the NT uses of πάς, which concludes that there can be no 
exceptions implied in 6:18.105 Further grammatical analysis by Jay E. Smith also provides 
compelling reasons for doubting the likelihood of this “exceptive” sense.106 Smith seeks to 
provide extensive supporting evidence from the Hellenistic-Roman background, especially from 
Stoicism to demonstrate that, “the philosophical ‘raw materials’ were present for the Corinthians 
to construct [such] a slogan”107 Burk also draws attention to the diatribal features of 6:12–20 that 
strongly suggest the dialogical nature of the passage, with the difference that Paul is interacting 
with real slogans, not with an imaginary opponent.108 None of these scholars can establish with 
certainty that 6:18b are the words (or position) of the Corinthians but they do provide compelling 
                                                
 103 Byrne, “Sinning,” 608–16 at 609–10 and followed by Alistair Scott May, The Body for the Lord: Sex and 
Identity in 1 Corinthians 5-7 (JSNTSup 278; London: T&T Clark, 2004), 123–27. 
 104 Fee, 1 Corinthians, 290, agreeing with Gundry, Sōma, 73–74 and argued on other grounds by Bruce 
Fisk, “Porneuein as Body Violation: The Unique Nature of Sexual Sin in 1 Corinthians 6:18,” NTS 42.4 (1996):  
540–558 at 544 (reflected also by the RSV: “Every other sin . . .” and followed by Brian S. Rosner, Paul, Scripture 
and Ethics: A Study of 1 Corinthians 5–7 (AGJU 22; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 144 and Garland, 1 Corinthians, 236). 
Burk, “Discerning,” 99–121 at 118 finds no evidence for this usage in any of the major Greek grammars. Lambrecht, 
“Reasoning,” 479–486 at 484–86 cautiously affirms that 6:18b is Paul’s position, based on his structural analysis of 
6:12–20. 
 105 Cited in  Burk, “Discerning,” at 118 note 61.  
 106 Jay E. Smith, “A Slogan in 1 Corinthians 6:18b: Pressing the Case,” in Studies in the Pauline Epistles: 
Essays in Honor of Douglas J. Moo (ed. Matthew Harmon and Jay E. Smith; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 74–
98 at 82–83, as well as the difficulties of making sense of 6:18b as a Pauline statement in the context of the letter in 
84–87. Smith also tries to propose evidence for seeing ἁμάρτημα as a non-Pauline word (understanding the 
vocabulary of Rom 3:25 as a pre-Pauline formula, with most commentators) in 87–91.  
 107 Idem, “Roots,” 69, with evidence from Stoicism presented in 69–77, stressing the prime place given to 
intention over action in Stoic thought, with supporting evidence from Epictetus, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Stobaeus 
and Sextus Empiricus, and the evidence typically provided for Stoic views in 1 Cor 6:12a from Diogenes Laertius, 
Dio Chrysostom and Philo as well as from scholars of Stoicism such as F. H. Sandbach and E. V. Arnold. Smith also 
sees a possible background in a kind of incipient gnosticism and postulates the possible misunderstanding of the 
sayings preserved in Mark 7:14–23 (see Idem, “Roots,” 77–84 for the former and 84–95 for the latter.) By contrast, 
Bruce Fisk seeks to demonstrate that the ethos of 6:18b is in agreement with what we find in the Jewish wisdom 
tradition (Fisk, “Porneuein,” 540–558 at 541, with evidence provided in 545–46). 
 108 Burk, “Discerning,” 99–121 at 102–110. Brookins, Wisdom, 85–86, 188–89 also takes this position. 
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evidence for its likelihood based on a variety of both literary and cultural factors and I shall 
assume this position here.    
 Looking at 6:12–20 as a whole, Paul begins by quoting a Corinthian slogan with which 
many have identified Stoic and Cynic parallels.109 He counters this focus on individual rights or 
freedom (ἔξεστιν) with what builds up the community instead.110 For my purposes I wish to note 
that the passage has a relentless focus on the physical body. The σῶμα rightly belongs to ὁ 
κύριος (13), last named as the Lord Jesus Christ (11). Having already identified πόρνοι as the 
first in a list of offenders who will not inherit the kingdom of God (9), Paul contrasts πορνεία 
with ὁ κύριος (13). The body is not intended for πορνεία but for the Lord.111 ὁ θεὸς  and ὁ 
κύριος continue to be the subject of 6:14, as does the focus on the supremacy of ὁ θεὸς (he is the 
one who does the destroying in 6:13 and who raises ὁ κύριος in 6:14; cf. my discussion of 1:23 
earlier). Paul hints at a later theme that will be dealt with expansively in 1 Cor 15: God raised the 
Lord and he will raise us through his power (14).112 This is clearly a reference to the raising of 
                                                
 109 Including D.L. 6.72; 7.125; see e.g. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 108–09; Terence Paige, “Stoicism, 
Ἐλευθερία and Community At Corinth,” in Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor 
of Ralph P. Martin (ed. Michael J. Wilkins and Terence Paige; JSNTSup 87; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1992), 180–93 and Brookins, Wisdom, 174–75. Winter, Corinth, 76–96 locates the setting more in the ethics of the 
elite. 
 110 On which see particularly, Mitchell, Rhetoric, passim; Lanci, Temple, passim.  
 111 Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, contend that 6:14–15 depicts a hypothetical scenario. Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 275–77, is representative of most scholars, who differ. Rosner, “Prostitution,” 336–51 and Ciampa and 
Rosner, Corinthians, 246–249 lay out the various options and argue for temple prostitution; Kempthorne, “Incest,” 
568-74 and Deming, “Unity,” 289–312 argue that Paul is returning to the problem of incest identified in 1 Cor 5:1; 
Bruce W. Winter, “Gluttony and Immorality at Élitist Banquets: The Background to 1 Corinthians 6:12–20,” Jian 
Dao 7 (1997):  77–90 makes the case that the elite indulged in sexual immorality in Roman banquets. Martin, Body, 
176, asserts that the πόρνη “is not a person in her own right (as if such a thing is imaginable for Paul) but a 
representative of the cosmos that is estranged and opposed to God and Christ” (see 176–79 generally) but Martin’s 
whole discussion seems scarcely more imaginable than his dismissal of a concrete circumstance (especially in light 
of references to the specific πόρνοις in 5:9–10, using a cognate word).  
 112 The textual tradition is evenly split between three tenses of the verb ἐξήγειρεν (aorist), ἐξεγείρει 
(present) and ἐξεγερεῖ  (future: the reading of the NA28), but the context seems to demand the future reading 
(Metzger, Textual Commentary, 486–87; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 274 note 262) although Philip W. Comfort, New 
Testament Text and Translation Commentary: Commentary on the Variant Readings of the Ancient New Testament 
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some kind of body, since Paul pointedly addresses the Corinthians directly with the familiar 
accusatory topic marker οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι (15) in order to draw attention to the fundamental place 
that the physical body plays in God’s economy. Here the references are plural; it is their bodies 
that are members of Christ (15a). Thus, Paul’s incredulity that they might even make these 
members become members of ἡ πόρνη is signaled by another familiar Pauline phrase of 
disbelief, and though grammatically a volitive optative (a wish expressed almost like a prayer), it 
expresses more a note of abhorrence, μὴ γένοιτο (6:15; “May it never be” or “Certainly not!”).113 
It would be unthinkable to join (κολλάω) these members of Christ with ἡ πόρνη, signaled by 
Paul’s second use of μὴ γένοιτο, because to do so would create a one body (ἓν σῶμά) 
relationship with her, or one flesh (6:16; citing Gen 2:24 LXX). Although the “one flesh” 
relationship (using σάρξ) almost certainly would have been well known from the LXX and from 
early Christian tradition,114 Paul’s focus in this discourse is on the σῶμα, (eight times in 6:12–20) 
not the σάρξ. Yet, strikingly, Paul’s immediate assertion is that the one joined to the Lord is ἓν 
πνεῦμά (6:17). Although one spirit could mean something like one in spirit, referring to the 
human spirit (as in 2:11a), the immediate context would seem to demand a forward pointing 
reference to the Holy Spirit, both in 6:19, and then in the discussion that begins with 12:4.115 
Therefore Paul issues a strong warning to flee πορνεία (6:18). As argued earlier, I see good 
                                                                                                                                                       
Manuscripts and How they Relate to the Major English Translations (Carol Stream, Ill.: Tyndale House, 2008), 495, 
argues for the present reading as the original, following the “process exhibited in the corrections of p46”.  
 113 “γίνομαι,” BDAG, 196–99, at 4.a, 97; Ernest De Witt Burton, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New 
Testament Greek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900), 79 [§177], discussed in Wallace, Grammar, 481–
82. For its use uniquely in the diatribes of Epictetus and Paul, see Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular 
Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 25–33.  
 114 cf. Matt 19:5; Mk 10:8; Eph 5:31 (which of course, may have been written by Paul), and the marriage 
imagery between God and his people is drawn on by Paul in 2 Cor 11:2–3.   
 115 Fee, 1 Corinthians 87, 260; followed by Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 469. Comfort, Commentary, 495–96 
however, argues that “spirit” should not be capitalized since what is described is a union of the divine Spirit with the 
human spirit and manuscripts p46 and p11 support this, since the scribes did not write πνεῦμα as a nomen sacrum. 
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reason for taking 6:18b as the objection (whether actual or or hypothetical) of the Corinthians: 
that sin as an act has no reference to the body. Paul then uses πορνεύω in participle form as a 
substantive (the one who engages in sexual immorality) to make a radical claim to an audience 
influenced by philosophical thought, whether Stoic or Platonic: that such an act would be to sin 
against their own body (6:18b). Fisk is surely right to note that 6:12–20 is tied together by a 
“focus on the corporeal” (with the multiple descriptors σῶμα, κοιλία and σάρξ), whether that is 
purely related to the physical body or to the person as a whole “viewed particularly as a physical 
being”.116 
 
4.3.3  1 Corinthians 6:19: Main Features 
  I come now to the next metaphorical temple reference. For the purposes of my 
discussion I would note the following points about Paul’s words. Firstly, the explicit referent of 
the temple of the Holy Spirit is the human σῶμα. This goes beyond the sense of 3:16, where the 
reference to the person could conceivably have been understood by Paul’s audience only with 
respect to the soul. Secondly, although the reference is clearly to the individual body of 
Christians,117 Paul chooses not to use the plural of σῶμα here. Instead, he expresses himself very 
carefully with ὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν, which Moulton and Turner class as a distributive singular 
(something that belongs to each person in a group).118 This makes clear that the reference is to 
the body of the individual (who may or may not choose to unite with ἡ πόρνη) but at the same 
                                                
 116 Fisk, “Porneuein,” 548.  
 117 Garland, 1 Corinthians, 238.  
 118 J. H. Moulton and Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Vol. III: Syntax (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1963), 23. 
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time keeps the corporate dimension of the temple very much in focus, just as in 3:16.119 Thirdly, 
the Spirit is specifically defined as ἅγιος. In the earlier discussion, Paul had defined the temple 
as holy (3:17), and as the place of God’s Spirit (3:16). Now he unites the two to provide 
definition to his characterization of the Spirit. Fourthly, Paul makes even more explicit one 
inference of 3:16–17: you are not your own; you are like slaves of a different master (6:19b), 
who have been acquired with a price (and thus possess value).120 Fifthly, such people are under 
obligation, consequently, to glorify (δοξάζω) God in the body; again using the singular form of 
σῶμα with the possessive plural personal personal ὑμῶν (6:20). 
 
4.3.4 Comparing 1 Corinthians 6:19 with Hellenistic Philosophy 
4.3.4.1 Philosophy 
 I have already observed certain of these emphases in relation to 1 Cor 3:16–17; the most 
obvious one being that the temple is still a corporate image in 6:19 (though applied to the 
individual bodies of those within the community). I noted earlier that the indwelling references 
found in the philosophers related either to the universe as a whole or to the individual. It is not 
always clear whether these references to the individual could include the body. In Epictetus there 
is a hint that they may do so. When he admonishes his hearers with the notion that they are 
nourishing God and exercising God whenever they take physical exercise, or when he speaks of 
                                                
 119 Agreeing with Gupta, Worship, 73–75; Idem, “Which “Body” is a Temple (1 Corinthians 6:19)? Paul 
beyond the Individual/Communal Divide,” CBQ 72.3 (2010): 518–36 at 523 and see the article as a whole for a 
balanced presentation of this subject; also e.g. McKelvey, Temple, 102; Hogeterp, Temple, 340; Wassen, “Temple,” 
55–86 at 74–75. 
 120 For the background to this metaphor and its use in a context more explicitly concerned with slavery in 
Paul’s day (1 Cor 7:23), see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 475–79; 561–65; and specialist studies such as S. Scott 
Bartchy, Μᾶλλον χρῆσαι: First Century Slavery and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21 (SBLDS 11; Missoula, 
Mont.: Scholars Press, 1973), and Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline 
Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), passim. 
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“bearing God about with you”121 such that God sees the motions of the human soul as 
corresponding to his own motions so that they are “of one body with Himself”,122 it is hard not to 
hear overtones of a physical aspect.123 I have already drawn attention to places in Philo that refer 
to the human body as a sacred dwelling-place or shrine for the soul, which is the image of 
God.124 However, I noted earlier the caution of Torrey Seland that this corporeal reference only 
appears in one place in Philo and it is with reference only to Adam, not to human beings in 
general. Despite each of these references in Epictetus and Philo, it is the norm that philosophers 
only speak of the divine indwelling in the soul or mind. Philo is the only Jewish Hellenistic 
philosopher that I am considering and so we might imagine that he would have a more positive 
view of the body than pagan Stoic and Middle Platonic thinkers. In fact, for Philo, it is strictly 
the mind, not the body, that is a temple or dwelling place of God.125 Philosophy tends to stress 
that the divine dwells in the soul,126 or that a δαίμων dwells in the soul of each person.127 
 The special emphasis we find on the soul in philosophy is contrasted with the place of the 
body. Sometimes the body is spoken of almost with indifference; it is something to which the 
mind or soul should pay no attention.128 The soul should have as little association as it is possible 
to have with the body during its earthly existence.129 In fact, the body and its inclinations are to 
be resisted.130 The body has dwelling within it not only good, but also evil.131 As in the writings 
                                                
 121 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.12 (Oldfather, LCL). 
 122 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.6 (Oldfather, LCL).  
 123 Seneca, Ep. 31.2 and 66.12 and Cicero, Resp. 6.24.26 could also be read in this way.  
 124 Philo, Opif. 137 (see for context; Opif. 135).   
 125 Philo, Praem. 123; Deus. 8–9; Mos. 2.82; Virt. 188; Somn. 2.250–51; Det. 90.  
 126 E.g. Seneca, Ep. 110.2; 120.14; Cicero, Leg. 2.11.27–28; Tusc. 1.24.56; 1.25.62; Philo, Cher. 98, 100; 
Deus. 134; Sobr. 62; Somn. 1.149; 2.215, 248; QG 4.80; see also Hogeterp, Temple, 342–44.  
 127 E.g. Dio, 4 Regn. 139; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.14.12, 14; Marcus, Med. 2.13, 17; 3.3.2; 3.12, 16; 5.10.2; 
5.27; Cicero, Div. 1.54.122. 
 128 E.g. Marcus, Med. 6.32;   
 129 E.g. Plutarch, [Cons. Apoll.] 108CD.  
 130 E.g. Marcus, Med. 7.55.1–2; Alcinous, Handbook, 172.16.2.10–19 (26); 182.4.3–8 (38); cf. Plato, Tim. 
42AB. 
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of Plato, later philosophers viewed the body as a prison house for the soul; a time when the soul 
is in exile.132 The soul is the instrument of God; the body, merely the instrument of the soul.133 
Therefore, the soul that detaches itself from the things of the body and the earth will enjoy a 
speedier release from its prison than that of others.134 The mind’s life can be godlike, but only if 
it is free from the body.135 In the meantime, Epictetus can even speak of the body as a corpse, in 
view of its final destiny.136 Thus the body is like unwanted clothing; only fit to be cast off and 
thrown away.137 For the Pythagoreans, this was enshrined in their creeds, since the soul moves 
(transmigrates) from one body to another, showing the body to be non-specific to the soul.138 
 In respect to my third point, some philosophers spoke of the spirit as holy. I noted in 
chapter two that Seneca avers, “a holy spirit indwells within us (sacer intra nos spiritus 
sedet)”,139 perhaps an extension of the Stoic view that a spiritus permeates all there is.140 I have 
already noted that for Zeno, the πνεῦμα holds all things together, including individuals.141  
 Timothy A. Brookins sees the phrase οὐκ . . . ἑαυτῶν (1 Cor 6:19b) as a subversion of a 
Stoic position, citing the use of the expression in Stoic writers but with a different meaning.142 
For the Stoic the body was not their own because it was part of a larger whole, it belonged to the 
cosmos, or, “because the self was located not in the body but the soul . . . and especially because 
the body resided outside the individual’s own control, liable as it was to disease, lameness, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 131 Plutarch, Virt. prof. 122E, cf. Homer, Od. 4.392.  
 132 E.g. Plutarch, Exil. 607D; Maximus, Or. 7.5; 9.6; 10.3–5; cf. 10.9. 
 133 E.g. Plutarch, Sept. sap. conv. 163E. 
 134 E.g. Seneca, Marc. 23.1–2; Polyb. 9.3, 8; Helv. 11.6; Ep. 41.5  
 135 Cicero, lib. inc. fr. 2; cf. Div. 1.57.129.  
 136 Epictetus, Frag. 26; Diatr. 2.1.17; cf. Plutarch, Quaest. plat. 2, 1002C. 
 137 E.g. Maximus, Or. 11.11.  
 138 Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 3.19.1.  
 139 Seneca, Ep. 41.2 (Gummere, LCL). 
 140 Seneca, Nat. 2.6.5; 6.16.1; 3.29.2; Helv. 8.3.  
 141 SVF, 2.473; cf. SVF, 2.552–53, 634.  
 142 Brookins, Wisdom, 189, citing Epictetus, Diatr. 3.20.1; 3.22.21, 34, 40–41; 4.1.66, 78, 87, 104, 158; 
4.7.17, 31–32; Ench. 1.1; Seneca, Ep. 120.18–19.    
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most of all the whims of “tyrants”.143 Paul on the contrary attributes great value to the body 
(6:20a) because it matters to God, who is the master of those who belong to Christ, in whom the 
Spirit dwells exclusively. The philosophers also speak of a certain obligation to glorify God (cf. 
6:20b). For the middle Platonists, the goal was to know and to imitate God and to submit to 
God’s direction in all things,144 but other writers (including Stoics) also spoke of the need to 
imitate the example of the gods.145 The response to the gods should also be a life oriented 
towards virtue,146 that includes a life characterized by self-control,147 with the goal to please 
God.148 A person’s desire for purity before God149 should lead to an inward purification150 and 
the destruction of all thoughts that would tend away from purity.151 This means being led by and 
keeping pure your inner δαίμων152 by honoring him.153 As I described in the previous two 
chapters, purity in both thought, word and action could be described as a sacrifice, and thus an 
offering of worship.154  
 
4.3.4.2 Paul 
When I compare these findings with 1 Cor 6:19, there are a number of points to consider. 
Firstly, whereas the human body is spoken of by philosophers (whether Stoic or Platonic) at best 
                                                
 143 Idem, Wisdom, 189.  
 144 E.g. Plutarch, Sept. sap. conv. 163E. 
 145 E.g. Alcinous, Handbook, 181.28.22–30 (37); 182.4.3–8 (38); Maximus, Or. 35.2; cf. 26.9; also in Stoic 
writers like Seneca, Ben. 4.25.1; Vit. beat. 15.6; 16:1–2; Ep. 95.50; cf. De otio. 5.8; Vit. beat. 3.3; 8.1; Dio, 3 Regn. 
82; Epictetus, Diatr. 2.14.13; 2.16.42;    
 146 DL 7.1.88, 89, 93–117; Seneca, Prov. 1.5; cf. Ep. 31.9; Cicero, Leg. 1.7.25. 
 147 Dio, 4 Regn. 23.  
 148 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.30.1.  
 149 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.18.19; 2.19.26. 
 150 Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.112. 
 151 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.12–13; 4.1.175; Apollonius, Vit. Apoll. 3.42.1–2; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.54 
 152 Apollonius, Vit. Apoll. 1.18.1; 2.39.3; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.13, 17; 3.5.1; 3.6.2; 3.12; 3.16; 5.27. 
 153 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.18–22.  
 154 E.g. Cicero, Nat. d. 2.28.71; Dio, Exil. 35; Leg. 2.8.19; 2.10.24, 25; Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 6.11.3; 
Philo, Spec. 1.201, 203, 257–60, 269–271, 283, 287; QE. 1.17; 2.31, 98–99; Sacr. 73; 109–111; Mos. 2.137–39, 
148–51; Plant. 108; Somn. 2.73–74.   
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with indifference and at worst with disdain, Paul sees the body itself as the temple of the Holy 
Spirit, a sacred place where God’s presence dwells.155 Again, I noted the corporate implications 
of Paul’s use of the second person possessive plural in referring to the body, by contrast to the 
individual focus of temple references that I have surveyed. Thirdly, the πνεῦμα or spiritus 
inhabits the whole universe in the philosophers, and this includes every individual that dwells 
within it. By contrast, it is those who have been washed, sanctified and justified in the name of 
the Lord Jesus and by the spirit of their God who are a temple of the Holy Spirit in Paul (6:11; cf. 
1:2; 2:10–13; 3:16–17, 21–23; 12:3). For Paul, the spirit is not the possession of all people 
irrespective of their relationship to Jesus. Correspondingly, among the philosophers there is no 
sense that one set of people belong to God in a way that others may not. Finally, the philosophers 
would concur with Paul that there is an obligation to glorify God (or the gods) by imitating their 
example, in inward and outward purity. However, Paul adds to the injunction to glorify God ἐν 
τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν (6:20b). This short phrase encapsulates the heart of the difference between Paul 
and the philosophers: unlike Platonism and Stoicism, he emphasizes a defined group with 
boundaries set by their relationship to Jesus Christ and stresses the corporeal dimension to 
identification with and obedience to God.156  
 
4.4 Corresponding Emphases in 1 Corinthians 
 The key emphases I have identified here can also be found elsewhere within the epistle. 
In this next section I shall comment briefly on a number of other important places in the letter 
that relate to the issues identified in 1 Cor 3:16–17 and 6:19. I shall be selective and aim to 
                                                
 155 For more on this theme, see e.g. Fee, Presence, 134–37.  
 156 May, Body, 130 suggests that this phrase connotes the sense that each temple is set apart for the divinity 
whose image dwells within, “the temple is the property of the resident divinity”.   
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address only those areas that may have been notable for an audience influenced by philosophy, 
such as the need for holiness to be expressed in the body, idolatry rather than the acceptance of 
multiple gods, and Paul’s positive view of the body and his willingness to use indwelling 
imagery with material language.   
 
4.4.1  Holiness in the Body 
 The concern for holiness and for its expression within the body comes to the fore in 1 Cor 
7, where Paul gives most of his attention to the question of marriage and whether to marry or 
remain unmarried. The question, apparently raised by the Corinthians,157 of whether to touch 
(ἅπτω) a woman (γυνή)158 is expressly concerned with sexual relations (7:1),159 and thus matters 
of the body. Paul’s foundational principle is that each spouse (ἐξουσιάζω) has authority over the 
body of the other (7:4).160 Taking up the language of 1:2, Paul proclaims that an unbelieving 
                                                
 157 The position of most commentators, see Lang, Korinther, 89; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 6,12-11,16, 59; 
Collins, 1 Corinthians, 252–55, 257; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 498–500; Schnabel, Korinther, 352; Fee, 1 
Corinthians, 303–08; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 272. Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 154 and Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 278 cautiously express the view that Paul may be in agreement with the sentiment, but this seems 
unlikely in the context of the wider discussion and the way that Paul answers Corinthian slogans in other passages.  
 158 Though this could equally be translated “wife”, but most adopt the more neutral “woman”, see 
Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 500; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 278. 
 159 For evidence for the use of ἅπτεσθαι in the middle voice with the genitive, as a euphemism in Greek 
literature for sexual intercourse, see Gordon D. Fee, “1 Corinthians 7:1 in the NIV,” JETS 23.4 (1980): 307–314; 
Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 500; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 258; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 301–06. Idem, “1 Corinthians 7:1–7 
Revisited,” in Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of of Margaret 
Thrall (ed. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott; NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 197–213 restates his case in 
opposition to the more recent attempt to revive the argument that γυναικὸς μὴ ἅπτεσθαι is a metonymy for 
marriage, argued by C Caragounis, ““Fornication” and “Concession”? Interpreting 1 Cor 7, 1–7,” in The Corinthian 
Correspondence (ed. R Bieringer; BETL; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 543–60 at 543–49. More 
recently, an interesting and persuasive argument has been put forward that the euphemism specifically applied to 
cases of acting on sexual passions motivated by pleasure or passion, not for procreation; see Ciampa and Rosner, 
Corinthians, 272–75 and for fuller details, Roy E. Ciampa, “Revisiting the Euphemisim in 1 Corinthians 7.1,” JSNT 
31.3 (2009): 325–38. 
 160 For the significance of this for Paul’s theology of the body and its radical disjunction with contemporary 
views of the body in marriage see e.g. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 504–06; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 6,12-11,16, 63–66. 
For a discussion of the possibility that Paul is interacting with a wider Stoic-Cynic debate over marriage, see David 
L. Balch, “1 Corinthians 7:32–35 and Stoic Debates about Marriage, Anxiety, and Distraction,” JBL 102.3 (1983):  
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spouse in a marriage is sanctified (ἁγιάζω) by the believer, rendering the children holy (ἅγιος) 
rather than unclean (ἀκάθαρτος) in 7:14.161 Paul repeats the language of 6:20 (last used in 
connection with the temple image), in reminding the Corinthians again that they have been 
bought with a price (ἀγοράζω), that they might not be slaves of people (τιμῆς ἠγοράσθητε in 
7:23 and ἠγοράσθητε . . . τιμῆς in 6:20b). I also note in passing that in Paul’s understanding, the 
single person’s goal is ἵνα ᾖ ἁγία καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ πνεύματι (7:34). Holiness must be 
expressed in the body as well as the spirit; Paul is never concerned with matters of the soul alone, 
but the whole person.162 Finally in this chapter, Paul places one condition on those who remarry 
after widowhood, μόνον ἐν κυρίῳ (7:39), which I would understand as meaning that the new 
spouse must be a member of this community set apart for Jesus Christ.163 
 
4.4.2 Idolatry 
 First Corinthians 8:1–11 is an immensely complex section of the letter and so I can only 
briefly touch on the areas that relate to the themes of idolatry, purity and temples, while 
neglecting other important areas of Paul’s discussion.164 Paul introduces the section with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
429–39 and Will Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7 (2d ed.; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), passim.   
 161 Within the confines and narrow focus of this work I do not have space to discuss the interpretation of 
this contentious verse, for which see Schrage, 1 Korinther: 6,12-11,16, 104–09; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 527–33; 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 299–301; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 296–302; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 330–333. 
 162 See Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 134 note 32; Schrage, 1 Korinther: 6,12-11,16, 180; Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 320; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 353–54. Collins, 1 Corinthians, 292 and Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 
181 speculate that this is a quotation from the Corinthians but there is no evidence for this and it fits comfortably 
within Paul’s argument in the chapter.   
 163 This is disputed by e.g. J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on Epistles of St. Paul (ed. J. B. Harmer; Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1895), 235; Barrett, 1 Corinthians, 186 but held by most commentators, so Robertson and 
Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 161; Collins, 1 Corinthians, 303; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 604; Fitzmyer, First 
Corinthians, 329; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 392. Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 365–66 also understand this as the 
meaning but are cautious about its universal application. 
 164 For more detail, see the monographs listed in the first chapter and the relatively recent and 
comprehensive survey of the literature, found in John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A 
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words Περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων (8:1).165 Although many vital topics are discussed along the 
way, it is essential to always keep in mind that the subject of this section is things offered to 
idols, and more broadly, idolatry. Jerome Murphy O’Connor describes the problem of idol 
offerings as, “of very limited interest” compared to, “the nature of Christian freedom, the place 
of the believer in a non-Christian society, and the education of the conscience.”166 For J. C. 
Brunt, “the specific question of idol meat is transcended by the consideration of love’s 
responsibility.”167 Yet the fact that these topics are introduced in order to further Paul’s 
treatment of idolatry is overlooked.168 Idolatry was a pressing issue for the Corinthians.  
Many recent commentators agree that Paul addresses two contexts: meals eaten in or 
around pagan temples (8:1–10:22) and food sold in the marketplace and eaten at home (10:23–
11:1).169 While it was once common to claim that a distinction could be made between what 
Bruce Fisk refers to as “harmless social events” at the temple and activities that were “blatantly 
                                                                                                                                                       
Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1 (WUNT 2/ 151; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2003), 1–
48, including the very helpful chart comparing the views of different scholars, found on 41–48. 
 165 See the discussions of εἰδωλόθυτα in Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 617–20 and dining in Roman Corinth in 
Witherington III, Conflict, 191–95.  
 166 Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom Or the Ghetto: (1 Corinthians 8:1–13; 10:23–11:1),” in Keys to 
First Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues (ed. Jerome Murphy O’Connor; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 87–128 at 87.  
 167 J. C. Brunt, “Rejected, Ignored or Misunderstood? The Fate of Paul’s Approach to the Problem of Food 
Offered to Idols in Early Christianity,” NTS 31 (1985): 113–24 at 121. 
 168 Note the criticisms of Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8–10 in Its Context (Waterloo, 
Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), xvii, 47–48; A. T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background 
and Pauline Legacy (JSNTSup 176; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 18–19.  
 169 E.g. Gordon D. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8–10,” Bib 61.2 
(1980): 172–97; Theissen, Setting, 121–43; Wendell L. Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 
Corinthians 8 and 10 (SBLDS 68; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985), 265–71; Gooch, Food, 73–97; Witherington 
III, Conflict, 186–91; Idem, “Not So Idle Thoughts about Eidolothuton,” TynBul 44.2 (1993): 237–54; Derek 
Newton, Diety and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth (JSNTSup 169; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), 389–91; Cheung, Food, 82–164 (with some qualifications); Joop F. Smit, “About the Idol Offerings”. 
Rhetoric, Social Context and Theology of Paul’s Discourse in First Corinthians 8:1–11:1 (CBET 27; Leuven: 
Peeters, 2000), 41; Fotopoulos, Food, 38; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 394–400.  
   212
idolatrous”, even Fisk concedes that, “lines . . . were fuzzy, if drawn at all.”170 The study of Peter 
D. Gooch examined archeological and literary evidence for the cult of Demeter and Kore and the 
place of dining rooms at Lerna in relation to the Asklepios and concluded that idol sacrifice went 
hand in hand with meals of social significance.171 Gooch’s research has been comprehensively 
updated (and, in places, corrected) by John Fotopoulos, who provides a very thorough discussion 
of the archeological evidence and concludes that meals in both the temple and its courts would 
have involved eating idol food with a religious connotation, and that further many meals were 
accompanied by sexual encounters172 (so involving the threat of both idolatry and sexual 
immorality that I highlighted as a constant concern for Jewish writers, including Paul in this 
letter). Paul therefore is severe in his warnings against participation in idolatry, focused on 
alternative temples in Corinth. He does so by drawing on the very heart of Jewish monotheism, 
the Shema (Deut 6:4), for which he provides a “Christological” reinterpretation (8:6),173 
reminiscent of his words in 3:23, in which θεός and κύριος are conjoined once more, and the 
relationship between the Corinthians and this God and Lord is reaffirmed. Paul draws on his 
Jewish roots and its universal condemnation of idolatry,174 but also both the tradition that idols 
have no objective reality (8:4a, 5a, drawing on the tradition found in e.g. Deut 32:21; Pss 115:4–
                                                
 170 Bruce Fisk, “Eating Meat Offered to Idols: Corinthian Behavior and Pauline Responses in 1 Corinthians 
8–10 (A Response to Gordon Fee),” TrinJ 10 (1989): 49–70, at 63; Willis, Meat, 47 expresses a similar sentiment, 
that “social conviviality and good cheer” was the focus of religious associations meeting in the temple for meals.   
 171  Gooch, Food, 1–46; followed by Cheung, Food, 27–38; Smit, Offerings, 49–52. 
 172 See the evidence provided in Fotopoulos, Food, 49–178. 
 173 The wording of N. T. Wright, “Monotheism, Christology and Ethics: 1 Corinthians 8,” in The Climax of 
the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (ed. N. T. Wright; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 120–36 at 
125–29.  
 174 Cheung, Food, 39–81; cf. Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the 
Apostle to the Gentiles (CRINT 3.1; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 151–77, although Tomson notes a spectrum of 
views on the severity of attitudes towards, and interpretations of, idolatry. This work has been supplemented by 
Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority. A Study of 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1 in the Light of the Jewish 
Diaspora (JSNTSup 299; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), passim, whose study contends that in the Jewish diaspora 
there were various interpretations of what constituted idolatry and so, a variety of responses. See also Paul’s 
vehement attacks on idolatry in other letters such as Rom 1:21–32; 2:22; 2 Cor 6:16; Gal 4:8; 1 Thess 1:9. 
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8; 135:15–18; Isa 40:19–20; 44:9–17) combined with the subjective experience of idols for those 
who formerly encountered them as pagans, and were influenced by demons through them (8:7, 
10, drawing on the tradition found in Deut 18:11; 32:17; Ps 106:37; Isa 8:19; 19:3).175 Some 
consider it their ἐξουσία (“right” in the context of 8:9) to eat idol food in temple contexts. 
Whether or not this is a Corinthian term, it certainly encapsulates what is probably a Corinthian 
catchphrase (Πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν in 6:12 and 10:23). For a Corinthian to eat in an idol temple may 
“build up” (in an ironic sense: οἰκοδομέω in 8:10; cf. 8:1; 10:23; 14:4, 17) the brother to follow 
their example. The end result will be destructive (8:11) rather than constructive, and will also 
constitute a sin against Christ (8:12, emphasizing the unity between believers and believers that 
is also a vital theme for the letter). Paul’s argument in 8:7–13 is not simply about relationships 
between believers. It is noteworthy that he uses temple language (μολύνω) to describe the 
polluting effect on a person of weak conscience who is led into eating idol food (8:7).176   
 Paul’s discussion of his rights (1 Cor 9) actually constitutes a de facto prohibition of the 
Corinthians’ exercise of their rights rather than an affirmation of their freedom.177 Paul never 
claims his right to eat idol food just as he never argues that πορνεία (cf. 6:18 with 6:12) would 
be permissible in different circumstances. The tone and direction of Paul’s discussion from 8:7–
13 through to the end of 1 Cor 9 is intended to dissuade the Corinthians from such 
                                                
 175 Cheung, Food, 151–52. 
 176 Both uses of μολύνω highlighted by “μολύνω,” BDAG, 657, relate to purity, defilement and holiness in 
connection with temple worship; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 640. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 345, comments that 
the conscience is defiled because in eating εἰδωλόθυτα, “precisely, “as sacrificed to idols,” that person’s conscience 
is stained by an idolatrous act.” 
 177 Contra “Freedom,” 87–128 at 99. Note the study of Peter Richardson, “Temples, Altars and Living 
From the Gospel,” in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker 
(ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson; JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 89–110, who 
suggests that Paul refused support from the community precisely because other patrons were offering the Corinthian 
community idol food and Paul wants neither himself nor the community as a holy temple to be tainted by eating. 
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participation.178 Paul’s examples from scripture in 10:1–13179 warn the Corinthians that their 
spiritual ancestors had their own kind of “baptism” and “communion” (cf. 10:14–22; 11:17–34) 
but their dalliance (10:7) came at a terrible cost (10:11–11). The idols are not gods but to 
participate in idol worship is to enter into κοινωνία with demons (10:19–22).180 Therefore Paul 
urges the believers to flee idolatry (φεύγετε ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας) in 10:14. The other use of 
the verb φεύγω is in 6:18 in relation to πορνεία, thus demonstrating the twin dangers of idolatry 
and immorality highlighted by Paul).181 I would agree with A. T. Cheung that Paul’s very 
different arguments in 8:1–13 and 10:1–22 are not contradictory nor evidence of partition,182 but 
rather evidence of a two stage argument, that presses home the point that Paul prohibits the 
eating of idol food “with the awareness of their idolatrous origins”, especially in idol temples but 
even in homes.183 All this means that for those who constitute the temple of the Holy Spirit, there 
cannot be even the hint of contact with idolatry. As Gordon Fee puts it, “fundamental allegiance 
is at stake”.184 This perspective would have clashed sharply with the worldview of philosophy 
                                                
 178 See Cheung, Food, 90, 140; Smit, Offerings, 64, 88, 90, 92–120; Gooch, Food, 84. Paul does use temple 
language in 9:13 but this is an illustration of literal temple service, drawn from the LXX (cf. Lev 6:16, 26; 7:6; Num 
5:9, 10; 18:8–20; Deut 8:1) rather than a temple metaphor, so I shall not consider it in my discussion.    
 179 Drawing on passages such as Exod 13:21–22; 14:22–29; 16:4; 17:6; 32:6; Num 11:4, 34; 14:16, 23, 29–
30; 20:11 and others.  
180 Bruce W. Winter, “Identifying the Offering, the Cup and the Table of the ‘Demons’ in 1 Cor 10:20-21,” 
in Saint Paul and Corinth: International Scientific Conference Proceedings, Corinth, 23-25 September, 2007 (ed. C. 
Belezos, S. Despotis and C. Karakolis. Athens: Psychogios, 2009), 847–68 identifies the δαιμόνιον in 10:20–21 
with imperial gods, in line with his understanding of the meals as Roman banquets in imperial temples (see below). 
Within the limited confines of this study, I will not be able to interact with his proposal. 
 181 I shall return to consider the words related to idolatry in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 a little more closely when I 
examine 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 in the next chapter.  
 182 Contra Khiok-Khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with 
Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic (BibInt 9; Leiden: Brill, 1995), passim. 
 183 Cheung, Food, 96, 104–09, 116–17, 297; confirmed by rhetorical analysis throughout Smit, Offerings, 
passim. This is in contrast to treatments of the passage that stress the “horizontal” emphasis almost to the exclusion 
of the “vertical”. One modern example would be Newton, Diety, e.g. 115–276, 290, 305–06, 341, 363, 367 who 
repeatedly speaks as if “community consciousness” was Paul’s only interest; cf. the critique of Smit, Offerings, 21–
23.  
 184 Fee, 1 Corinthians, 524.  
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that was happy to accommodate many gods; speaking at times of θεός and at other times of θεοὶ, 
and at home with temples dedicated to different gods, including to the emperor.185 
 Furthermore, the Corinthians’ worship is to be distinct and worthy of the Lord, avoiding 
that which is contrary to nature and imitates Roman cultic practice (11:2–16).186 Similarly as a 
Spirit empowered body, they will no longer follow the practice of pagans, who led astray by 
idols, curse Jesus (or possibly utter a curse in the name of Jesus in 12:3).187 Incidentally it is 
notable that Paul refers to them as ἔθνη (12:2) or “nations, Gentiles” in the past tense, even 
though the majority of the congregation are still Gentiles.188 In the past they were “were being 
led, being carried away to mute idols” but by implication they have a new identity that precludes 
any relation to other gods/idols. 
 
4.4.3 Body language 
 Next, I shall briefly consider the place of body language in First Corinthians since this 
has a bearing on the use of σῶμα in 1 Cor 6:19 and the place of the body in philosophy. Firstly, I 
note in passing that Paul views the breaking of bread as a κοινωνία in the body (σῶμα) of Christ, 
and this participation makes them one σῶμα (10:16–17). Paul revisits this image in 11:27–29 
                                                
 185 cf. Bruce Winter who contends that the problem faced by Paul’s converts was the pressure to dine in a 
temple dedicated to the emperor, caused by the establishing of a federal imperial cult in Corinth itself and the re-
siting of the Isthmian Games in Corinth. Both of these events probably happened between Paul leaving Corinth and 
him writing 1 Corinthians according to Winter, Corinth, 269–86.   
 186 See the evidence set out in Idem, Corinth, 121–41.  
 187 See Idem, Corinth, 164–83, for the latter. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 918–23 identifies as many as twelve 
different explanations offered for the use of the phrase Ανάθεμα Ἰησοῦς, not counting Winter’s position, which is to 
suggest that we translate “Jesus [Grants] a Curse” (Winter, Corinth, 174–76). Winter sees a precedent for this 
translation in other curse inscriptions that he describes. However, the most natural translation would be to supply 
εἶμι in either subjunctive (“Jesus be cursed”) or indicative mood (“Jesus is cursed” in parallel with “Jesus is Lord”) 
as noted by Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 918; Ciampa and Rosner, Corinthians, 565 note 15; see the telling critique of 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 456 that Winter’s interpretation depends on inscriptions missing some of the words 
from the original (unlike Paul, who has simply omitted the verb intentionally).       
 188 Hays, Conversion, 9; Wright, Faithfulness, 416 note 225, 541, 1107, 1446 and Ciampa and Rosner, 
Corinthians, 563.  
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where Paul avers that those who eat the bread and drink the cup in an unworthy manner 
(ἀναξίως) will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord. Judgment is pronounced on 
those who eat and drink μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα (“without discerning the body”, 11:29).189 In 
speaking of the Eucharist in both passages, Paul is willing to use a metaphor drawn from the 
human body to positively describe the relationship between the Corinthian believers and Christ. 
 This metaphor is elaborated upon at length in 12:1–31, where the believers are explicitly 
compared to a body with members (τὰ μέλη in 12:12). Just as the Corinthians are the temple of 
God (3:16a) by virtue of God’s spirit (3:16b; 6:19), so too they are members of one body because 
of the one Spirit (12:13), who energizes all the activities of the body (12:4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). There 
is one body, just as there is one temple.190 Paul makes evident the fact that that his metaphor is 
drawn from the human body by his references to specific members: the foot, the hand (12:15), 
the ear, the eye (12:16), and by implication, the nose (using ὄσφρησις for “sense of smell” in 
12:17d).191 Remarkably, Paul even draws attention to the unpresentable parts (τὰ ἀσχήμονα in 
12:23) of the human body and compares them in a positive way to members of the Corinthian 
                                                
 189 For a helpful excursus on this much debated phrase, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 891–94;  
 190 Raymond F. Collins, “Constructing a Metaphor. 1 Corinthians 3,9b-17 and Ephesians 2,19-22,” in Paul 
et L’Unité des Chrétiens (ed. Jacques Schlosser; Colloquium Oecumenicum Paulinum 19; Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 
193–216 at 207.  
 191 Recent scholarship has rightly drawn attention to the topos of the body in political rhetoric; see the 
survey in Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 992–94, drawing upon works such as Mitchell, Rhetoric, 68–83, 157–64 and 
Martin, Body, 38–68, 87–103, citing Plutarch, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom and Dionysius of Halicarnassus among 
others. I am not denying Paul’s use of this common topos, nor the political resonances it might have had for his 
readers. I am merely recognizing that the source of this metaphor was the human body, and although other writers 
used the analogy of various body parts and internal organs, Paul speaks unashamedly, although obliquely, of its 
most private members (12:23). For more on the whole relationship between this metaphor in Stoicism and Paul, see 
Lee, Stoics, passim.  
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church whose status or background might naturally afford them less respect.192 In fact, God 
himself gives greater honor in particular to those parts (12:24).  
 Finally, Paul reserves the longest discussion of a single topic (not counting 8:1–11:1, 
whose arguments and flow are a little more varied) to his argument for the resurrection in 15:1–
58.193 It is evidently the climax to the variety of topics dealt with in the letter, followed by a brief 
rounding up of unfinished business in 1 Cor 16. Paul is responding to another issue, either raised 
by the Corinthians themselves (15:12) or reported back to Paul (cf. 1 Cor 1:11). Paul is at pains 
to stress that Christ was raised from the dead and appeared to the apostles as proof of this (15:3–
9).194 This is evidence that there will be a future resurrection of the dead ones (15:12). Christ’s 
own resurrection is the ἀπαρχή of the harvest (15:20; cf. 16:15: the household of Stephanas were 
the first of many converts in the province of Achaia) and the rest of the chapter continues this 
argument for the future resurrection of those who belong to Christ (15:20–23). Paul’s discussion 
does raise the question of whether the σῶμα πνευματικόν (15:44b) is in some way not physical, 
since it is contrasted with the σῶμα ψυχικόν (15:44a) and the man who is χοϊκός (earthy, 
predicated of the ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς (15:47). This is especially pertinent for my 
discussion, since when Paul discusses different types of body he gives the example of the 
heavenly bodies (ἐπουράνιος in 15:40), after which he immediately lists the sun and the stars 
(15:41) among his illustrations. In Hellenistic philosophy, it was believed that some became stars 
                                                
 192 See Martin, Body, 94–96; “ἀσχήμων,” BDAG, 147, which draws attention to the word’s application to 
sexual matters in LXX Deut 24:1 and cf. Dio Chrysostom, Conc. Apam. 29, and its use for genitalia here. 
“ἀσχήμων,” LSJ, 266, provides definitions such as “misshapen, ugly” or “unseemly, shameful”. 
 193 Within the constraints of my topic I cannot provide adequate discussion of this lengthy chapter. 
Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 1 Kor 15,1-16,24 (EKKNT 7.4; Zürich: Benziger, 2001), 
devotes over four hundred pages to the chapter and Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1169–1313 provides extensive 
discussion, excurses and multiple bibliographies of significant works.  
 194 See Idem, 1 Corinthians, 1197–1203 who interacts with the discussion of the relationship between belief 
in Christ’s resurrection and the empty tomb tradition, in 15:3–5.  
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(viewed as gods) after their death, sometimes spoken of as “bodies”.195 Dale Martin has in fact 
revived an older view that a body of πνεῦμα is referring to the kind of ethereal substance of 
which that body consists, referring to it as, “a stuff of a thinner, higher nature.”196 Paul’s point at 
this juncture though is not to identify the precise material of such a body but to make the more 
general point that God designs appropriate bodies for the environments to which they are suited. 
In this instance, the point about the σῶμα πνευματικόν is its appropriateness to the resurrection 
mode of existence; a mode empowered and sustained by the Spirit.197 Gordon Fee avers, “the 
transformed body is not composed of ‘spirit’; it is a body adapted to the eschatological existence 
that is under the ultimate domination of the Spirit”198 or as Anthony Thiselton puts it, “Paul uses 
the adjective πνευματικός in its regular Pauline sense to denote that which pertains to the Holy 
Spirit of God”199 and “the totality of the mode of life of the resurrection body is more than 
physical but not less”.200 It is evident throughout Paul’s discussion that the body itself is critical 
                                                
195 See the evidence presented in Martin, Body, 117–20; examples from philosophy would include Seneca, Marc. 
25.3; Ep. 65.17; 102.21, 28. 
 196 Martin, Body, 128, and generally 124–29. See the discussion of Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1276 on 
precedents to this view. In this, Martin has been followed by Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the 
Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), passim, who also wishes to speak of 
pneuma as material, and of what has been typically understood as metaphorical language in Paul (e.g. the body of 
Christ) as literal. Engberg-Pedersen himself admits that not every specialist agrees with his understanding of 
Stoicism generally, even citing the words of Tad Brennan’s analysis of his earlier work on Stoicism: “impressive 
but, I believe, wholly misguided” (Idem, Cosmology, 249 note 10). In the same note, Engberg-Pedersen claims that 
“the doyen of modern Stoic studies”, A. A. Long, is in far closer agreement with my understanding”, citing A. A. 
Long, Stoic Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177–78, but Long’s comments are not as 
positive as Engberg-Pedersen’s assessment of them might imply. In fact, elsewhere in the same compendium of 
Long’s writings, he accuses Engberg-Pedersen of paying “insufficient regard to the physical and theological 
underpinning of Stoic ethics.” (Idem, Studies, 155, and see 154–55 generally). Other scholars of Stoicism have been 
trenchant in their criticism of Engberg-Pedersen’s methodology, assumptions and reliance on Cicero, e.g. Teun 
Tieleman, review of Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social 
Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy, Mnemosyne 48 (1995): 226–32; cf. also the critique in Wright, Faithfulness, 
1392–1406. 
 197 As Witherington III, Conflict, 308 puts it, “the resurrection body will be animated and empowered by 
the Spirit, just as the present physical body (the sōma psychikon) is animated and empowered by a physical life 
principle or force”.  
 198 Fee, 1 Corinthians, 869.  
 199 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1275.  
 200 Idem, 1 Corinthians, 1277; see more fully the discussion of 1276–1281. 
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to his argument. The word σῶμα is used nine times between 15:35–44, but in any case, 
references to resurrection, which are repeated throughout the chapter, would have been 
understood throughout the ancient world as involving a return of a physical body, as has been 
comprehensively demonstrated by N. T. Wright.201 Paul embraces and argues passionately for a 
bodily understanding of life beyond death at the final resurrection. In Paul’s articulation of the 
need for the bonded holiness and the purity of believers in 1 Cor 7 (in addition to the passages I 
explored earlier in 1 Cor 5–6), his challenge to those who would participate in some kind of 
temple/idol related activities in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 and his positive emphasis on the physical body in 
1 Cor 11, 12 and 15, Paul’s message would have challenged those from a background influenced 
by philosophy. Instead of the easy acceptance of temples and gods in that worldview, Paul 
demonstrates the threat to the very existence of Christ-centered life that they pose. Instead of the 
indifferent or even dismissive attitude to the body held within philosophy, Paul positively 
celebrates it and uses it as a central metaphor for their present existence (as the body of Christ) as 
well as the hope of their future existence (a body patterned on the resurrection body of Christ).202   
 
4.5 Comparing the Theologies of 1 Corinthians with Hellenistic Philosophy 
 In the last two chapters I have considered how the philosophers’ understanding of the 
nature of divinity, the nature of humanity and how they should live out their philosophy in 
practice. In the following section I aim to offer the briefest of sketches of what Paul has to say on 
                                                
 201 Wright, Resurrection, especially 32–84 on the contrast with paganism.  
 202 Albert V. Garcilazo, The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics (Studies in Biblical Literature 106; New 
York: Peter Lang, 2007), passim argues that the denial of the resurrection of the dead stems from the influence of 
Roman Stoicism on the Corinthians. In my view, Garcilazo’s case is weakened by his over-reliance on a small 
number of texts from Seneca.   
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these topics in First Corinthians so that I can compare them with the philosophical positions 
identified previously.203 
  
4.5.1 Paul’s Understanding of God in 1 Corinthians 
 God has called Paul an apostle in line with his will (1:1) and he has called the Corinthians 
into the closest possible participation (κοινωνία) with Jesus Christ (1:9). Paul’s reference to 
those who call upon the name of the Lord evokes allusions to OT examples of this phrase (1:2; 
cf. Ps 99:6; Joel 3:5 LXX). Yet in Paul’s case, the κύριος is the Lord Jesus Christ, bringing Jesus 
into the closest possible connection, or even identity, with God. This “name” of Jesus, 
identifying him with the one called upon in the NT, appears again in 1:10. God is the father to 
the Corinthians (1:3), and again the fact that he is invoked here in tandem with Jesus suggests 
their essential unity. God is also described specifically as the father of Jesus (1:9). Where the OT 
might have spoken of the day of the Lord, referring to Yahweh (e.g. Joel 2:31; Isa 2:12; 13:6, 9; 
Amos 5:18; Zeph 1:17–18) and of God’s appearing (cf. Mal 3:2), Paul pairs these two events by 
making Jesus the subject (1:7–8). God gives grace (χάρις in 1:3–4) so that the Corinthians lack 
no gift (χάρισμα in 1:7; the verb χαρίζομαι in 2:12); enriching all in speech and knowledge (1:5). 
He is faithful (1:9) and will sustain/establish (βεβαιόω) those who belong to Christ until his 
                                                
 203 My aim here is the limited one of simply noting what Paul has to say in one letter. For attempts to 
address Paul’s theology of God, his understanding of humanity (and its predicament), and for Pauline ethics, some 
modern significant works would include especially James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998); Ben Witherington III, Paul’s Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and 
Triumph (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994); Thomas R. Schreiner, Paul, Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ: 
A Pauline Theology (Downer’s Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2006), and, somewhat differently, Wright, Faithfulness. 
For a celebrated and more limited attempt to compare the theology of God, humanity and human relations in Paul 
with that of one important Stoic philosopher, Seneca (who was his near contemporary), see J. N. Sevenster, Paul 
and Seneca (NovTSup 4; Leiden: Brill, 1961), and for a succinct comparison of the writings and worldview of Paul 
and Seneca, see J. B. Lightfoot’s essay “St Paul and Seneca” in J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the 
Philippians (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1913), 270–333.    
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return (1:8). God’s wisdom and power is greater than all (1:21, 25; 2:5, 7; 3:18–20) and he 
manifested it in Christ (1:24; 2:7–8), by choosing those despised by others (1:26–28; 2:6–8) to 
know wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption from him through Christ (1:30; 2:9–
16) and the message of his cross (1:18, 23; 2:2) so that people might only give credit to God 
(1:29, 31; 2:5). God reveals himself through his Spirit but only to the spiritual person (2:10–16).  
God gives the growth in spiritual work; though he has servants who work with him (3:6–
9), all the credit belongs to him (3:7) and Corinthian believers belong to him uniquely, described 
as God’s field, God’s building (3:9), God’s temple (3:16). The foundation of God’s work is Jesus 
Christ (3:11; reminiscent of earlier references that unite the two) and God is a God of judgment 
(implied by 3:13–15, 17 and stated in 4:4–5). All things belong to God and again the unique 
place of Christ is stressed (3:22–23). The Lord is the revealer of hearts who will bring everything 
into the light when he comes (4:5). Everything comes from God (4:7). God’s reign comes with 
power (4:20) and he will be the judge, especially of those outside the church (5:13). God does 
not give his kingdom to the unrighteous but he has justified, washed and sanctified the 
Corinthians (6:9–11). The body belongs to the Lord, who does not intend it for πορνεία; he will 
raise up the Corinthians bodily by his power (6:13–14; cf. 6:19),204 and he is to be glorified in the 
body (6:20).  
It is God who gives gifts to individuals (χάρισμα in 7:7; cf. 1:7). God calls his people to 
peace (7:15) and assigns different circumstances to different people (7:17). God has bought his 
people with a price (7:22; cf. 6:20) and calls his people to be both freed persons in the Lord and 
slaves of Christ (7:22–23). Anyone who loves God is known by him (8:3). There is only one God 
and all other seeming-gods are not real (8:4–6). All things exist from God and for him, and 
                                                
 204 I have already noted and argued for the view that the statement “God will destroy” the stomach/body 
(6:13b) was made by the Corinthians, not Paul. 
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through the agency of Jesus Christ (8:6), who, yet again is spoken of in intimate connection with 
God. Food itself and the eating of it is indifferent to God (8:8). Christ died for the “weak” 
believer as well as for the “strong” (8:11). Christ is intimately connected with his people, such 
that to sin against one of them is to sin against him (8:12). In fact, in Paul’s retelling of the 
wilderness wanderings of the Israelites, Christ is viewed as the rock that sustained them (10:4) 
and the one who must not be put to the test (10:9);205 both characteristics that would ordinarily 
be used of God. God is both the one who judges (by overthrowing those who engaged  in both 
idolatry and in immorality; πορνεύω, in 10:5–8), and the one who is faithful to empower the 
believer to resist temptation (10:12–13). Everything belongs to God (10:26; 11:12b; cf. 3:22–23; 
4:7; 8:6, noted earlier).  
The head of man is Christ and the head of Christ is God, underlining Christ’s intimate 
connection with God again, his supremacy over people and yet again placing God above Christ 
in the order of things (11:3; cf. 1:30; 3:22–23; 6:14; 8:6). It is possible to be liable for the body 
and blood of the Lord by taking the bread or cup of the Lord’s supper in an unworthy manner 
(11:27; cf. 10:21–22). Paul’s dire warning in 11:29–32 reminds again of the judgment of the 
Lord, though here his purpose to discipline (παιδεύω) is stressed (cf. 5:5). In 1 Cor 12:4–6 
πνεῦμα, κύριος, and θεός are clearly placed in parallel when speaking of the different workings 
of the Spirit (12:7), and God is named as the source of these activities (12:6b). Just as the 
Corinthians are a temple of the Holy Spirit (3:16; 6:19), so too they are a body (of Christ) 
immersed in the Spirit (12:12–13, 27). God orders the body the way that it is and does not 
                                                
 205 The textual tradition is split between manuscripts that have Χριστόν and others that have κύριον or 
θεόν. However Χριστόν appears to be the reading that best explains the others as it is, “attested by the oldest Greek 
manuscript (p46) as well as by a wide diversity of early patristic and versional witnesses” and plausible reasons can 
be given for changing Χριστόν to one of the other readings (Metzger, Textual Commentary, 494; cf. also Comfort, 
Commentary, 506–07)  
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consider one part inferior to the others (12:18, 22, 24). Although 1 Cor 13 does not mention God, 
if love alone never comes to an end and is the greatest quality that there is (13:8, 13), Paul must 
be implying that God is a God of love.  
In 1 Cor 14, we learn that God can be spoken to (14:2), that God is not a God of disorder 
(ἀκαταστασία) but of peace (14:33), and that he can cause the secrets of unbelievers’ hearts to be 
exposed so that they confess that, “God is really among you.” (14:25, which is obviously seen by 
Paul as an accurate statement). This is another indicator that the Corinthian believers have 
become the place where God’s presence can be found.206 In 1 Cor 15 Paul spells out a number of 
important points about God that have already been stated or implied earlier in the epistle. Christ 
died for their sins (15:3; implied by 1:13b, 17–18, 23, 30; 2:2, 8; 5:7b; 8:11; 10:16; 11:23–25), 
he was raised (15:4, presumably a “divine passive”, meaning “raised by God” as in 15:15b, cf. 
6:14). Life comes through Christ (15:22), and at his coming all shall be made alive who belong 
to him (15:23), yet in another instance of his subordination to “God the Father” (15:24), at the 
end of Christ’s reign, he will destroy all other powers and deliver the kingdom to God at the end 
(15:24–28) so that God “may be all in all” (cf. 3:23; 11:2). To each of his creatures, God gives 
the body as he has chosen (15:38) and to his people he gives the victory through their Lord Jesus 
Christ (15:57) 
    
4.5.2 Paul’s Understanding of Humanity in 1 Corinthians 
 Here we must distinguish between Paul’s view of humanity in general and his view of the 
church in particular. As God’s temple in Corinth, the Corinthians have many God-given 
privileges in Christ (regardless of the behavior of some of them, for which they are chastised 
                                                
 206 I. H. Marshall, “Church and Temple in the New Testament,” TynBul 40 (1989): 203–22 at 213.  
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frequently in the epistle). They are set apart in Christ (1:2) and called saints (1:2, 24, 26). They 
are the ones enriched in him in all speech and knowledge (1:5) and they are not lacking any gift 
as they await the revealing of Christ (1:7), having been called into the fellowship (κοινωνία) of 
his son, who is their Lord Jesus Christ (1:9). They are in (ἐν) Christ Jesus, who has become for 
them their wisdom from God, righteousness, sanctification and redemption (1:30). They have 
been enabled to understand the things of God because the Spirit interprets those things for them 
(2:6–16). Jesus Christ is the foundation of their identity (3:11); they are God’s field, building 
(3:9 and temple (3:16–17). All things belong to them and they belong to Christ (3:21–22). 
People’s hearts have hidden motivations that God will judge on the final day (4:4–5). The body 
is meant for the Lord (6:13) and the bodies of the Corinthians are members of Christ (6:15) and 
will be raised up at the last day (6:14). The Corinthians belong to God and their bodies are a 
temple of the Holy Spirit (6:19–20). They have been bought (a redemption image) and belong to 
the Lord as a slave, while also being a “freedman” of his (6:19b–20; 7:22–23). The body of a 
husband belongs to his wife and vice versa (7:4); they are bound to one another (7:39), unless a 
believing partner chooses to separate (7:15) but otherwise the unbelieving members of the family 
are sanctified by the believing spouse (7:14). By contrast, to unite with a prostitute is to become 
one body with her (6:15–16). All things are created by God (8:4; 10:26) and exist from and for 
him and through Jesus Christ (8:6). A person’s conscience can be defiled (8:7, 12) and they 
themselves can be destroyed by idolatrous actions (8:10–11). Christ is the head of every man and 
the head of woman is man (11:3). Man (as opposed to woman here) is the image and glory of 
God (11:7). Man and woman are not independent of one another in the Lord (11:11). Overall 
Paul teaches that men and women have their place in the divine hierarchy and in relationship to 
one another (11:2–16). A person is nothing without love (1 Cor 13). The obverse of 15:18 (its 
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implication) is that without Christ, people perish (cf. also 15:19: we are most to be pitied if only 
hope in Christ for this life). 
 In one of the richest sections of the letter for our understanding of humanity, we learn 
that death came through a man; Adam (15:21) and “in Adam”, that is, by virtue of their share in 
his humanity (the man from the dust of earth: 15:47) and the consequences of his actions, all die 
(15:21–22a). Yet, death and all powers will finally be destroyed (15:20–24) and those who are in 
Christ will be raised (15:22, 42–55). 
 Paul paints a very different picture of humanity outside of Christ. They are the ones 
perishing (τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις in 1:18), regardless of whether they are considered to be the wise, 
the discerning, the scribe or the scholar by the age in which they live (1:19–20). The human 
standards of the world (κατὰ σάρκα in 1:26) are disregarded by God, and its wisdom is coming 
to nothing (2:6). Instead, God brings to shame the wisdom and strength of the world, revealing 
its lack of value (1:26–28). Those of the world are unable to understand the things of God 
because they lack the Spirit (2:6–16). First Corinthians 5:9–10 implies that there are at least 
some (perhaps many) immoral people in world and those who are unrighteous will not inherit the 
kingdom of God (6:9–10). Paul implies that all need to be saved in 1 Cor 9:19–23. Some have no 
knowledge of God (15:34) and flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (15:50). 
 
4.5.3 Living as the Temple in 1 Corinthians 
 So much of 1 Corinthians deals with practical instruction so I shall attempt to deal simply 
with the most pertinent instructions applicable beyond their immediate context, in summary 
form. The Corinthians are urged to act as a united body (1:10; cf. 1 Cor 12) and, by implication, 
to live according to the wisdom of God, the Spirit of God and the word of the cross (1:18–2:16). 
   226
The image of the Corinthians as God’s building in 3:9 imagines each person still building upon 
the foundation of Christ. Each of them is urged to take care when building upon this foundation 
(3:10–15), to be mindful of what they are (God’s building, field, temple), that they may not 
destroy the temple (3:17) and grow into spiritual maturity (the obverse of 3:1–3). The 
Corinthians should not make judgments before the coming of the Lord (4:5; 11:32) but imitate 
Paul (4:16, in the light of Paul’s example in 4:1–4, 10–13, 17; cf. 11:1). They should mourn over 
πορνεία (5:2; cf. the warnings over arrogance and boasting in 1:29; 3:21; 4:8–10, 18–19; 5:2). 
They are not to associate with the immoral who claim to be one of them (5:4–5), so that they are 
not polluted by them (5:6–8) but equally they are not to judge those outside the church and be 
willing to associate with them (5:9–13). They will judge the world (6:2) and so matters for 
judgment within the church should be settled there, rather than with judges outside the church 
(6:1–8). They are called to identify as righteous, and (implicitly) not to indulge in the practices 
enumerated in 6:9–10. They are to flee immorality (6:18) and recognize that their body belongs 
to God as his temple; thus they should glorify him there (6:13, 19–20).  
Husbands and wives should honor one another in marriage (7:3–5) and both married and 
unmarried should remain in the state to which they have been assigned, if at all possible (7:8–14, 
17–40). Ultimately they should keep the commandments of God (7:19). Love for God (8:3) and 
for the brother in Christ (implied by 8:7–13) ought to be the hallmark of the body. This love 
should build others up first and foremost (8:1; 10:23). This ought to involve putting the 
consciences of others first and doing nothing to put harm in anyone’s way rather than the 
Corinthians claiming their ‘right/authority’ to do something. First Corinthians 9 holds up the 
example of Paul as an apostle who chose not make use of his rights for the sake of others and 
their salvation (cf. also 10:32–33). Therefore they should not seek their own good but the good 
   227
of others and their consciences (10:23–30). The Corinthians should run to obtain the prize of 
their calling by living a life of self-discipline characterized by the athlete (9:24–27). They should 
be careful not to participate in idolatry (10:7–22; cf. implied in 12:3) and immorality (8:7) and in 
this, do everything to the glory of God (10:31).  
While we have already seen warnings against judging others, they are to make judgments 
for themselves, especially concerning themselves and their behavior (e.g. 11:13, 31–32). First 
Corinthians 12:1–31 constitutes an implicit call to unity. They should value members of the body 
equally, and recognize that all comes from God (12:4–6, 18, 24, 28–30). They are to seek the 
greater gifts (12:31), especially to prophesy (14:1), which is needed by the church (14:6). Overall 
they must do everything for the building up of the church (14:3–5, 12, 17, 26). Everything should 
be done out of love (1 Cor 13; 14:1) and so they must be eager to excel in gifts that build up the 
church (14:12). Therefore, they must be mature, not infants in their thinking (14:20) and come to 
the assembly ready to share the gifts of God; especially the ones that communicate God’s 
revelation to the congregation (14:26).207 They should stand firm in the gospel by which they are 
saved and believe in the resurrection of Christ from the dead and the future resurrection (1 Cor 
15). Their hope in Christ must not be just for this life (15:19). They should come to themselves 
and reject wrong teaching about the resurrection (the implication of 15:34) but always be 
steadfast in the work of the Lord (15:58). In the final chapter of the letter, Paul exhorts them to 
                                                
 207 I leave aside the injunction of Paul towards women in 14:33b–36, partly because it is highly contested 
but also because I understand it to be highly specific to a particular situation, though authentically Pauline with e.g. 
Witherington III, Conflict, 287–88; Dunn, Paul, 591–92; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1146–62;  Collins, 1 Corinthians, 
516; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 666, 673; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 117–20; against e.g. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 
246; Lang, Korinther, 199; Hays, Corinthians, 246–47; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 1 Kor 
11,17-14,40 (EKKNT 7.3; Zürich: Benziger, 1999), 481–84; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 780–789; Horrell, Ethos, 184–95; 
Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, Keys to First Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 265–68, 282–84. 
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keep alert, stand firm in their faith, be courageous and strong (16:13) and to let all that they do be 
done in love (16:14; cf. 1 Cor 13). 
 
4.6 The contrast between Paul’s understanding and the Philosophers’ understanding 
4.6.1 Divinity 
 I have already noted some features that the Philosophers would share with Paul. The gods 
are merciful and forgiving (Seneca and Epictetus), pure and undefiled (Epictetus) and perfect in 
every way (Alcinous, Hierocles). God orders all things, governs the world with care and is 
referred to with names such as Father, King and Protector (Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, Plutarch, 
Alcinous and Maximus of Tyre). He is friends with people and reveals himself to them 
(especially those who study philosophy). He is benevolent and gentle. There are notable 
differences too. Many writers identified God with the universe (such as Chrysippus, Marcus 
Aurelius and Seneca) or identify the universe as divine or infused with divinity (e.g. Plutarch). 
Writers like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius make little distinction between God, Nature, Reason, 
Fate and Providence and use these nouns interchangeably. Nature is sometimes given the role 
that Paul would attribute to God, such as governing and sustaining the world (in the case of the 
early Stoics, Marcus Aurelius and Cicero). At the same time, Gods can seem dependent on a pre-
existent law (Cicero and Dio), that governs the universe (Cicero). Plutarch speaks of God 
binding together the substance of the world and Alcinous holds that God endowed the pre-
existent world with wisdom or intellect and bought order to the world soul. Marcus says that 
Intelligence or Universe or Reason is the source of all that is. For Maximus of Tyre, as for other 
writers, daemons are the bridge between God and people, since the gods dwell in the heavens 
and not upon the earth, and people are able to become daemons after death.  
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 Paul’s doctrine of God is quite unlike the philosophers’ at important points. For instance, 
1 Cor 8:4–6 stands in contrast to the philosophers’ views of many gods. Paul says that all things 
(πάντα) exist from God and for him, through the agency of Jesus, but he does not say that all 
things exist in him (pantheism). Although philosophical writers will refer to πνεῦμα as what 
infuses the whole universe,208 in 1 Corinthians it is those who belong exclusively to Christ who 
are the temple of the Holy Spirit in whom the Spirit dwells in a unique way and to whom the 
Spirit reveals the things of God.209 The role of Christ in close proximity and equality to God 
(though subordinated to him in the ultimate eschatological plan) is unequalled in what I found 
philosophy and there are no obvious analogues in the references I have surveyed.210 The 
Corinthians have a distinct identity in relation to God that is different to others in the world by 
means of their relationship to Christ, described, among other images, as a building laid on his 
foundation or as his body. They belong to him in a way that others outside the church do not. 
 
                                                
 208 See e.g. the sources cited in Lee, Stoics, 49–54.  
 209 Stanley K. Stowers, “Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosphy?,” in Paul Beyond the 
Judaism-Hellenism Divide (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 81–102 at 89–
102 identifies seven closely connected areas in which Pauline Christianity resembles a Hellenistic philosophy, 
including an exclusive adherence to a teacher (such as Epicurus) or a set of doctrines/way of life (like Stoicism), that 
can almost be classed as a conversion and exclusive adherence to one community. Abraham J. Malherbe, 
“Conversion to Paul’s Gospel,” in The Early Church in Its Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson (ed. 
Abraham J. Malherbe, Frederick W. Norris, and James W. Thompson; NovTSup; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 230–44 also 
compares some accounts of conversion to philosophy recorded in Lucian of Samosata, Dio Chrysostom and 
Musonius Rufus with Paul’s accounts of the conversion of Gentiles in his writings. However, my focus has been on 
ideas common to several traditions and I also note that, in practice, many followers of philosophy were eclectic (as 
Middle Platonism was itself), and not necessarily strictly attached to one philosophy (e.g. Cicero). Malherbe also 
notes that Paul’s account in 1 Thess 1:9–10 stresses turning from idols to serve one God, which required a change in 
understanding of the divine and service to God, whereas a conversion to philosophy retained a belief in multiple 
gods and rarely involved a call to moral transformation that was linked to religion (239–40). 
210 As I have already noted, some philosophers equate Fortune, Providence, Nature etc. with God but this is 
different from the personal relationship and equality that the person of Jesus Christ enjoys with God. Dr Fredrick J. 
Long has drawn my attention to Seneca, Clem. 1.5.1, that pictures the young ruler as the soul of the Roman state, 
which is his body. Since Roman emperors came to be seen as divine, it could be said that this is very similar to the 
divine filling the world (or at least the Roman world). Dr Long has also pointed out to me that the emperor most 
represents/epitomizes the gods on earth, and so is something like a high priest figure in relation to the Roman 
empire. Since my focus has been on the various philosophies such as Stoicism and Middle Platonism, I am unable to 
explore this further here. 
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4.6.2 Humanity 
 Seneca describes humanity on the one hand as good but on the other he avers that all 
have sinned. The soul is pre-existent and grants humans a knowledge of divinity not possessed 
by the rest of creation (Seneca and Alcinous). Although all have immortal souls, only good 
(Cicero and Apollonius) or wise (Seneca) men are divine, or at least, like gods (Seneca). All 
humanity are God’s children (Epictetus). Human beings are united to the divine by indwelling 
reason (Epictetus, Marcus and Maximus) that awakens the self-knowledge of the soul so that it 
can accurately perceive reality (Maximus) by making correct use of sense impressions (Epictetus 
and Marcus). Philosophers speak of ruling reason that directs them (found in many writers such 
as Marcus, Alcinous, Maximus and Cicero). Humans have the ability to make right moral 
choices (Epictetus, Marcus and Cicero) although they need God’s help to overcome vice 
(Maximus). The soul is variously described as in exile or in prison while in the body but after 
death it is set free from its cage.211 Different philosophers speculate as to its ultimate destiny; 
some say that it is made divine by the Gods after death (Cicero; Apollonius); others that it is set 
free from the body to become a daemon (Plutarch, Maximus); or to travel to the imperishable 
realm where God is king (Plutarch; Maximus). Some refer to rewards and punishments meted 
out to the soul after death (Plutarch; Maximus) and Neopythagoreanism taught the 
transmigration of souls (Apollonius).212 
 By contrast with the philosophers, Paul understands there to be two groups of humanity; 
those who are in Christ and those who are not. Those who are outside do not possess divinity or a 
                                                
 211 See also the discussion and references cited by David E. Aune, “Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic 
Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context (ed. Troels 
Engberg-Pedersen; SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 291–312 at 294–97, 305–09.  
 212 See recently Brookins, Wisdom, 185–88, 192–96 who compares the body-soul dualism of the Stoics 
with Paul’s teaching here on the resurrection.  
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knowledge of the divine that is salvific. The wisdom of the age is to be rejected rather than 
studied and lived out (as it is in the philosophers). Only those who are part of the temple of the 
Holy Spirit receive this revelation and knowledge. It is the Spirit, not reason, or the person’s 
daemon, that unites them to God and the foundation of their lives is Jesus Christ, not reason.213 
Paul’s focus is very much on the sanctified community, not on the individual and rather than 
seeking release from the body, that is despised, Christian life is embodied at its very heart and 
this is confirmed by humanity’s final destiny: the resurrection of the body. 
  
4.6.3 Living Out the Philosophy 
 The goal of Stoic thinkers is to live in accordance with nature (e.g. Zeno, Seneca, 
Epictetus; Marcus) while that of the Platonists is to know and imitate God (e.g. Plutarch, 
Maximus), and thus to please Him (Epictetus), though many Stoics also urge their hearers to 
imitate the example of the gods (Seneca, Epictetus and Alcinous). This means indifference to 
what nature is indifferent to, which includes the body (Marcus). So, people are urged to resist 
bodily inclinations (Marcus), have as little to do with the body as possible (Plutarch) and 
distance themselves from worldly concerns and sensations that would attach to them from the 
body (Alcinous, Seneca). A person who does these things will enjoy a speedy journey to the gods 
                                                
 213 In this Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 
35 is right to say that a commitment to philosophy for the Stoics meant a change in the individual’s perception of 
their identity, that now revolved around reason. Engberg-Pedersen sees an equivalent in Paul, in that, in the place of 
reason for the Stoic stands “God and Christ” (35) for the Christian. In this he is partly right, except that the Spirit 
takes the place of reason in communicating God’s presence to his people. Yet I would question whether this also 
transformed the Stoic’s self-awareness from “I” to “we” to the same degree as the Pauline communities, who Paul is 
teaching to see themselves corporately as the temple of God. I would not agree with Engberg-Pedersen’s claim that 
Paul looked to Stoic ethics for his model. I concur with Wright, Faithfulness, 1395–97 that Paul was certainly not 
“converted” from a self-centered individualistic lifestyle to one opened up to others (contra Engberg-Pedersen), in 
that “His whole pre-conversion identity was . . . corporate” (1396) and that by comparison the Stoics were nothing 
like as community orientated as the Pauline churches, a fact that even Engberg-Pedersen himself admits (Idem, 
Faithfulness, 1396–97, citing Engberg-Pedersen, Stoics, 78).  
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(Seneca). The goal of life should be virtue (Zeno and Seneca), which is the only thing of value. 
Devotion to one’s own intelligence/genius leads to a life of virtue (Marcus and Apollonius) but a 
moral education is needed (Maximus), enabling a person to know right principles (Cicero). This 
will be attained through training in philosophy (Alcinous), that can fan into flame the spark in 
human nature (Maximus). It is assumed that all humanity possess this reason.214 The true 
philosopher should be ruled by Reason and God (Epictetus, Marcus and Dio) and devoted to the 
mind (Epictetus) and thus reject the passions (Plutarch). In order to do this they should honor the 
one within (Epictetus and Apollonius), keeping pure their inner daemon (Marcus, Apollonius), 
purifying their judgments and their outer life (Epictetus), that leads to virtue. The contemplation 
of God/things on high (Seneca and Alcinous) leads to freedom from disturbance (Seneca and 
Epictetus) and fear, and freedom from the wrong impulses (Marcus), making a person a friend of 
God (Epictetus and Marcus) so that they can achieve a kind of likeness to the divine (e.g. 
Alcinous) or contemplation of God (Maximus and Cicero). Those who seek to be loved by Gods 
are called sons of God and live self-controlled lives (Dio). The Stoic should will everything to be 
as it should (Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus). The true student of philosophy should not compare 
themselves with others but run for the goal while at the same time, seeking the common interest, 
through avoiding evil and dealing rightly with their neighbor (Marcus). Marcus sees each person 
as a limb of an organized body of rational things. 
 Paul, like the philosophers, urges a love for the neighbor, a rejection of evil speaking and 
thinking, self-control and virtue. However, Paul’s foundation is not Reason or the guidance of a 
daemon, but the empowering of the Holy Spirit, with Jesus Christ and the wisdom of his cross as 
the foundation. Although Marcus does once use the image of a body, the body consists of all 
                                                
 214 See further Lee, Stoics, 60–83. 
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rational things, whereas for Paul the body is limited to the Christian community, joined to Christ. 
Whereas both Stoics and Platonists treat the body with indifference or disdain and seek to 
distance themselves from it, Paul urges an active confrontation with sexual immorality and 
devotes much of his letter to matters involving the physical body, especially in sexual 
relationships (e.g. 1 Cor 5:1–13; 6:9–20; 7:1–40). He devotes his longest chapter to a celebration 
of the embodied life of the resurrection in stark contrast to the philosophers’ anticipation of a 
bodiless life. While philosophers seek contemplation of the gods, Paul urges to readers to shun 
idolatry (10:14).  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 I have observed a number of contrasts between the philosophers’ use of metaphorical 
temple language, and its implications for their worldview and practice, and the emphases found 
in First Corinthians. In philosophy, the pneuma is typically that which infuses the whole universe 
and within it, each individual, regardless of their beliefs. Reason is the divine guide that enables 
the life of virtue to be led and it dwells in each individual, although it needs to be cultivated. 
Wisdom is to be sought from philosophy wherever it is found. The body is spoken of either 
disparagingly or with indifference and the goal of each individual is to pay the body as little 
attention as possible in the present life and to escape it in the next. Within philosophy the 
existence of many gods is accepted and tolerated.  
The main features of Paul’s metaphorical temple references in First Corinthians also find 
corresponding emphasis in the letter as a whole and stand in contrast to my findings from 
Hellenistic philosophy. The temple is corporate, in contrast to the largely individual referents for 
metaphorical temple language in the philosophers. It is holy and distinct from the world around 
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it. The temple is sacred and must not be destroyed or defiled. It is constituted by the Spirit, and 
the Spirit that dwells within it is the Holy Spirit. The Spirit dwells only in those who are this 
temple, whose foundation is Jesus Christ. The Spirit empowers the life that glorifies God in the 
body. The wisdom and spirit of the world are foolishness; the true wisdom is found in Christ and 
his cross. God is distinct from his body and there are clear roles and distinct relationships 
between God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. There is only one God; other so-called gods are 
not real and to worship them is to fall into idolatry and be led astray by (evil) demons. The 
physical body of all those who constitute the believers at Corinth is a temple. In the letter as a 
whole I also observed a strong emphasis on the exclusive, bounded nature of the community. 
Paul frequently stresses the holiness of the body and the importance of keeping it free from 
defilement, whether that be from immorality or idolatry. Paul uses body language in a number of 
places, both to describe the nature of the community as it exists now and to contend for the 
physical nature of believers’ existence beyond death. 
    235
Chapter Five: Metaphorical Temple Language in 2 Corinthians 
5.1 Introduction 
 To a greater extent than any other Pauline epistle, Second Corinthians has often been 
treated as a collection of letters rather than a single letter.1 Although there is no consensus on the 
topic, perhaps the most commonly recognized division is between 2 Cor 1–9 and 2 Cor 10–13. 
The largest single grouping of modern commentators recognize the chapters as having been 
written in that sequence. Some propose that 2 Cor 10–13 was a separate letter, sent by Paul 
shortly after the letter now recognized as 2 Cor 1–9.2 A smaller but growing group of scholars 
detect a rhetorical and thematic unity to the whole epistle3 (with some positing a small pause 
between Paul’s writing of 2 Cor 1–9 and 2 Cor 10–13).4 Since the majority of scholars treat 2 
Cor 2:14–7:4 as a discrete unit,5 and because of constraints of space, unlike the previous chapter, 
I shall largely confine my remarks to the relationship of 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 to its context in 2 Cor 
                                                
 1 For comprehensive summaries of the scholarly debate and the various advocates of partition theories, see 
e.g. Margaret E. Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the 
Corinthians (ICC; London: T&T Clark, 1994), 3–49; Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 8–51. 
 2 E.g. Victor Paul Furnish, II Corinthians. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 32a; 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 35–41, following the earlier commentaries of Windisch, Bruce and 
Barrett. 
 3 Examples include: James L. Price, “Aspects of Paul’s Theology and Their Bearing on Literary Problems 
of Second Corinthians,” in Studies in the History and Text of the New Testament in honor of Kenneth Willis Clark, 
Ph.D. (ed. Boyd L. Daniels and M. Jack Suggs; SD 29; Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1967), 95–106; 
Frances Young and David F. Ford, Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 27–36; 
Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 328–39; Paul Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 17–25; Jan Lambrecht, Second Corinthians (SP 8; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 
1999), 7–9; David R. Hall, The Unity of the Corinthian Correspondence (JSNTSup 251; London: T&T Clark, 
2004), 86–112; Fredrick J. Long, Ancient Rhetoric and Paul’s Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians 
(SNTSMS 131; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–14; Craig S. Keener, 1–2 Corinthians (NCBC; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 146–51; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 8–51; Mark A. Seifrid, The Second 
Letter to the Corinthians (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), xxix–xxxi; George H. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians 
(BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 23–32. 
 4 E.g. Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians (WBC 40; 2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 68–69.  
 5 E.g. Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, xiii; Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 51; Lambrecht, 2 Corinthians, v; J. D. H. 
Amador, “Revisiting 2 Corinthians: Rhetoric and the Case for Unity,” NTS 46.1 (2000): 92–111 at 110; Harris, 2 
Corinthians, x; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 50, and many specialist studies. 
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2:14–7:14 rather than treating the whole canonical epistle. Although I incline to the view that 
Second Corinthians is a single letter, my focus on 2 Cor 2:14–7:4 means that a different 
hypothesis would have little impact on my conclusions. As with the previous chapter, I shall 
examine Paul’s use of temple language in the epistle and then compare it to my earlier findings 
from Hellenistic philosophy. I shall also seek to demonstrate the way that some of the themes 
present in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 are emphasized elsewhere in the Corinthian correspondence and 
consider how they would have spoken to a reader influenced by philosophy. Finally, I shall also 
briefly address Paul’s theology of God, humanity and Christian living in this section, as it relates 
to the themes I have discussed.  
  
5.1.1 The Contested Place of 2 Corinthians 6:14–7:1 
 The place of 2 Corinthians 6:14 –7:1 in 2 Corinthians has been such a battleground for 
interpreters that its relation to Paul and the epistle must be addressed before I can continue. 
Whilst there is no evidence that the text was ever omitted from manuscripts of 2 Corinthians nor 
placed anywhere other than its current position,6 the interpretation of 6:14–7:1 has been 
dominated by the question of its origins and its placement within the epistle.  It is frequently 
argued that the pericope is an interpolation and therefore Paul is not its author.7 The effect of this 
                                                
 6 See Harris, 2 Corinthians, 22–25; and noted earlier by Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians (ICC; 2d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914), 205; 
Philip E. Hughes, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 244. 
 7 In fact, so confident of this was Bultmann, that his commentary contains the sub-heading “[6:14–7:1 is an 
interpolation]” and the passage is not discussed. Later he classes the passage as “An insertion” and six sentences are 
devoted to speculation concerning its origins, but nothing on exegesis; see Rudolf Bultmann, The Second Letter to 
the Corinthians (trans. Roy A. Harrisville; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1985), 175, 180. Important works that 
have argued for this position from a variety of standpoints include, J. A. Fitzmyer, “Qumran and the Interpolated 
Paragraph in 2 Cor 6,14 – 7,1,” CBQ 23 (1961): 271–80; Joachim Gnilka, “2 Cor 6:14–7:1 in the Light of Qumran 
Texts and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” in Paul and Qumran: Studies in New Testament Exegesis (ed. 
Jerome Murphy-O’Connor; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968), 48–68; H. D. Betz, “2 Cor 6:16 – 7:1: An Anti-
Pauline Fragment?,” JBL 92 (1973): 88–108; N. A. Dahl, “A Fragment and Its Context: 2 Corinthians 6:14 – 7:1,” in 
Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission (ed. N. A. Dahl; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 62–69; P. 
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discussion has been a tendency to neglect the place and theology of the passage within the 
Corinthian correspondence. It may say something about the lack of attention that the passage has 
received “in its own right” that while numerous articles have been devoted to the passage, most 
of them focus on the controversy over its origins and context. Few full length monographs have 
been published that deal with the passage’s subject matter in the context of Second Corinthians. 
It may also say something about the comparative neglect of the passage that the bibliography of 
William J Webb’s 1993 book length study of 2 Cor 6:14–7:1, Returning Home, cites no other 
monographs prior to his that concentrate on the pericope.8 In the intervening years, there has 
been only one other published monograph (that of J. Ayodeji Adewuya, published in 2003) and 
none since.9  
 Since the rise of the historical-critical method in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, scholars began to contend for the fragmentary nature of Second Corinthians. In time 
this led to the proposal that our passage is, at best, dislocated from its original position elsewhere 
within either First or Second Corinthians, or at worst, a non-Pauline interpolation.10 The 
discoveries at Qumran that were made available during the 1950s led scholars such as Joseph 
Fitzmyer and Joachim Gnilka to note numerous parallels between the pericope and the Qumran 
                                                                                                                                                       
B. Duff, “The Mind of the Redactor: 2 Cor. 6:14 – 7:1 in Its Secondary Context,” NovT 35 (1993): 160–80; Paul 
Brooks Duff, “2 Corinthians 1–7: Sidestepping the Division Hypothesis Dilemma,” BTB 24 (1994): 16–26 at 16–21; 
W. O. Walker Jr, “The Burden of Proof in Identifying Interpolations in the Pauline Letters,” NTS 33 (1987): 610–18; 
Idem, “2 Cor 6.14–7.1 and the Chiastic Structure of 6.11–13; 7.2–3,” NTS 48.1 (2002): 142–144; C. Heil, “Die 
Sprache Der Absonderung in 2 Kor 6,17 Und Bei Paulus,” in The Corinthian Correspondence (ed. R. Bieringer; 
BETL; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 717–29 and Stephen J. Hultgren, “2 Cor 6.14–7.1 and Rev 21.3–8: 
Evidence for the Ephesian Redaction of 2 Corinthians,” NTS 49.1 (2003): 39–56, as well as Friedrich Lang, Die 
Briefe an die Korinther (NTD 7G; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 310–11; Hans-Josef Klauck, 2. 
Korintherbrief (NEchtB 8; Echter: Würzburg, 1986); Outi Leppä, “Believers and Unbelievers in 2 Corinthians 6:14–
15,” in Lux Humana, Lux Aeterna: Essays on Biblical and Related Themes in Honour of Lars Aejmelaeus (ed. Antti 
Mustakallio; Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 2005), 374–90. 
 8 William J. Webb, Returning Home: New Covenant and Second Exodus as the Context for 2 Corinthians 
6:14–7:1 (JSNTSup 85; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993). 
 9 J. Ayodeji Adewuya, Holiness and Community in 2 Cor 6:14-7:1: Paul’s View of Communal Holiness in 
the Corinthian Correspondence (Studies in Biblical Literature 40; New York: Peter Lang, 2001).  
 10 See the helpful survey of Webb, Returning, 18–21.   
    238
literature, leading to suggestions of some kind of influence.11 Between the late 1960s to the early 
1980s Margaret Thrall, Gordon Fee and Jan Lambrecht each offered a different theory arguing 
for the passage’s integration within 2 Corinthians.12 Webb claims that the decade prior to the 
publication of his own research saw a consensual mediating position emerge from the leading 
commentators of that period, such as Victor Furnish and Ralph Martin. They posit that Paul has 
taken over a fragment, which has been influenced in some way by Qumran thought.13 Webb 
                                                
 11 Idem, Returning, 21–22 and see Gnilka, “2 Cor 6,” 48–68 and Fitzmyer, “Paragraph,” 271–80. See also 
Bertil E. Gärtner, The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the New Testament: A Comparative Study in the 
Temple Symbolism of the Qumran Texts and the New Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 
49–55; Robert J. Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background Before Origen (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1978), 256–61; Hans-Josef Klauck, “Kultische Symbolsprache Bei Paulus,” 
in Freude am Gottesdienst. Aspekte ursprünglicher Liturgie (ed. J. Schreiner; Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches 
Bibelwerk, 1983), 107–18 at 109 for the same kind of argument. Other specialist studies have questioned the idea of 
direct dependence, e.g. R. J. McKelvey, The New Temple: The Church in the New Testament (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 96–97; E. Schüssler Fiorenza, “Cultic Language in Qumran and in the New Testament,” 
CBQ 38 (1976): 159–77 at 171–72; Michael Newton, The Concept of Purity at Qumran and in the Letters of Paul 
(SNTSMS 53; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 110–12 and more recently, Sang-Won (Aaron) Son, 
Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology: A Study of Selected Terms, Idioms, and Concepts in the Light of 
Paul’s Usage and Background (AnBib; Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2001), 142–44 (following Pierre 
Benoit, “Qumran and the New Testament,” in Paul and Qumran: Studies in New Testament Exegesis (ed. Jerome 
Murphy-O’Connor; Chicago: Priory Press, 1968), 1–30 at 2); Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, Keys to Second 
Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 121–39 (who notes that Paul’s 
language is simply at home within the thought-world of Hellenistic Judaism; e.g. parallels found with the Testament 
of the Twelve Patriarchs and Philo are even closer than those of Qumran); Peter J. Tomson, “Christ, Belial, and 
Women: 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 Compared With Ancient Judaism and With the Pauline Corpus,” in Second Corinthians in 
the Perspective of Late Second Temple Judaism (ed. Reimund Bieringer et al.; CRINT 14; Leiden: Brill, 2014), 79–
131; George J. Brooke, “2 Corinthians 6:14–7:1 Again: A Change in Perspective,” in The Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Pauline Literature (ed. Jean-Sébastien Rey; STDJ 102; Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1–16 at 12–16, notes parallels in the 
thought world and language of Jewish literature in the Graeco-Roman world generally. 
 12 Webb, Returning, 23–26; Margaret E. Thrall, “The Problem of 2 Cor vi. 14–vii. 1 in Some Recent 
Discussion,” NTS 24 (1977): 132–48; Gordon D. Fee, “II Corinthians VI.14 – VII.1 and Food Offered to Idols,” NTS 
23 (1977): 140–61; J Lambrecht, “The Fragment 2 Corinthians 6,14–7,1: A Plea for Its Authenticity,” in Studies On 
2 Corinthians (ed. Reimund Bieringer and Jan Lambrecht; BETL 112; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), 
531–549.  
 13 Furnish, II Corinthians, 375–83; Martin, 2 Corinthians, 46–47, 356–60, following, though modifying, D 
Rensberger, “2 Corinthians 6:14 – 7:1 – A Fresh Examination,” Studia Biblica et Theologica 8 (1978): 25–49. 
Georg Klinzing, Die Umdeutung des Kultus in der Qumrangemeinde und im Neuen Testament (SUNT 7; Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 179–82 earlier posited that Paul used a source, perhaps found in a Qumran 
baptismal exhortation; see, similarly, Klauck, 2. Korintherbrief, 60–61 and Christian Wolff, Der zweite Brief des 
Paulus an die Korinther (THKNT 8; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1989), 146–50. 
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himself sees the passage as Pauline, and explained by, “conceptual threads which tie together the 
Old Testament traditions”.14   
 Recent work by Murray J. Harris and Adewuya has helpfully summarized the various 
reasons the pericope is often considered un-Pauline (including the claim that 6:14–7:1 disrupts 
the flow of thought from 6:13 to 7:2 suggested by the verbal links either side of the passage, un-
Pauline language, parallels with Qumran literature, an un-Pauline exclusivism, and an abundance 
of hapax legomena) and the proposals made to answer these objections.15 Margaret Thrall 
identifies verbal and conceptual links between this pericope and other sections of the letter, 
notably 2 Cor 4:3–6; 5:11, 18–21.16 Gordon Fee argues that Paul’s “rhetorical flourishes” 
elsewhere (including in the Corinthian correspondence) tend to include a high proportion of 
hapax legomena (e.g. 1 Cor 4:7–13),17 and that on closer examination, most of them come from 
the OT citation, while other terms are related to verbs found elsewhere in the Pauline corpus or 
are paralleled by Paul’s preference for similar συγ(μ) compounds in his letters.18     
 Adewuya summarized the discussion up to 2003 in his “Current State of Research”.19 In 
addition to the summaries of Harris and Webb, he notes that the claim by Betz that this is an 
“Anti-Pauline fragment”,20 has been rebutted in recent studies and has not gained a following.21 
While there is nothing approaching a consensus, many recent studies and the most significant of 
                                                
 14 Webb, Returning, 28 and see 26–28 generally. Webb also cites G. K. Beale, “The Old Testament 
Background of Reconciliation in 2 Corinthians 5–7 and Its Bearing on the Literary Problem of 2 Corinthians 6:14–
7.1,” NTS 35.4 (1989): 550–81, who came to a similar conclusion independently and using different methodology. 
 15 For a comprehensive survey, see Harris, 2 Corinthians, 15–21, and the summary in Adewuya, Holiness, 
16–17 and more generally, 13–43. 
 16 Thrall, “Problem,” 132–48 at 144–45. 
 17 Fee, “Food,” 140–61 at 144. 
 18 Idem, “Food,” 140–61 at 145–47. See the earlier comments of Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 204 on the 
abundance of uncommon vocabulary in three other Pauline epistles, although two of them are from the disputed 
Paulines (Ephesians and Colossians).  
 19 Adewuya, Holiness, the name of his second chapter, 13–43.  
 20 Betz, “Fragment,” 88–108 .  
 21 See Adewuya, Holiness, 17–18 for examples.  
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recent exegetical commentaries have broadly defended the placement of the pericope in its 
context in 2 Corinthians by Paul and in most cases, Pauline authorship.22 In particular, the 
resurgence of rhetorical-critical approaches has provided credible alternatives to interpolation 
theories to explain the place of 6:14–7:1 within the epistle.23 The usefulness of these recent 
studies is that, having made this claim, they are able to consider the reason for Paul’s 
                                                
 22 Idem, Holiness, 25–29 and similarly Harris, 2 Corinthians, 15, 21–25, as well as commentaries such as 
Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 25–36; Furnish, II Corinthians, 375–83; William L. Lane, “Covenant: The Key to Paul’s 
Conflict with Corinth,” TynBul 33 (1982): 3–29 at 22–25; Reimund Bieringer, “2 Korinther 6,14–7,1 Im Kontext 
Des 2. Korintherbriefes: Forschungsüberblick Und Versuch Eines Eigenen Zugangs,” in Studies On 2 Corinthians 
(ed. Reimund Bieringer and Jan Lambrecht; BETL 112; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), 551–70; Barnett, 2 
Corinthians, 15–24; Frank J. Matera, II Corinthians: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2003), 29–32; Seifrid, 2 Corinthians, 287–89; Martin, 2 Corinthians, 46–47, 355–60; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 26–27, 
346–47. Martin, 2 Corinthians, 46 rightly states the conundrum for the advocates of interpolation, “It is equally as 
difficult to understand why the compiler placed the text amidst an apparently irrelevant exhortation as it is to explain 
why Paul digressed on an ethical homily.” (see, similarly, Webb, Returning, 162–63). Now see also e.g. Beale, 
“Background,” 550–81  at 566–75; James M. Scott, Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical Investigation into the 
Background of υἱοθεσία in the the Pauline Corpus (WUNT 2/ 48; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1992), 215–20, and 
more fully Idem, Adoption, 73–99 at 88–96; David deSilva, “Recasting the Moment of Decision: 2 Corinthians 
6:14–7:1 in Its Literary Context,” AUSS 31 (1993): 3–16 (adapted in David Arthur deSilva, The Credentials of an 
Apostle: Paul’s Gospel in 2 Corinthians 1-7 (N. Richland Hills, Tex.: Bibal, 1998), 14–29); Amador, “Revisiting,” 
92–111; Albert L.A. Hogeterp, Paul and God’s Temple: A Historical Interpretation of Cultic Imagery in the 
Corinthian Correspondence (BITS 2; Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 365–73; Timothy Wardle, The Jerusalem Temple and 
Early Christian Identity (WUNT 2/ 291; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2010), 212; Nijay K. Gupta, Worship That 
Makes Sense to Paul: A New Approach to the Theology and Ethics of Paul’s Cultic Metaphors (BZNW 175; Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 2010), 96; David I. Starling, Not My People: Gentiles as Exiles in Pauline Hermeneutics (BZNW 184; 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), 61–101; Jeffrey W. Aernie, Is Paul Also Among the Prophets?: An Examination of the 
Relationship between Paul and the Old Testament Prophetic Tradition in 2 Corinthians (LNTS 467; London: T&T 
Clark, 2012), 221–22; David Starling, “The ἄπιστοι of 2 Cor 6:14: Beyond the Impasse,” NovT 55 (2013): 45–60 at 
45–50; Yulin Liu, Temple Purity in 1-2 Corinthians (WUNT 2/ 343; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2013), 196–98; 
Paul Han, Swimming in the Sea of Scripture: Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in 2 Corinthians 4:7-13:13 (LNTS 
519; London: T&T Clark, 2014), 107–110; and Emmanuel Nathan, “Fragmented Theology in 2 Corinthians: The 
Unsolved Puzzle of 6:14–7:1,” in Theologizing in the Corinthian Conflict: Studies in the Exegesis and Theology of 2 
Corinthians (ed. Reimund Bieringer et al.; BITS 16; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 211–228 who exhaustively tabulates all 
known scholars on this issue up to 1994 on 214–15, and provides a synopsis of each scholarly source from 1994 to 
2006 (216–22). In Second Corinthians in the Perspective of Late Second Temple Judaism (CRINT 14; ed. Reimund 
Bieringer et al.; Leiden: Brill, 2014), many, though not all of the articles, find the concept of one integrated letter the 
best working hypothesis for their respective studies. The earlier commentaries of Philip E. Hughes, C. K. Barrett and 
F. F. Bruce also argued for Pauline authorship and against the interpolation hypothesis. 
 23 A number of scholars speak of the paragraph as a digression (egressio), such as Thrall, “Problem,” 132–
48 at 144; Frederick W. Danker, II Corinthians (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989), 18; Witherington III, Conflict, 402–
06; Amador, “Revisiting,” 92–111 at 100–05; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys Second Corinthians, 116–20; others prefer 
to speak of a climactic argument in relation to a section beginning at 2:1 (e.g. Long, Ancient Rhetoric, 169–72). 
Rhetorical approaches are also highlighted in favor of the unity of the epistle by Young and Ford, Meaning, 36–44; 
Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 17–19; deSilva, Credentials, 8–14, 36–43, following on from David deSilva, “Meeting the 
Exigency of a Complex Rhetorical Situation: Paul’s Strategy in 2 Corinthians 1 through 7,” AUSS 34.1 (1996): 5–22 
(on the rhetorical unity of 2 Cor 1–7); James W. Thompson, “Paul’s Argument From Pathos in 2 Corinthians,” in 
Paul and Pathos (ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney; SBLSymS 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2001), 127–45. 
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exhortations and promises in their literary context. In an important article, Gordon Fee noted the 
points of contact between the present passage and 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 and proposed that here Paul is 
reinforcing his prohibition against participation in temple gatherings and idolatry in general.24 
David DeSilva’s exploration of the literary context of 2 Corinthians led him to a different 
conclusion, arguing that Paul is warning the Corinthians to disassociate from the false 
preachers/apostles of 2 Cor 2:17 and 5:12 (noting a parallel with Gal 1:6–9 and previous 
disassociation language in 1 Cor 5:1–13, meaning that 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 need not be a “non-
Pauline” oddity).25 Adewuya’s own thesis is that Paul’s argument seeks to emphasize communal 
holiness in the light of the Levitical “holiness code”, reflecting God’s own holiness, the 
relationship between God and his people (of which his relationship with Israel was supposed to 
be the paradigm) and the call to be distinct and separate, found elsewhere in the Corinthian 
correspondence (e.g. 1 Cor 3:16; 5:1–13; 6:1–20).26 
 
5.2  2 Corinthians 6:14–7:1 
5.2.1  2 Corinthians 6:14–7:1: Main Features 
 For the purposes of my topic I note the following features of 6:14–7:1 that might have 
struck an audience influenced by philosophy. The passage begins emphatically with a 
prohibition. A present tense imperative (γίνεσθε) carrying general application, but applicable 
specifically to the problem of idolatry (cf. 1 Cor 8:1–11:1), is combined with a participle in a 
                                                
 24 Fee, “Food,” 140–61 at 143–44, 148–61; Witherington III, Conflict, 402–06, agrees with Fee, speaking 
of the “entangling alliances”, including with unbelievers in pagan temples and sees 6:16 as a reference to “spiritual 
profligacy in the form of attendance at idol feasts in pagan temples” (406). Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 347 identifies 
unbelievers as unconverted Gentiles “in their characteristic cultic life that involved both idolatry and temple 
prostitution.” Hogeterp, Temple, 376–77 also comments, “we should rather understand 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 as serving a 
more comprehensive purpose of condemning all aspects in relationships with unbelievers which could cause an 
unbalanced situation by tending to the pagan, idolatrous side.” 
 25 deSilva, “Recasting,” 3–16.  
 26 See the “Summary and Conclusions” in Adewuya, Holiness, 193–200. 
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periphrastic construction.27 According to Fredrick J. Long, the use of γίνομαι rather than εἶμι 
makes the construction more marked and therefore more prominent.28 The use of the periphrastic 
participle (from ἑτεροζυγέω) draws attention to the verbal action.29 The command warns against 
being unevenly yoked or mismatched30 with ἀπίστοι. The question of how this is to be 
understood is answered, to a certain extent, by the conjunction γάρ, which provides the 
explanatory grounds for what precedes,31 with the questions that follow substantiating the 
implied grounds of the command (i.e. that being yoked, rightly understood, with the ἀπίστοι, is 
impossible for Paul's audience). The theme is developed in terms of a strong dualism; such that a 
partnership between the two groups is ruled out.32 Paul piles up terms for partnership in this 
section, using hapax legomena such as μετοχή (14a), συμφώνησις (15a) and συγκατάθεσις (16a) 
as well as κοινωνία (14c) and μερίς33 (15b). People are divided into two groups: unbelievers 
(presuming an implied group of believers),34 lawless(ness) and righteousness, darkness and light, 
Christ and Βελιάρ. Paul then returns to the opening theme with πιστός and ἄπιστος used 
                                                
 27 Fredrick J. Long, 2 Corinthians: A Handbook on the Greek Text (BHGNT; Waco, Tex.: Baylor 
University Press, 2015), 121. 
 28 Idem, 2 Corinthians, 121.  
 29 Idem, 2 Corinthians, 21, introducing this feature in relation to 2 Cor 1:9 and citing for support, Stanley E. 
Porter, Idioms of the Greek New Testament (2d ed.; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 46. 
 30 “ἑτεροζυγέω,” BDAG, 399. 
 31 Stephen Levinsohn explains that this feature, “constrains the reader to interpret the material it introduces 
as strengthening an assertion or assumption that has been presented in or implied by the immediate context” 
(Stephen H. Levinsohn, Discourse Features of New Testament Greek: A Coursebook on the Information Structure of 
New Testament Greek (2d ed., Dallas: SIL International, 2000) 69, cited in relation to 2 Cor 1:8 by Long, 2 
Corinthians, 18.   
 32 This is not as un-Pauline as is sometimes claimed, as C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Second Epistle 
to the Corinthians (BNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 197 exposes the claim by comparing this pericope to 
Rom 6:19, which contains the same contrast between ἀνομία and δικαιοσύνη as found in 2 Cor 6:14. Thrall, 2 
Corinthians 1-7, 474 notes the contrast between believers as υἱοὶ φωτός and σκότος in 1 Thess 5:5, to which we 
could also add passages such as Rom 13:12 and Eph 5:8, if Pauline; similarly see e.g. J. Ayodeji Adewuya, “The 
People of God in a Pluralistic Society: Holiness in 2 Corinthians,” in Holiness and Ecclesiology in the New 
Testament (ed. Kent E. Brower and Andy Johnson; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 201–18 at 210.  
 33 Although μερίς might appear to be an exception, the sense here is what one party shares with another, 
(see “μερίς,” BDAG, 632.2).  
 34 I shall return below to the question of the referent of ἄπιστος in 2 Cor 6:14–15. 
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substantively to speak of a believer and an unbeliever (15b), before concluding with the contrast 
between ναός and εἴδωλα (16α).  
 It is notable that unbelievers and believers (assuming that the group being addressed in 
6:14 are taken to be believers) appear twice; at the start of the series of rhetorical questions and 
before the concluding question. This suggests that Paul’s contrasts between images like light and 
darkness, or concepts like righteousness and lawlessness come down to a contrast between those 
who believe and those who do not believe. But who or what is the object of their faith? As Long 
points out, it is probably not accidental that Χριστός and Βελιάρ are placed at the center of the 
five rhetorical questions beginning with τίς.35 This observation would suggest that Christ is the 
one in whom the first group believe, distinguishing them from those who do not believe in him. 
Βελιάρ is clearly conceived as a being in direct opposition to Christ, just as Βελιάρ, or the variant 
Βελιάλ, appears as an adversary opposed to God in second temple Jewish literature, especially in 
the Dead Sea Scrolls.36 This would suggest that those characterized as aligned with Βελιάρ are 
                                                
 35 Long, 2 Corinthians, 126.  
 36 See the summaries in “Βελιάρ,” BDAG, 173; W. Foerster, “Βελιάρ,” TDNT 1:607; and commentaries 
including Hans Windisch, Der Zweite Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 215; Furnish, II 
Corinthians, 362, 373; Lang, Korinther, 309; Wolff, Korinther, 150; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 474; Barnett, 2 
Corinthians, 347–48; Erich Grässer, Der Zweite Brief an Die Korinther Kapitel 1,1–7,16 (Ökumenischer 
Taschenbuchkommentar zum Neuen Testament 8/1; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2002), 260; Harris, 2 
Corinthians, 503. More recently Fredrick J. Long, “Roman Imperial Rule Under the Authority of Jupiter-Zeus: 
Political-Religious Contexts and the Interpretation of ‘the Ruler of the Authority of the Air’ in Ephesians 2:2,” in 
The Language of the New Testament: Context, History, and Development (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. 
Pitts; LBS 6; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 113–54; Idem, 2 Corinthians, 122; Idem, “‘The God of This Age’ (2 Cor 4:4) and 
Paul’s Empire-Resisting Gospel,” in The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth (ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. 
Welborn; WGRWS; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, forthcoming), followed and expanded by Paavo Tucker, 
“Reconsidering Βελιάρ: 2 Corinthians 6:15 in Its Anti-Imperial Jewish Apocalyptic Context,” JSPL 4.2 (2014):  
169–85 understand Paul’s language for demonic beings here as “Jewish apocalyptic demonization of the Roman 
Empire and ruler cult” and Tucker has argued that Βελιάρ in 2 Cor 6:15 is “a reference to Nero as the representative 
of the power of Satan in opposition to Christ.” (Idem, “Reconsidering,” 169–85 at 171), noting also how Paul can 
speak of human representatives of Satan in 2 Cor 1:14–15; 12:7 (Idem, “Reconsidering,” 185 note 66). I would 
observe the close connection between 2 Cor 6:14–15 and T. Levi 19:1, that offers a choice between σκότος and φῶς, 
ἢ ἔργα Βελιάρ or ἢ νόμον κυρίου (cf. the reference to ἀνομία as the opposite of δικαιοσύνη in 2 Cor 6:14; cf. T. 
Naph. 2:6, that depicts the same contrast). T. Zeb. 9:8 provides a tantalizing glimpse of the redemption of humanity 
from the spirit of Beliar and the consequent appearance of God in human form in the temple. This would provide a 
neat backdrop for Paul’s words in 2 Cor 6:15–16 but the OTP translation signifies that ἐν σχήματι ἀνθρώπου, is a 
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more than simply “faithless”. The term ἄπιστος appears frequently with a substantive sense in 
the Corinthian correspondence (cf. 1 Cor 6:6; 7:12, 13, 14, 15; 10:27; 14:22, 23, 24; 2 Cor 4:4; 
6:14, 15) and clearly carries the meaning “unbeliever” or “unbelieving” in each of these 
instances. In its only other use in this letter, the ἄπιστοι are the ones whose eyes ὁ θεὸς τοῦ 
αἰῶνος τούτου has blinded so that they cannot see the gospel of the glory of Christ (2 Cor 4:4); 
in other words they are precisely those who do not believe in Christ; they are non-Christians or 
“pagans”.37 Therefore, the first thing that might strike our audience is that the ναός signifies 
those who believe in Christ. Those who do not believe are not the temple. Secondly, the ναός is 
at the heart of the passage and appears twice (16a and 16b). This ναός is specifically contrasted 
with εἴδωλα. Idolatry is therefore central to this passage (see further below).38  
 Therefore, to add to what has been said concerning the metaphorical temple language in 1 
Cor 3:16 and 6:19, this temple is contrasted with idolatry; and here the idols are plural but the 
temple is singular. Unlike 1 Cor 3:16 and 6:19 that use the second person plural, Paul’s address 
in 2 Cor 6:16 adopts the first person plural, according to the UBS5/NA28 text. Both of these 
claims need to be addressed in light of two significant variants that appear in the manuscripts of 
2 Cor 6:16. There is a variant that substitutes ναόι for ναός in only a handful of witnesses. As 
well as the weak external evidence, this variant does not agree with Paul’s singular use in First 
Corinthians,39 and is probably a correction to bring the noun into line with the plural pronoun 
                                                                                                                                                       
restoration of the text and “[ἐν ναῷ]” is not translated, as it may not be original. The possibility of Christian 
interpolation in T. Zeb. 9:8 also remains.   
 37 See the thorough survey of Webb, Returning, 184–99, who comes to the same conclusion.  
 38 As recognized by, among others, Fee, “Food,” 140–61; Webb, Returning, 193–94, 202–04, 209–11, 213–
15; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 475–76; Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 341, 347–48, 351, 356; Matera, II Corinthians, 162; 
Harris, 2 Corinthians, 500–501, 504–05, 508.   
 39 It is rejected by Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (2d ed.; Stuttgart: 
United Bible Societies, 1994), 512; Philip W. Comfort, New Testament Text and Translation Commentary: 
Commentary on the Variant Readings of the Ancient New Testament Manuscripts and How they Relate to the Major 
English Translations (Carol Stream, Ill.: Tyndale House, 2008), 543, as well as the commentators.  
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and verb.40 A more important issue is whether to read ἡμεῖς (NA/UBS) or ὑμεῖς. The variant has 
reasonable external support from p46 2 אC D2 F G and Tertullian. The text reading is supported 
by B D* L and more miniscules than the variant. Although the evidence is fairly evenly split if 
we only count the quantity of manuscripts, ἡμεῖς has stronger support from a wide range of both 
Alexandrian and Western witnesses,41 and, on balance, it is more likely that a later scribe made 
the change to conform the reading to 1 Cor 3:16, as well as guided by the context of verses 14 
and 17 (if the alteration was intentional).42 Assuming the correctness of this text critical decision, 
Paul’s language is inclusive; he includes himself and others in the “we” rather than referring to 
them only, as he does in the other metaphorical temple references. This same inclusiveness is 
also emphasized in the quotation “καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι εἰς υἱοὺς καὶ θυγατέρας” (6:18) by the 
addition of θυγατέραι to the text alluded to in 2 Sam 7:14.43 Unlike 1 Cor 3:16 and 6:19, there is 
no reference to the Holy Spirit; rather God is described as ὁ θεός ζῶν (6:16). Paul elsewhere in 
First Corinthians cites or alludes to the LXX freely, suggesting that, despite his audience being 
majority Gentile, he assumes that they would recognize these allusions.44 The phrase “living 
God” frequently appears in polemical contexts in the LXX, emphasizing the contrast with dead 
idols and the gods of the other nations,45 and in this passage it appears in contrast to εἴδωλα 
(16a). In addition, the reference to them as the temple of the God who is living is a reminder of 
                                                
 40 Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 36; Metzger, Textual Commentary, 512.  
 41 Idem, Textual Commentary, 512.  
 42 Idem, Textual Commentary, 512; although Comfort, Commentary, 543 is more ambivalent, averring that 
a scribe could have changed the reading to the first person plural under the influence of 2 Cor 5:1–7. The UBS4 
upgraded its confidence rating from a C to B (Long, 2 Corinthians, 122). 
 43 The reference to θυγατέραι is probably taken from Isa 43:6, e.g. Beale, “Background,” 550–81 at 572; 
Harris, 2 Corinthians, 510; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 479.  
 44 Latterly, there has been fresh interest in allusions to the LXX in Second Corinthians too. See e.g. Aernie, 
Prophets and Han, Swimming, especially 80–110. 
 45 E.g. Josh 3:10; 1 Sam 17:36; 2 Kgs 19:4, 16; Isa 37:4, 17; Dan 4:22; 5:23; Jos. Asen. 8:2, 5; 11:10; 19:8. 
For development of this theme, see Mark J. Goodwin, Paul: Apostle of the Living God (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity 
Press International, 2001), 42–108.  
    246
his living presence within them, which in light of the two previous temple references, could 
indicate that the Spirit dwells within. Three crucial references to “God says/said” underscore the 
divine authority of this teaching (6:16b, 17a, 18b) and the third, climactic reference, is 
emphasized by the use of παντοκράτωρ (“Almighty”), again stressing his pre-eminence and 
superiority over other Gods, as well as recalling the frequent use of this term for God in the LXX 
as the all-powerful Lord. 
 The theme of God’s presence among the Corinthians is also emphasized by the use of 
verbs for God dwelling (ἐνοικέω) and walking among them (ἐμπεριπατέω), conflating Lev 
26:12; Ezek 37:27 (16b). In addition to the inclusive first person plural used in 6:16b, Paul also 
uses these OT texts to highlight the inclusive relationship that the Corinthians have with their 
God, καὶ ἔσομαι αὐτῶν θεὸς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονταί μου λαός (6:16c) and then in 6:18 by applying 
the words of 2 Sam 7:8, 14, combined with the emphasis on θυγατέρας found in texts like Isa 
43:6, καὶ ἔσομαι ὑμῖν εἰς πατέρα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι εἰς υἱοὺς καὶ θυγατέρας (6:18), as well as 
affirming the welcome they will receive (citing Ezek 20:34), κἀγὼ εἰσδέξομαι ὑμᾶς (6:17d). 
They are treated as sons and daughters of the same father (addressed also as ἀγαπητοί in 7:1), 
and it is striking that these mainly Gentile former-pagans are addressed using the words reserved 
in the OT for the people of Israel. 
 These Gentile Christians are now God’s people, so it is ironic and notable that Paul cites 
words from the OT (Isa 52:11) that once would have been used to urge separation from the 
nations surrounding Israel (using ἀφορίζω as well as the command to come out, ἐξέλθατε) and 
applies them to these Corinthians who are from the other nations (17), continuing the separation 
theme of 6:14–16a. These words also take up the language of impurity with the command to 
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touch no unclean thing (καὶ ἀκαθάρτου μὴ ἅπτεσθε).46 The passage concludes with an 
exhortation. This hortatory subjunctive is in the first person plural, like the temple reference of 
16b, emphasizing the inclusive calling laid upon both Paul and the Corinthians. As 6:17c used 
impurity language, so 7:1 appropriates both purity and impurity language with its call negatively 
to cleanse themselves from every defilement of flesh and spirit  (καθαρίσωμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ 
παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος) and positively to perfect holiness (ἐπιτελοῦντες 
ἁγιωσύνην), which, like the implicit call to persuade others in 5:11, has as its motivation the fear 
of the Lord (ἐν φόβῳ θεοῦ). Although the noun used for the concept of defilement, μολυσμός is 
a hapax legomenon, the cognate verb μολύνω appears in the context of Paul’s discussion of the 
dangers of idolatry in 1 Cor 8:7. The repetition of this defilement terminology used in First 
Corinthians has the effect of confirming the implicit context of idolatry that lies behind 2 Cor 
6:14–7:1 (see below), even if the application of Paul’s teaching is not limited by this context. 
Finally, Paul reassures his readers that the promises of 6:16–18 are certain (7:1), as he previously 
assured them that all God’s promises are confirmed in Christ (1:20).47 
 
5.2.2  Comparing 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 with Hellenistic Philosophy 
5.2.2.1  Philosophy 
 If I consider some of these themes as they appear in Hellenistic philosophy,48 the first 
comment to make is that, as we saw in the previous chapter, sometimes the emphasis is that the 
                                                
 46 Which, in its original context, contrasts with τὰ σκεύη κυρίου (Isa 52:11 LXX) so the opposition between 
priestly purity and idolatry is readily apparent, see Harris, 2 Corinthians, 508; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 356.   
 47 For a more detailed exploration of the passage with a focus on holiness, see Adewuya, Holiness, 89–128.  
 48 Two more recent published dissertations have engaged Hellenistic philosophy in relation to Second 
Corinthians. Ivar Vegge, 2 Corinthians – a Letter about Reconciliation: A Psychagogical, Epistolographical and 
Rhetorical Analysis (WUNT 2/ 239; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2008), examines the use of Praise and Idealization 
for rhetorical purposes in the moral philosophers (especially at 54–70) and V. Henry T. Nguyen, Christian Identity 
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divine presence dwells in the whole world and thus in every individual. However, in other texts 
certain individuals are said to be those in whom God dwells in a way that, it is assumed, he does 
not in others, or at least not to the same extent. Since God fills all things in the universe,49 which 
itself is the temple of the gods,50 it logically follows that the divine dwells inside each 
individual.51 Indeed, the essence of the human mind is divine,52 so people are divine.53 
Elsewhere, there is a different emphasis, even within the same writers: the divine dwells 
especially in a wise54 or good55 person. Secondly, the philosophers, rather than speaking of 
“idols”, assume the reality and validity of multiple gods, even if they do not necessarily argue for 
it. The gods are spoken of in the same language that the philosophers use for the God who 
pervades the universe, that is, similar qualities are attributed to them. For instance, the gods 
govern all things,56 are merciful, forgiving and just,57 send providential blessings upon all 
people,58 and lend their aid to humanity,59 although they look upon the upright with special 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximus (WUNT 2/ 243; Tübingen: 
Mohr (Siebeck), 2008), addresses issues of social identity and social conflict in relation to Second Corinthians, 
through the exploration of the idea of persona found in Epictetus and Valerius Maximus. 
 49 E.g. Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.9; Alcinous, Handbook, 165.10.3.1–2 (18); Cicero, Leg. 2.11.26; Philo, 
Leg. 3.4; Fug. 75; Post. 6, 14, 30; Conf. 137–38; Seneca, Ben. 4.7.1; Plutarch, Quaest. plat. 2, 1002C; Quaest. plat. 
8. 
 50 Cicero, Leg. 2.10.26; Resp. 6.15.15; Seneca, Ben. 7.7.3; Ep. 90.29; Plutarch, Tranq. an. 477C.  
 51 E.g. Cicero, Leg. 1.22.59; Seneca, Ep. 92.30; 110.2 (describing the views of the Stoics); Marcus 
Aurelius, Med. 5.10.2; and see this theme repeated throughout Epictetus, e.g. Diatr. 1.14.14; 2.8.11–17; even 
evildoers, see Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1.  
 52 Seneca, Helv. 6.8; Cicero, Div. 1.32.70; 1.49.110. 
 53 Plutarch, Gen. Socr. 593A; Cicero, Leg. 1.7.24. 
 54 DL 7.1.119; Seneca, Ep. 92.3; Philo, Somn. 2.248. 
 55 Seneca, Ep. 31:2; 41.2; 73.16; 120.14; Plutarch, Virt. prof. 86A; Cicero, Leg. 2.11.27; Philo, Cher. 98, 
100. 
 56 Cicero, Nat. d. 2.29.73–2.30.77; Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1124F.; for God governing the universe, see e.g. 
Epictetus, Diatr. 2.14.25–26; 2.16.33; Dio Chrysostom, 1 Regn. 42, 56; 3 Regn. 50; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.1. 
Plutarch, Quaest. plat. 2, 1002C; Is. Os. 381–82B; Exil. 601B; Adv. Col. 1124F; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 13.7. 
 57 Seneca, Clem. 1.7.1–2; Ira. 2.27.1; Plutarch, Def. orac. 413F; for the same language used for God, see 
e.g. Dio Chrysostom, 1 Regn. 16, 39; Dei cogn. 22, 74, 75; Borysth. 32. Plutarch, Is. Os. 381B; Def. orac. 423D; 
Superst. 167F.  
 58 Cicero, Nat. d. 2.65.164–2.66.166; Leg. 2.7.15–16; Seneca, Ben. 4.25.1; 4.26.1–3; 4.28.1, 3; Marcus 
Aurelius, Med. 2.3; 9.27. The same language is used of a supreme deity in Epictetus, Diatr. 2.14.11; 3.13.7; 3.26.28; 
Dio Chrysostom, 2 Regn. 26; Hom. 12. 
 59 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 2.1.  
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favor.60 The gods reveal themselves to people.61 They are pure and holy.62 I have already dealt 
with the theme of God’s presence in the individual soul at some length in Chapter Two, but I 
note that Philo uses one of the verbs found in 2 Cor 6:16 (ἐνοικέω) to speak of Wisdom as the 
tabernacle in which the wise man dwells.63 In some places God is described as the father of all of 
humanity (as well as gods)64 and so there is a special kinship between God and people.65 As I 
noted in Chapter Three, Philo also refers to Lev 26:12, the same passage that Paul appears to cite 
in 2 Cor 6:16. Philo makes the connection between God “walking” and purity, writing, “Now the 
God and governor of the universe does by himself and alone walk about invisibly and noiselessly 
in the minds (διάνοιαι) of those who are purified in the highest degree.”66 This act of walking 
fulfills Lev 26:12, which is described by Philo as a prophecy or oracle (θεοπρόπιον). In others, 
who are yet to fully cleanse themselves, angels or divine words walk. In these souls it is 
specified that their heavy bodies defile and stain them (κεκηλιδωμένην ἐν σώμασι βαρέσι),67 and 
so “troups of evil tenants” must be driven out, in order for them to become a holy temple of 
God.68 A soul that is “perfectly purified” can be a house in which God can dwell.69 Philo also 
pictures the tabernacle itself as the symbolical representation of divine virtue and wisdom sent 
from heaven in order that people can be purified and washed from everything that defiles their 
                                                
 60 Seneca, Prov. 1.5.  
 61 Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 1.1.1–3, 7; 2.5.3.  
 62 Epictetus, Diatr. 4.11.3.  
 63 Philo, Leg. 3.46.  
 64 Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus (SVF 1.537), 1; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.3.1; 1.9.7. 
 65 Epictetus, Diatr. 1.9.1–7, 22–26; Cicero, Leg. 1.7.24; Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 8.7.20.  
 66 Philo, Somn. 1.148 (Younge’s translation). Lev 26:12 is also cited by Philo, Somn. 2.248 speaking of 
God dwelling in the soul of a wise man. 
 67 Somn. 1.148. 
 68 Somn. 1.149.  
 69 Sobr. 62; see also Epictetus, Diatr. 2.18.19; 4.11.3, 5; cf. Philostratus, Vit. Apoll. 2.5.3; 3.42.1–2. From a 
Jewish perspective, Philo recognizes the need for purity of soul in passages such as Plant. 162; QE 1.13; Spec. 
1.257–61; Mos. 2.108; Her. 184; QE 2.98; Sobr. 62; and cf. the warning of Deus. 9. 
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life.70 Elsewhere in philosophy, true worship of the gods should include purity of speech and 
thought,71 judgments,72 mind73 and action,74 and impurity in others is taken to indicate their lack 
of piety.75 The philosopher has a duty to keep their inner daemon pure.76 Philo views wisdom, 
virtue,77 instruction78 and a spirit of thanksgiving79 as the agents that can cleanse the mind. The 
unblemished soul is compared to a priest in Philo.80  
 
5.2.2.2 Paul 
 When I compare these findings with 2 Cor 6:14–7:1, there are a number of points to 
consider. Firstly, again I note that the temple is corporate: God dwells in his people rather than 
only in the souls of individuals (as documented at greater length in previous chapters). Instead of 
many gods and many temples, there is one God and one temple. Whereas the philosophers speak 
of the gods using the same language as they do for “God” (often ascribing to them the same 
attributes and qualities of character), Paul, unsurprisingly, sees only idols rather than gods (cf. 1 
Cor 8:4–7). I noted in a previous chapter that many philosophers will urge their hearers to seek 
philosophy, almost regardless of which philosophy (and its understanding of divinity) is being 
discussed. The existence of gods and the worship of them is taken for granted, whether by those 
who would identify as Stoics, or others more influenced by Middle Platonism.  
                                                
 70 Her. 112–13.  
 71 Cicero, Nat. d. 2.28.71; see also Philo, Mut. 240.  
 72 Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.112.  
 73 Cicero, Leg. 2.10.24  
 74 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.8.12–13; Philo, Mos. 2.148–51. 
 75 E.g. Arthur J. Pomeroy, ed., Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics (SBLTT 44; Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 1999), 5b, 5–21 (26); 11k, 4–14, 18–20, 26–29 (84).  
 76 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.13, 17; 3.12, 16.  
 77 Philo, Spec. 1.269; Sobr. 62.  
 78 Somn. 2.73.  
 79 Deus. 7.  
 80 Leg. 2.55–56; Spec. 1.82; Her. 84. 
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 However, for Paul, partnership with gods rather than the one true God, revealed through 
Jesus Christ and experienced by the indwelling Spirit, is as different as darkness is from light (2 
Cor 6:14c). God is the κύριος παντοκράτωρ (6:18c); the rest are idols. Paul, like the 
philosophers, speaks of God dwelling in a person and making himself present to them. Yet, for 
Paul the presence of the “living God” is restricted only to those who are in Christ (6:15a; cf. 
1:21; 5:19). For Paul there is both inclusiveness and separateness. Like the philosophers who 
speak of God’s presence dwelling within each individual, there are no restrictions for Paul: both 
sons and daughters (6:18b) and Gentiles (not just Jews) can be his temple. Paul does not place 
himself above his congregations as one who is better or wiser; instead he makes no distinction 
between groups in the church or between them and him as their apostle; “we are the temple of the 
living God” (6:16b). Unlike the philosophers, being wise or good by others’ estimation does not 
signify that God’s presence dwells within. It is those who believe in Christ who are his temple. It 
is not the case that all have divine minds that make them divine. Rather, those who relate to idols 
rather than being indwelt with the presence of the living God are simply described as 
unbelievers. Purity, and cleansing from defilement, matters both for Paul and for the 
philosophers in their relationship to God. For the philosophers, a person can cleanse themselves 
or keep their daemon pure by right thinking and action. However, for Paul, those who are in 
Christ can do so in the light of all God’s promises that find their fulfillment in Christ (1:20) and 
that guarantee a relationship as intimate as that between “the Father of mercies and God of all 
comfort” (1:3) and his sons and daughters (6:18). Believers can be cleansed because God dwells 
and walks among them (6:16). 
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5.3. Corresponding Emphases in the Corinthian correspondence   
 Some of the key emphases I have identified here can also be found elsewhere within the 
Corinthian correspondence as a whole. In this next section I shall comment briefly on a number 
of other important places in the letters that relate to the issues identified in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1. I shall 
be selective and aim to address only those areas that may have been notable for an audience 
influenced by philosophy.  
5.3.1 Idolatry 
 Although εἴδωλον is the only idol-related word to appear in Second Corinthians, such 
words (beginning with the εἰδωλ– stem) are common in First Corinthians. The word εἴδωλον 
appears in 1 Cor 8:4, 7; 10:19; 12:2; εἰδωλεῖον (idol temple) is used in 1 Cor 8:10; εἰδωλόθυτος 
(something offered to idols) is the topic of discussion in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1, appearing in 1 Cor 8:1, 
4, 7, 10; 10:19;  εἰδωλολατρία (idolatry) in 1 Cor 10:14 and εἰδωλολάτρης (idolater) in 1 Cor 
5:10, 11; 6:9; 10:7. Eleven occurrences of these cognate terms take place in 1 Cor 8:1–11:1. The 
prominence of the term εἴδωλον here may suggest that the presenting issue of 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 
has not been fully resolved (though this passage need not be limited to that concern).81 Gordon 
Fee has presented strong arguments that 1 Cor 8:1–11:1 provides the context for an ongoing 
dispute between Paul and the Corinthians over idol food and idolatry, represented in the stern 
warnings of 2 Cor 6:14–7:1.82 Paul had warned in 1 Cor 8:7 that some eat food as if offered to an 
idol and their consciences, being weak, are “defiled” and the verb used here, μολύνω, is cognate 
                                                
 81 E.g. Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 475; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 500–01; Webb, Returning, 202–03; Fee, 
“Food,” 140–61. 
 82 Idem, “Food,” 140–61, supported by M.D. Goulder, “2 Cor. 6:14–7:1 as an Integral Part of 2 
Corinthians,” NovT 36 (1994): 47–57 at 50–51.    
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with the noun μολυσμός (2 Cor 7:1) that Paul urges the Corinthians to cleanse themselves from 
in our passage.83 
 
5.3.2 Separation for the sake of purity 
 Many scholars see Paul’s call not to associate with “unbelievers” as problematic given 
Paul’s emphasis on not withdrawing from the immoral of this world (1 Cor 5:10; cf. 5:12).84 The 
majority of those who do so understand the use of ἀπίστοι here to refer to “faithless” apostles 
(presumably the ones spoken of in 2 Cor 10–13, e.g. 11:13)85 or faithless Christians.86 The 
problem with this theory is that it violates the principle of consistency: every other use of 
ἄπιστος by Paul in the Corinthian correspondence refers unambiguously to non-Christians.87 
                                                
 83 Fee, “Food,” 140–61 at 145 also makes this connection.  
 84 E.g. E.-B. Allo, Saint Paul: Seconde Épître aux Corinthiens (EBib; 2d ed.; Paris: Gabalda, 1956), 189; 
Rensberger, “Examination,” 25–49 at 29–31, 37.  
 85 E.g. J. -F. Collange, Enigmes de la Deuxieme Epitre de Paul aux Corinthiens: Etude Exegetique de 2 Cor 
2,14 – 7,4 (SNTSMS 18; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 305–06, 316–17; Dahl, “Fragment,” 62–
69; Rensberger, “Examination,” 25–49; Daniel Patte, “A Structural Exegesis of 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:4 With Special 
Attention on 2:14–3:6 and 6:11–7:4,” in Society of Biblical Literature 1987 Seminar Papers (ed. Kent Harold 
Richards; SBLSP 26; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 45 note 59; Wolff, Korinther, 146–50; deSilva, “Recasting,” 
3–16; Franz Zeilinger, “Die Echtheit von 2 Cor 6:14–7:1,” JBL 112 (1993): 71–80; deSilva, Credentials, 17–19, 
105–06; Murphy-O’Connor, Keys Second Corinthians, 128–29. 
 86 Young and Ford, Meaning, 33–34; Goulder, “2 Cor 6:14–7:1,” 47–57 at 53–54. 
 87 1 Cor 6:6; 7:12, 13, 14, 15; 10:27; 14:22, 23, 24; 2 Cor 4:4; see further e.g. Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 
206–08; Windisch, Korintherbrief, 218; C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (BNTC; Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 1968), 195; Thrall, “Problem,” 132–48 at 143; also supported by Webb, Returning, 184–99;  Fee, 
“Food,” 140–61; Furnish, II Corinthians, 362–63, 371–72, 382; Witherington III, Conflict, 404; Barnett, 2 
Corinthians, 342, 345; Matera, II Corinthians, 162; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 499; Aernie, Prophets, 219; Volker 
Rabens, “Paul’s Rhetoric of Demarcation: Separation From “Unbelievers” (2 Cor 6:14–7:1) in the Corinthian 
Conflict,” in Theologizing in the Corinthian Conflict: Studies in the Exegesis and Theology of 2 Corinthians (ed. 
Reimund Bieringer et al.; BITS 16; Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 229–53 at 233–36; Martin, 2 Corinthians, 361, 365–66; 
Han, Swimming, 85–87. Rabens, “Demarcation,” 229–53 at 243–53 also argues for a secondary referent to 
idolatrous people inside the church (including the false apostles of 11:13) as well as outside the church (Idem, 
“Inclusion of and Demarcation From ‘outsiders’: Mission and Ethics in Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians,” in 
Sensitivity Towards Outsiders: Exploring the Dynamic Relationship between Mission and Ethics in the New 
Testament and Early Christianity (ed. Jacobus Kok et al.; WUNT 2/ 364; 2014), 290–323 at 294–317 is very similar 
to the preceding article). Similarily, Adewuya, Holiness, 101–103 posits an inclusive reference: both to pagans and 
those who behave like them; Starling, “ἄπιστοι,” 45–60 identifies unbelievers as idolatrous pagans but also suggests 
that contextually it is implied that in embracing the false apostles they are becoming “mismatched” with the pagans 
in their attitudes (59–60). Liu, Purity, 202–04 starts from the other end, identifying unbelievers with “false 
brothers”, but concludes that the advice could also apply to pagans. Gupta, Worship, 99–100 argues contextually 
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Given the contrast between Christ and Beliar in 6:15a, the contrast between ὁ πιστός and ὁ 
ἄπιστος in 6:15b that elaborates upon 6:15a would suggest that one representative person is 
aligned with Christ and the other with Beliar. In fact, the sole other use of the term ἄπιστος in 
this letter, in 2 Cor 4:4, is defined in apposition to οἱ ἀπολλύμενοι (4:3), who, elsewhere in the 
Corinthian correspondence, are depicted as the antithesis of οἱ σῳζόμενοι (1 Cor 1:18; 2 Cor 
2:15).88 The reference to δικαιοσύνη in 6:14 recalls another occurrence of a cognate term in 
Paul’s first letter where he warns them that the ἄδικοι will not inherit the kingdom of God (6:9), 
in contrast with the present state of the Corinthians who have been justified (δικαιόω). I have 
already noted the theme of idolatry and the impossibility of believers having a share (μετέχω in 1 
Cor 10:21, cognate to μετοχή in 2 Cor 6:14) in the table of demons or being a partner with them 
(κοινωνός in 1 Cor 10:18, 20, cognate to κοινωνία in 2 Cor 6:14).89 There is also precedent for 
the emphasis on separation from that which defiles (2 Cor 6:17; 7:1) in Paul’s injunctions in 1 
Cor 5:6–13 (especially at 5:7, 13).90 It is true that in 1 Cor 5, Paul clarifies that he does not 
oppose the believers mingling/associating with (συναναμίγνυμι) the immoral of this world 
(5:10) but with the immoral brother (5:11, and thus believer). At the same time, Paul speaks of 
the unbelieving husband being made holy (ἁγιάζω) by his believing wife, stating that if not for 
the faith of the wife, both husband and children would be unclean (ἀκάθαρτος in 7:14). The 
problem of the believer who is already married to an unbeliever is clearly an exceptional case; 
hence Paul’s need to address it (1 Cor 7:12–16). However if a believer were to enter into a new 
                                                                                                                                                       
that, ‘unbelievers’ is Paul’s counter-claim against those who accuse him of being unfaithful to the law (i.e. Jews and 
perhaps Jewish Christians), following Lambrecht, 2 Corinthians, 62. 
 88 Murphy-O’Connor, Keys Second Corinthians, 117. The question is explored in some detail by Webb, 
Returning, 184–99, itself a revision of Idem, “Unequally Yoked with Unbelievers, Part 1: Who are the Unbelievers 
(ἄπιστοι) in 2 Corinthians 6:14?,” BSac 149 (1992): 27–44. 
 89 Both points noted by Goulder, “2 Cor 6:14–7:1,” 47–57 at 50–51.  
 90 See Idem, “2 Cor 6:14–7:1,” 47–57 at 51–52. Webb, Returning, 190 helpfully contrasts the purposes 
given for the different advice in 1 Cor 5:10 and 2 Cor 6:17; see also Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 341 note 23. 
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marriage they should marry μόνον ἐν κυρίῳ (1 Cor 7:39b) since someone outside of the Lord 
would not be set apart for him. It seems then that Paul must mean something different by 
speaking of ἑτεροζυγέω in 2 Cor 6:14, rather than συναναμίγνυμι (1 Cor 5:10, 11). Paul is not 
prohibiting social contact with unbelievers, but instead warning against making “a mismatched 
covenant” with them.91 The succession of words that follow emphasize partnership, sharing and 
fellowship; something stronger than mere association.92 In light of the explicit contrast between 
the “living God” and idols, it seems likely that Paul prohibits any kind of activity “which 
establishes a covenant-like bond with pagans and their literal idols (either through physical or 
metonymical idolatry)— an action which seriously violates the reader’s existing covenant with 
God.”93 
 
5.3.3 The theme of Indwelling in 2 Corinthians 
There are a number of passages in the epistle that highlight the theme of divine 
indwelling. In the context of speaking of the believer’s union with Christ94 (εἰς Χριστὸν in 1:21), 
Paul speaks of God as the one who has sealed (σφραγίζω) the Corinthians as his own and given 
                                                
 91 C. Spicq, Theological Lexicon of the New Testament (trans. J. Ernest; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 
1994), 2.80–81, speaking of the figurative sense; or “be yoked in unequal partnership” (cf. “ἑτεροζυγέω,” LSJ, 701) 
cf. “ἑτεροζυγέω,” BDAG, 399; K. H. Rengstorf “ζυγός, ἑτεροζυγέω,” TDNT 2.896–901. Philo speaks in Leg. 3.193 
of the person who yoked themselves to the chariot of passions that produced boastfulness and arrogance (using the 
noun ζυγός) or of pleasure personified who struggles to break free from the yoke (using a cognate verb, 
ζυγομαχέω). See also e.g. Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 206; Windisch, Korintherbrief, 212–13; Furnish, II Corinthians, 
361; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 501; Rabens, “Demarcation,” 229–53 at 241.  
 92 See also Webb, Returning, 190–92.  
 93 Idem, Returning, 211, and see generally 200–15, itself based on his earlier article, Idem, “Unequally 
Yoked with Unbelievers, Part 2: What is the Unequal Yoke (ἑτεροζυγοῦντες) in 2 Corinthians 6:14?,” BSac 149 
(1992): 162–79. Despite Webb’s persuasive arguments against a reference to mixed marriages (Idem, Returning, 
205–09), he hesitantly allows that the passage, “lends itself in a secondary sense to a mixed marriage application” 
(209) and I would agree with Harris, 2 Corinthians, 501 note 32 that the contracting of a mixed marriage (cf. 1 Cor 
7:39) would certainly be included; see also Witherington III, Conflict, 405–06; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 473; 
Alistair Scott May, The Body for the Lord: Sex and Identity in 1 Corinthians 5-7 (JSNTSup 278; London: T&T 
Clark, 2004), 228 note 63; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 193–94; Han, Swimming, 87–89. 
 94 Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 155–58; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 205; Martin, 2 Corinthians, 164.  
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them the ἀρραβών (down payment, pledge guaranteeing what is to come),95 probably best seen 
as epexegetical, that is, consisting of the Spirit96 ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν (1:22). The Spirit dwells, 
not just in their midst, but in their hearts.97 Similarly, Paul calls the Corinthians an ἐπιστολὴ 
Χριστοῦ (letter of Christ, 3:3), that has been written πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος, by the Spirit of the 
living God on tablets of fleshly hearts (“ἐν πλαξὶν καρδίαις σαρκίναις”, 3:4). This is the same 
living God language that is used in 6:14, and affirms that the Corinthians are a letter of Christ 
precisely because the life-giving Spirit98 of God has made them so within, in changing them from 
pagans to bearers of his Spirit.99 Space does not permit me to properly examine 2 Cor 3:4–18 and 
the exegetical issues it presents.100 However, it is clear that the new covenant era, that Paul 
contrasts with the old, surpasses it in glory and involves a new found ἐλευθερία (3:17).101 This 
freedom comes from the Lord, the Spirit, who transforms (μεταμορφόω) believers into τὴν 
αὐτὴν εἰκόνα (3:18), which I take to be the divine image; the image of God found in Christ that 
is referred to only a few verses later (4:4).102 Gordon Fee’s comment on Paul’s use of “the Lord” 
                                                
 95 With the NIV: “a deposit, guaranteeing what is to come”; see Harris, 2 Corinthians, 207.  
 96 With e.g. Furnish, II Corinthians, 137; Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in 
the Letters of Paul (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994), 293; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 207; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 
115; Long, 2 Corinthians, 38. 
 97 Fee, Presence, 294.  
 98 See the translations of Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 227; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 264; Keener, 1–2 
Corinthians, 167.  
 99 Drawing on the promise of new covenant life found in places such as Ezek 11:19; 36:26; Jer 38:33 LXX 
(31:33 MT), as well as an allusion to God writing on tablets of stone in passages such as Exod 31:18; Deut 4:13; 
Deut 5:22. See with more detail, Goodwin, Living God, 161–89.  
 100 The section has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest. Among full length monographs, see e.g. 
Carol Kern Stockhausen, Moses’ Veil and the Glory of the New Covenant: The Exegetical Substructure of II Cor 3, 
1–4, 6 (AnBib 116; Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblica, 1989; Linda L. Belleville, Reflections of Glory. Paul’s 
Polemical Use of the Moses-Doxa Tradition in 2 Corinthians 3:1-18 (Journal for the Study of the New Testament 
Supplement Series 52; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991); Scott J. Hafemann, Paul, Moses, and the History 
of Israel: The Letter/Spirit Contrast and the Argument from Scripture in 2 Corinthians 3 (WUNT 2/ 81; Tübingen: 
Mohr (Siebeck), 1995); and see the up-to-date bibliography in Martin, 2 Corinthians, 197–99. 
 101 A notion that would appeal to those influenced by Stoicism, as noted by Collange, Enigmes, 113–14 and 
followed by Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 276.  
 102 Pace e.g. W. C. van Unnik, “‘With Unveiled Face,’ an Exegesis of 2 Corinthians iii 12–18,” NovT 
(1963): 153–69; followed by Belleville, Reflections, 290, 296; N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ 
and the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 175–92, who each speak of transformation into the 
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in the phrase “the Lord (Yahweh) is the Spirit” is apposite for the audience I am considering 
here, “This usage presupposes the Spirit as the fulfillment of the Presence of God motif in a 
thoroughgoing way. The Lord to whom Moses turned is the one whose “Presence” tabernacled in 
the midst of his people Israel . . . the “Lord” to whom God’s newly constituted people turn, 
whose “Presence” is now in their hearts, is none other than the life-giving Spirit of the living 
God.”103  
 In 2 Cor 4, Paul uses a number of indwelling images. Firstly, he speaks of the divine 
illumination that has entered the hearts of the Corinthians, granting them the knowledge of the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ (4:6). Then Paul speaks of the frail humanity of his 
readers104 as ὀστράκινη σκεύη in which the θησαυρός (probably referring to the gospel in the 
context of the repeated references to it in 4:3–4 and allusions to it in 4:1, 6)105 is carried. This 
might have reminded some readers of the way that sacred items, manifesting the presence of the 
deity, were carried in contemporary religious processions.106 By contrast the Corinthians carry 
Christ and his gospel within their frail human bodies. Thirdly, after enumerating the ways in 
                                                                                                                                                       
image of one another, but with the majority of modern commentators. For those influenced by middle Platonism, 
this also would also speak to them of the common notion of being transformed into the image of the deity by 
contemplating that image; see Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 290, 294–95; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 170–71; a recurring 
theme in Maximus of Tyre and Philo of Alexandria, among our sources influenced by Middle Platonism. See the 
sources cited by J. Behm, “μεταμορφόω,” TDNT 4:755–7; Donald A. Hagner, “The Vision of God in Philo and 
John: A Comparative Study,” JETS 14:2 (1971): 81–93; Craig S. Keener, “Transformation through Divine Vision in 
1 John 3:2-6,” Faith & Mission 23 (2005): 13–22; Idem, “Heavenly Mindedness and Earthly Good: Contemplating 
Matters Above in Colossians 3.1-2,” JGRChJ 6 (2009): 175–90; Idem, “We Beheld His Glory! (John 1:14),” in 
John, Jesus, and History, Volume 2: Aspects of Historicity in the Fourth Gospel (ed. Paul N. Anderson, Felix Just, 
and Tom Thatcher; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 15–25 and Volker Rabens, The Holy Spirit & Ethics in Paul: 
Transformation & Empowering for Religious-Ethical Life (WUNT 283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 184–86. 
 103 Fee, Presence, 313.  
 104 Probably including their weak earthly bodies, but perhaps not restricted to this referent; see Plummer, 1 
Corinthians, 127; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 323; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 340.    
 105 Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 321; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 339; Timothy B. Savage, Power through 
Weakness: Paul’s Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 Corinthians (SNTSMS 86. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 164–67. 
 106 See Paul Brooks Duff, “The Transformation of the Spectator: Power, Perception, and the Day of 
Salvation,” in Society of Biblical Literature: 1987 Seminar Papers (ed. Kent Harold Richards; SBLSP 26; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1987), 233–37; Idem, “Apostolic Suffering and the Language of Processions in 2 Corinthians 4:7–
10,” BTB 21.4 (1991): 158–65 at 160; Long, 2 Corinthians, 82.  
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which this treasure is displayed in frailty (4:8–9), Paul uses another indwelling image: that they 
always carry around in their bodies the νέκρωσις107 of Jesus so that the life of Jesus might be 
manifested in their bodies (4:10). I note here that in addition to further indwelling imagery (both 
the death/dying and the life of Jesus are to be φανερόω – manifested, same verb in both 4:10, 
11), Paul is unashamed about associating this revelation with his physicality. He stresses that the 
life and death of Jesus are revealed ἐν τῷ σώματι (4:10) and ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ (4:11), clearly 
placed in parallel. Paul could have simply used σῶμα but the addition and combination of σάρξ 
with θνητός, according to Murray J. Harris, has the effect, “of emphasizing the transitory, 
creaturely, and weak nature of the body that, paradoxically, is the very place where Jesus’ 
powerful risen life is on display.”108 Although it is difficult to be sure whether Paul’s reference to 
τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως (4:13) alludes to the disposition of the Psalmist109 or to the Holy 
Spirit, a good case can be made for the Holy Spirit, as the one who produces faith, in light of 
other Pauline usage and to the references to the Spirit in the co-text of 2 Cor 3 and 2 Cor 5:5 
(who then arguably produces the faith of 5:7).110 The picture of the inner self being renewed 
daily, in its context, also suggests the work of the Spirit bringing about an internal transformation 
and would have been very suggestive to an audience influenced by Stoic and Platonic thought.111 
                                                
 107 Which may be intended to mean both the state of deadness and the process of dying, see John T. 
Fitzgerald, Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian 
Correspondence (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1988), 178–79; though many commentators 
understand Paul to be emphasizing the process of dying e.g. J. B. Lightfoot, 2 Corinthians and 1 Peter: A Newly 
Discovered Commentary (Lightfoot Legacy Set 3; ed. Ben Witherington III and Todd D. Still; Downers Grove, Ill.: 
IVP, forthcoming), on 2 Cor 4:10 (my thanks to Dr Ben Witherington III for sharing with me his pre-publication 
manuscript of Lightfoot’s commentary); Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 130; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 345; Guthrie, 2 
Corinthians, 359–60, while Collange, Enigmes, 154–55, followed by Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 332, think the state 
of deadness may be intended, since Paul’s only other use of this noun (Rom 4:19) has this nuance.   
 108 Harris, 2 Corinthians, 349.  
 109 As argued by e.g. Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 338–39; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 262.  
 110 See the citations and arguments provided by e.g. Collange, Enigmes, 162–63; Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 
142; Furnish, II Corinthians, 257–58; Fee, Presence, 323–24; and tentatively Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 175.   
 111 See especially Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 348–51; also Furnish, II Corinthians, 261; Fee, Presence, 324 
and the philosophical references cited by Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 177–78.    
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This inner transformation is evidenced in the way that Paul endures hardships (6:4–5) and the 
qualities he displays in the midst of these (6:6–7), including ἁγνότης (purity) generated by the 
Holy Spirit (6:6).112 
 
5.4 Comparing the Theologies of 2 Corinthians with Hellenistic Philosophy  
5.4.1 Paul’s Understanding of God in 2 Corinthians 
 In this and the following sections, I shall briefly make reference to passages that 
corroborate my findings from the previous chapter, rather than attempting to provide a 
comprehensive summary. God is the one who characteristically raises the dead (1:9),113 and who, 
like in First Corinthians, is intimately associated with Jesus Christ his son (1:3), who is also Lord 
(1:2–3; 4:5; cf. 1 Cor 8:5–6 on other Lords and 2 Cor 4:4 on the opposing ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος 
τούτου), through whom all God’s promises are fulfilled (1:19–20). God has ownership of, and 
resides in, his people by his Spirit (1:22). He has written on the hearts of the Corinthians by his 
Spirit (3:3) to give them life (3:6) and identifies fully with the Spirit as Lord (3:17–18). God’s 
purposes are accomplished through Christ, his image (3:18; 4:6), the agent of revelation (3:14), 
in whom the Corinthians reveal the knowledge of God to the world (2:14–15; 4:10–11). Like 
First Corinthians, there is a strong emphasis on Jesus as the one who was raised and God as the 
one who raised him (1:9; 4:14; 5:15), and who will raise the Corinthians with him (4:14; cf. 5:1–
10). God urges people to be reconciled with him (5:11–21) since through Christ he has 
                                                
 112 See Fee, Presence,332–35; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 460. Most English translations also follow the 
variant reading ἐν ἁγιότητι rather than ἐν ἁπλότητι found in 1:12. If this is correct, as Windisch, Korintherbrief, 54;  
Comfort, Commentary, 534; Margaret E. Thrall, “2 Corinthians 1:12: Ἁγιότητι Or Ἁπλότητι?,” in Studies in New 
Testament Language and Text: Essays in Honour of George D. Kilpatrick on the Occasion on his Sixty-Fifth 
Birthday (ed. J. K. Elliott; NovTSup 44; Leiden: Brill, 1976), 366–72; Idem, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 130–31, 32–33 and 
Harris, 2 Corinthians, 183 convincingly argue, this would provide another example of Paul’s stress on 
purity/holiness in behavior in the letter; see also Starling, “ἄπιστοι,” 45–60 at 54–55. 
 113 Noting the present participle with Harris, 2 Corinthians, 157.  
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reconciled the world to himself (5:18–21). This grace must be received now (6:1–2) in light of 
the coming judgment enacted by Christ on God’s behalf (5:10). As we observed in the first letter, 
Paul connects God and his people very closely with bodily resurrection. He dwells through 
Christ by his Spirit, only in his people who believe and who have been reconciled to him, and not 
in all people.114   
 
5.4.2 Paul’s Understanding of Humanity in 2 Corinthians 
 Although 2 Cor 6:14–7:1 is well known for its contrasts between believers and 
unbelievers and what they represent, these same contrasts appear more generally in 2 Cor 2:14–
7:4 as a whole. There are some who are being saved and others who are perishing (2:15), and the 
Gospel is veiled to the latter group (4:3) since the god of this age has blinded their minds so that 
they cannot see the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ (4:4). All will be judged for what 
was done in their body (5:10) and the bodies of all will be destroyed (5:1). The world has been 
reconciled to God through Christ (5:19) but this grace must be received through Christ (5:20; 
6:1–2) for people to be transformed into Christ’s likeness (3:18; 4:10–18) and finally, to receive 
the resurrection body (5:1). The goal is not freedom for the soul from the body or absorption into 
the universe, as in much philosophy, but new creation (5:17).  
 
5.4.3 Living as the Temple in 2 Corinthians 
 There are at least two other places in the letter where Paul may be using metaphorical 
temple language. The images used in 2:14–16 clearly draw on the well documented occurrences 
of Roman triumphal processions. In this passage, Paul uses ὀσμή (2:14b, 16) and εὐωδία (2:15), 
                                                
 114 For a more comprehensive survey, see Young and Ford, Meaning, 235–61; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 115–
17.  
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that are often combined in the Septuagintal formula ὀσμή εὐωδίας (e.g. Gen 8:21; Exod 29:18; 
Lev 4:31; Num 15:5 etc.). However, for some scholars, Paul’s avoidance of the exact formula, 
which he does employ elsewhere to speak of sacrifices (in Phil 4:18 – and Eph 5:2 – if the latter 
is Pauline), indicates that Paul is still making use of the triumph motif, imagining himself and his 
colleagues as incense-bearers in the parade.115 For others, however the use of these commonly 
associated words signals a shift to the image of OT sacrifice.116 Given the very close conjunction 
of two terms very commonly associated with sacrifice in the LXX, the possibility of a sacrificial 
referent should not be ruled out. The conjunction of the two terms is rare in Hellenistic 
literature,117 but appears in philosophical literature in connection with incense,118 or a fragrance 
                                                
 115 See especially Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 165–73 and more detail provided in Idem, “Paul’s Triumphal 
Procession Imagery (2 Cor 2.14–16a): Neglected Points of Background,” NTS 61 (2015): 79–91, and previously 
Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 71; Harold W. Attridge, “Making Scents of Paul: The Background and Sense of 2 Cor 
2:14–17,” in Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (ed. 
John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 71–88 at 83–88. 
Paul Brooks Duff, “Metaphor, Motif, and Meaning: The Rhetorical Strategy behind the Image “Led in Triumph” in 
2 Corinthians 2:14,” CBQ 53 (1991): 79–92, reads the whole image in relation to epiphany processions in the Greco-
Roman world, rather than to the Triumph in particular (for which see also Idem, “Transformation,” 233–43 at 241. 
Long, ‘God’, will argue that 2 Cor 2:14––7:2 has been constructed to reflect the triumphal procession, that 
culminates at the temple (in 6:14–7:1). My thanks to Dr. Fredrick J. Long for sharing his forthcoming article with 
me.  
 116 E.g. Scott J. Hafemann, Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical Study of II Cor 2:14–3:3 within the 
Context of the Corinthian Correspondence (WUNT 2/ 19; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1986), 40–58, who argues 
that, “the technical term ὀσμή εὐωδίας as a metonymy for sacrifice seems to have been so well established by the 
post-exilic period . . . when used in the same context, the terms could also be separated and used as synonyms” and 
in Sir 24:15, like 2 Cor 2:14–15, “the terminus technicus has been split up, but the two terms have nevertheless 
retained their sacrificial meaning” (48); supported also by e.g. Collange, Enigmes, 30–31; James I. H. McDonald, 
“Paul and the Preaching Ministry: A Reconsideration of 2 Cor 2:14-17 in its Context,” JSNT 17 (1983): 35–50 at 
39–42; Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 197–98; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 248; Gupta, Worship, 87–90; Long, 2 Corinthians, 
57. Roger David Aus, Imagery of Triumph and Rebellion in 2 Corinthians 2:14–17 and Elsewhere in the Epistle: An 
Example of the Combination of Greco-Roman and Judaic Traditions in the Apostle Paul (Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 2005), 41 connects the imagery to the triumph but sees one referent as the use of incense in 
sacrifices of thanksgiving at the end of the procession; Furnish, II Corinthians, 176–77 denies the sacrificial 
referent. 
 117 Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 626B is perhaps the only example that does not clearly post-date the New 
Testament period significantly.  
 118 E.g. Dio Chrysostom, 2 Regn. 41; Plutarch, Is. Os. 383A–D; Tranq. an. 477B. Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 
645E speaks of μύρον (perfume) as if it is εὐσέβεια (piety, godliness), so providing an example of a sweet smell 
used metaphorically. 
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that indicates the presence of a god in a shrine,119 or generally in relation to offerings and 
washings for purification performed at a shrine.120 For a Corinthian audience influenced by 
Hellenistic philosophy, Paul’s image of himself and his colleagues spreading the fragrance of the 
knowledge of Christ would certainly have been comprehensible in a sacrificial context.121 
 Secondly, there is a possible temple/tabernacle allusion at 2 Cor 5:1. This verse and the 
verses that follow comprise one of the most disputed passages in the letter, and space does not 
permit to consider the timing of the reception of the οἰκοδομή that Paul contrasts with the current 
ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους (5:1) nor the relationship between 1 Cor 15 and 2 Cor 5.122 
However, what does seem relatively clear is that while Paul, in common with Hellenistic 
writings, sees the temporary existence of the earthly body as something from which he longs to 
be freed (5:1–2),123 his hope is not in freedom for the soul from the body, but rather for a body 
from heaven that will be infinitely superior. While some philosophical writers speak of the body 
as a house for the soul,124 with the eager expectation that it will finally be cast off,125 Paul looks 
forward to a house (οἰκία) from heaven that is a body. In Scipio’s vision (Somnium Scipionis) in 
Cicero’s De republica, Scipio is told by his dead father that the universe is God’s temple and the 
earth is the centre of that temple. His final destiny in this universe is to escape from the bondage 
                                                
 119 Plutarch, Def. orac. 437C.  
 120 Plutarch, Pyth. orac. 402C–D.  
 121 David Renwick, A., Paul, the Temple, and the Presence of God (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 75–94, 
thinks the cultic reference most likely when placing the pericope in the context of cultic images in Second 
Corinthians. 
 122 For which see especially Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 357–70; N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son 
of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 361–71 and Carl N. Toney, “Excursus: Resurrection in 2 Corinthians,” 
in Martin, 2 Corinthians, 250–56. 
 123 See for instance, Wis 9:15 (which uses βαρύνω, cognate to βαρέω in 2 Cor 5:4); Plato, Phaed. 81C; 
[Ax.] 365E; 366A; Philo, Somn. 1.122; Cicero, Tusc. 1.22.51 cited by e.g. Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 142; Thrall, 2 
Corinthians 1-7, 357–58. 
124 Such as Philo, Somn. 1.122 (using οἶκος); Cicero, Tusc. 1.22.51 (using domus).  
125 Cicero, Tusc. 1.22.51 contrasts the alien home (the body) of the soul with the home, the free heaven 
(liberum caelum) where the soul is now set free from the body (divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione 
complecti).  
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of the body,126 and so in his earthly life he should keep his gaze fixed on heavenly things.127 
Scipio thus resolves to pursue the path to heaven, that will lead to freedom from this prison.128 
By contrast, ideal existence in Paul’s “vision” of 2 Cor 5:1 is still corporeal existence. Paul’s use 
of σκῆνος for “tent” is reminiscent of the way that σκηνή can be used in the LXX for 
“tabernacle” combined with οἶκος in 2 Chr 9:23; Isa 38:12 uses the metaphor of a tent being 
taken down to depict death and Job 4:19 combines οἰκία with πήλινος (literally made of πηλός, 
clay) to speak of human bodies (cf. 2 Cor 4:7).129 Further, ἀχειροποίητος (not made with hands) 
is used elsewhere in the NT to refer to the earthly temple or tabernacle (Mk 14:58 and similarly, 
the use of χειροποίητος negated by οὗ in Acts 7:48; 17:24; Heb 9:11, 24) and given the place of 
a heavenly temple or future eschatological temple in other Jewish literature,130 and in the context 
of church as temple (1 Cor 3:16) and the body as temple (1 Cor 6:19) in the Corinthian 
correspondence, this reference to the body ἀχειροποίητος is likely to suggest the idea of temple 
to Paul’s readers.131 This might also help prepare the readers for Paul’s use of temple imagery in 
6:16. 
 Some of Paul’s remarks also confirm those areas of his understanding I discussed in 
relation to First Corinthians that would have struck audiences influenced by philosophy. For 
instance, Paul expresses his longing that what is θνητός (cf. 4:11) be swallowed up (καταπίνω). 
This would resonate with those who despised mortal flesh, but in Paul’s case, mortality is to be 
                                                
126 Resp. 6.15.15.  
127 Resp. 6.17.17; 6.19.20 (cf. Col 3:1–2). 
128 Resp. 6.24.26.  
 129 Cited by Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 357–58.  
 130 McKelvey, Temple, 25–41. Examples include 1 En. 14:1–25; 24–26; 71:5; 4 Ezra 10:25–28; 2 Bar. 4:1–
7. 
 131 With Thrall, 2 Corinthians 1-7, 359; Harris, 2 Corinthians, 374; Keener, 1–2 Corinthians, 180. 
Collange, Enigmes, 183 notes that in the LXX, the opposite, χειροποίητος, is frequently used for idols (e.g. Lev 
26:1, 30; Isa 2:8, 10:11). It is at least possible for the Corinthian readers that Paul’s use of ἀχειροποίητος may 
suggest to them that which comes from God, as opposed to that which comes from idolatry. See further, Gupta, 
Worship, 90–96. 
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swallowed up by ζωή (5:4), which is defined here as the life of the resurrection body (5:1–5; cf. 
the use of the same clothing imagery in respect of the resurrection body in 1 Cor 15:53–54).132 
Although many other things could be said about 2 Cor 5:10, for my purposes I note that Paul 
sees the body as the locus of all activity that merits judgment, whether bad or good (rather than 
the body being associated only with all that is evil).  
 More generally in these early chapters of Second Corinthians, I note that Paul again 
addresses believers in Christ as ἅγιοι (1:1). The believers are uniquely owned and established by 
God and indwelt by the Spirit, who guarantees the consummation of their salvation (1:22), in a 
way that others are not. The Corinthians are a letter of Christ, written by the Spirit in their hearts 
(3:3). They stand by faith (1:24) and their character must be tried by obedience (2:9). Paul’s 
recounting of the hardships he has encountered (e.g. 4:7–11; 6:4–10) serve as an example to the 
Corinthians, that the life of Christ should be revealed through them (4:6, 10–11, 16) in the midst 
of weakness (4:7–9), dying (4:11) and decay (4:16–5:1) in their bodies (4:10), not merely their 
souls. They also face opposition from Satan (2:11; 4:4; cf. 11:3, 14; 12:7), so, in following Paul’s 
example (cf. 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1), they should fix their eyes on unseen realities (4:18), make it their 
aim to please God (5:9), fear him (5:11) and live for Christ (5:15) as his ambassadors (5:20).133 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 I have observed a number of contrasts between the philosophers’ use of metaphorical 
temple language, and its implications for their worldview and practice, and the emphases found 
in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1. The philosophers often spoke of the divine filling all things and thus 
                                                
 132 Harris, 2 Corinthians, 387 notes that the positive reason for Paul’s groaning in 5:2, 4 is, “not a 
Hellenistic depreciation of corporeality but an intense longing for investiture with a heavenly body”.  
  133 For a more comprehensive survey of holiness in the Corinthian correspondence and Paul’s emphasis on 
communal holiness, see Adewuya, Holiness, 129–64.  
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indwelling each individual. At the same time, some writings speak of the divine dwelling only in 
those who are good or wise. The imagery either relates to all without exception (all of creation) 
or specifically to certain individuals. The acceptance of multiple gods is assumed and affirmed. 
These gods are held to share identical characteristics with God.   
 The main features of Paul’s metaphorical temple references in First Corinthians also find  
corresponding emphasis in the letter as a whole and stand in contrast to my findings from 
Hellenistic philosophy. Paul only speaks of the Spirit indwelling those who believe in Christ, 
rather than every created person or a category of people, such as those who are especially wise or 
noble. At the same time, the metaphorical temple is spoken of corporately – it is a group of 
people. On the one hand, this is a very restrictive group; only those who believe in Christ have 
the indwelling Spirit and the rest are aligned with idolatry. On the other hand, the group includes 
those formerly counted as pagans, who are now spoken of using language previously applied to 
Israel. Paul’s addition of the word for “daughters” from the Isa 60:4 reference highlights the 
inclusive nature of the group; male and female, Jew and Gentile are welcomed and included by 
God. Whereas, for the philosophers the gods share the same beneficent characteristics as God, 
for Paul, they are simply idols and he associates them with evil, unbelief, darkness and 
lawlessness, while the Corinthian believers are associated with Christ, belief, light and 
righteousness.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary 
 This study has examined the use of metaphorical temple language in Paul’s letters to the 
Corinthians (1 Cor 3:16–17; 6:19; 2 Cor 6:14–7:1) and compared it to the use of such language 
in Hellenistic philosophy.  
 In Chapter One, I noted that a number of monographs have considered Paul’s own 
background in Judaism in order to illuminate his use of metaphorical temple language, 
particularly focusing on the presence of such imagery in the Dead Sea Scrolls, especially as such 
language is not pervasive in other intertestamental literature. However, more recent studies of the 
scrolls are less confident than earlier ones that we can trace any direct influence on Paul. In any 
case, the majority of Paul’s readers were Gentiles (see e.g. 1 Cor 6:9–11; 8:7; 12:2) and it is 
unlikely that the scrolls would have been known to these congregations and would have 
influenced their understanding of Paul’s words. Most scholars writing on the temple language 
from the 1930s to the 1980s considered the metaphor purely in relation to Paul’s own 
background. A number of recent studies have recognized the significance of the audience’s 
context for the Corinthians’ understanding of Paul’s language. As Gentiles, they would have 
been exposed to a variety of religious, cultural and philosophical influences before and after 
conversion, notably the presence of Roman temples and thus the possibilities of eating idol foods 
in various contexts (cf. 1 Cor 8:1–11:1). A steady stream of modern studies have examined 
Paul’s advice on idol offerings in relation to the religious and social context of Corinth, and 
Paul’s temple metaphors have been examined in relation to building projects (John Lanci) and 
local temples (Yulin Liu).  
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 However, I sought to demonstrate that, for Paul’s audience, philosophy provided the 
worldview and guidance for living that people seek from religion today. I also claimed that the 
influence of Hellenistic philosophy was pervasive in the first century and its ideas would have 
trickled down to influence those who had never read philosophy. Although others have compared 
Paul’s theology with Stoicism, or compared spiritual sacrifices in the Greco-Roman world with 
the NT, I noted a lacuna in the literature, with no available comprehensive study of the most 
relevant sources of metaphorical temple language that could have influenced the Corinthians’ 
thinking. While noting that this was not Paul’s own background, nor the sole background for the 
Corinthians, it was nevertheless one important background for the audience, that has been 
neglected and that Paul may have sought to address.  
 In Chapter Two, I surveyed relevant non-Jewish Hellenistic writers’ use of metaphorical 
priest, temple and sacrifice language, beginning with the schools that marked the start of the 
Hellenistic era and ending with works from the second century C.E. Because neither 
Epicureanism nor Skepticism had a place for the direct involvement of God in human affairs, the 
vast majority of references were found in writers influenced by Stoicism or Middle Platonism. 
There were no unambiguous references to metaphorical priests but plenty of discussion of 
spiritual sacrifices. Some retained a place for literal sacrifices but placed a greater emphasis on 
purity of thought and deed as a sacrifice. Substitutes for sacrifices included purity in worship, 
prayer and contemplation, purity of thought, speech and intention and an attitude that seeks for 
divine truth or studies divine things. Writers from different traditions spoke of the universe as 
being the temple of the gods. Some make a fine distinction between God and the world (e.g. 
Epictetus) but, in speaking of the divine filling all things, others speak of the world in more 
pantheistic terms. Stoics, in particular, speak of the place of god or a daemon within the 
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individual soul, and there is some ambiguity as to whether this applies to every individual 
without exception, or solely, or perhaps to a greater degree, in those who are wise and/or good.  
 In order to place these references within the worldview of their philosophical systems, I 
also attempted to sketch out the way such writers understood the nature of divinity, humanity and 
the application of the philosophy to practical living. I noted how God is frequently equated 
pantheistically with Nature, Fate, Fortune and Reason and in later Stoics as well as Middle 
Platonists he is identified simply as intelligence. Many speak of multiple gods who share the 
same benevolent and governing characteristics with God. Most philosophers see Soul or Reason 
as separate from and superior to the body, governing its impulses and aversions. The soul is often 
understood as pre-existent, of divine essence and capable of comprehending the divine and doing 
the good. Evil also originates in the soul. Humans have the capacity to live in accordance with 
Nature and to unite with the divine. At death, the soul is set free from the body and may become 
a daemon. The Stoics exhort followers to live in accordance with Nature and exercise right 
judgments about the gods, obeying their inner daemon in order to be pure and to avoid wrong 
sense impressions. The Middle Platonists speak more in terms of imitating God’s character and 
ways through contemplation of the divine and by choosing the good and avoiding the passions. 
 Chapter Three was devoted purely to the writings of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BCE – 
50 CE). Although Philo is Jewish, his Judaism is mediated through Hellenistic philosophy; he 
provides our largest first century corpus for Middle Platonic thought and there are copious 
references to metaphorical priest, temple and sacrifice language in his writings. Although Philo, 
as a good Jew, affirms literal sacrifices, the offerer must have a pure and noble mind and reason. 
Yet, he also affirms, with the philosophers that a sacrifice can be spiritual, and like them, 
emphasizes the offering of the mind and soul. Purity and virtue in thought, speech and word can 
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also be sacrifices. Philo depicts Reason as a priest (rather like the role of the daemon in Stoic or 
Platonic thought) who acts as internal guide, judge and arbiter of the conscience. The garments 
of the priest can represent purity of soul, the virtues or the cosmos, and the universe can be 
compared to a priest (as can the universe, angels, the nation of Israel and a household).   
 Philo also speaks of both of the mind/soul and of the universe as the dwelling place of 
God, in agreement with other philosophers. He too speaks of God filling all things and Wisdom 
dwelling as in a temple. The world, virtue, purity, truth and wisdom are described using 
tabernacle language. There is a solitary reference to a person in their embodiment as a temple, 
but this may be restricted to Adam, rather than any individual. 
 In Chapter Four, I compared 1 Cor 3:16–17 and 6:19 with my findings from Hellenistic 
philosophy. Whereas philosophers speak of the divine presence filling individuals, in 1 Cor 
3:16–17, Paul’s understanding of the temple is corporate. The Corinthians as a group are the 
temple. Philosophy speaks of the divine presence inhabiting all individuals or particularly the 
good or wise. However, the Corinthians are the temple by virtue of the Spirit who dwells within 
them. This Spirit is not given to all, nor to the wise or noble per se, but only to those who belong 
to Christ; who are set apart and called as holy people (1:2). Christ is the foundation of this 
building (3:9). The temple is sacred and has very strict boundaries, such that defilement of the 
temple brings destruction (3:17). This warning of destruction upon any who threaten the sanctity 
of the community contrasts with the Stoic stress on the world’s final destruction or Middle 
Platonism’s teaching on the destruction of the body. Paul’s use of metaphorical temple language 
in 1 Cor 6:19 has a distinctive emphasis on the physical body, whereas the philosophers, whether 
Stoic or Platonic, speak of the body with indifference or even disdain. As in the previous 
passage, the emphasis is still corporate, despite the reference to the bodies of individuals, as Paul 
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makes explicit with his use of the second person possessive pronoun. In the philosophers, the 
πνεῦμα or spiritus inhabits the whole universe and thus every individual. In Paul, the Spirit 
inhabits those who have been set apart and cleansed through Jesus. Philosophy emphasizes the 
obligation to glorify God but in 6:19 the injunction is specifically to glorify God “in your body”, 
an unthinkable notion for the Platonic worldview. The Corinthian temple is a group defined by 
specific boundaries and relationship to Jesus Christ and is viewed with reference to their 
corporeal obedience to God. I noted that some of these themes were also emphasized in the 
wider epistle: holiness in the body, the importance of not defiling the temple (especially through 
idolatry) and the use of body language to describe believers as well as to speak of their final 
destiny in terms of the physical resurrection body. 
 Paul’s metaphorical temple language would have challenged any of the Corinthian 
readers still influenced by the prevailing Hellenistic philosophical worldview. Philosophy spoke 
of the divine or the gods filling the universe and, with it, every individual, or certain individual 
souls, and cleansing coming by reason, wisdom or virtue. Paul, however, makes a clear 
distinction between the true God revealed in Jesus Christ and experienced by the indwelling 
Spirit and other gods who are merely idols. The corporate nature of the temple as God’s people is 
always emphasized in the Corinthian metaphorical temple language, and the Spirit dwells only in 
those who belong to Jesus Christ, although there are no divisions on the basis of hierarchy, race 
or gender when it comes to inclusion in this temple. In sharp contrast to the disparagement of the 
physical body seen in philosophy, Paul emphasizes that the physical body is included as the 
place where God dwells. 
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6.2 Avenues for further study 
 There are a number of potential areas that could be further explored using the data from 
Hellenistic philosophy that I cited earlier. Although recent articles have explored language and 
imagery that evokes notions of sacrifice1 or Paul’s priestly language in Romans,2 my research 
could be applied to other letters to see how Paul’s use of metaphorical temple language there 
compare to my insights from philosophy. In Romans, Paul speaks of his vocation using two 
priestly words: his call to be a λειτουργός in priestly service (ἱερουργέω) to make an offering 
(προσφορά) of the Gentiles (15:16) as well as urging his readers to offer their bodies as θυσίαν 
ζῶσαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ (12:1). In Phil 2:17, Paul paints a picture of himself as a drink 
offering, using the verb σπένδω in relation to the sacrifice (θυσία) and (cultic) service 
(λειτουργία) of the Philippians’ faith and towards the end of the same letter, in Phil 4:18, Paul 
calls their gift a fragrant offering, using the same language as 2 Cor 2:14–16 (ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας), as 
well as an acceptable sacrifice (θυσίαν δεκτήν). Both congregations were majority Gentile, one 
in Rome and the other a Roman colony (Philippi), so exploring the use of these phrases in their 
context in the letter and in Roman society and philosophy would be a fruitful exercise. The same 
verb, meaning to be poured out as a libation (σπένδω), also appears in 2 Tim 4:6 and could be 
explored in its context. Ephesians contains a striking parallel to my study in 1–2 Corinthians, 
with its reference to the people of God growing into “a holy temple in the Lord” (Eph 2:21) with 
Christ as the center (2:21a) and cornerstone/capstone (2:20), and in whom (2:22a) they are being 
built into a dwelling place (κατοικητήριον) for God in the Spirit. Given what we know of the 
                                                
 1 J. Ayodeji Adewuya, “The Sacrificial-Missiological Function of Paul’s Sufferings in the Context of 2 
Corinthians,” in Paul as Missionary: Identity, Activity, Theology, and Practice (ed. Trevor J. Burke and Brian S. 
Rosner; LNTS 420; London: T&T Clark, 2011), 88–98.  
 2 Richard J. Gibson, “Paul the Missionary, in Priestly Service of the Servant-Christ (Romans 15.16),” in 
Paul as Missionary: Identity, Activity, Theology, and Practice (ed. Trevor J. Burke and Brian S. Rosner; LNTS 420; 
London: T&T Clark, 2011), 51–62.  
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religious and philosophical climate in Ephesus (including from Acts 18–19), it would be 
instructive to examine Eph 2:18–22 both in reference to that environment and the wider themes 
of the letter relating to cosmic unity (1:10; 2:2:11–22; 3:4–6; 4:6), heavenly and earthly rulers 
and powers (1:20–22; 2:2; 3:10; 6:10–20) and union with Christ (1:3; 2:1–7; 3:14–21; 4:13; 
5:31–32). In the light of these studies, a further study might then be made, comparing the 
language of spiritual sacrifice and temple in the undisputed Paulines (Romans, 1–2 Corinthians, 
Philippians) with the references found in the disputed Paulines (perhaps including 1 Tim 3:15, if 
this is a spiritual temple reference). 
 Beyond the study of metaphorical temple language applied to Christians, while 
monographs have been written on Jesus as temple in the Gospels,3 or as a sacrifice in the 
epistles,4 a comparison with the metaphorical temple language in Hellenistic philosophy would 
illuminate the possible reception of these metaphors among Gentile Christians and others 
influenced by Hellenism. Similarly, the understanding of Jesus as both Priest and sacrifice and 
the use of heavenly tabernacle language in Hebrews5 could be compared with the relevant 
material.  
                                                
 3 E.g. Mary L. Coloe, God Dwells with Us: Temple Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel (Collegeville, Minn.: 
Liturgical Press, 2001); Nicholas Perrin, Jesus the Temple (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010). 
 4 E.g. Stephen Finlan, The Background and Content of Paul’s Cultic Atonement Metaphors (SBLAcBib 19; 
Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004); Jane Lancaster Patterson, Keeping the Feast: Metaphors of Sacrifice 
in 1 Corinthians and Philippians (ECL 16; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2015).  
 5 See e.g. Kiwoong Son, Zion Symbolism in Hebrews: Hebrews 12:18–24 as a Hermeneutical Key to the 
Epistle (Waynesboro, Ga.: Paternoster, 2005).  
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